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SUMMARY
The two research questions of this thesis are: ‘What is the aesthetic?’ and ‘What 
is the relationship of the aesthetic to art?’ These questions launch an argument that 
seeks to challenge and reverse some recent ‘deflationary’ accounts of the aesthetic.
The research uses the foundational aesthetics of Hume, Baumgarten and Kant to 
counter the arguments of deflationary aesthetics, then, drawing upon evolutionary 
theory and cognitive neuroscience, it highlights the power of the aesthetic in both nature 
and art.
The ‘deflationist’ George Dickie called the aesthetic attitude a ‘myth’ and 
dismissed the concept o f ‘disinterestedness’. Gombrich doubted whether shared 
aesthetic values are possible, while Danto initially argued that aesthetic properties are 
merely imputed to artworks through context. For Carroll, historical precedence 
determines the identity of art, with the aesthetic reduced to a contingency.
However, Hume and Kant testified to the realism of both disinterestedness and 
the aesthetic attitude, while Baumgarten proposed a new science of aesthetics to 
underscore the centrality of the senses to epistemology, rhetoric and art, notably through 
his postulated ‘imaged concepts’, the apparent source for Kant’s ‘aesthetic ideas’.
Danto’s final acknowledgment of the artistic role of enthymeme and metaphor signalled 
his acceptance of art’s essentially aesthetic character.
Evidence from Darwin confirms that the aesthetic is a shaping force in 
evolution, rather than a construct of human culture, and much congruence is revealed 
between the aesthetics of Baumgarten and Kant, and recent cognitive neuroscience. It is 
argued that philosophical aesthetics needs to integrate the findings of science into its 
metaphysics. Accordingly, this thesis offers some new definitions of the aesthetic 
attitude, rhetoric and art, principally influenced by Baumgarten and biology. The 
arguments are further evaluated through three case studies: ‘bowerbird art’, the ‘nexus 
of art, power and crime’, and ‘sound sculpture’.
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ABSTRACT:
This chapter sets out the research questions of this thesis: ‘What is the 
aesthetic?’ and ‘What is the relationship of the aesthetic to art?’ Both questions 
were provoked by ‘deflationary’ accounts of the aesthetic that were written in 
reaction to mid-twentieth century formalism. Deflationary aesthetics had tapped 
into ancient anxieties about the epistemological reliability of the senses, while 
signalling a renewed interest in the social and historical aspects of art. This first 
chapter introduces the central issues of this thesis and outlines the arguments to 
be presented in opposition to deflationary aesthetics, analysing its claims and 
testing them against a) foundational texts in aesthetics from the eighteenth 
century and b) recent empirical evidence from evolution and cognitive 
neuroscience. This chapter also outlines three case studies: ‘bowerbird art’, ‘the 
nexus of art, power and crime’ and ‘sound sculpture’.
1.1 Background to this Project
This thesis grew from puzzlement about contemporary arts practices and from 
dissatisfaction with sceptical and deflationary accounts of the aesthetic. How can the 
‘deflationary’ Institutional Theory, which emphasises the social and conventional 
dimensions of art at the expense of the aesthetic, be squared with the ‘aesthetic’ aspects 
of art championed by formalism and paramount to many art lovers and practitioners? 
This clash over the status of the aesthetic leads to three lines of enquiry. The first 
analyses the arguments advanced against the aesthetic by the deflationists. The second 
investigates exactly what was meant by the term ‘aesthetic’ in some of the foundational 
texts of modem aesthetics written by Baumgarten and Kant. The third looks for 
empirical evidence for the aesthetic in the recently expanding fields of evolutionary 
theory and cognitive neuroscience. Finally, these arguments are tested against three case 
studies: ‘bowerbird art’, ‘the nexus of art, power and crime’ and ‘sound sculpture’.
1.2 The Construction of this Chapter
This chapter will introduce the central issues of the thesis. Then the chapter 
structure of the thesis is outlined, followed by a more detailed chapter-by-chapter 
breakdown of the forthcoming argument. There then follows a summary of the claims 
made and conclusions reached by the thesis as a whole.
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1.3 The Central Issues of this Thesis
1.3.1 Outline of the Central Issues
The central issues of this research are a) the two research questions (RQs) and b) 
scepticism towards the aesthetic, symptomatic of a deflationary account of the aesthetic 
which will be challenged in this thesis. The research questions are:
RQ1 What is the aesthetic?
RQ2 What is the relationship of the aesthetic to art?
Both questions concern the status of the aesthetic in nature, ordinary life, and 
art. This thesis argues that the arts constitute a subdivision within the category of the 
aesthetic. If accepted, this argument would make the aesthetic necessary to art, thus 
challenging any ‘deflationary’ account that sees the aesthetic as contingent to art. This 
thesis, therefore, sets out to refute the following claim by the deflationist Noel Carroll, 
who argues that, in principle, aesthetics and the philosophy of art are separate domains:
Aesthetics is broader than the philosophy of art, since it studies nature as well. 
And a philosophy of art might define “art” without reference to aesthetic 
experience or audience reception. Such a philosophy of art would not regard 
aesthetic experiences or aesthetic properties as necessary ingredients in all art 
(although it might recognise them as important)1.
Carroll’s deflationary position is represented in Fig. la, below left. The position 
defended in this thesis is represented in Fig. lb, below right.
b)
1 the ‘aesthetic’
2 ‘aesthetic’ art
3 ‘non-aesthetic’ art
a)
Fig. 1. The aesthetic in art: a) contingent, b) necessary
Today, the deflationary stance colours the studio talk and seminar speak of Art 
Colleges, where one might overhear such ‘sceptical hypotheses’ (SHs) as these:
1 Noel Carroll (1999) Philosophy o f  Art: a Contemporary Introduction, London, Routledge, p. 159.
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SHI “Dickie has proved that the ‘aesthetic attitude’ is a ‘myth’.”
SH2 “It’s putting it in an art gallery that makes it art.”
SH3 “The word ‘aesthetic’ connotes passive receptivity.”
SH4 “Duchamp proved that the aesthetic is merely optional in art.”
SH5 “The historical aspect of art ‘trumps’ the aesthetic.”
SH6 “The term ‘aesthetic’ by definition excludes the cognitive, historical, or
moral.”
SH7 “The source of the aesthetic lies in art rather than in nature” (paraphrase 
of Hegel).
Challenging such opinions will involve enquiring into the nature of the aesthetic 
itself, taking arguments from two main sources: a) eighteenth century arguments 
foundational to modem philosophical aesthetics and b) empirical evidence. The 
eighteenth century sources will include Baumgarten, who not only provided the 
headline title of this research project, ‘Imaged Concepts’, but who also coined the term 
‘aesthetic’ in its modem sense. The empirical evidence is of four kinds: a) from my 
experience of the teaching of drawing, b) from evolutionary theory, c) from cognitive 
neuroscience and d) from philosophical anthropology.
This investigation into the nature of the aesthetic leads to an attempt to 
formulate some new definitions clustering around the concept of the aesthetic, 
emulating the ‘axiomatic’ style of Baumgarten, that had itself been modelled on the 
argumentative style of Euclid and Spinoza . These new definitions of the aesthetic will 
be introduced in chapter two (section 2.5) and appear as a full sequence in Appendix A.
The evolutionary theory and cognitive neuroscience deployed in this thesis both 
entail an acceptance of Daniel Dennett’s argument that philosophy needs to take greater 
account of evolutionary theory , and an acceptance, with a few modifications, of the 
modularity of mind often associated with the work of Jerry Fodor4 (See section 2.4.1).
2 Baumgarten’s adaptation o f the axiomatic style is explained in the ‘Introduction’ to Alexander Gottlieb
Baumgarten (1735; 1954 edn.) Reflections on Poetry, with an Introduction, Notes, and 
Translation into English by Karl Aschenbrenner and William B. Holther, Berkely and Los 
Angeles, University o f California Press, pp. 10-16.
3 Daniel C. Dennett (1995) Darwin's Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meaning o f  Life, London,
Penguin.
4 Jerry A. Fodor (1983) Modularity o f  Mind: an Essay on Faculty Psychology, Cambridge, Mass., MIT
Press.
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Against the non-realist approach of sceptics towards the aesthetic, this thesis 
adopts a realist ontology of art adapted from the writings of Gregory Currie5 and John 
Searle6 (See section 3.6) but also influenced by Arthur C. Danto7and Joseph Margolis8 
(See section 3.5.2).
1.3.2 Initial discussion of the Central Issues
The phrase, ‘imaged concepts9’ is taken from Baumgarten’s first publication, his 
Reflections on Poetry, where he also coined the term ‘aesthetic’, defined as ‘the science 
of perception10’. This new discipline was intended by Baumgarten to include both the 
scientific study of sensory knowledge and the artistic use of images. Athough the 
Greeks had used the word aia0T|xa to denote knowledge acquired through the senses 
rather than reason, they had not attempted to systematise the aesthetic into a science, as 
Baumgarten now proposed to do. Through his new science, aesthetics, knowledge 
acquired through the senses, could be systematised in a way analogous to the role of 
logic in regulating reason. As he wrote in the Reflections on Poetry:
If logic by its very definition should be restricted to the rather narrow limits to 
which it is as a matter of fact confined, would it not count as the science of 
knowing things philosophically, that is, as the science for the direction of the 
higher cognitive faculty in apprehending the truth? Well, then. Philosophers 
might still find occasion, not without ample reward, to enquire also into those 
devices by which they might improve the lower faculties of knowing, and 
sharpen them, and apply them more happily for the benefit of the whole world. 
Since psychology affords sound principles, we have no doubt that there could be 
available a science which might direct the lower cognitive faculty in knowing 
things sensately.11 (Aschenbrenner and Holter’s translation)
5 Gregory Currie (1989) An Ontology o f  Art, Basingstoke, Macmillan.
6 John R. Searle (1979) Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory o f  Speech Acts, Cambridge, CUP.
7 Arthur C. Danto (1981) The Transfiguration o f  the Commonplace: A Philosophy o f  Art, Cambridge 
Mass., Harvard University Press.
8 Joseph Margolis (2001) Selves and Other Texts: The Case fo r Cultural Realism, University Park Pa.,
Pennsylvania State University Press.
9 Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten Op. Cit. §29, scholium, p. 49. This is Aschenbrenner and Holter’s
translation o f the Latin, ‘notio phantasmatum ’, which prefigures Kant’s concept o f the ‘aesthetic 
idea’.
10 Ibid. §116, p. 78. The lull context o f this definition o f aesthetics as translated by Aschenbrenner and
Holter is as follows: ‘Therefore, things known are to be known by the superior faculty as the 
object o f logic; things perceived  [are to be known by the inferior faculty, as the object] o f the 
science o f perception, or AESTHETIC’; in the facsimile, p. 39, this sentence reads: Sunt ergo 
uoTyra cognoscenda facultate superiore obiectum logices, aiaGqia £7ii<;Tr|fir|<; aia6r|TiKT|<; sive 
A e s t h e t ic a e ’. 
u Ibid. §115, pp. 77-8.
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In the very next paragraph, Baumgarten gives his famous definition of the new
1 7 • •science of aesthetics, which omits any mention of beauty . That had to wait for his
11second definition of aesthetics, four years later .
Not only a philosopher, but also a classicist and poet, Baumgarten was interested 
mostly in poetic imagery, though it is clear he intended his new discipline to have 
scientific applications14 and to embrace all the arts15. The term ‘imaged concepts' 
encapsulates the cognitive emphasis within Baumgarten’s aesthetics, and his phrase 
‘imaged concepts’ has been identified as the source of Kant’s ‘aesthetic idea’16.
Baumgarten’s understanding of the term ‘aesthetic’ was very different from the
1 7much narrower use of the term by the formalists who were targeted for attack by 
deflationists. In their attack on formalism, the deflationists often avoided the term
1 o
‘aesthetic’, as for them it seemed to connote formalist assumptions . The deflationist 
critique goes further, at one point arguing that the formalist model of the ‘aesthetic’ is 
the ‘traditional' meaning of that term, necessarily excluding from its meaning both 
interpretation and awareness of the historical interconnections of a work19. Such an 
interpretation has the effect of collapsing the ‘aesthetic’, without remainder, on to
12 See footnote 10, above.
13 ‘AESTHETICS is the science o f sensorily knowing and proposing (the logical faculty o f lower
cognition, the philosophy o f the graces and the muses, lower epistemology, the art o f thinking 
beautifully, art as an analogy to reason);’ my translation o f §533 of the Metaphysica from 
Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1983 edn), Texte zur Grundlegung der Asthetik, extracts from 
the Metaphysica and other texts, published with Introduction, Translation into German, and 
Notes by Hans Rudolf Schweizer, Hamburg, Felix Meiner Verlag, p. 16. See my translation of 
§§501-623 o f the Metaphysica from the Latin in Appendix D.
14 As expressed at the end o f his second philosophical letter, written under the pseudonym Aletheophilus
in 1741, reprinted by Hans Rudolf Schweizer in Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1983 edn) Op. 
Cit. (pp. 67-72) p. 72.
15 Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten Op. Cit. (1735; 1954 edn.) §41, pp. 52-3 mentions pictures. §533 from
the Metaphysica, quoted in footnote 13, above, is even more explicit.
16 Paul Guyer (2005) Values o f  Beauty: Historical Essays in Aesthetics, Cambridge, CUP, p. 29. Kant’s
‘aesthetic idea’, defined in Immanuel Kant, (1790; 1987 edn.) Critique o f  Judgment, translated 
and edited by W.S. Pluhar Indianapolis, Hackett, §48, Ak 312-3, pp. 180-1.
17 Clive Bell is usually identified as the paradigmatic formalist, as in his (1914; 1949 edn.) Art, London,
Chatto and Windus. Bell places all the value in visual artworks upon their formal or ‘plastic’ 
qualities, rather than their literary or sentimental content.
18 Noel Carroll (2002) “Aesthetic Experience Revisited” BJA (Vol. 42, no. 2) pp. 145-168.
19 This corresponds to sceptical hypothesis SH7, above:’ The term “aesthetic” by definition excludes the
cognitive, historical, or moral’. See Noel Carroll (1986) “Art and Interaction” JAAC, Vol. 45, 
no. 1, pp. 57-68, reprinted N. Carroll (2001a) Beyond Aesthetics: Philosophical Essays, 
Cambridge, CUP (pp. 5-20), pp. 15-6. Carroll has rowed back from his 1986 position, now 
allowing that, ‘ . . .  quality detection will usually be ineliminable in interpreting the thematic 
viewpoints o f artworks’, in Noel Carroll (2001b) ‘Four Concepts o f the Aesthetic’ in Noel 
Carroll Op. Cit. (2001a) (pp. 41-62) p. 61. This appears to be the first publication o f this essay, 
in a book which is otherwise a collection o f reprints.
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formalism. This was Carroll’s sceptical stance towards the aesthetic, and he dubbed it 
the ‘deflationary’ account20.
This thesis seeks to redress this line of deflationary argument, and also considers
21other forms of aesthetic scepticism, such as expressed by A. J. Ayer and Ernst 
Gombrich22. The central question of this thesis, therefore, concerns the aesthetic. What 
is it? Where does it come from? What is the true extent of its role in art? These 
questions have already been formulated, above, as Research Questions ‘RQ1’ and 
‘RQ2’ (‘What is the aesthetic?’ and ‘What is the relationship of the aesthetic to art?’)
In the spirit of Baumgarten, the arguments employed to provide answers will be 
drawn from both the arts and the sciences. For Baumgarten, aesthetics was about ways 
of knowing by means of the senses, as opposed to knowledge defined by logical 
reasoning. Bivalent logic, as a system of thought, is unable to analyse either physical 
images or poetic imagery24. Baumgarten draws attention to the fact that examples, often 
employing metaphor, harness the resources of the senses to the understanding of 
abstract concepts25. It is important to acknowledge the revolutionary nature, for a 
rationalist, of Baumgarten’s assertion of the epistemological value of the senses. His 
position resisted two millennia of doubts about the reliability of the senses.
However, in addition to the ancient epistemological doubts about the sensory, 
aesthetics has for two centuries been divided by two other distinctions. The first lies 
between those who give differing values to the synchronic or diachronic aspects of art. 
Those who favour the synchronic approach tend to emphasise the formal qualities of 
artworks, and those who favour a diachronic approach tend to emphasise the historical
• Oftdimension of art. Adapting from Kai Hammermeister , I call this the ‘Sychronic versus 
Diachronic dialectic’:
SvDl: an a-historical, aestheticising, synchronic account of art, versus
20 Noel Carroll Op. Cit. (2001b) pp. 58-62.
21 A.J. Ayer (1936) Language, Truth and Logic (2nd Edition, 1946), London, Victor Gollanz, p. 113.
22 Gombrich is famous for saying, ‘There really is no such thing as Art. There are only artists’, in (1963)
The Story o f  Art, London, Phaidon, p. 5. Sheldon Richmond explains how this extends to a 
general scepticism about the aesthetic, in his (1994) Aesthetic Criteria: Gombrich and the 
Philosophies o f  Science o f  Popper and Polanyi, Amsterdam, Rodopi, to be discussed in Chapter 
Three, section 3.5.1, below.
23 Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten Op. Cit. (1735; 1954 edn.) §14, p. 42, and §116, p. 78.
24 Metaphors were described as ‘non-proper’ terms: metaphorici termini improprii in Alexander Gottlieb
Baumgarten Op. Cit. (1735; 1954 edn.) §83, facsimile, p. 30.
25 Ibid  §21 and its scholium pp. 45-6.
26 The history o f these divisions has been recounted by Kai Hammermeister in his 2002 book, The
German Aesthetic Tradition, Cambridge, CUP.
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SvD2: an historicising, anti-aesthetic, diachronic account of art.
These two differing emphases align roughly with a second distinction, between 
those who emphasise individual versus social modes of engagement with art. These 
two divisions also align roughly with the split between ‘aesthetic’ and ‘deflationary’ 
accounts of art. Contemporary ‘deflationists’ can be seen as voicing a rejection of the 
dominant formalism of the early and mid-twentieth century model of aesthetics (SvDl) 
advocated by Clive Bell27, Monroe Beardsley28 and Jerome Stolnitz29.
This thesis will argue that the leaders of the deflationary critique, George 
Dickie , Arthur C. Danto and now Noel Carroll , assumed that formalism, which 
they identified with the term ‘aesthetic’, entails synchronicity at the expense of 
diachronicity. Unfortunately, they either ignored or were ignorant of the existence of an 
equally long-standing diachronic tradition within aesthetics itself . It will be argued in 
this thesis that this oversight has led deflationists to over-state the degree to which the 
formalist use of the term ‘aesthetic’ was paradigmatic or ‘traditional’ within the 
discipline of philosophical aesthetics as a whole; hence the present need to re-examine 
foundational eighteenth century texts. As Noel Carroll has admitted34, Dickie had 
argued strategically in attempting the ‘demolition of the aesthetic’, in order to turn the 
attention of fellow philosophers of art away from the aesthetic as narrowly conceived 
by formalists, and towards institutional factors, which appeared to Dickie to be more 
central to the philosophy of art.
This thesis seeks to preserve the insights which undoubtedly accrued from the 
efforts of Dickie and the other deflationists in drawing attention to the nature of the
27 Clive Bell Op. Cit. (1914; 1949 edn.).
28 Monroe C. Beardsley (1983) “An Aesthetic Definition o f Art”, in Hugh Curher (Ed.) What is Art? New
York, Haven Publications, reprinted in Peter Lamarque and Stein Haugom Olsen (Eds.) (2004) 
Aesthetics and the Philosophy o f  Art: the Analytic Tradition, Oxford, Blackwell, pp. 55-62.
29 Jerome Stolnitz (1960) Aesthetics and the Philosophy o f  Art: a critical introduction, Boston MA,
Houghton Mifflin.
30 George Dickie (1964) “The Myth o f the Aesthetic Attitude”, The American Philosophical Quarterly,
Vol. 1, pp. 56-65.
31 Arthur C. Danto (1964) "The Artworld" Journal o f  Philosophy, Vol. 61, pp. 571-84, reprinted in A.
Neill and A. Ridley (Eds) (1995) The Philosophy o f  Art: Readings Ancient and Modern, Boston 
Massachusetts, McGraw Hill, pp. 202-11.
32 Noel Carroll Op. Cit. (2001a).
33 Paul Guyer criticises the selectivity o f Dickie and Carroll’s accounts o f the character and history o f the
‘aesthetic’ within the philosophy o f art in his (2003) ‘History of Modem Aesthetics’ in Jerrold 
Levinson (Ed.) (2003) The Oxford Handbook o f  Aesthetics, Oxford, OUP (pp. 25-60) pp. 29-31.
34 Noel Carroll wrote: ‘I have always thought that Dickie’s classic article “The Myth o f the Aesthetic
Attitude” can best be read as a demolition o f the notion o f “the aesthetic” for the purpose, 
ultimately, o f undermining aesthetic theories o f art -  thereby paving the way for his own 
Institutional Theory o f Art’, in his Op. Cit. (2001a) ‘Introduction’, p. 2.
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‘extrinsic’ properties of artworks, so often ignored or denied by formalists who 
concentrated almost exclusively on the plastic or ‘intrinsic’ formal elements of 
artworks, as if their properties could be seen as equivalent to the properties of physical 
objects. However, this thesis also wishes to restore the status, realism and vitality of the 
aesthetic values that have been disparaged by some of the arguments advanced by 
deflationary aesthetics.
1.3.3. Introduction to the Case Studies
In order to help evaluate the account of art offered by this thesis, three case 
studies will examine some problems that are largely ignored by philosophical aesthetics, 
but which seem to have the potential to offer significant insights into the nature of art 
and the aesthetic. These three case studies are 1) the status of bowerbird art, 2) the 
nexus of art, power and crime and 3) the puzzle of ‘sound sculpture’. The first case 
study (See section 8.5.1, below), addresses the possibility that non-human species might 
also make art, of which the paradigm case is often taken to be the bowerbird, a cluster 
of 18 species in Australia and New Guinea, which Geoffrey Miller describes as, ‘The 
only other animals [apart from humans] that spend significant time and energy 
constructing purely aesthetic displays beyond their own bodies’35. This issue is 
expressed simply as question BB:
BB Is the bowerbird’s bower art ?
The second case study, the ‘nexus of art, power and crime’ (See section 8.5.2, 
below) applies mostly, but not exclusively, to the visual arts: the alignment at many 
periods of history of the visual arts with centres of power. It is expressed as the question 
APC:
APC What is the reason for the nexus between Art, Power and Crime?
The third case study (See section 8.5.3, below) concerns ‘sound sculpture’. This 
case study was triggered by a series of encounters with works of ‘sound art’, usually 
described as ‘sculpture’, in galleries dedicated to the visual arts. The enquiry began by 
asking why it is meaningful to consider these works to be ‘sculpture’, rather than
35 Geoffrey Miller (2000) The Mating Mind, Edition used (2001), London, Vintage, p. 267.
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‘music’ or ‘drama’, and ends by offering an explanation, and confirming the capacity of 
this new medium to deliver great works of art.
1.4 The Structure of this Thesis
Apart from the introductory and concluding chapters, this thesis comprises three 
pairs of chapters. The first pair examines scepticism towards the aesthetic, including the 
deflationary accounts of Dickie, Danto and Carroll. The second pair examines the 
eighteenth century aesthetics of Baumgarten and Kant, and asks what they might teach 
us about the sceptical questions raised. The third pair of chapters examines the 
empirical evidence for the aesthetic from evolutionary theory and cognitive 
neuroscience. The final chapter reviews and summarises all the arguments presented 
and applies them to the project’s three case studies: the art of the bowerbird (8.5.1), the 
nexus of art, power and crime (8.5.2) and sound sculpture (8.5.3).
i / :
1.5 Chanter-bv-chapter Outline of the Argument
Chapter two presents a close reading of George Dickie’s famous paper, ‘The 
Myth of the Aesthetic Attitude’, an early deflationary account, in which Dickie 
provocatively encourages sceptics of the aesthetic to ask whether the ‘aesthetic 
dimension’ is necessary to a work of art. He argues that the ‘aesthetic attitude’ is not 
only a myth, but a damaging myth, because of the ways it ‘misleads’ criticism and the 
philosophy of art. Dickie aimed to undermine the aesthetic attitude by attacking its 
supposed paradigmatic characteristic: disinterestedness. He argued first that there is no 
special state of mind involved in the ‘detachment’ of the aesthetic attitude; there is only 
paying ‘close attention’. Then he criticised advocates of the aesthetic attitude, 
represented by Jerome Stolnitz, for setting three misleading limitations on the aesthetic 
attitude: a) restricting what is relevant in the aesthetics of an artwork, while claiming b) 
that the aesthetic attitude is incompatible with criticism and c) that the aesthetic attitude 
is incompatible with making moral judgments. An argument is then mounted against 
Dickie’s position. First, Fodor’s arguments for the modularity of mind will be sketched 
out, in opposition to Dickie’s view that states of mind are limited to paying attention or
36 The following chapter summaries will not be footnoted, because references are provided in the main
text.
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failing to pay attention. Dickie’s denial of the aesthetic attitude will be further tested, 
first against empirical evidence from the teaching of drawing and second against some 
findings in cognitive neuroscience. Then his accounts of the aesthetic attitude and 
disinterestedness, based entirely on Stolnitz, are compared to Hume’s eighteenth 
century account of aesthetic experience. I conclude that Dickie’s reasoning is at points 
incoherent, and despite his success in rebutting Stolnitz on some significant points of 
detail, his arguments against the aesthetic attitude and disinterestedness both fail. At the 
end of the chapter, I offer my own definition of the aesthetic and of the aesthetic 
attitude.
Chapter three continues the scrutiny of deflationary aesthetics, extending to 
other forms of scepticism towards the aesthetic. A number of questions are collated, to 
be checked, in chapters four and five, against some of the foundational ideas of 
aesthetics in the work of Baumgarten and Kant, and in chapters six and seven, against 
empirical evidence from the biological sciences. One of the key ‘deflationary’ ideas to 
be questioned is Stephen Davies’ distinction between the ‘functional’ (aesthetic) and
'xn‘procedural’ (historical/institutional) properties of works of art . Although, historically, 
there may have been good reasons for this deflationary move, it will be argued that the 
deflationists are responsible for steering too sharply away from formalism, thereby 
undervaluing the aesthetic in art38. This thesis attempts to correct the direction of the 
debate, without losing the undoubted insights contributed by the deflationists. At the 
end of this chapter, I offer an argument in favour of an ontology of art, developed from 
Gregory Currie and John Searle, which places the aesthetic at its centre.
In chapter four, the quest continues for an understanding of the central place 
once accorded to the aesthetic in the philosophy of art. The quest comes to the door of 
Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, who most notably among Enlightenment philosophers 
followed Epicurus in valuing the senses for revealing to us both knowledge and beauty. 
Philosophers since Socrates have more usually distrusted the senses, both for moral 
reasons and for their supposed epistemological unreliability. Two texts by Baumgarten 
are studied, one of which has been translated into English from Latin for the first time. 
These texts claim for the senses a central role in providing ‘imaged concepts’ to the arts
37 Stephen Davies (1991) Definitions o f  Art, Ithica, Cornell University Press. He draws this distinction in
Chapter 2 (pp. 23-49, and develops it in Chapters 3 and 4 (pp. 50-114).
38 Noel Carroll Op. Cit. (2001a and b) and Op. Cit. (2002).
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and sciences, sensory images which make abstract concepts more tangible in the 
imagination, most notably in metaphor.
Chapter five consults Immanuel Kant on the nature of the aesthetic, and its 
relationship to the arts. I examine Kant’s accounts of a) aesthetic judgment b) 
disinterestedness and c) the aesthetic idea. Some comparisons are made with 
Baumgarten’s aesthetics. The split between synchronic and diachronic models of the 
aesthetic (SvDl and SvD239) is considered, in order to understand the origins of the 
divide that led to the separation of formalist/aestheticising and deflationary/ 
institutionalising tendencies in analytical philosophy’s accounts of art. It is concluded 
that Kant’s moral misgivings about the senses, his low estimate of their cognitive 
potential and the requirements of his own philosophical system, led to inconsistencies in 
his account, and reinforced a formalist tendency (SvDl) already present in the tradition. 
However, many of his insights, some of them based on Baumgarten’s teachings, are still 
relevant today, including the aesthetic idea and the nature of aesthetic experience, which 
he memorably described as the ‘free play of the imagination and understanding’, an 
expression which, like Baumgarten’s ‘imaged concepts’ unites sensation with cognition.
Chapter six attempts to ground the aesthetic in biology, the discipline where any 
attempt to naturalise aesthetics is likely to focus, in attempting to answer RQ1: ‘What is 
the aesthetic?’ The chapter tries to update Kant’s account of the sensus communis, using 
arguments based on the discoveries of evolutionary biology. Two principal ideas are 
taken from Daniel C. Dennett’s account of the relevance of evolution to philosophy: the 
invocation of a) ‘sky hooks’ or ‘cranes’ as explanations, and b) the existence of only 
one ‘design space’. Following Darwin’s insistence that human capabilities evolved in 
small steps from non-human animals, Dennett questions the feasibility of invoking 
concepts such as ‘altruism’ in human behaviour without giving an account of how these 
qualities might have evolved. Simply to ‘help oneself to such concepts is to invoke 
‘skyhooks’. To give an incremental, evolutionary, explanation is to describe an 
earthbound ‘crane’. I apply this argument to the realm of the aesthetic. Dennett also 
emphasises that animals and humans evolve solutions within a single ‘design space’, 
which implies that there are, in principle, no solutions ‘marked o ff exclusively for 
human activity, and I would add, ‘Not even art’. Various selective pressures for the 
evolution of the aesthetic dimension are considered, including sexual selection.
39 SvDl: an a-historical, aestheticising, synchronic account o f art; SvD2: an historicising, anti-aesthetic,
diachronic account o f art.
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Chapter seven attempts to justify the central position given to the senses in the 
aesthetics of Baumgarten, using arguments drawn from psychology and cognitive 
neuroscience. The biological dimension is reflected in Gombrich’s account of the 
survival need of animals to find, in their surroundings, meaning and order, which he 
interprets as identifying ‘what?’ and ‘where?’ The neuroscientist Zeki explains his 
theory that each visual module contributes a distinctive element to aesthetic pleasure, 
and each also contributes separately to an organism’s understanding, as Zeki relates 
these factors to a viewer’s response to works of visual art. Ramachandran attempts to 
state some ‘laws’ of art, and relates these to an organism’s emotional responses.
Through synaesthesia, he offers a contemporary explanation of the creative imagination 
and metaphor, in a way that seems to vindicate Baumgarten’s emphasis on the senses in 
cognition and in the arts.
Chapter eight then reviews all the preceding arguments and, in order to evaluate 
them, concludes with an examination of the three case studies. The first defends the 
claim that that the courtship activities of both male and female bowerbirds share a 
common ontology with human rhetoric and art, and can therefore be considered for 
classification as either rhetoric or art. How one decides whether bowerbird 
constructions are ‘rhetoric’ or ‘art’, as with many examples of human aesthetic 
production, is a matter of interpretation and therefore open to debate. The second case 
study investigates the nexus of art, power and crime, and the third argues that ‘sound 
sculpture’ may indeed be regarded as ‘sculpture’ rather than music or drama and that 
this new medium has the capacity to produce ‘great art’. It is hoped that the combined 
insights from the three case studies secure for this thesis some fresh insights into the 
nature of art and the claims of the aesthetic.
1.6 Summary and Conclusion
This opening chapter has set out the research questions of this thesis: ‘What is 
the aesthetic?’ and ‘What is the relationship of the aesthetic to art?’
Both questions had been provoked by ‘deflationary’ accounts of the aesthetic 
that were written in reaction to the formalism which had been dominant in mid­
twentieth century aesthetics in the analytical tradition. This chapter has outlined how the 
claims of deflationary arguments against the aesthetic will be challenged in chapters 
two and three, and the way the case for the realism and significance of the aesthetic can 
be supported by arguments advanced in some of the foundational texts of modem
13
philosophical aesthetics written in the eighteenth century, and how these are further 
supported by recent discoveries in evolutionary theory and cognitive neuroscience.
It is concluded that there would be merit in an account that combined an 
eighteenth century perspective on the aesthetic with a twenty-first century 
understanding of evolution and cognitive neuroscience. Such an account would offer a 
more complete explanatory framework for both the arts and the aesthetic than either 
formalism or the Institutional Theory.
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ABSTRACT
This chapter will focus on George Dickie’s influential article questioning the 
aesthetic attitude and its paradigmatic characteristic: disinterestedness. Dickie 
claimed: 1) that the aesthetic attitude is not characterised by a mental state such 
as ‘distancing’- there is only ‘attention’ or ‘inattention’; 2) that the aesthetic 
attitude is not attending in a special way (disinterestedly) - there is only 
attending more or less closely. The main target of Dickie’s paper is Stolnitz’s 
formalistic account o f ‘disinterestedness’, which entails a) limiting the aesthetic 
relevance of the extrinsic properties of artworks b) the incompatibility of 
appreciation and criticism, and c) the irrelevance of moral questions to the 
aesthetic attitude. Dickie’s arguments are tested in three ways: a) for self- 
consistency b) by comparison with an eighteenth century account of aesthetic 
response and disinterestedness and c) by considering empirical evidence from 
the teaching of drawing and from cognitive neuroscience. The conclusion is that 
although Dickie succeeds in defending the place of moral and critical judgments 
in our response to art, he fails to disprove the existence of either the aesthetic 
attitude or disinterestedness. New definitions of the aesthetic and the aesthetic 
attitude are presented.
2.1 Introduction
2.1.1 The Place of this Chapter in the Argument
This is the first of two chapters to examine the claims and arguments advanced 
in ‘deflationary’ and sceptical accounts of the aesthetic, which are being scrutinised in 
pursuit of this project’s Research Questions (RQ):
RQ1 What is the aesthetic?
RQ2 What is the relationship of the aesthetic to art?
In this chapter, Dickie’s claims in ‘The Myth of the Aesthetic Attitude1’ will be 
tested against a) their self-consistency, b) a text in eighteenth century aesthetics and c) 
some empirical evidence. New definitions of the aesthetic and the aesthetic attitude are 
offered in opposition to Dickie.
In chapter three, some further deflationary arguments by Danto, Dickie, 
Levinson, Carroll and others will be challenged, including Stephen Davies’ distinction
1 George Dickie (1964) ‘The Myth o f the Aesthetic Attitude’, The American Philosophical Quarterly, 
Vol. l,pp . 56-65.
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between ‘functional’ and ‘procedural’ definitions of art. Chapters four and five compare 
deflationary accounts with the claims of Baumgarten and Kant. Two more chapters 
enlarge upon the present chapter’s examination of empirical evidence: chapter six looks 
into evolutionary theory and chapter seven looks further into the findings of cognitive 
neuroscience. The final chapter reviews and summarises all the arguments presented 
and applies them to the project’s three case studies: the art of the bowerbird (section 
8.5.1), the nexus of art, power and crime (section 8.5.2) and the problem of sound 
sculpture (section 8.5.3).
2.1.2 The Structure of ‘The Myth of the Aesthetic Attitude’
Dickie opens his paper with a witty paragraph attacking the aesthetic attitude as 
a ‘myth’ and as an ‘encrusted article of faith’:
Some recent articles have suggested the unsatisfactoriness of the notion of the 
aesthetic attitude and it is now time for a fresh look at that encrusted article of 
faith. This conception has been valuable to aesthetics and criticism in helping 
wean them from a sole concern with beauty and related notions. However, I 
shall argue that the aesthetic attitude is a myth and while, as G. Ryle has said, 
“Myths often do a lot of theoretical good while they are still new,” this particular 
one is no longer useful and in fact misleads aesthetic theory.2
His preamble then sets out the results of his review o f ‘attitude theorists’, couched very 
much in the idiom of ordinary language philosophy, listing some of the terms used to 
articulate the different varieties of ‘attitude theory’. He presents a taxonomy of three 
‘grades’ of aesthetic attitude, the strongest, the weaker and the weakest, each described 
in separate sections of the paper, numbered I to III. The playful tone of the opening does 
not last until the end of the paper, where, rather than call for a better understanding of 
the ‘aesthetic attitude’, he admits that ‘an underlying aim of this essay is to suggest the 
vacuousness of the term “aesthetic”’ 3.
In section I, Dickie takes the ‘strongest’ version of the aesthetic attitude to be 
Bullough’s psychological theory o f ‘distancing’. Dickie describes this as a supposed 
‘action’ of distancing which ‘constitutes or is necessary for’ the aesthetic attitude4.
2 Ibid. p. 56.
3 Ibid. p. 64. This opinion chimes well with pronouncements by A. J. Ayer and Ludwig Wittgenstein,
quoted in section 3.2.2, below.
4 Ibid. p. 56.
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In section II, Dickie examines what he calls the ‘weaker’ version of the aesthetic 
attitude: ‘This weaker theory speaks not of a special kind of action (distancing) but of 
an ordinary kind of action (attending) done in a certain way (disinterestedly)5’. In this 
section, Dickie examines principally the writings of Jerome Stolnitz, Eliseo Vivas and J. 
O. Urmson6. In the first part of section II, which I will call section Hi, Dickie questions 
the concept of ‘disinterestedness7’. In the second part, ‘section Ilii’, Dickie elucidates
O
his claim that disinterestedness and the aesthetic attitude mislead aesthetic theory . As 
we shall see, there are reasons to consider that section Ilii carries this paper’s true 
message, an attack on formalism, which is expressed only indirectly in the paper’s 
headline title.
In section III, Dickie discusses the ‘weakest’ version of the aesthetic attitude9,
described by Vincent Tomas as ‘attending closely10’. This version allows Dickie to
claim, that, once ‘purged of distancing and disinterestedness’ the aesthetic attitude is a
‘great letdown11’. The term ‘letdown’ is a deflationary metaphor, which anticipates by
10decades Carroll’s coinage: ‘deflationary aesthetics ’. Thus, despite the headline title of 
his paper, Dickie inconsistently accepts the existence of the aesthetic attitude, even if 
only in this form: ‘attending (closely)’. Although he calls this minimalist formulation 
‘vacuous’, it nevertheless conveys some truth about the intensity of attention required 
for aesthetic engagement. The real target of Dickie’s attack, therefore, was not the 
aesthetic attitude, but the ‘baggage’ attached to it by formalists. Therefore, Dickie’s 
paper is an indirect attack on formalism, by means of a direct attack on the ‘aesthetic’, 
with unfortunate consequences for the wider understanding both art and the aesthetic.
To resist Dickie’s reductive interpretation, this chapter will concentrate on his claims in 
sections I and II, in order to show that the aesthetic attitude cannot be collapsed onto 
‘attending (closely)’, even though ‘attending closely’ is a vital and far from ‘vacuous’ 
element in adopting the aesthetic attitude.
5 Loc. Cit.
6 Also mentioned, but not discussed by me are I. A. Richards (p. 61), H. S. Langfield (p. 61) and David
Pole (pp. 63-4).
7 George Dickie Op. Cit. (1964) pp. 57-60.
8 Ibid. pp. 61-4.
9 Ibid. pp. 64-5.
10 George Dickie Op. Cit. (1964) p. 64.
u Loc. Cit.
12 Noel Carroll (2001b) “Four Concepts o f Aesthetic Experience” in N. Carroll (2001a) Beyond 
Aesthetics: Philosophical Essays, Cambridge, CUP (pp. 41-62) pp. 58-62.
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2.2 Dickie’s Arguments against the ‘Aesthetic Attitude’
2.2.1 Section I: ‘Distancing’ is a Myth
As we have just seen, in section I of his paper, Dickie describes distancing as a
1 ^supposed ‘action which either constitutes or is necessary for the aesthetic attitude’
(my Italics). Dickie calls this the ‘strong’ version of the aesthetic attitude:
Psychical distance, according to Bullough, is a psychological process by virtue 
of which a person puts some object (be it a painting, a play, or a dangerous fog 
at sea) “out of gear” with the practical interests of the self14.
This gives Dickie his first line of attack. His first argument could be summarised as 
follows: if ‘distancing’ is a necessary condition for the aesthetic attitude, then 
disproving distancing will also disprove the existence of the ‘aesthetic attitude’. Dickie 
then quotes from the version of the theory presented by Sheila Dawson15:
Miss Dawson maintains that it is “the beauty of the phenomenon, which captures 
our attention, puts us out of gear with practical life, and forces us, if we are 
receptive, to view it on a level of aesthetic consciousness”16.
This is a description of the phenomenology of spontaneously falling into the aesthetic 
attitude. I shall argue that this is a description of a real, not a ‘mythical’ phenomenon. 
However, Dickie ignores the phenomenological character of this and several other 
descriptions of the aesthetic attitude in his article. Dawson maintains that some persons 
(e.g. critics and actors) ‘distance deliberately17’. This refers to a learned ability to adopt 
the aesthetic attitude at will, as a mental act. I shall also argue that this, too, is real, and 
that teaching this mental skill is one of the main reasons for arts education.
In Bullough’s example of a ship caught in a fog at sea, an aesthete on board 
must first ‘distance’ himself from the practical dangers facing him and the crew before
13 George Dickie Op. Cit. (1964) p. 56.
14 Loc. Cit.
151 treat Dickie as a primary source, and, by extension, as a reliable secondary source for most o f the
writers he quotes, including Sheila Dawson, Jerome Stolnitz, Eliseo Vivas and Vincent Tomas, 
whom I have neither cross-checked nor referenced individually.
16 George Dickie Op. Cit. (1964) p. 56.
11 Loc. Cit.
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he can enjoy the spectacle created by the fog18. According to Bullough’s approach, a 
failure to adopt an aesthetic attitude can arise from ‘over distancing’ (insufficient 
engagement with the spectacle) or ‘under distancing’ (being in such a panic about the 
dangers, that our aesthete fails to engage with the visual spectacle). Accordingly, a 
jealous ‘under-distanced’ husband watching Othello might be plagued by his fears, 
whereas a visiting stage manager, concentrating on technical details, might be too ‘over 
distanced’ to follow the play itself.
Dickie is sceptical about this terminology and the existence of such actions:
When the curtain goes up, when we walk up to a painting, or when we look at a 
sunset are we ever induced into a state of being distanced either by being struck 
by the beauty of the object or by pulling off an act of distancing? I do not recall 
committing any such special actions or of being induced into any special state, 
and I have no reason to suspect that I am atypical in this respect 9.
This denial seems to me unconvincing. A little reflection will confirm that a melody or 
natural landscape can cast an instant spell; a story or a picture can similarly transform 
consciousness. Dickie, however, claims that all these experiences are undifferentiated 
examples of focused attention. He rejects the ‘technical metaphor’ of being ‘out of gear 
with the practical interests of the self . For him, it is simply that, at such moments, we 
are not being distracted by practical concerns:
To introduce the technical terms “distance,” “under-distance,” and “over­
distance” does nothing but send us chasing after phantom acts and states of 
consciousness21.
Ockham22 would have approved. Far more parsimonious to claim that there is only one 
unvarying state of consciousness, attention, which we can focus upon this object or that. 
Two questions arise from this discussion of section I:
18 Edward Bullough (1912) “Psychical Distance”, British Journal o f  Psychology (Vol. 5), extracts
reprinted in Alex Neill, and Aaron Ridley (Eds) (1995) The Philosophy o f  Art: Readings Ancient 
and Modern, Boston Massachusetts, McGraw Hill (pp. 297-311).
19 George Dickie, Op. Cit. (1964) p. 57.
20 Ibid. pp. 56-7.
21 Ibid. p. 57.
22 William Ockham, medieval philosopher whose name is associated with the principle o f parsimony of
means in explanation, as also taught by Aristotle. Marilyn McCord Adams (1995) ‘Ockham, 
William’ and ‘Ockham’s razor, or the principle o f parsimony’ in Ted Hondenrich (Ed.) The 
Oxford Companion to Philosophy, Oxford, OUP, p. 633.
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IA: Why does Dickie ignore the phenomenology of the aesthetic attitude as 
described by Bullough and Dawson and by others he quotes later?
IB: Is Dickie correct in claiming that ‘distancing’, ‘under-distancing’ and ‘over­
distancing’ are ‘phantom acts and states of consciousness23’, there being 
only ‘attention’ to an object, or ‘inattention’?
Question IB will be discussed in section 2.4, which examines some empirical evidence 
for the aesthetic attitude. However, it is possible to begin immediately to answer 
question IA.
The reason Dickie repeatedly ignores the phenomenology of the aesthetic 
attitude was tactical. Dickie’s position is incoherent, both accepting the existence of the 
aesthetic attitude, as ‘attending (closely)’, and rejecting it as a ‘myth’24. The only way to 
sustain this incoherent position is to mask it by claiming that ‘attending (closely)’ is so 
feeble (so ‘vacuous’) that it fails to secure the reality of the ‘aesthetic attitude’. This 
claim then requires Dickie to ignore the phenomenological descriptions of the aesthetic 
attitude contained in his paper. As Noel Carroll explains:
I have always thought that Dickie’s classic article “The Myth of the Aesthetic 
Attitude” can best be read as a demolition of the notion of “the aesthetic” for the 
purpose, ultimately, of undermining aesthetic theories of art -  thereby paving the 
way for his own Institutional Theory of Art25.
It is claimed in this thesis that, contrary to the claims of Dickie and Carroll, the 
‘aesthetic attitude’ is a term which denotes a real phenomenon which Dawson calls 
being ‘receptive’, and which I describe as an openness to our perceptual experiences 
and the thoughts and feelings they engender. Such openness is spontaneous in infants 
and young children, but not necessarily readily available in later life, for reasons that 
will be discussed. A baby as young as three weeks old can be enchanted by a visual 
array, such as a ‘baby gym’, surrounding an infant on all sides by brightly coloured 
patterns (see Plate 3). I would claim that a state of ‘rapture’ is a common response to an 
intensely positive aesthetic experience. Kant calls it a ‘quickening’ of the faculties , 
suggesting something different from merely focused attention.
23 George Dickie Op. Cit. (1964) p. 57.
24 See the discussion o f Section III o f Dickie’s paper, at the end o f section 2.1.2, above.
25 Noel Carroll Op. Cit. (2001a) p. 2.
26 Immanuel Kant (1790), Critique o f  Judgment, trans. W.S. Pluhar (1987) Indianapolis, Hackett, §9, Ak
219, p. 63. The widely quoted use o f the word ‘faculties’ occurs in Meredith’s translation, which 
says ‘quickening o f both faculties (imagination and understanding)’, in Immanuel Kant (1790;
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However, if the ‘aesthetic attitude’ is so obvious a phenomenon, how could 
Dickie deny its existence? First, the aesthetic attitude is somewhat elusive. It is often 
‘switched on automatically’, so that, although people enter the state, perhaps at a fairly 
low level of intensity as they focus on something which has caught their attention, they 
may not classify the experience as an instance of the ‘aesthetic attitude’. As mentioned, 
it can, after childhood, require practice to cultivate it. Also, the aesthetic attitude can 
easily be over-ridden by the preoccupations of daily living; hence the need, expressed 
metaphorically, for ‘distancing’, or for getting ‘out of gear with practical affairs’.
This preliminary discussion of Dickie’s argument has been enough, however, for 
us to settle the first of our two questions:
IA Why does Dickie ignore the phenomenology of the aesthetic attitude as 
described by Bullough and Dawson and by others he quotes later?
I have argued that it was Dickie’s strategic agenda that encouraged him to 
overlook these phenomenological descriptions, because to acknowledge them would 
detract from his anti-formalist objective, which he thought required him to prove the 
aesthetic attitude to be a myth. I will argue further, in the next chapter, that it was also 
because Dickie shared a physicalist approach to artworks, influenced by positivism .
A second question was also raised in section I:
Is Dickie correct in claiming that ‘distancing’, ‘under-distancing’ and 
‘over-distancing’ are ‘phantom acts and states of consciousness28’, there 
being only ‘attention’ to an object, or ‘inattention’?
This question has already been tentatively answered in the negative (bracketed asterisk) 
by the answer to question IA. However, a fuller reply will need to await consideration 
of some empirical evidence for the realism of the aesthetic attitude. Before that, it is 
necessary to analyse the rest of the argument in Dickie’s article.
2.2.2 Section II: ‘Disinterestedness’ is a Myth
1952 edn) translated James Creed Meredith, Oxford, Clarendon Press, p. 60. In the same place, 
Pluhar says ‘quickening o f the two powers (imagination and understanding)’.
27 See section 3.2.2, below.
28 George Dickie Op. Cit. (1964) p. 57.
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Now it is time to look at Dickie’s arguments in section II, which comprises most 
of his paper, covering what he calls the ‘weak’ version of the aesthetic attitude, defined
9Qas carrying out an ordinary action, ‘attending’, in a particular way, ‘disinterestedly’ . 
There are two parts to section II, which I have called Hi and Ilii. The first, Hi ,
T1questions the concept of ‘disinterestedness’, and the second, Ilii , contains what I 
believe to be Dickie’s main argument. This is an indirect attack on formalism. Overtly, 
he attacks a target he had come to associate with formalism: the concept of the 
‘aesthetic’ in art. He does this, as Carroll has shown, in order to prepare the ground for 
his own Institutional Theory, which, unlike formalism, emphasised the importance of 
the supposedly extrinsic (institutional) properties of artworks, as opposed to their 
supposedly intrinsic (aesthetic) properties. Although section Ilii contains very cogent 
arguments against some dogmas of modernist formalism, this chapter will argue that 
Dickie’s arguments nevertheless fail to disprove the existence of the aesthetic attitude. 
First, we need to look at Dickie’s treatment of ‘disinterestedness’.
2.2.2.1 Attending ‘Disinterestedly’
Dickie begins Hi by quoting Stolnitz’s definition of the ‘aesthetic attitude’ as:
. . .  “disinterested and sympathetic attention to and contemplation of any object 
of awareness whatever, for its own sake alone” 32.
Note Stolnitz’s use of language. The words ‘sympathetic’, ‘contemplation’, ‘for its own 
sake alone’, have been chosen in order to evoke the phenomenology of the aesthetic 
attitude. Dickie then quotes Stolnitz’s explanations of key terms:
. . .  “disinterested” means “no concern for any ulterior purpose”; “sympathetic” 
means “accept the object on its own terms to appreciate it”; and “contemplation” 
means “perception directed toward the object in its own right and the spectator is 
not concerned to analyze it or ask questions about it”33.
Stolnitz’s gloss on ‘sympathetic’ and ‘contemplation’ emphasises the intensity of 
perceptual engagement required for the aesthetic attitude. However, this aspect is 
ignored by Dickie, who comments only on the definition Stolnitz gives for
29 Loc. Cit.
30 George Dickie Op. Cit. (1964) pp. 57-60.
31 Ibid. pp. 61-4.
32 Ibid. p. 57.
33 Ibid, p. 58.
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‘disinterestedness’. Dickie comments that an apparent perceptual difference 
(‘interested’ or ‘disinterested’) is, in fact, a motivational difference: i.e. with or without 
an ‘ ulterior purpose’ (my Italics). This leads Dickie to his famous thought experiment 
involving Jones and Smith, the first listening to some music for an exam (i.e. with an 
ulterior purpose, hence supposedly not in the ‘aesthetic attitude’, according to Stolnitz) 
and the second, Smith, who listens ‘with no such ulterior purpose’. Dickie claims that, 
though the men might well have different motives, their actions, listening to the music, 
are identical:
There is only one way to listen to (to attend to) music, although the listening 
may be more or less attentive and there may be a variety of motives, intentions, 
and reasons for doing so and a variety of ways of being distracted from the 
music34 (Dickie’s Italics).
This chapter will challenge the claim that there is only one way to listen to music.
Dickie then imagines someone who supposedly gives an interested response to a 
portrait, in that it reminds him of his grandfather, triggering a description of the older 
man’s exploits as a pioneer. Dickie finds it easy to dismiss this example (his own) as an 
obvious case o f ‘distraction’ or ‘inattention’. In the same way, he dismisses as 
‘inattention’ the case of someone who allows his mind to wander while reading a
35poem .
Next, Dickie discusses J. O. Urmson’s example o f ‘aesthetic satisfaction’, 
contrasted with ‘economic, moral’ and other ‘satisfactions’. Seated in a theatre is the 
play’s impresario who is thinking about the ‘economic satisfaction’ of a full house. To 
Dickie, this and other examples are merely cases of ‘inattention’: thinking about the box 
office, or a visiting stage manager concentrating on the scenery movement, rather than 
attending to the play itself. Dickie offers another example, of a playwright attending an 
out-of-town performance of his own play with a view to making revisions. Dickie 
claims that, despite the playwright’s ulterior motives, his attention to the play would be 
no different from that of other theatre-goers.
Let us now assess Dickie’s arguments in section Hi. In some cases, his analysis 
is correct: Urmson’s impresario was thinking about money rather than attending to the 
play. However, Dickie’s visiting stage manager is surely ‘attending closely’, but his 
attention will differ from that of the average theatre-goer. This is not a straightforward
34 Loc. Cit.
35 George Dickie Op. Cit. (1964) p. 60; this example is taken from Eliseo Vivas.
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case of ‘inattention’; it is a case of a different kind of attention, which leads to Dickie’s 
example from Eliseo Vivas, o f ‘disinterested’ or ‘interested’ readings of literature. For 
Vivas an interested approach is ‘nonaesthetic’:
By approaching a poem in a nonaesthetic mode it may function as history, as 
social criticism, as diagnostic evidence of the author’s neuroses and in an 
indefinite number of other ways .
The use of the word ‘nonaesthetic’ for the quality of attention is the obverse of Sibley’s 
use of the term for the properties in the artwork, which he contrasts with its ‘aesthetic 
properties’, as will be discussed in section 2.4.4, below. However, for Vivas, for a poem 
to be read in an aesthetic way, means adopting the aesthetic attitude, and Dickie quotes 
Vivas’ definition of this:
. . .  an experience of rapt attention which involves the intransitive apprehension 
of an object’s immanent meanings and values in their full presentational 
immediacy37.
Dickie seizes on the word ‘intransitive’, and asks what it would mean to read a poem 
‘transitively’. Dickie thinks the meaning becomes clearer with the following passage 
from Vivas:
Having once seen a hockey game in slow motion, I am prepared to testify that it 
was an object of pure intransitive experience [attention] - for I was not interested 
in which team won the game and no external factors mingled with my interest in 
the beautiful rhythmic flow of the slow-moving men38 (Dickie’s gloss and 
Italics).
Dickie concludes that ‘intransitive attention’ for Vivas means the same as ‘disinterested 
attention’ for Stolnitz: i.e. ‘for no ulterior purpose’ . For Dickie, the ‘purpose’ should 
be immaterial; there is only ‘one way’ to listen to music (as with Jones and Smith) or 
one way to watch a hockey game. However, the most striking feature of Vivas’ 
definition of the aesthetic attitude and description of the hockey is the language in 
which he tries to communicate their phenomenology, describing them as different from 
simple ‘attention’. Again, Dickie ignored this phenomenological dimension, and moves
36 Quoted by Dickie, Ibid. p. 59.
37 Loc. Cit.
38
39
Ibid. 
Loc. Cit.
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quickly on to ‘transitive’ readings of poetry, which he treats as instances of 
‘distraction’:
As deplorable as such a sustained practice [reading a poem as history] may be, it 
is at best a case of attending to certain features of a poem and ignoring others40.
However, this is surely to concede the existence of different ‘states of mind’ depending 
on what is attended to. To Vivas’ example of reading a poem ‘simply as history’ (i.e. 
‘non-aesthetically’) Dickie replies:
But even this meaning does not mark out a special kind of attention but rather 
means that only a single aspect of a poem is being noticed and that its rhyme, 
meter, and so on are ignored41.
This is a self-contradiction. To ‘notice’ one aspect rather than another is, indeed, to give 
it ‘a special kind of attention’. Thus Dickie contradicts his own claim that there is only 
‘attention’ or ‘inattention’. To attend to ‘rhyme, meter and so on’ is to give ‘a special 
kind of attention’ to the sensory qualities of a poem rather than to its historical content.
Despite this self-contradiction, Dickie maintains that ‘ . . .  “disinterestedness” or 
“intransitiveness” cannot properly be used to refer to a special kind of attention42’. 
Instead, he claims that all his examples fall into one of two groups; first, where there are 
ulterior motives, and second where there is inattention. Dickie claims that ulterior 
motives make no difference to the quality of attention, as with the music-listeners Jones 
and Smith. Similarly, distraction reduces the degree, but not the character of attention, 
as with the jealous husband43. For Dickie, none of his examples demonstrates anything 
to justify invoking an ‘aesthetic attitude’, and the term ‘disinterestedness’ applies only 
to motives or judicial matters, not to the phenomenology of attention. All Dickie will 
admit is that attention can be ‘more or less close44’ (interestingly, a ‘proximity’ 
metaphor, as opposed to Bullough’s ‘distancing’ metaphor).
Section Hi has therefore given rise to another two questions which the argument 
so far has enabled us to answer in the negative (marked with an asterisk):
40 George Dickie Op. Cit. (1964) p. 60.
41 Loc. Cit.
42 Ibid.
43 See the discussion o f ‘distancing’ in section 2.2.1, above.
44 George Dickie Op. Cit. (1964) p. 60.
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*IIiA Is Dickie correct in his claim that differences in motivation result in no 
qualitative differences in attention or aesthetic experience?
*IIiB Is Dickie correct in his claim that the ‘aesthetic attitude’ is a myth, 
because there is only ‘attending’ more or less ‘closely’?
These two questions were linked. If Dickie were correct or incorrect in one, the 
same would apply to the other. I have answered both questions in the negative, by 
challenging Dickie’s analyses of his own examples of a) the visiting stage manager and 
b) the reader of poetry solely for historical information. As far as question IliA is 
concerned, though both the stage manager and reader of poetry for history are motivated 
to ‘attend closely’ to the artworks, neither has adopted the ‘aesthetic attitude’, because 
they have not, in Bullough’s terms, ‘changed gear’ or ‘distanced themselves’ from their 
‘everyday’ outlook, in a way that would lead them to monitor their subjective responses 
to the sensory qualities of the artworks, and to introspect on the feelings and thoughts 
engendered by the play’s action or the ‘sound’ of the poem’s words and their meanings. 
Dickie’s claim in IliB is proved wrong because both respondents are attending closely, 
though ‘non-aesthetically’.
Now it is time to consider what I believe to be the true motivation for Dickie’s 
challenge to the aesthetic attitude: his claim that it misleads aesthetics.
2.2.22 Why ‘Disinterested Attention’ Misleads Aesthetics
In the most cogent part of his paper, Dickie challenges the dogmas of Stolnitz’s 
version of formalism, as he prepares the way for a theory of art which aims to take 
greater account of the supposedly extrinsic (institutional), rather that the supposedly 
intrinsic (aesthetic) qualities of a work of art. However, Dickie again disguises his 
attack, so that it is not overtly about formalism, but nominally about ‘disinterested 
attention’. Dickie opens section Ilii with this modification of his claim:
I have argued that the second way of conceiving the aesthetic attitude is also a
myth, or at least that its main content - (disinterested attention) -  is [a myth]45;
Despite the title of his article, this is further evidence that Dickie believes the aesthetic 
attitude to be reall The true focus of his disbelief and criticism is ‘disinterested 
attention’, which, according to Dickie, misleads aesthetics in three ways:
45 George Dickie Op. Cit. (1964) p. 61.
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(1) the way in which he [i.e. the attitude theorist] wishes to set the limits of 
aesthetic relevance; (2) the relation of the critic to the work of art; and (3) the 
relation of morality to aesthetic value46.
Dickie’s first concern is over the limits o f ‘aesthetic relevance’. Stolnitz asked: 
‘Is it ever “relevant” to the aesthetic experience to have thoughts or images or bits of 
knowledge which are not present within the object itself?47’, and Stolnitz concludes that 
it can be relevant:
If the association [i.e. thought, image or bit of knowledge not present in the 
object] re-enforces the focusing of attention upon the object, by ‘fusing’ with the 
object and thereby giving it added ‘life and significance,’ it is genuinely 
aesthetic. If however, it arrogates attention to itself and away from the object, it 
undermines the aesthetic attitude48. (My gloss on ‘association’)
Here Stolnitz reveals himself to have rejected the narrowest variety of formalism, which 
would have placed all the value upon the surface, ‘plastic’ features of the artwork. 
However, Stolnitz limits the relevance of supposedly extrinsic properties by stipulating 
that they must enhance the formal congruence of artworks, and Dickie argues 
convincingly and against Stolnitz, that all aspects of a work, including its meaning, are 
relevant to our response49.
This paves the way for Dickie to emphasise the relevance of those ‘institutional’ 
factors that were later to structure his philosophy of art. His second and third criticisms 
of Stolnitz’s version of disinterestedness are equally significant. They concern the 
relationship of both criticism and morality to art. Dickie quotes Stolnitz’s view that, if 
anyone ‘has the purpose of passing judgment upon [a work of art] his attitude is not 
aesthetic’50. Dickie’s summary of Stolnitz continues, including some verbatim 
quotations:
He [Stolnitz] develops this line at a later stage of his book, arguing that 
appreciation (perceiving with the aesthetic attitude) and criticism (seeking for 
reasons to support an evaluation of a work) are (1) distinct and (2) 
“psychologically opposed to each other.” The critical attitude is questioning, 
analytical, probing for strengths and weakness, and so on. The aesthetic attitude 
is just the opposite: “It commits our allegiance to the object freely and
46 Loc. Cit.
47 Quoted by Dickie, Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 Dickie writes: ‘The problem is perhaps best described as the problem of relevance . . .  more generally,
to a work o f art, rather than aesthetic relevance’. Ibid.
50 Quoted by Dickie, Ibid.
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unquestioningly”; “the spectator ‘surrenders’ himself to the work of art.” “Just 
because the two attitudes are inimical, whenever criticism obtrudes, it reduces 
aesthetic interest”51.
Dickie’s explanation for this apparently rigid separation o f ‘appreciation’ from 
‘criticism’ lies in Stolnitz’s concept of disinterestedness, as having ‘no concern for any 
ulterior purpose’. The act of engaging with art in order to write criticism would indeed 
appear to involve an ulterior purpose. As Dickie says, Stolnitz, ‘confuses a perceptual 
distinction with a motivational one’ . According to Stolnitz’s definition of 
disinterestedness, an analytical and evaluative response to an artwork cannot be an 
‘aesthetic’ one, whereas he would surely have to acknowledge that if criticism is to be 
at all illuminating, it must also incorporate something from the critic’s aesthetic 
response to the work. Dickie then explains how this can be done, drawing upon his own 
experience as a post-film-projection panellist. Far from detracting from his enjoyment, 
he found that having to prepare his comments helped him to focus more ‘perceptively 
and acutely’, enabling him to ‘appreciate things about the films I was watching which 
ordinarily out of laziness I would not have noticed’ . However, it will be argued later in 
this chapter that Stolnitz’s use of language reveals an intuitive awareness of some kind 
of phenomenological distinction between critical, analytical thought about an artwork, 
and a more sensory, appreciative, ‘surrendering . . .  freely and unquestioningly’54 to it.
It will be argued that this distinction corresponds to a real difference between two kinds 
of brain function, often expressed in the (admittedly short-hand) terms of ‘left-brain’ 
and ‘right-brain’ function. This topic will be addressed after this chapter’s look at 
empirical evidence. This could be expressed as the ‘Appreciation versus Criticism’ 
claim (AvC):
AvC Appreciation and criticism are incompatible mental states.
Dickie’s third criticism of the limitations placed on aesthetics by Stolnitz’s 
model of ‘disinterestedness’ concerns the place of morality in art, and again he quotes 
Stolnitz directly:
51 George Dickie Op. Cit. (1964) pp. 61-2.
52 Ibid. p. 62.
53 Loc. Cit.
54 Quoted by Dickie, Op. Cit. (1964) p. 61.
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‘Any of us might reject a novel because it seems to conflict with our moral 
beliefs . . .  When we do so . . .  We have not read the book aesthetically, for we 
have interposed m oral. . .  responses of our own which are alien to it. This 
disrupts the aesthetic attitude. We cannot then say that the novel is aesthetically 
bad, for we have not permitted ourselves to consider it aesthetically. To maintain 
the aesthetic attitude, we must follow the lead of the object and respond in 
concert with it55’. (Dickie’s ellipses)
Dickie criticises this view, because:
This conception of the aesthetic attitude functions to hold the moral aspects and 
the aesthetic aspects of the work of art firmly apart56. (Dickie’s italics).
Here, again, Dickie inadvertently confirms his hidden assumption that the aesthetic 
attitude is a reality, contradicting his title, which claims it is a ‘myth’. His criticism is 
of ‘this conception o f the aesthetic attitude ’ (my underlining and italics). If his 
reservations are about this [formalist] conception of the aesthetic attitude, then it can 
only mean that he can conceive of a different conception of it. Dickie is probably 
correct in articulating Stolnitz’s reasoning in the following lines:
. . .  the moral aspects of a work of art cannot be an object of aesthetic attention 
because aesthetic attention is by definition disinterested and the moral aspectscn
are somehow practical (interested) . (Dickie’s parentheses)
That would accord with one of Kant’s stipulations for disinterestedness in judgments of
CO
taste . However, Dickie’s response to Stolnitz is surely correct, when he protests that:
. . .  a work’s moral vision is a part of the work. Thus, any statement -  
descriptive or evaluative -  about the work’s moral vision is a statement about 
the work', and any statement about a work is a critical statement and, hence, falls 
within the aesthetic domain59. (Dickie’s italics)
This is one of the reasons Dickie gives for the ‘vacuousness’ of the term ‘aesthetic’,
when it is used in a way which:
. . .  segregates certain aspects or parts of works of art such as formal and stylistic 
aspects from such aspects as a work’s moral vision60.
55 Ibid. p. 63.
56 Loc. Cit.
51 Loc. Cit.
58 Immanuel Kant Op. Cit. (1790; 1987 edn.) §4, Ak 207-8, pp. 48-9.
59 George Dickie Op. Cit. (1964) p. 64.
60 Loc. Cit.
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Thus, Dickie has made an effective move in an ultimately successful campaign 
to free analytical aesthetics from formalism. Paradoxically, by securing for the word 
‘aesthetic’ a wider meaning than it had had in Stolnitz, Dickie in fact undermined his 
own professed aim, to suggest the ‘vacuousness of the term “aesthetic”’61.
Dickie, therefore, dismisses Stolnitz’s treatment of a) the effect of criticism upon 
aesthetic experience, and b) the place of morality in art. Dickie correctly attributes both 
problems to Stolnitz’s understanding of the concept o f ‘disinterestedness’. However, it 
will be argued in this thesis that Dickie was wrong to assume that Stolnitz’s view of 
disinterestedness was the only possible, or even the standard interpretation of that 
concept. This mistake leads Dickie to overstate the achievement of his paper, when he 
claims he has proved that the ‘aesthetic attitude’ means no more than ‘simply attending
£i)(closely) ’ (Dickie’s brackets). Dickie’s claim has been challenged at several points in 
the present chapter, but these challenges will need to be consolidated a) by comparing 
the models of ‘disinterestedness’ as characterised by Dickie and Stolnitz’ against 
eighteenth century accounts (both in this chapter and in chapter five) and b) by looking 
for empirical evidence for both disinterestedness and the aesthetic attitude (in this 
chapter and in chapters six and seven).
To conclude: in section Ilii, Dickie has revealed that there are shortcomings in 
the characterisation of disinterestedness by Stolnitz, who was strongly influenced by 
formalism. Stolnitz 1) underestimated the aesthetic relevance of factors considered by 
formalists as extrinsic to the art object, and 2) believed ‘criticism’ and ‘appreciation’ to 
be incompatible and 3) separated critical and moral judgments. Having revealed these 
shortcomings, Dickie goes on to claim that he has thereby nullified, if not disproved, the 
aesthetic attitude by ‘purging’ it of ‘disinterestedness ’. However, he could only rightly 
claim to have achieved that if Stolnitz’s version of ‘disinterestedness’ were definitive. 
This gives us our first question for section Ilii:
Ilii A Is Dickie correct in his assumption that Stolnitz’s interpretation of 
disinterestedness is the definitive version of that concept?
To answer that will require research into earlier models of ‘disinterest’ in aesthetics, a 
task to be begun in section 2.3, on Hume, and to be continued in chapter five, on Kant.
61 Loc. Cit.
62 Loc. Cit.
63 Loc. Cit.
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Paradoxically, Dickie argued for two incompatible views. First, he argued as if he 
accepted Stolnitz’s word that disinterestedness is a necessary condition for the aesthetic 
attitude. Secondly, he also argued that the aesthetic attitude is itself a ‘myth’. This gives 
us our last question:
IliiB Is disinterestedness a necessary condition for the aesthetic attitude?
That question will need to be considered, as the thesis progresses, in the light of both 
eighteenth century aesthetics and empirical evidence.
2.2.3 Dickie’s Arguments: Summary and Conclusion
This survey of Dickie’s arguments against ‘disinterestedness’ and the ‘aesthetic 
attitude’ is now complete. Dickie’s first attack was on the metaphor of ‘distancing’, 
which he characterised as the ‘strong’ version of the aesthetic attitude. Although I 
accepted Dickie’s interpretation of some examples as cases of inattention, such as the 
jealous husband, I argue that in some other cases, the metaphor of ‘distancing’ describes 
a real, not a phantom ‘state of consciousness’.
I have argued that, despite the title of his paper, Dickie failed to prove the 
aesthetic attitude to be a ‘myth’, and that his article is partial and incoherent. It is partial 
because he is working to an anti-formalist agenda, so that he ignored or discounted 
phenomenological evidence for the aesthetic attitude. It is incoherent, because he claims 
the ‘aesthetic attitude’ is a ‘myth’, while in section III he accepted its existence in the 
deflationary form: ‘attending (closely)64’. Although he poured scorn on the 
‘vacuousness’ of that definition, this chapter will argue that ‘attending (closely)’ 
describes an important aspect of the aesthetic attitude, though it is not a complete 
account.
However, it was found that Dickie’s criticisms of Stolnitz’s model of 
‘disinterestedness’ were justified, creating a good case against some of the claims of 
formalism. However, Dickie’s assumption was not accepted, that the disproof of 
Stolnitz’s account o f ‘disinterestedness’ also disproved the existence of the aesthetic 
attitude. This was not accepted because Stolnitz’s version of disinterestedness was 
flawed. There are other interpretations of disinterestedness, for example from eighteenth
64 George Dickie Op. Cit. (1964) p. 64.
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century aesthetics. Also, other approaches to the aesthetic attitude, such as the 
biological, need to be considered. This chapter will start to examine both, beginning 
with an example from eighteenth century aesthetics.
2.3 Hume: An Eighteenth Century View of Issues Raised bv Dickie
We can recognise descriptions of what came to be known as the ‘aesthetic 
attitude’ in the writings of David Hume (1711-1776), when he gives testimonial 
evidence for aesthetic judgment and the way this involves adopting a mental set65, 
including ‘disinterestedness’.
First of all, it is clear that Hume, contra Stolnitz and pro Dickie, accepts the 
compatibility of criticism with appreciation; for him criticism is an unavoidable part of 
judgments of taste. First there must be refinement and sensitivity, which Hume calls 
delicacy66, and his model is the wine tasting story from Don Quixote, where the palate 
of one connoisseur can detect a taint of iron, while another could taste a hint of leather, 
in an otherwise excellent vintage. At the bottom of the casket was found an old key on a 
leather thong. From this, Hume concludes:
The great resemblance between mental and bodily taste will teach us to apply 
this story . . .
. . .  a quick and acute perception of beauty and deformity must be the perfection 
of our mental taste; nor can a man be satisfied with himself while he suspects, 
that any excellence or blemish in a discourse has passed him unobserved .
Thus, attaining full aesthetic satisfaction entails a process of criticism for Hume, who 
anticipates T. S. Eliot’s dictum, that, ‘criticism is as inevitable as breathing ’. Hume 
places equal value upon identifying blemishes and noting excellences. This provides us 
with some negative evidence regarding claim AvC:
65 Hume is relevant to the following questions arising from our reading o f Dickie:
IliA Is Dickie correct in his claim that differences in motivation result in no qualitative 
differences in attention or aesthetic experience?
IliB Is Dickie correct in his claim that the ‘aesthetic attitude’ is a myth, because there is only 
‘attending’ more or less ‘closely’?
IliiA Is Dickie correct in his assumption that Stolnitz’s interpretation o f disinterestedness is the 
only version o f that concept?
IliiB Is disinterestedness a necessary condition for the aesthetic attitude?
66 David Hume (1757) “Of the Standard o f Taste”, Reprinted in Alex Neill, and Aaron Ridley (Eds) Op.
Cit. (1995) (pp. 254-68), pp. 260-1.
67 Loc. Cit. p. 260.
68 T. S. Eliot (1919) “Tradition and the Individual Talent” reprinted in Alex Neill and Aaron Ridly Op.
Cit. (1995) (pp. 53-9) p. 54.
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AvC Appreciation and criticism are incompatible mental states.
To harness this delicacy of taste to a critical faculty requires a process, which Hume 
describes, giving us a clear description of the phenomenology of what later would be 
called the ‘aesthetic attitude’:
When we would make an experiment of this nature, and would try the force of 
any beauty or deformity, we must choose with care a proper time and place, and 
bring the fancy to a suitable situation and disposition. A perfect serenity of 
mind, a recollection of thought, a due attention to the object; if any of these 
circumstances be wanting, our experiment will be fallacious, and we shall be 
unable to judge of the catholic and universal beauty69.
The novice, who has not learned to adopt the aesthetic attitude, will be unsure of how to 
respond to and evaluate an artwork:
But allow him to acquire experience in those objects, his feeling becomes more 
exact and nice: He not only perceives the beauties and defects of each part, but 
marks the distinguishing species of each quality . . .  The mist dissipates, which 
seemed formerly to hang over the object. . .  In a word, the same address and 
dexterity, which practice gives to the execution of any work, is also acquired by 
the same means, in the judging of it70.
Even the experienced critic might need time to peruse a new work before its excellences 
and blemishes become fully apparent:
There is a flutter or hurry of thought which attends the first perusal of any piece, 
and which confounds the genuine sentiment of beauty. The relation of the parts 
is not discerned: The true characters of style are little distinguished: The several 
perfections and defects seem wrapped up in a species of confusion, and present 
themselves indistinctly to the imagination. Not to mention, that there is a species 
of beauty, which, as it is florid and superficial, pleases at first; but being found 
incompatible with a just expression either of reason or passion, soon palls upon 
the taste, and is then rejected with disdain, at least rated at a much lower value71.
Hume sees comparison with other works as an inevitable part of this process, 
anticipating T.S.Eliot’s description of how the entry of a new talent forces us to re-
79evaluate earlier artistic achievements within the tradition . In this way, Hume has 
anticipated the emphasis on history usually attributed to Hegel and his followers, and
69 David Hume Op. Cit. (1757; 1995 Edn.) p. 259.
70 Ibid. pp. 261-2.
71 Ibid. p. 262.
72 T. S. Eliot Op. Cit. (1919; 1995 edn.) p. 55.
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then claimed two centuries later as an innovation by Institutional and Historical
7^Theorists . To Hume, the historical perspective is integral to any critical response:
One accustomed to see, and examine, and weigh the several performances, 
admired in different ages and nations, can alone rate the merits of a work 
exhibited to his view and assign its proper rank among the productions of 
genius74.
That this is not an ‘ahistoricaT evaluation, based mainly on formal considerations, is 
indicated by his rhetorical question, ‘Must we throw aside the pictures of our ancestors, 
because of their ruffs and farthingales?’ The context was the need, in judgments of 
taste, to avoid ‘prejudice’, which is how Hume couches his further discussion of 
disinterestedness. Mary Mothershill points out, however, that the avoidance of prejudice 
for Hume has its limits where morality affects the arts, quoting this passage from the 
same essay:
But where the ideas of morality and decency alter from one age to another, and 
where vicious manners are described without being marked with the proper 
characters of blame and disapprobation, this must be allowed to disfigure the 
poem, and to be a real deformity. I cannot, nor is it proper I should, enter into 
such sentiments; and however I may excuse the poet on account of the manners 
of his age, I can never relish the composition75.
• 7A •Once again, Dickie’s assumption that Stolnitz’s interpretation of disinterestedness 
constituted the definitive account of the concept, necessarily excluding criticism and 
morality from the aesthetic attitude, has now been disproved. Hume described the 
focusing of attention described by Dickie, but shows that this involves more than simply 
‘attending (closely)’, for example making comparisons with other works (further 
disproving Dickie’s claims in *IIiA and *IIiB77). Thus Dickie was wrong to treat
7ftStolnitz’ interpretation o f ‘disinterestedness’ as definitive . However, in the 
respondent’s need to clear the mind and focus on the artwork, Hume gives support for
73 See section 3.3, below.
74 Op. Cit. p. 262.
75 Quoted by Mary Mothershill (1998) “Hume, David: ‘Of the Standard o f Taste”’ in Michael Kelly,
Encyclopedia o f  Aesthetics Oxford, OUP, (4 Volumes) (Vol. 2, pp. 428-433) p. 432.
76 In question IliiA: Is Dickie correct in his assumption that Stolnitz’s interpretation o f disinterestedness is
the only version o f that concept?
77 IliA Is Dickie correct in his claim that differences in motivation result in no qualitative differences in
attention or aesthetic experience?
IliB Is Dickie correct in his claim that the ‘aesthetic attitude’ is a myth, because there is only 
‘attending’ more or less ‘closely’?
78 Question IliiA, again; see footnote 76, above.
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an affirmative answer to question IliiB :4 Is disinterestedness a necessary condition for 
the aesthetic attitude?’
This initial foray into eighteenth century aesthetics will suffice at this juncture to 
demonstrate Dickie’s limited historical overview. We must now begin to test Dickie’s 
claims about the aesthetic attitude against empirical, biological, evidence.
2.4 Some Empirical Evidence for the 4 Aesthetic Attitude’
Until now, the approach in this chapter has been argumentative: enquiring into 
the nature of Dickie’s strategic move within philosophical aesthetics, examining his 
arguments for consistency and identifying his evasions over the phenomenology of the 
aesthetic. A pattern emerged of Dickie repeatedly ignoring the contradictory testimonial 
evidence provided by his antagonists. He minimises the significance of this evidence, as 
when he characterises as 4vacuous’ Vivas’ description of the aesthetic attitude 
('attending closely’).
The aim of this section is to take seriously the testimonial evidence Dickie chose 
to ignore, and to enquire whether there is today any empirical evidence for the existence 
of the aesthetic attitude as a real, not a 'phantom’, state of consciousness. This chapter 
will consult three sources. The first is the work of Jerry Fodor on the modularity of the 
mind. The second is the evidence of the laterality of brain function and the variable 
blood-flow to different regions of the brain, as researched by Roger W. Sperry and other 
neurologists, and applied by Betty Edwards to the teaching of drawing79.1 have 
practical experience of using her textbook to teach drawing to adults who 'think they 
can’t draw’. The third source is Antonio Damasio, a neurologist whose research shows 
how our conscious experiences, including feelings, relate to the functioning of different
OA
parts of the brain . In chapter seven, further evidence for the aesthetic attitude will be 
adduced from cognitive neuroscience.
Because there is a range of sense modalities involved in aesthetic experience, I 
appreciate David Cooper’s suggestion that, instead of the aesthetic attitude, we should 
speak o f 'a  motley of aesthetic attitudes81’. However, because I view the aesthetic
79 Betty Edwards (1979) Drawing on the Right Side o f  the Brain, (1993 UK paperback edition) London,
Harper Collins.
80 Antonio Damasio (1999) The Feeling o f  What Happens: Body, Emotion and the Making o f
Consciousness, London, William Heinemann.
81 David E. Cooper (1992a) “Attitude, Aesthetic” in David E. Cooper (Ed.) A Companion to Aesthetics,
Oxford, Blackwell, (pp. 23-7), p. 27. Semir Zeki expressed a similar view that each o f the 30-
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attitude as involving the intense inner ‘global’ monitoring of all feelings and thoughts, I 
shall continue to refer to ‘the aesthetic attitude’, in the singular.
The present review of empirical evidence for the aesthetic attitude begins with 
Fodor, who places his emphasis on the modularity of mind, rather than upon aesthetic 
experience. However, as we shall see both here and in chapter seven, recent research 
suggests that both the aesthetic attitude and aesthetic experience can be closely related 
to the function of individual brain modules and their interactions.
•  •  HO2.4.1 Fodor: modularity, creativity and communication .
As already noted in section 1.3.2, above, Baumgarten presented the aesthetic as 
more or less synonymous with perception, and in so doing he was trying to push the 
aesthetic, interpreted as the senses, to the centre of epistemology. He wrote:
•  JIT •It is objected . . .  that confusion [i.e. the sensory] is the mother of errors. I 
reply that it is the sine qua non of discovering truth, without which nature could 
not make the leap from obscurity to distinctness. The growing light of dawn 
leads us from the darkness of night to the clarity of mid-day8 .
The exact relationship between ‘input systems’ and ‘central systems’ (to use 
Fodor’s terminology), or between the ‘Imagination’ and ‘Understanding’ (to use 
Kant’s), is still contested among philosophers and cognitive neuroscientists. Differing 
interpretations of how sensory experience relates to artistic response distinguish 
‘deflationary’ accounts of the aesthetic from the account presented in this thesis, with 
the deflationists tending to minimise the aesthetic dimension, relative to social, 
institutional and historical factors. An attempt will be made to adjudicate upon this 
debate, using evidence from cognitive neuroscience.
odd visual processing modules imparts to consciousness its own distinctive aesthetic feeling, in 
his (1999a) Inner Vision: an exploration o f  Art and the Brain, Oxford, OUP, p. 87.
82 Jerry A. Fodor (1983) Modularity o f  Mind: an Essay on Faculty Psychology, Cambridge, Mass., MIT
Press.
83 As will be explained in Chapter 3, ‘confusion’ in Rationalist epistemology meant the ‘con-fusion’, or
the ‘fusing together’ in perception o f different properties which only science could separate and 
measure.
84 My translation, from Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1750/58; 2007 edn) Aesthetika reprinted in Latin
as Asthetik in 2 Volumes (Vol. 1 §§1-613) and (Vol. 2 §§1-614-904) with Translation into 
German, an Introduction, Notes and a Glossary, by Dagmar Mirbach, Hamburg, Felix Meiner 
Verlag, §7, p. 14: Obi. 5) Confusio mater err or is. Rsp. a) sed conditio, sine qua non, inveniendae 
veritatis, ubi natura non facit saltum ex obscuritate in distinctionem. Ex nocte per auroram 
meridies.
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Fodor postulated a taxonomy of three cognitive mechanisms which yield 
‘representations of the world’ which ‘co-vary’ with changes in the world: ‘transducers’ 
(e.g. eyes), ‘input systems’ (e.g. visual cortex) and ‘central systems’ (e.g. thought- 
enablers)85. In his description, the ‘transducers’ and the ‘input systems’ are 
‘encapsulated’ and, to a great extent, removed from conscious control. On the other 
hand, Fodor describes the ‘central systems’ of semantic knowledge and thought as free-
o/:
ranging, and ‘unencapsulated’ . The central systems look at what the input systems
o7 #
deliver, consult memory and come up with the ‘best hypothesis’ . Their workings are 
both ‘isotropic’ and ‘Quinean’. In an istropic system, anything known can be put to 
work, whereas a Quinean system is ‘sensitive to the properties of an entire belief 
system’88.1 would claim that these isotropic and Quinean patterns operate in thought 
experiments, in generating and understanding metaphor and, of course, in the arts. 
Thought is not confined to abstract reasoning, but can dig ‘top-down’ into the store of
• QQsensory memory and harness the sense-based powers of the imagination . When the 
discoverers of Buxminsterfullerene came up with the formula ‘C6o’ for an allotrope of 
Carbon, the visual memory of Fuller’s geodesic domes popped into consciousness, to 
explain the carbon-bond structure90. When Albert Einstein imagined his tram in Berne 
travelling away from the clock tower at the speed of light, ‘freezing’ the image of the 
clock’s dial, his visualised thought experiment demonstrated, contra Newton, that time 
is not absolute91. When Baumgarten offers Campanella’s definition o f ‘fever’ as, ‘the 
war instigated against disease by the powerful force of the spirit92’, an intensively93 
abstract concept is made ‘extensively clearer’, through the sensory, visualising power 
of metaphor.
Arthur C. Danto compared the structure of metaphors to that of artworks:
85 Jerry A. Fodor Op. Cit. (1983) pp. 38-9.
86 Ibid. p. 104.
%1 Ibid. p. 105.
88 Ibid. pp. 105-7.
89 Fodor, Ibid. p. 54, expresses doubts about the claims o f painters and phoneticians to get, ‘raw
transducer output’. However, I believe there is evidence in their favour, which will be presented, 
later.
90 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AHotropes o f carbon#Buckminsterfullerenes.
91 http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/teachers/ideas/2311 einstein.html.
92 Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1735; 1954 edn.) Reflections on Poetry, with an Introduction, Notes,
and Translation into English by Karl Aschenbrenner and William B. Holther, Berkely and Los 
Angeles, University o f California Press, §21, pp. 45-6.
93 The term ‘intension’ refers to the meaning o f a word, and ‘extension’ to the objects in the world which
are referenced by that word, corresponding to the distinction between connotation and 
denotation. See A. W. Sparkes (1991) Talking Philosophy: a wordbook, London, Routledge, pp. 
56-7.
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. . .  they do not merely represent subjects, but properties of the mode of 
representation itself must be a constituent in understanding them. It is, after all, a 
commonplace that every metaphor is a little poem. By dint of the features we 
have identified, metaphors are minor works of art94.
Collingwood is prepared to push the aesthetic even further back, to a child’s second cry, 
which is:
. . .  deliberately uttered to call attention to its needs and to scold the person to 
whom it seems addressed for not attending to them. [This] cry is still a mere cry; 
it is not yet speech; but it is language. It stands in a new relation to the child’s 
experience as a whole. It is a child aware of itself and asserting itself. With that 
utterance language is bom; its articulation into fully developed speech in English 
or French or some other vernacular is only a matter of detail95.
For Collingwood, that cry is not only the beginning of language, but also of art, 
for he shortly goes on to declare that: ‘Every utterance and every gesture that each one 
of us makes is a work of art’96. This coupling of sensory stimulation (or its re-activation 
in the brain) with cognition, and their fit with action theory provides the ontological 
framework for the present account of art, derived from action theory, including the 
background concepts of speech acts, in the work of Gregory Currie and John Searle, to 
be described and discussed in section 3.6, below.
2.4.2 Sperry and Edwards: Left Brain, Right Brain and Learning to Draw
Young children seem to be in immediate contact with their aesthetic experience, 
and their responses are transparent and spontaneous (See Plate 3). In the early years, 
children are uninhibited artists; they draw, they act out dramas and make up stories. 
Betty Edwards describes how children leam to be more guarded and self-critical by the 
age of about eleven to thirteen97. In our culture, this is the age at which many decide 
they are ‘no good at art’, and stop drawing for pleasure. The change may be related to 
the gradual loss of plasticity in the brain, as the different sense modules mature and 
consolidate their specialised functions, perhaps becoming more isolated laterally and
94 Arthur C. Danto (1981) The Transfiguration o f  the Commonplace: a philosophy o f  art, Cambridge,
Mass., Harvard University Press, p. 189.
95 R. C. Collingwood (1938) The Principles o f  Art, Oxford, OUP, p. 236.
96 Ibid. p. 285.
97 Betty Edwards Op. Cit. (1979; 1983 edn.) Ch. 5, “Drawing on Memories, Your History as an Artist”.
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98more integrated vertically (more encapsulated, according to Fodor’s model ; see 
section 2.4.1, above). One of the main processes in brain maturation is the stripping out 
of the connectivity between regions of the brain, which is at its maximum at birth", 
when, for example, the visual and auditory centres are linked together. Regions of the 
brain gradually lose their interconnections, but not totally, as we all remain to some 
extent synaesthesic, as the senses continue work in concert, not in isolation. Vision, for 
example, is heavily influenced by knowledge acquired through touch100. Also there are 
cross-modal illusions, where lip-reading can change the perceived sound of a phoneme, 
from ‘pa’ to ‘ka’101. Without some degree of synaesthesia, metaphors would be 
incomprehensible, and poetry colourless. This theory of brain connectivity, as described 
by Vilayanur Ramachandran in his 2003 BBC Reith Lectures102, now provides an 
explanation for experimentally identifiable synaesthetes, many of whom experience 
sounds with both auditory and colour sensations, apparently through having retained 
more of the infantile interconnections than others of more normal maturation .
The next piece of evidence comes from the work of Betty Edwards, who 
developed a method for teaching drawing, influenced by Roger W. Sperry, who won a 
Nobel prize in 1981 for his research into brain laterality. The subjects of his 
experiments were patients with so-called ‘split brains’, where the corpus callosum, had
98 The maturational process is described in Colwyn Trevarthen’s (1987a) entry on “Brain Development”
in R. L. Gregory (Ed.) (1987) Oxford Companion to the Mind, Oxford, OUP, pp. 101-110. 
However, any adverse effect o f this maturation on artistic development is my own speculation, 
as is my link with Fodor’s theory in this context. I am referring to Jerry A. Fodor Op. Cit. (1983) 
pp. 104-7.
99 Colwyn Trevarthen Op. Cit. (1987a). Fig. 3, p. 107: the caption reads: “The corpus callosum [linking
the hemispheres] has a maximum number o f fibres at birth (approximately 1010)but increases in 
size by fibre thickening, and myelin deposition, after a majority are lost in early infancy”.
100 Richard L. Gregory, contributor to ‘Perception and the Senses’, the 28 April 2005 edition o f In Our
Time, presented by Melvyn Bragg, with fellow contributors David Moore and Gemma Calvert, 
at http://www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/history/inourtime/inourtime_20050428.shtml.
101 David Moore gives this example in the same edition o f  In Our Time, as referenced in the previous
footnote. This is known as the ‘McGurk’ effect.
102 The Reith Lectures 2003 “The Emerging Mind” by Vilayanur S. Ramachandran. Still available to
“listen again”: http://www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/reith2003/lectures.shtml.
103 Other links experienced by synaesthetes are between numbers and colours, and more rarely, between
words and tastes and smells. A report, posted on the internet, at 
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/health/4375977.stm. states that scientists at the University o f  
California San Diego believe that, ‘This cross-wiring might develop . . .  by a failure o f the 
“pruning” of nerve connections between the areas [for processing different sensory information] 
as the brain develops . . .  ’ The second page o f the article cites Vilayanur Ramachandran’s well- 
known view that processes similar to synaesthesia might also underlie our general capacity for 
metaphor and might be essential to creativity. He is quoted as saying that, “It is not an accident 
that the condition [of synaesthesia] is eight times more common among artists than the general 
population”.
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previously been cut104, thus separating the left and right hemispheres in order to reduce 
the violence of their epileptic seizures. These subjects revealed more about the 
specialisation of function in each hemisphere than can be observed in ordinary cases of 
brain trauma. Specialist structures are already present as anatomical asymmetries in the 
foetal brain at 24 weeks, apparently in preparation for linguistic specialisation (in the 
left hemisphere), and for the perception of form and ‘visuo-constructive skills’ (in the 
right)105. In Sperry’s experiments, the left and right hemispheres could occasionally be 
seen to compete over a task, even to the point of one hand wrestling the other in an 
attempt to seize control. The relevance of this research to the aesthetic lies in three 
phenomena: 1) modes of thinking, 2) hemisphere dominance and 3) cerebral blood- 
flow. Edwards quotes Sperry on his split-brain experiments:
The main theme to emerge . . .  is that there appear to be two modes of thinking, 
verbal and nonverbal, represented rather separately in left and right hemispheres, 
respectively, and that our educational system, as well as science in general, tends 
to neglect the nonverbal form of intellect106.
As a result of our extended ‘left brain’ educational experience, perhaps, the left
t  ryj
hemisphere, with its verbal and arithmetical-mathematical reasoning becomes 
dominant in most of us, most of the time. However, in the joyous, sensuous play of 
early childhood, most of us also acquire sufficient visual-spatial ‘right-brain’ skills to 
perform adequately in our physical and cultural environments, before the brain modules 
involved fall into relative neglect, until reactivated in moments of peak experience, 
including contact with nature and engagement with the arts, sports and tasks with an 
aesthetic dimension.
A caveat is needed here, because subsequent research has shown that patterns of 
cerebral asymmetry are in fact rather more nuanced and variable than was at first 
believed following Sperry’s research. This makes the case for left-brain dominance less
104 Betty Edwards gives an account o f Sperry’s experiments, Op. Cit. (1979; 1983 edn.) pp. 26-32. The
corpus callosum is a 10cm long commissure joining the cerebral hemispheres deep in the brain. 
According to G ray’s Anatomy, this enables the two hemispheres to act as one by the “transfer o f 
information (including memorised data)”. See Williams, P.L. et el, (1995) G ray’s Anatomy: the 
Anatomical Basis o f  Medicine and Surgery (38th Edition), Edinburgh, Churchill Livingstone.pp. 
1178-82.
105 Colwyn Trevarthen, Op. Cit. (1987a). p. 108.
106 Berry Edwards, Op. Cit. (1979; 1993 edn.) p. 29.
107 Geometrical/mathematical reasoning, on the other hand, is usually a ‘right-brain function’ (see Fig. 2).
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clear-cut, and has revealed that, on average, the female brain is less asymmetrical than 
the male108. Bearing this reservation in mind, the following table in Fig. 2 summarises 
Sperry’s findings on hemisphere specialisation.
Left Hemisphere Right Hemisphere
■ Verbal ■ Almost non-verbal
■ Linguistic description ■ Musical
■ Mathematical ■ Geometrical
■ Sequential ■ Spatial comprehension
■ Analytical ■ Temporal synthesis
■ Direct link to ‘consciousness’ ■ Link to ‘consciousness’?
Fig. 2: Asymmetrical location of specialised brain functions
(from Gray’s Anatomy109)
Whatever the specific physical laterality in individuals, and this can vary, the pattern of 
separated functional areas is clear enough to enable us to speak, if only in short-hand, of 
‘left-brain’ and ‘right-brain’ function. In Fig. 2, the question-mark following the ‘link to 
consciousness’ of the right-hemisphere implies that much of the information processed 
there remains unconscious in normal circumstances, which would imply the need for 
practice, as in musical or artistic training, to bring ‘right-brain’ activity more fully into 
consciousness. Hence practice, and study, as attempted by Jones in Dickie’s thought 
experiment110, can help us to look and listen with more insight and appreciation.
It is at this point in the argument that the question of blood-flow within the brain 
becomes relevant. The brain’s high level of metabolism is very expensive for the body 
to maintain. Although the brain comprises only about 2% of the body’s weight, it 
receives 15% of the fresh blood from the heart, consumes 20% of the available 
oxygen111 and 20% of the available glucose, even when at rest112. In normal 
functioning, only limited regions of the brain can become active at any one time, and 
therefore the blood-flow within the brain is not equally distributed, but is directed, 
according to need, through rapidly dilating and constricting blood vessels, to the most 
active areas of the brain for any particular task. This process can be monitored more or
108 P.L Williams, et.al., Op. Cit., (1995) “Cerebral Asymmetry”, pp. 1183-6.
109 Ibid., p. 1184.
110 See section 2.2.2.1, above.
111 Sherwin B. Nuland (1997) The Wisdom o f  the Body, London, Chatto and Windus, p. 328.
112 Susan Greenfield (1997) The Human Brain: a guided tour, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, p. 28.
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less in real time in fMRI scans113, though the phenomenon had already been observed, 
externally, in the nineteenth century114.
Sperry claimed that Western education has encouraged habitual ‘left brain’ 
thinking, and Betty Edwards’ teaching method sets specific tasks intended to help adult 
students to harness their comparatively neglected visual-spatial skills to the task of 
drawing. That entails learning to divert blood-flow away from the dominant verbal ‘left 
brain’ to the right hemisphere. This shift, though not habitual in most adults, is possible 
because the brain circuits loosely referred to as ‘right-brain’ acquired in childhood the 
perceptual and manipulative skills needed for drawing, although these skills may have 
been neglected ever since. At first, it takes a struggle for adult drawing students to learn 
to suppress the (left) conceptual/verbal brain115.1 have often witnessed this kind of a 
‘tug of war’ between the hemispheres. Before students can improve their observational 
drawing, the ‘left brain’ has to ‘relinquish control’ to the ‘right’, enabling the ‘right 
brain’ to receive a sufficient supply of blood to accomplish the task. Plate 4a shows how 
concentrating on different aspects of the same visual stimulus activates different regions 
of the brain, and in so doing redirects the blood-flow. This refutes Dickie’s claims that 
attention comprises only ‘attention’ or ‘inattention’, with no qualitative differences116. 
These differences are exemplified, as we shall see shortly, when a person enters right- 
brain mode, which reduces blood-flow to the left hemisphere, thereby suppressing the 
verbal/conceptual thought and the verbal/conceptual formulae of childish drawing, in 
favour of the perception needed to produce a sensitive observational drawing of a 
complex object.
113 Rita Carter (1998) Mapping the Mind, London, Weidenfield & Nicholson, p. 26.
114 Michael I. Posner and Marcus E. Raichle (1994) Images o f  Mind, New York, Scientific American, (pp.
58-9) describe the case o f Walter K., who had a congenital skull malformation, and whenever he 
opened his eyes, especially coming out o f a darkened room, he reported a noise in his head. It 
was found that this was caused by an increase in blood-flow to his visual cortex, causing a bruit, 
which, with a stethoscope, was externally audible.
115 Betty Edwards sets specific tasks to help students become accustomed to the shift from left- to right-
brain mode. The aim is to wrong-foot the verbal/conceptual side o f the brain. One exercise 
involves turning an image to be copied through 180°, so that it is upside-down. This weakens the 
links to the verbal and cognitive, thus making the purely visual experience more accessible. See 
her Op. Cit (1979; 1983 edn.) Chapter Four, ‘Crossing Over: Experiencing the Shift From Left 
to Right’, pp. 45-59. See Plate 4a, in Appendix E.
116 Answering negatively the following questions arising from our analysis o f Dickie:
IB: Is Dickie correct in his claim that ‘distancing’, ‘under-distancing’ and ‘over-distancing’ are
‘phantom acts and states o f consciousness’, there being only ‘attention’ to an object, or 
‘inattention’?
IliA Is Dickie correct in his claim that differences in motivation result in no qualitative differences in 
attention or aesthetic experience?
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It is at this stage of the learning process that an unexpected dividend can be 
enjoyed. The act of inhibiting the verbal brain also silences for a while the voices of 
self-criticism, which usually assail students who have decided to try again to learn to 
draw, even though they feel they failed in the past. The room falls silent, and people 
experience the oceanic rapture of right-brain, non-verbal thinking. This kind of visual 
absorption is perhaps the origin of the concept of disinterestedness, and of descriptions 
of the aesthetic attitude, quoted, but otherwise discounted by Dickie, particularly Vivas’ 
description of the hockey game in slow motion117. In some circumstances, it requires 
practice to make a voluntary, as opposed to a spontaneous, shift into ‘right-brain’ 
thinking. That is why adults who did not learn, through practice, to make the shift 
habitually before adolescence, find it requires conscious effort to learn, later. The old 
teaching method was for the apprentice artist to spend some years copying the master’s 
drawings, like the young draughtsman in Chardin’s painting (Plate 5). One way a 
teacher can help students to begin to make the shift at will, is to learn what the ‘right- 
brain’ mental state feels like, by setting a task that the ‘left brain’ alone cannot attempt. 
This makes it easier for control to pass over to the ‘right brain’. Betty Edwards re­
enforces this with an injunction to banish verbal thoughts. One of her preparatory 
exercises asks students to study two Japanese woodcuts: Actor Dancing and Woman 
Dancer (See Plate 4b). These show how art can ignite imaginative, ‘right-brain’ 
thinking. If we allow ourselves time to contemplate each image, we begin to ‘hear’ the 
percussive or mellifluous musical accompaniment of each dancer. ‘Left brain’ (rational, 
verbal) thinking could not achieve this, nor handle the visual response inspired by 
watching a high waterfall, or waves breaking on rocks; nor listening to music, which
I 1 O
Schopenhauer considered the ultimate palliative for the trials of life . With practice, it 
is possible to learn to induce at will such rapturous states of mind in contemplating the 
visual world119. With a little comic bathos, Betty Edwards conjures up, in the mind’s 
eye, one of Leonardo’s studies of drapery (See Plate 6) when she writes in one of her 
marginal asides:
In The Doors o f Perception, Aldous Huxley described the effects of mescalin on 
his perception of ordinary things -  in this instance, the folds of his grey flannel
117 Quoted by George Dickie Op. Cit. (1964) p. 59; see section 2.2.2.1, above.
118 Kai Hammermeister (2002) The German Aesthetic Tradition, Cambridge, CUP, p. 117.
119 Edward Bullough believes that artists are “gifted” in achieving “distancing” (his term for adopting the
aesthetic attitude) towards phenomena beyond “the usual subjects o f Art”, Op. Cit., p. 302. I 
believe it is more a question o f practice acquired through training or chance opportunity.
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trousers. He saw the folds as “living hieroglyphs that stand in some peculiarly 
expressive way for the unfathomable mystery of pure living . . . .  The folds of 
my gray flannel trousers were charged with ‘isness’.” Huxley continued: “What 
the rest of us see only under the influence of mescalin, the artist is congenitally 
equipped to see all the time120.”
Rather than see it as a gift, I would agree with Betty Edwards that this change in mind­
set can be learned, and her technique is to set students tasks that baffle the ‘left-brain’, 
thus encouraging ‘right-brain’ activity. This evidence would point us towards an 
affirmative answer to our fourth question in this section:
IliiB Is disinterestedness a necessary condition for the aesthetic attitude?
Another task set by Betty Edwards to baffle the left hemisphere, so that it cedes
control to the right, is to copy, upside-down, a reproduction of Picasso’s portrait
drawing of Igor Stravinsky121 (See Plate 7a). Students are told to refrain, while making
the copy, from naming the parts of the body represented. As might be expected, the pre-
100course drawings of Edwards’ students A and B in Plate 7b (left) are similarly childish 
and ‘left-brain’ (conceptually dominated, or formulaic). In an experiment, their copies 
of the Picasso turned out very differently, although at a ‘beginner level’ their work had 
been comparable (See Plate 7b, right). Student A was asked to copy the drawing the 
‘right way up’, making it easy for the left hemisphere to seize control, and impose its 
stereotypical visual/conceptual symbols for parts of the body, as learned in childhood. 
Student B, who had been tasked to keep the picture ‘upside-down’, and to avoid naming 
body parts, was able more effectively to ‘baffle and silence’ the ‘left brain’, enabling 
the ‘right-brain’ to undertake its visual-spatial task, with a much better outcome. John 
Ruskin, in Modern Painters, gave an early description of just such a battle between 
cognition and vision, recently quoted extensively by John Onians in the Ruskin chapter 
of his recent book on ‘Neuroarthistory’123.
It is not easy for adult students of drawing to establish such new habits of visual 
perception and manual skill. In my experience, one of the most difficult is to learn to 
see the spaces between or around objects as discrete shapes, and then to hold them in
120 Betty Edwards Op. Cit. (1979; 1983 edn.) p. 88.
121 Picasso’s Portrait o f  Igor Stravinsky (1920), reproduced up-side-down, Ibid. p. 52.
122 All student drawings in Plate 7b are taken from Ibid. p. 54.
123 John Onians (2007) Neuroarthistory: From Aristotle and Pliny to Baxandall and Zeki, New Haven,
Yale Univeristy Press, pp. 88-94.
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short-term memory for long enough to be able to draw them. These shapes are known in 
studio jargon as ‘negative spaces’ (each marked by an ‘x’ in Plate 8a124). Negative 
spaces include the shapes of bits of background, as in this diagram for beginners. They 
also include, for more advanced students, the gaps between items on a surface, such as 
the shapes of un-named tracts of skin, such as the spaces between the eyes, between the 
eye and the eyebrow, and so on. These are usually unnamed gaps between other, named, 
visual elements125. They do not come ‘pre-packaged’ as items in the left brain’s word- 
bank. This verbal lacuna seems to make negative spaces, at first, very difficult to 
summon up into consciousness, where they can be mentally circumscribed, memorised 
and drawn. However, it is worthwhile persevering with this feat of mental gymnastics 
for two reasons. The first is that learning to see and then draw negative spaces helps to 
position landmark features in the correct relationship with each other. Secondly, it gives 
students another unexpected bonus: it can open their eyes to the ‘visual music’ of the 
beautiful forms of negative spaces, not only in the works of the old masters (Plate 8b), 
but also in the everyday world around them.
However, it would be an exaggeration to conclude that drawing and the aesthetic 
attitude are both entirely ‘right brain’ activities. It is clear from fMRI scans, that more 
than one part of the brain can be engaged in a task, and blood flow can be switched 
quickly from one part of the brain to another, while the ‘findings’ of the separate parts 
of the brain are somehow brought together in short term memory. It is here where 
words, previously banished by an act of will, can now be welcomed back to assist with 
the twin tasks of visual analysis and fleeting memorisation. The trick is to supply these 
nameless negative spaces with nicknames. As a drawing teacher, I might ask a student, 
“Can you see the diamond-shaped space between here and here?” as I point to a gap 
between elements in the visual array being drawn.
In one of the few scientific studies of the drawing process, the portrait artist 
Humphrey Ocean gave this commentary as he was drawing a portrait:
The shape you are putting down is always abstract. ( . . . )  That next rhomboid is 
the side of the nose -  or it is an abstract shape. Each bit of the picture has to be 
able to exist in its own right. Even if there was none of the rest of the painting, if 
you put that bit down, it would work126.
124 The chair comes Betty Edwards Op. Cit. (1979; 1993 Edn) Fig. 7-19, p. 108; the ‘x ’ letters were added
by me.
125 Named elements, like the upper lip, need to be ‘re-conceived’ as shapes to be drawn correctly.
126 From the Concluding Remarks (Section 8) o f a report posted on the internet by R. C. Miall and John
Tchalenko (2001) “Eye Movements in Portrait Drawing” at
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Using eye tracking equipment, it was found that, when drawing, the length of Ocean’s 
fixed gaze directed at a detail of the model’s face averaged about 1 second, twice that of 
novice artists (Plate 9a127). When not engaged in drawing, Ocean’s eye fixations 
returned to the average of about half a second. The most finished portrait drawing of the
experiment is shown in Plate 9b. This shows the artist’s clear mapping out of the
128negative spaces .
2.4.3 Sperry and Edwards: Discussion and Conclusion
What, then, are the conclusions from this preliminary excursion into brain 
anatomy and function? The first is to confirm our doubts about Dickie’s claims in 
sections I and II of his article, that attention is a uniform, undifferentiated, state of 
mind129. Empirical evidence now available indicates that the aesthetic attitude is a 
reality in that the qualities of mind experienced during a sensitive response to a natural 
object or work of art depend not only on the properties of the object, but also upon 
which areas of the subject’s brain are prepared to engage and do in fact become engaged 
in the response. What I have been calling, in short-hand, ‘right-brain thinking’ appears 
to be partly a matter of learning to access more fully the early-stage processing of visual
1 3 0stimulation by the sensory modules of the brain. Fodor expresses doubts about the 
claims of painters and phoneticians to be able to access this level of sensory awareness, 
but in my experience, this is what is required for people to learn to draw. I have
http://www.arts.ac.uk/research/drawing cognition/portrait.htm. A shortened version o f this Sci- 
art study appeared in Leonardo (2001), Vol. 34, No. 1, pp. 35-40.
127 Ibid. (web posting), Fig 11.
128 Op. C/7., (web posting), Fig 12. A comparable study was carried out as part o f the National Gallery’s
“Telling Time” millennium celebrations. This looked at the eye movements o f people looking at 
paintings, to see whether artists o f the past were successful, as is often assumed, in directing the 
gaze o f viewers. The vast quantity o f data collected has not yet been analysed to see if  there is 
any difference between the way trained artists and other members o f the public look at paintings 
(see http://www.lboro.ac.uk/research/esri/applied-vision/projects/national_gallery/index.htm). 
Some other more general findings from the National Gallery project are briefly discussed in 
Andrew T Duchowski (2003) Eye Tracking Methodology: Theory and Practice, New York, 
Springer.
129This gives firm negative answers to questions IB, IliA and IliB:
IB: Is Dickie correct in his claim that ‘distancing’, ‘under-distancing’ and ‘over-distancing’ are
‘phantom acts and states o f consciousness’, there being only ‘attention’ to an object, or 
‘inattention’?
IliA Is Dickie correct in his claim that differences in motivation result in no qualitative differences in 
attention or aesthetic experience?
IliB Is Dickie correct in his claim that the ‘aesthetic attitude’ is a myth, because there is only 
‘attending’ more or less ‘closely’?
130 Jerry A. Fodor Op. Cit., (1983) p. 54.
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observed that, until they attempted to draw an object using light and shade, some
students had not learned voluntarily to bring to consciousness the pattern of highlights
and shadows that constantly plays across objects. Hitherto they had seen objects qua
objects, and only began to notice the way light gives three dimensional form to an
object when they tried to draw it from observation. After all, Zeki would argue, the
prime function of the brain is to pick out the permanent characteristics of objects
1 ^  1against the ‘noise’ of such fleeting contingencies .
The second conclusion is to confirm that Stolnitz’s claim of incompatibility 
between criticism (verbal/conceptual/left-brain thinking) and appreciation (non-verbal, 
‘oceanic’, right-brain response) has received some support from observing the tug-of- 
war between the left and right hemispheres experienced by students of drawing, who 
can engage fully with some aspects of their visual perception only by relatively 
suppressing their language-dominated thinking. However, Dickie as film commentator, 
and Ocean as portrait artist, both learned the trick of switching rapidly between what we 
are calling ‘left-‘ and ‘right-brain’ modes of perceptual engagement and thinking. 
Stolnitz detected, but over-stated, the divide between the two modes. A balanced 
appreciation of any artwork becomes less likely if one is locked into either left- or right- 
brain functioning. Jasper Johns argues for Stolnitz’s position, with his brick-shaped 
sculpture, The Critic Sees made in 1964, the same year as Dickie’s article, in which he 
modelled a pair of spectacles with talking mouths in place of eyes (See Plate 10). This 
goes a long way towards explaining the difficulty some people have with innovatory art, 
where their aesthetic experience is occluded by their linguistically articulated ‘rational’ 
objections to innovation. Children, with fewer preconceptions, are usually much more 
open to new or unconventional work, both in the visual arts and music. Therefore, the 
following claim, effectively contradicted by Hume in section 2.3 above, seems to 
acquire some credence from brain laterality, but must await further evidence:
AvC Appreciation and criticism are incompatible mental states.
The third conclusion is that, when we are learning anything, neural connections 
are strengthened between regions of the brain; in the case of learning to draw, perhaps, 
between the visual cortex, the motor cortex controlling the hand, nerves directing blood-
131 Semir Zeki (1999a) Inner Vision: an exploration o f  Art and the Brain, Oxford, OUP, p. 5. This view 
fits with Roger Fry’s distinction between the ‘imaginative life’ and the ‘actual life’, discussed in 
section 7.5, below).
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flow and so forth. In order to accommodate the new demands being made on the brain, 
some neural patterns are weakened, others reinforced, and new connections grow,
•  • 132 *restoring some of the brain’s connectivity lost in the maturational process . This 
growing interconnectivity through learning seems to reduce the encapsulated modularity 
of the brain, which, in any case, is now known to be less rigid than Fodor at first 
believed133. Not only is greater connectivity established ‘vertically’ in what Fodor 
called the ‘input systems’ (e.g. the visual cortex), but also within the ‘central systems’ 
linking concepts and different ‘input systems’. Thus the perceptual skills acquired in 
learning to draw can impart a generally enhanced level of sensory and cognitive 
awareness and, not only towards art, but also towards ordinary life experiences.
I am not claiming that it is a necessary condition for this improving sensory (or 
even ‘aesthetic’) perceptiveness that it be acquired through practical activity, but there 
are indications that such learning can accelerate and in some ways deepen the process. 
For example, even a failed attempt to learn to play the piano can make one listen with 
more awareness to a performance of Chopin. Dickie was therefore wrong to claim, 
‘there is only one way to listen to (to attend to) music134’. It is also clear that it is 
possible to learn to adopt the aesthetic attitude, simply by being an attentive member of 
the audience. David Hume had realised this, when he wrote that:
. . .  the same address and dexterity, which practice gives to the execution of any 
work, is also acquired by the same means, in the judging of it135.
This acknowledges the powerful, but often unacknowledged, role of the perceptive 
patron, connoisseur or critic, a theme to which we shall return: the often overlooked 
Role of the Patron and Critic (RPC):
RPC Consider the role of the patron, critic and connoisseur of art.
We can conclude, therefore, that education and practice in aesthetic perception 
can help subjects to get more closely in touch with their feelings and perceptions. This
132 New dendritic growth in adulthood is still disputed by some scientists who insist on genetic
determination. However Gray’s Anatomy states: “There is some evidence that dendritic trees 
may be plastic structures throughout adult life, expanding and contracting as the traffic of  
synaptic activity varies through afferent axodendritic contacts (for review see Berry 1991)”
(from “Dendrites” in P. L. Williams et a i, Op. Cit., p. 922).
133 See Jay L. Garfield (1994) “Modularity” in Samuel Guttenplan (Ed.) A Companion to the Philosophy
o f  Mind, Oxford, Blackwell, pp. 441-8.
134 George Dickie Op. Cit. (1964) p. 58.
135 David Hume Op. Cit. (1757; 1995 edn.) p. 262.
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will not only increase the readiness and fluency with which they are able to adopt the
aesthetic attitude towards objects of all kinds, but it has the potential to enhance their
sensitivity and awareness in other aspects of their lives. This, of course, is one of the
prime sources of value in the arts, and one of the main reasons for including the arts in
education. Dickie’s Jones and Smith thought experiment, designed to prove attention is
‘on’ or ‘o ff, with no qualitative variation apart from degrees of inattention, therefore
1fails, as do its re-iterations by Noel Carroll .
We shall now consider another approach to the role of feelings and brain 
function.
2.4.4 Damasio: The Feeling of What Happens
1 ^7In his book, The Feeling o f  What Happens , the neurologist Antonio Damasio 
explores the nature of consciousness and its basis in the brain, body and the emotions. 
Many of his case studies are of his own patients who have suffered brain trauma 
through accident or disease. Where bilateral lesions have occurred, the effect is to 
eliminate specific elements from consciousness.
The amygdalae aid survival and well-being by triggering a fear reaction, for 
example, causing us to leap back on to the pavement, automatically, when threatened by 
a passing bus of which we are unaware, until after the event. The amygdalae also 
operate in more subliminal ways. Damasio’s patient S had lost the use of both of her 
amygdalae through calcification, and this led her, despite normal intelligence and 
learning ability, to be too trusting towards unsavoury characters138. Damasio and his 
colleagues studied her deficit in a number of tests. One revealed that she had lost the 
ability to recognise the expression offear in other people’s faces, whereas she was able 
to recognise and even draw an expression of surprise. Another test presented her with a
136 Dickie Op. Cit. (1964) p. 58; Noel Carroll has ‘Sydney and Evelyn’ with pianist ‘Jerome’ in his Op.
Cit. (1999) pp. 185-6; ‘Oscar and Charles’ in his (2001b) “Four Concepts o f Aesthetic 
Experience” in N. Carroll (2001a) Beyond Aesthetics: Philosophical Essays, Cambridge, CUP, 
(pp. 41-62), pp. 48-9. In the latest version, Carroll stipulates that the brain computations o f  
‘Charles and Oscar’ in listening to the piece o f music are ‘type identical’. This is an impossible 
demand as all human beings have had different learning experiences which will give them 
different neural configurations. He claims the only differences between Oscar and Charles are 
differences in belief about the ‘instrumental’ or ‘intrinsic’ value o f listening to music, making 
the one experience ‘aesthetic’ and the other ‘non-aesthetic’. He has in effect abandoned the 
distinctions drawn by Dickie in 1964, and can only claim success for his argument by imputing 
an unrealistic position to those defending the aesthetic attitude. Clearly, Oscar and Charles have 
both adopted the aesthetic attitude, albeit with different motivations and beliefs.
137 Antonio Damasio Op. Cit. (1999).
138 Ibid. pp. 62-7.
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set of 100 portrait photographs, which had been rated for trustworthiness by a control 
group. Patient S agreed with the ratings of the trustworthy faces, but unlike patients 
with only one damaged amygdala, or members of the control group, she failed to 
identify any sinister-looking faces.
Although Damasio’s focus is not on aesthetics, his neurological findings are 
relevant. We learn that, below the threshold of consciousness, the brain is constantly 
monitoring sensory inputs for signs of danger. This is effected by the brain sampling 
unrefined, early-stage sensory input, with many false alarms (e.g. being startled by a 
wind-blown plastic bag in peripheral vision, mistaken for a bird) resulting in rapid 
‘alert’ signals to the amygdalae, by-passing the relatively slow-processing, but more 
reliable, higher sensory cortex. In this way, the amygdalae can trigger a quick physical 
response to avoid a bus, which could save a person’s life.
Damasio’s case study of patient S shows that the amygdalae carry out their 
danger-monitoring activity, even when someone is merely looking at photographs, with 
no immediate physical threat; they affect our state of mind whether we are engaging 
with real life situations or with media, such as works of art. The failure of the 
amygdalae in patient S meant that, to her, the sinister faces just didn’t look sinister.
There are implications here for Frank Sibley’s model of the aesthetic. As Colin 
Lyas has described, Sibley introduced a distinction between aesthetic concepts, such as
‘balanced’ and ‘graceful’, and non-aesthetic properties, such as having ‘a red patch’, or
« ♦ 1 ^ 0being ‘curved’, physical properties upon which the aesthetic properties ‘supervene’ .
Although Sibley insisted there were no ‘necessary conditions’ for non-aesthetic
properties to meet before aesthetic terms can be applied to them140, he did argue that,
within certain limitations, there is a near equivalence of objectivity between secondary
qualities, such as colour, and publicly shareable, widely agreed, aesthetic properties141.
Sibley deployed this argument in order to establish an ontological equivalence between
aesthetic experiences and colour experiences. However, the case of patient S compels us
to adjust his emphasis slightly. Rather than aesthetic properties being a matter of a
publicly shareable correspondence between an object’s primary qualities and its
139 Colin Lyas (1992) ‘Sibley, Frank N oel’ in David Cooper (Ed.) Op. Cit. pp. 397-9.
140 Frank Sibley (1959) ‘Aesthetic Concepts’, Philosophical Review, 68, pp. 421-50, (revised version in
J. Margolis (Ed.) (1962) Philosophy Looks at the Arts, 1st Edition, New York, Scribner’s, pp. 63- 
88; edition consulted: F. Sibley (2001) Approach to Aesthetics: Collected Papers on 
Philosophical Aesthetics, Oxford, OUP (pp. 1-23) p. 5.
141 Frank Sibley (1968) ‘Objectivity in Aesthetics’, Proceedings o f  the Aristotelian Society,
Supplementary Vol. 42, pp. 31-54, reprinted in F. Sibley Op. Cit. (2001) pp. 71-87.
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aesthetic properties, as implied by Sibley’s account of supervenience, the emphasis 
should perhaps make more allowance for the individual subject’s capacity or 
preparedness to perceive certain aesthetic qualities142. This is already partly implicit in 
Sibley’s awareness of the educational side, with ‘arm-waving’ to help novices to 
perceive subtler aesthetic properties. This would correspond to teachers encouraging 
students to focus on line, negative spaces, or light and shade. They are encouraging 
students to ‘dig’ below the formulaic expectations of conceptually-engaged (rather than 
visually-engaged) students, whose preconceptions cause them to be visually neglectful, 
as in the different outcomes for students A and B in the Picasso-copying exercise (See 
Plate 7b, right). John Onians quotes Ruskin’s example of Northern European artists 
painting Italian skies intensely blue, because of their erroneous preconceptions143. 
Perhaps Sibley’s ‘arm waving’ is encouraging novices to go ‘beneath’ their 
stereotypical, linguistically dominated, expectations, in order to engage more intently, 
in ‘right brain mode’, with the sensory qualities of an aesthetic object, below their 
‘everyday’ preoccupations and preconceptions. Perhaps Sibley should have spoken of 
‘subvenience’ rather than ‘supervenience’.
Thus, any adequate account of the aesthetic must allow for a widely variable 
level of what might be called aesthetic preparedness. For each individual, the aesthetic 
qualities they perceive, and their judgments, are as real and vivid to them as the colour 
red or the taste of sugar, and should therefore also be accorded an ontological status for 
those individuals, which is equivalent to their experiences of redness or sweetness. Such 
a statement seems seriously to compromise the realism of aesthetic properties. Sibley’s 
reply would be that the aesthetic dimension should not be subject to a higher standard of 
objectivity than that demanded of other disciplines, such as history, or even physics, 
which also face a measure of inter-subjective undecidability. I believe that this would be 
Sibley’s riposte to John W. Bender, who takes the harsh view that irresolvable aesthetic 
disputes are the ‘nemesis’ of aesthetic realism144.
2.4.5 Preliminary Empirical Evidence: Summary and Conclusion
142 Sibley does consider psychological variability in aesthetic response: Ibid., pp. 81-3.
143 John Onians Op. Cit. (2007) p. 89.
144 John W. Bender “Aesthetic Realism 2”, in Jerrold Levinson (Ed.) (2003) The Oxford Handbook o f
Aesthetics, Oxford, OUP (pp. 80-98) p. 93.
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To conclude this preliminary investigation of empirical evidence, it can be said 
that Dickie’s attacks on the aesthetic attitude have again been shown to fail, both his 
argument that there is only ‘attention’ or ‘inattention’ without qualitative variation, and 
that the aesthetic attitude is a ‘myth’(*IB and *IIiB)145. There are different qualities of 
attention, depending on the state of preparedness of the respondent. Consciousness is a 
confluence of many different streams of thought, sensation, emotion and past 
experience, arising from different parts of the brain and body; some are given 
prominence, by selectively increased blood-flow, other parts, relatively starved of 
oxygen and glucose, are pressed into the background or suppressed by other mental 
processes. Bullough’s spatial metaphor of ‘distancing’ may not be ideal, but it does 
attempt to describe a real phenomenon, which is not unlike the experience of students 
learning to draw who have to ‘distance’ or suppress their verbal thinking, in order to 
engage more fully with their visual experience. Drawing students are striving to bring to 
the foreground of their consciousness aspects of their sensory experience that they had 
learned largely to ignore. To practise such ways of foregrounding sensory experience 
and other responsive feelings and cognitions is also to practise how to adopt the 
aesthetic attitude.
2.5 A Definition of the Aesthetic Attitude
2.5.1 Defining the Aesthetic
Although concerned with the ontology rather than the definition of art146, this 
thesis attempts to redress deflationary accounts of the aesthetic by offering a robust 
definition of the ‘aesthetic’ and its cognates, applicable to nature, everyday life, and art. 
As quickly becomes apparent, these definitions reflect the biological content of section
2.4 above, and anticipate the biological chapters on evolutionary theory and cognitive
145 This confirms the negative outcomes to the following two questions from sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2.1: 
*IB: Is Dickie correct in his claim that ‘distancing’, ‘under-distancing’ and ‘over-distancing’ are
‘phantom acts and states o f consciousnes’, there being only ‘attention’ to an object, or 
‘inattention’?
*IIiB Is Dickie correct in his claim that the ‘aesthetic attitude’ is a myth, because there is only 
‘attending’ more or less ‘closely’?
146 In writing this thesis, I did not intend to attempt a definition o f art, but in reviewing my conclusions, it
seemed but a small step to risk such a definition, for no other reason than to conclude the 
sequence o f paragraphs begun in this chapter, and completed in Appendix A.
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neuroscience to follow (chapters 6 and 7). The full set of my definitions appears in 
Appendix A.
The term ‘aesthetic’ can stand alone, but is usually found as an adjective in such 
phrases as ‘aesthetic attitude’ and ‘aesthetic experience’. This linking of terms seems to 
make circularity inevitable, as each definition builds on earlier ones, a pattern observed 
by George Dickie in his book, The Art Circle141. It is also implicit in the structure of the 
‘axiomatic’ style of argument employed by Baumgarten148. At this point, only a few of 
my definitions will be given, but enough to indicate that the present argument follows 
Barmgarten in making a close link between perception and aesthetic experience:
§ 1 The a e s t h e t i c  is both an active and a passive resource for the flourishing 
of organisms.
§2 The p a s s iv e  a e s t h e t i c  comprises feelings and cognitions engendered by 
attention directed towards an external object or internal thought and/or 
feeling.
§3 The a c t i v e  a e s t h e t i c  is the presentation of a sensory profile by one 
organism to other organisms. The active aesthetic can be either tacit or 
expressive.
It is clear from the above, that this account of the aesthetic includes the sensory 
signalling and responses of both human and non-human species.
2.5.2 Defining the Aesthetic Attitude
On the basis of the arguments deployed in this thesis so far, and anticipating the 
findings of chapters six and seven, I now wish to oppose Dickie’s denial of the aesthetic 
attitude by offering the following definition, at this point in a draft form.
§14 To adopt the a e s t h e t i c  a t t i t u d e  is to take ‘time out’ from the flux of 
work-a-day practical necessities and, in a highly vigilant state of mind, to 
scrutinise an object or cognition in order to focus on the full range of 
feelings and cognitions it engenders in the subject. This ‘time out’ factor is 
the origin of the term d i s i n t e r e s t e d n e s s  in the context of aesthetics.
147 George Dickie admits the problem, as reflected in the title o f his book: (1984; 1997 edn.) The Art
Circle: a Theory o f  Art, Evanston, Illinois, Chicago Spectrum Press.
148 Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten Op. Cit (1735; 1954 edn.). Aschenbrenner and Holther explain this
style o f argumentation in their ‘Introduction’, p. 10, and is briefly discussed in section 1.3.1, 
above.
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An aesthetic experience is subjectively intensified: 1) through a heightened 
awareness of the sensory details within the subject’s external or internal fields of 
perception, whether of objects, feelings or thoughts, and 2) by reacting to the cognitions 
invoked by the perceptual experiences, feelings or thoughts, and 3) by any emotions 
(affects) which may also have been triggered by any of the above.
2.6 Summary and Conclusion
2.6.1 Conclusions from the Dickie Questions
This chapter began with a detailed analysis of Dickie’s landmark paper, ‘The 
Myth of the Aesthetic Attitude’, and argued that, although Dickie’s paper purported to 
be about the ‘aesthetic attitude’ and ‘disinterestedness’, its real target was neither of 
these, but was Stolnitz’s version of formalism. Stolnitz and Dickie had, indeed, 
employed the words ‘aesthetic attitude’ and ‘disinterestedness’, but Dickie’s attack was 
made upon eccentric, rather than paradigmatic, versions of both concepts. It was found 
that, although Dickie correctly rejected Stolnitz’s interpretation of disinterestedness, he 
does not attempt to correct Stolnitz’s account, but instead claims to have ‘purged’ the 
aesthetic attitude of distancing and disinterestedness, leaving a ‘vacuous’ account of the 
aesthetic attitude as merely ‘attending closely’. In making this move, Dickie damagingly 
misrepresented both the aesthetic attitude and disinterestedness, partly because he 
refused to engage with the phenomenology of the aesthetic attitude as it is described in 
several quotations contained in his article. Nor does he consider alternative, historic, 
uses of the term ‘disinterestedness’.
This chapter has begun to counter Dickie’s claims by a) taking 
phenomenological accounts of the aesthetic attitude seriously as accounts of something 
real, rather than of ‘phantoms’, b) beginning to enquire into eighteenth century views of 
the aesthetic and disinterestedness, in this case the account given by Hume in his essay 
‘Of the Standard of Taste’, and c) by beginning to look at empirical evidence for the 
aesthetic attitude and disinterestedness.
This evidence, from cognitive neuroscience and its practical application in Betty 
Edwards’ method of teaching drawing to adults, is that the aesthetic attitude is a real 
phenomenon that entails ‘disinterestedness’. This takes the form of suppressing verbal
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thinking (and its ‘everyday’ preoccupations) in the task of learning to draw, by bringing 
direct visual experience more fully into consciousness. This entails a ‘distancing’ from 
ordinary life, and is a necessary part of adopting the ‘aesthetic attitude’. It was also 
confirmed in Hume’s account of engagement with the work of art. This by itself does 
not complete the re-examination of disinterestedness in the wake of Stolnitz’s version, 
as Kant’s approach to disinterestedness will also be examined in chapter five.
We have a tactical explanation for Dickie’s denial of aesthetic experience (IA), 
in his desire to redirect the philosophy of art away from the aesthetic and towards the 
‘Institutional’. Our arguments have dismissed Dickie’s denial of different states of 
consciousness in aesthetic experience (*IB, *IIiA, and *IIiB149). Dickie’s assumption 
that Stolnitz’ account of disinterestedness was the only one was false (*IIiiA150), and 
evidence has been found in support of disinterestedness being a necessary condition for 
the aesthetic attitude (IliiB151).
It could be argued that Dickie’s paper has had a damaging and distorting effect 
on the debate in aesthetics in the analytical tradition. The damage is reflected in the 
widespread misapprehension among those who can remember only the misleading title 
of Dickie’s paper, who then reiterate such profound apergus as chapter one’s Sceptical 
Hypothesis 1: “Dickie has proved that the ‘aesthetic attitude’ is a ‘myth’”. Thus 
Janaway feels licensed to end a commentary on the ‘Aesthetic Attitude’, with the 
words: ‘The notion of an aesthetic attitude deserves to be treated with some scepticism,
i c*\
as it has been in recent philosophy ’.
2.6.2 Conclusions from Additional Questions and Claims
Two further issues arose in the course of reading Dickie’s paper, and the findings 
will be reviewed here:
149*IB: Is Dickie correct in his claim that ‘distancing’, ‘under-distancing’ and ‘over-distancing’ are 
‘phantom acts and states o f consciousness’, there being only ‘attention’ to an object, or 
‘inattention’?
“"IliA Is Dickie correct in his claim that differences in motivation result in no qualitative differences in 
attention or aesthetic experience?
♦IliB Is Dickie correct in his claim that the ‘aesthetic attitude’ is a myth, because there is only 
‘attending’ more or less ‘closely’?
150 *IIiiA Is Dickie correct in his assumption that Stolnitz’s interpretation o f disinterestedness is the only
version o f that concept?
151 IliiB Is disinterestedness a necessary condition for the aesthetic attitude?
152 Dr. C. Janaway (1995) ‘Aesthetic Attitude’ in T. Hondenrich, The Oxford Companion to Philosophy,
Oxford, OUP, p.8.
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AvC Appreciation and criticism are incompatible mental states
The present enquiry has uncovered evidence both for and against such an 
incompatibility. The evidence from Hume weighed against Stolnitz and in favour of 
Dickie: the two activities of appreciation and criticism are not only compatible, but 
inseparable. However, the evidence from brain laterality would seem to indicate an 
incompatibility, owing to competition for blood supply between different brain 
modules. Nevertheless, the case of Humphrey Ocean, who became adept at switching 
rapidly between verbal/conceptual and visual/spatial states of mind, suggests that, by 
rapid switching, and holding the results of both forms of brain activity in short-term 
memory, it is possible to overcome this incompatibility. Although the switching can be 
automatic, to switch at will appears to be a learned skill, part of an artist’s training. This 
interplay between the a) sensory stimulation and b) concepts, at work in drawing and in 
looking at art, seems to be the first clue to what Kant described as the ‘free play of the 
Imagination and Understanding’, and this is a line of enquiry to be followed up in the 
forthcoming chapters.
The second additional issue concerned the role of the patron, critic or connoisseur:
RPC Consider the role of the patron, critic and connoisseur of art.
Hume pointed out that, even without learning the practical skills of the artist, the
patron, critic and connoisseur can develop the mental skills involved in understanding,
responding to and evaluating works of art, involving the same interplay between
1 ^sensory stimulation and concepts . Hume descnbes how the novice needs to learn to 
harness and develop such critical skills. The important roles of patron, critic and 
connoisseur will be considered further as the thesis unfolds, where I will argue that their 
evolutionary origins lie in the aesthetic choices made by non-human animals, 
principally, though not exclusively, in mate selection.
2.6.3 Review of the Sceptical Hypotheses
153 There is another parallel with linguistic competence, in that people can develop listening or reading 
skills in a language, without acquiring the ‘practical’ skills o f speaking or writing.
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At the beginning of chapter one, eight ‘Sceptical Hypotheses’ were introduced to 
express the tenor of recent deflationary scepticism towards the aesthetic. Two of these 
have now been eliminated by our study of Dickie (marked by an asterisk).
*SH1 Dickie has proved that the ‘aesthetic attitude’ is a ‘myth’.
*SH6 The term ‘aesthetic’ by definition excludes the cognitive, historical, or 
moral.
However, the following five will need to be carried forward:
SH2 “It’s putting it in an art gallery that makes it art.”
SH3 “The word ‘aesthetic’ connotes passive receptivity.”
SH4 “Duchamp proved that the aesthetic is merely optional in art.”
SH5 “The historical aspect of art ‘trumps’ the aesthetic.”
SH7 “The source of the aesthetic lies in art rather than in nature” (paraphrase
of Hegel).
The next chapter will examine the wider picture of scepticism towards the 
aesthetic, including the way Dickie’s ‘deflationary’ account developed in Anglo- 
American analytical aesthetics over the next forty years, in his own work, and in the 
work of Danto, Levinson, Carroll, and Stephen Davies. Any sceptical questions left 
unresolved from that survey will be raised in the subsequent four chapters, two on 
eighteenth century philosophers and two on empirical evidence from the biological 
sciences. Finally, chapter eight will draw together the conclusions of the thesis, and 
apply them to the three case studies: the art of the bowerbird, the nexus of art, power 
and crime and sound sculpture.
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ABSTRACT
This chapter attempts to place the research questions of this thesis in the 
philosophical context of contemporary analytical aesthetics in the Anglo- 
American tradition, which for decades was dominated by a physicalist model of 
the artwork, inherited from positivism. Weaknesses in physicalist and non-realist 
approaches are analysed, and alternative approaches are sought by applying the 
realist ontologies developed by Gregory Currie and Joseph Margolis. The 
historical dimension of artworks is seen to assist the interpretation, rather than 
the identification of art. The distinction between ‘functional’ and ‘procedural’ 
models of art is rejected as a relict of physicalist thinking about artworks, and 
the aesthetic is reasserted as necessary to art, rather than merely contingent.
3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 The Place of this Chapter in the Argument
The second chapter exemplified the style of argument adopted by this thesis: 
first to examine scepticism towards the aesthetic, and then to counter it: 1) by 
contemporary philosophical argument, 2) by reference to eighteenth century aesthetics 
and 3) by empirical evidence. The present chapter will expand on the first step in that 
sequence by closely examining further sceptical challenges to the aesthetic, refining the 
issues raised, and attempting to reply to them using the resources of philosophical 
argument. Unresolved issues will be carried forward to chapters four to seven.
Chapters four and five will enlarge upon the second chapter’s questioning of 
eighteenth century aesthetics in the work of David Hume, by extending the enquiry to 
Baumgarten and Kant. It may be questioned why this historical survey has two large 
omissions: 1) the ancient Greeks and 2) nineteenth century aesthetics. Twentieth 
century ‘deflationary’ aesthetics made a number of claims about the meaning of the 
words ‘aesthetic’ and ‘disinterestedness’, and it became an objective of this project to 
ask how those words had been used, and the concepts understood, in the eighteenth 
century, the period in which modem philosophical aesthetics was consolidated1. In the 
nineteenth century, particularly under the influence of Hegel, the emphasis had shifted 
towards the historical rather than the aesthetic, and for reasons of space and time, it was 
decided, rather than attempting to describe the development of the historical line of
1 Paul Guyer (2005) Values o f  Beauty: Historical Essays in Aesthetics, Cambridge, CUP.
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argument, to attempt 1) to clarify the eighteenth century context from which the debate 
arose, and 2) to attempt some kind of a synthesis.
Chapters six and seven will expand upon the second chapter’s initial search for 
empirical evidence for the reality of the aesthetic, first considering the relevance of 
evolutionary theory, and then expanding upon the second chapter’s turn to cognitive 
neuroscience. Chapter eight will review all the arguments presented in the thesis, and 
will attempt to apply them to this project’s three case studies: 1) bowerbird art, 2) the 
nexus of art, power and crime and 3) sound sculpture.
3.1.2 The Structure of this Chapter
The arguments of this chapter are directed at the two prime research questions: 
RQ1: ‘What is the aesthetic?’ and 
RQ2: ‘What is the relationship of the aesthetic to art?’
Four new claims, sceptical of the aesthetic, will be examined in this chapter. 
Also, the discussion will involve some other issues raised in chapter one, such as the 
dialectic between synchronic and diachronic accounts of art, and also look at some of 
the unresolved questions and issues carried forward from chapter two:
From section 2.6.1:
IliiB Is disinterestedness a necessary condition for the aesthetic 
attitude?
From section 2.6.2:
AvC Appreciation and criticism are incompatible mental states.
RPC Consider the role of the patron, critic and connoisseur of art.
Also under consideration are the six ‘Sceptical Hypotheses’ that were still 
unresolved by the end of chapter two, and listed in 2.6.3. The following are the four 
new sceptical claims that will be the main focus of this chapter:
ANR The Aesthetic is Not Real.
IHP Art is defined by its Intentional and Historical Properties.
F/PT Davies’ Functional/Procedural distinction is Tenable.
AUA The Aesthetic is necessary only in ‘Ur-Art’.
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3.2 The ‘Non-Realism’ of the Aesthetic
This section will present the first part of this chapter’s attempt to refute the 
sceptical hypothesis expressed in statement ANR: The Aesthetic is Not Real. This 
section will attempt to present, and begin to challenge, relevant aspects of the 
background to deflationary accounts of the aesthetic.
As we have seen, George Dickie claimed that the aesthetic attitude is a myth2. In 
the opposite comer, Sibley claimed that, ‘ . . .  nothing is art that is not made with at 
least some aesthetic intention’, even if that intention were to reject the aesthetic3. This 
clash over the place of the aesthetic in art is part of a larger and as yet unresolved 
philosophical debate over the ontological status of the aesthetic and its place in nature, 
art and everyday living
3.2.1 Kant: an aesthetic non-Realist?
Questions o f ‘realism’ and ‘non-realism’ are metaphysical questions, to do with 
ontology, which 1) questions which entities can be said to exist and 2) questions the 
nature of their existence. Typical conundrums for ontology include the existence of 
God, minds, material objects, abstract entities, aesthetic properties, and art4. According 
to the principle of Ockham’s razor5, philosophy abhors the postulation of any entities 
beyond the minimum necessary. The ancient and modem battles over ontology are too 
large a subject to be tackled in any detail here, though a position has had to be taken, 
despite the fact that there is not space here to argue for it at length from a general 
standpoint. However, arguments will be presented to challenge aesthetic scepticism and 
deflationism. It is the aim of this thesis to present an argument for the reality of the 
aesthetic and its centrality in art and other forms of discourse, as expressed in the
2George Dickie (1964) ‘The Myth o f  the Aesthetic Attitude’, The American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 
1, pp. 56-65. This paper was examined in detail in chapter two.
3 F. Sibley (1992) “Arts or the Aesthetic -  Which comes First?” (Audiotape for the OU), script reprinted
in (2001) Approach to Aesthetics: Collected Papers on Philosophical Aesthetics (Ed. J. Benson 
and J.R. Cox, Oxford, OUP (pp. 135-141) pp. 137-8.
4 Dale Jaquette (2002) Ontology, Chesham, Acumen; Reinhardt Grossman (1992) The Existence o f  the
World: An Introduction to Ontology, London, Routledge.
5 M. M. Adams, (1995) ‘Ockham, William’ and ‘Ockham’s razor, or the principle o f parsimony’ in Ted
Hondenrich (Ed.) The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, Oxford, OUP, p. 633.
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project’s headline title, using Baumgarten’s oxymoron, ‘Imaged Concepts6’, uniting the 
senses to intellect.
Interestingly, it appears that there is nothing new in asserting the non-realism of 
the aesthetic, as it appears that a ‘non-realist’ argument can be found in Kant. At the end 
of the ‘Critique of Aesthetic Judgment ’ (§58), Kant describes aesthetic values as 
‘ideal’, contrasting them with the ‘realist’ view, which he identifies with Rationalism, 
which would claim, with some apparent evidence in its favour, that the beauties of 
nature have been tailored to please our senses . Kant rejects this view, using the 
example of the process of crystallisation, which he describes as purely ‘mechanical’. 
Even though the result delights our aesthetic sense, there is no ‘purposiveness’ at work 
there. His evidence that ‘the purposiveness in the beautiful in nature is ideal’ rather than 
‘real’ derives from his claim that:
Whenever we judge any beauty at all we seek the standard for it a priori in 
ourselves, and that the aesthetic power of judgment itself legislates concerning 
the judgment as to whether something is beautiful or not9.
Otherwise, we would always have to take our cue from nature:
In fact, however, what counts in judging beauty is not what nature is, nor even 
what purpose it [has] for us, but how we receive it. If nature had created all 
forms for our liking, such a purposiveness of nature would always be objective; 
it would not be a subjective purposiveness, based on the play of the imagination 
in its freedom, where it is we who receive nature with favor, not nature that 
favors us10.
Kant’s argument could also be turned against an evolutionary account, where it 
might be claimed, perhaps by a socio-biologist11, that aesthetic preferences are
6 Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1735; 1954 Edn.) Meditationes philosophicae de nonnullis adpoem a
pertinentibus, reprinted in facsimile with an Introduction, Notes, and Translation into English by 
Karl Aschenbrenner and William B. Holther, as: Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1954) 
Reflections on Poetry, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University o f California Press, §29, scholium, 
p. 49.
7 Immanuel Kant (1790/1987 Edn) Critique o f  Judgment, translated and edited by W.S. Pluhar
Indianapolis, Hackett; The ‘Critique o f  Aesthetic Judgment’ is Part I o f the Critique o f  
Judgment, comprising §§1-60; Part II is the ‘Critique o f Teleological Judgment’, §§61-9.
8 Ibid. §58, Ak 346-8, pp. 220-2. In this way, they would mirror our assumption that the laws o f  the
universe are purposive towards our powers o f Understanding.
9 Ibid  §58, Ak 350, p. 224
10 Loc. Cit.
11 Socio-biology is described by David Papineau as seeking ‘to understand animal social behaviour as the
genetically based product o f  natural selection,’ in his article ‘Biology, philosophical problems 
o f  in Ted Hondenrich (Ed.) (1995) The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, Oxford, OUP, pp. 93- 
4. The theory has been applied to aesthetics by Randy Thornhill in ‘Darwinian Aesthetics 
Informs Traditional Aesthetics’, in, Eckart Voland and Karl Grammer (Eds.) (2003)
Evolutionary Aesthetics, Berlin, Springer, pp. 9-35.
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genetically pre-determined. However, it is argued here that, where learning takes place, 
the bias of nature can be modified. The position adopted in this thesis will argue for the
• 19 • •view that the Intentional properties of cultural objects are ‘real’, though their claims to 
realism differ from the realist claims of primary and secondary properties13. This will be 
more fully argued as this chapter unfolds.
3.2.2 Positivism, Behaviourism, Physicalism
There was a ‘climate’ in twentieth century philosophy, and in some other 
disciplines, which encouraged the search for the ‘objective’ standards of physics in 
academic disciplines where such standards are not at all times appropriate. The trio of 
such tendencies named in the above sub-heading seem to have contributed to a 
widespread philosophical scepticism towards the aesthetic for many decades. The 
logical-positivist A.J. Ayer announced in his youth that, ‘ . . .  all metaphysical 
assertions are nonsensical14’, and that, ‘there is no possibility of arguing about questions 
of value in aesthetics, but only questions of fact15’. Wittgenstein considered it 
impossible to define aesthetic terms, likening it to trying to draw a sharply defined 
picture from a blurred one:
Won’t you then have to say, “Here I might just as well draw a circle or heart or a 
rectangle, for all the colours merge. Anything -  and nothing -  is right.” And this 
is the position you are in if you look for definitions corresponding to our 
concepts in aesthetics or ethics16.
Joseph Margolis has articulated how the debate in Anglo-American analytical 
aesthetics was affected by these influences. He traces the problem to the split between
12 The capital ‘I’ here indicates that I am following Joseph Margolis’ usage defined in his (1999) What,
After All, Is a Work o f  Art? Pennsylvania Park, PA, Pennsylvania State University Press, pp. 55- 
6: ‘. . .  to mark a family o f sui generic properties confined to the cultural world’, and Ibid. p. 12 
as ‘symbolic, semiotic, representational, expressive, rhetorical, stylistic, genre-bound, traditional 
predicates’.
13 John Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding provides the classic reference for the
distinction between primary and secondary qualities, quoted by Roger Woolhouse in his entry on 
‘Primary and Secondary qualities’ in Ted Hondenrich (Ed.) (1995) The Oxford Companion to 
Philosophy, Oxford, OUP (pp. 718-9): ‘ . . .  primary qualities (e.g. shape) are “utterly 
inseparable from . . .  [a] body”, however small (II. viii.9) and secondary qualities (e.g. colour) 
“in truth are nothing in . . .  objects themselves, but powers to produce various sensations in us” 
II.viii.10)’, p. 718 .
14 Ayer’s argument was that metaphysical assertions were neither tautologies nor empirical hypotheses;
A.J. Ayer (1936) Language, Truth and Logic (2nd Edition, 1946), London, Victor Gollanz, p. 41.
15 Ibid, p. 113.
16 L. Wittgenstein (1953) Philosophical Investigations (2nd Edition, 1958), Oxford, Blackwell, Section 77,
p. 36e.
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analytical and continental philosophy17. The discipline demanded of analytical
18philosophy, he says, was good for science, but impoverished the treatment of the arts . 
There was, for example, the influence of Quine who rejected intentional properties, as 
described by Brentano19, whom he attacked in Word and Object20. Margolis opposes 
this scepticism towards intentionality, arguing for human consciousness as emergent 
from the physical and biological world, generating ‘the arts, the sciences and history’,
^ I
all of whose outcomes are stable enough to ‘permit objective analysis This is his 
thesis o f ‘cultural realism’. In his view, Beardsley, Goodman and Danto were all in 
thrall to physicalism, for example, in his opinion, leading Beardsley to an ‘excessively
' I ' loptimistic empiricism’ which led him to treat texts and artworks as physical objects . 
Jaegwon Kim defines physicalism in the philosophy of mind as:
. . .  an application of the general metaphysical thesis that everything in the 
space-time world is physical. Concerning the sphere of the mental, then, 
physicalism claims that all the facts about minds and mentality are physical 
facts23.
This has sometimes led to the denial of mental properties, including the aesthetic.
During the same period, behaviourism had a similar effect in discouraging 
discussion of ‘private’ mental events, as opposed to publicly observable behaviours and 
language24. Taken together, positivism, physicalism and behaviourism formed a 
background of scepticism towards the aesthetic, which would have a) encouraged 
Dickie to call the aesthetic attitude a ‘myth’, and also b) would have discouraged him 
from acknowledging the phenomenology of the ‘aesthetic attitude’, so eloquently 
described, as we observed, in Dickie’s own quotations from Eliseo Vivas . These 
debates continue to cast a shadow across aesthetics. The realism of the aesthetic is still 
contested, even now, in the twenty-first century, providing the motivation for this thesis. 
In the Oxford Handbook o f  Aesthetics, published in 2003, there are two essays on
17 Joseph Margolis (2001) Selves and OtherTexts: The Case fo r Cultural Realism, University Park Pa.,
Pennsylvania State University Press.
18 Ibid. pp. 9-10.
19 Franz Brentano (1838-1917) is regarded as the ‘grandfather o f phenomenology’, see Wilhelm
Baumgartner (1995) ‘Brentano, Franz’ in in T. Hondenrich (Ed.) The Oxford Companion to 
Philosophy, Oxford, OUP, pp. 102-4.
20 Joseph Margolis Op. Cit. (2001) p. 13.
21 Ibid. p. 3. Later in this chapter, we shall see a similar position taken up by Karl Popper.
22 Ibid  pp. 16-18.
23 Jaegwon Kim (1995) ‘Physicalism in the philosophy o f mind’ in The Oxford Companion to Philosophy
(Ed. Ted Hondenrich) Oxford, OUP, pp. 679-80.
24 Owen Flanagan (1995) ‘Behaviourism’ in T. Hondenrich (Ed.) The Oxford Companion to Philosophy,
Oxford, OUP, pp. 81-2.
25 See chapter two, section 2.2.2.1.
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‘Aesthetic Realism’ one by Nick Zangwill26, the other by John W. Bender27. Zangwill 
says that Realists assert that aesthetic thoughts and experiences represent ‘aesthetic 
properties and states of affairs’, whereas non-Realists deny that aesthetic experiences 
have such ‘metaphysical commitments’. The non-Realist position would roughly 
correspond to Kim’s description of property physicalism, where all properties are 
physical, and the realists’ position would correspond roughly to his description of 
ontological physicalism, which accepts the existence of non-physical properties such as 
intentionality28. Realists would insist upon 1) the ‘experientiality’ of aesthetic 
judgments, grounded in subjective response; hence my emphasis in chapter two on the 
phenomenology of the aesthetic attitude, against Dickie’s deflationism, which ignores 
this phenomenology. The Realist would also insist 2) on the ‘normativity’ of aesthetic 
judgments, i.e. some aesthetic judgments can be better or worse than others, which 
could only hold if those judgments had ‘realistic representational content’, where 
aesthetic experiences can be said to correspond with ‘states of affairs ’. This last is the 
position adopted by the present thesis: aesthetic experiences are ‘real’, based in our 
biology, developed and nuanced by learning, which itself also becomes embodied in our 
biology, as will be argued in chapter six. Zangwill concludes that the onus is on the 
non-realist to argue that aesthetic judgments do not ‘represent what is really in the 
object30’. My position is not identical to Zangwill’s, because I wish to add to his claim a 
further claim. Not only do aesthetic properties ‘represent what is really in the object’, 
but I would claim that aesthetic properties are also dependent on what is really present 
in the mind o f the prepared subject. and that both early stage sensory processing and 
‘top-down’ cognitive influences are involved. This theme will be developed in chapter 
seven on cognitive neuroscience.
John W. Bender is less confident than Zangwill of any claim for aesthetic 
realism. For Bender:
. . .  any irresolvable dispute among well-situated and experienced critics
regardless of shared or disparate tastes, is enough to raise the non-realist flag31.
26 Nick Zangwill (2003) ‘Aesthetic Realism I’, in J.Levinson (Ed.) The Oxford Handbook o f  Aesthetics,
Oxford, OUP, pp. 63-79.
27 John W. Bender (2003) ‘Aesthetic Realism II, in J.Levinson (Ed.) The Oxford Handbook o f  Aesthetics,
Oxford, OUP, pp. 80-98.
28 Jaegwon Kim Op. Cit. (1995) p. 679.
29 Nick Zangwill Op. Cit. (2003) p. 68.
30 Ibid. p. 78.
31 John W. Bender Op. Cit. (2003) p. 92.
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I would argue that setting the truth conditions for aesthetic values so high as to 
demand unanimity is unreasonable. An equivalent scepticism would have to hold for 
any area of knowledge, including science, where equally well-informed minds 
sometimes reach divergent conclusions. In section 3.5.1,1 will take the Popperian view, 
extrapolated by Sheldon Richmond from Popper’s philosophies of science and society, 
that aesthetic terms and values, like scientific theories, are ‘guesses’ which are put into 
the public arena, and are open to scrutiny and debate, in a process of testing and 
refining32. This does not abandon the claims of aesthetic terms and values to realism, 
but simply admits that the issues are complex, though nevertheless ‘real’, and the 
‘hypotheses’ and ‘tests’ for them are more elusive than in most of the physical sciences, 
making the issues in the humanities less amenable to ‘knock down’ resolution.
3.2.3 The Development of Dickie’s Deflationary Aesthetics
As we have just seen, the context in which Dickie began his career was one 
where positivism and behaviourism had combined to suppress ‘mentalism’, as 
philosophy tried to emulate the ‘scientific objectivity’ of physics. George Dickie in 
1964 seems to have accepted this set of assumptions, trying to use entirely ‘extrinsic’ 
terms, to achieve a ‘classificatory’, as distinct from an evaluative definition of art .
Dickie’s Institutional theory evolved over several years, and in its early versions, 
was somewhat inconsistent with his earlier avowal that the aesthetic attitude is a myth34. 
As Danto pointed out35, Dickie’s 1974 version of the Institutional Theory retained a 
space for the aesthetic by his inclusion of ‘appreciation’ in his definition of art. Dickie 
quoted this version ten years later, in The Art Circle of 1984:
A work of art in the classificatory sense is (1) an artefact (2) a set of the aspects 
of which has had conferred upon it the status of candidate for appreciation by 
some person or persons acting on behalf of a certain social institution (the 
artworld)36. (My Italics)
32Sheldon Richmond (1994) Aesthetic Criteria: Gombrich and the Philosophies o f  Science o f  Popper and 
Polanyi, Amsterdam, Rodopi.
33 George Dickie (1984) The Art Circle: a Theory o f  Art, New York, Haven; edition used: (1997)
Evanston, Illinois, Chicago Spectrum Press p. 8. An evaluative definition is one in which the 
term ‘work o f art’ is used to express approval or appreciation o f an object or performance. In the 
case o f Dickie it seems the aim is also to exclude any value criteria from the definition.
34 George Dickie Op. Cit. (1964).
35 Arthur C. Danto (1981) The Transfiguration o f  the Commonplace: A Philosophy o f  Art, Cambridge
Mass., Harvard University Press, p. 91.
36 George Dickie Op. Cit. (1984; 1997 edn.) p. 8.
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Dickie’s evolving accounts have been scrutinised by Stephen Davies, who criticises
T7them for failing to describe the ‘rules and roles’ by which the artworld is governed , 
saying this weakens the institutional characteristics of Dickie’s theory. He speculates 
that Dickie might have shrunk from a more strongly institutional account because of his 
desire to make the institution of art appear democratic, rather than ruled by a snobbish 
clique, as alleged by some critics of ‘elitist’ modernism . Thus Dickie claims that a 
urinal salesman might have turned one of his samples into Fountain, whereas Davies
thinks only Duchamp would have had the authority to do this, having been empowered
10‘as a result of achieving recognition as an avant-garde artist ’. The concept of 
‘authority’ in an institutional sense does not seem appropriate in democratic societies 
(outside of the powerful state-funded art bureaucracies) though it has played a role in 
such tyrannies as ancient Egypt40, and the Church in the Counter-Reformation41.
The institutional (or perhaps social) dimension of art, which is undeniable, 
would have to be included in any adequate ontology of art, and included in that would 
have to be the personal authority, and sometimes charisma, which undoubtedly accrues 
to an artist who has acquired a reputation. Davies, however, fails to criticise Dickie’s 
Institutional Theory for omitting to say why art is considered to have any value in the 
first place, although this has been a frequent complaint about the Institutional Theory. 
The question of the value or point of art, says Davies, is a matter for a general theory of 
art, but is not essential for a definition42. This seems a strange move. Despite the faults 
he finds in Dickie’s version, Davies says his own aim is to defend the idea of an 
institutional theory43. However, his defence fails to rescue the Institutional theory from 
its own failure to address the point or value of art, a lacuna very apparent in Dickie’s 
final version of the theory, stated in five steps44:
37 This would be a necessary step if aesthetic properties are not themselves real, but only matters of
institutional rules and conventions; see Steven Davies (1991) Definitions o f  Art, Ithaca NY, 
Cornell University Press, Ch. 4 (pp. 78-114) pp. 97-100.
38 Ibid. p. 80.
39 Ibid. p. 88.
40 It took the power of a blasphemous Pharaoh, Akhenaten, to bring about a short-lived departure from the
canons o f proportion which imposed a remarkable continuity o f style over thousands o f years. 
See H. W. Janson, (1962) A History ofArt: a survey o f  the visual arts from the dawn o f  history to 
the present day, London, Thames and Hudson, pp. 47-8, figs. 63-5.
41 Veronese was famously summoned by the tribunal o f the inquisition for including ‘improprieties’ in a
painting of the Last Supper. His solution was to change the title to Supper in the House o f  Levi. 
See H. W. Janson Op. Cit. (1962) pp. 381-2, and Fig. 565.
42 Steven Davies Op. Cit. (1991), Ibid. p. 113.
43 Ibid  p. 84.
44 First presented in George Dickie Op. Cit. (1984); in 1997 edition, pp. 80-82; quoted by Davies (1991)
p. 84, and again by Dickie (2001) Art and Value, Oxford, Blackwell, p. 28.
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1. An artist is a person who participates with understanding in the making of a 
work of art.
2. A work of art is an artefact of a kind created to be presented to an artworld 
public.
3. A public is a set of persons the members of which are prepared in some 
degree to understand an object which is presented to them
4. The artworld is the totality of all artworld systems.
5. An artworld system is a framework for the presentation of a work of art by 
an artist to an artworld public.
Not a sniff of phenomenology to be had! It is an amusing task to write a similar five- 
step definition of medicine beginning, ‘ 1. A doctor is a person who participates with 
understanding in the enactment of medical procedures’. It is possible to complete the 
five steps without any mention of disease or cure45. Even if Dickie’s timid set of 
statements do achieve some sort of a definition of art, it appears a purely nominal one, 
with so little purchase on the real world of art as to be pointless, or to borrow a word 
from Dickie’s 1964 paper, entirely ‘vacuous’. As Davies says, Dickie could not have 
recourse to the aesthetic to assist his definition, having dismissed it in his 1964 paper, 
an action he has not retracted46.
Dickie revisits the problem of definition in the first half of Art and Value, where 
he declares that his project is not one of denying that psychological mechanisms play a 
role in art, but he denies that there are any psychological mechanisms ‘specifically and 
sufficiently productive of art47’. He smacks down the most obvious counter-example to 
this view, the bowerbird’s bower, by the simple expedient of denying that it is art .
This is a common resort for those who wish to dispose of inconvenient counter­
examples to their definitions of art49. He views the bowerbird’s activities as ‘instinctual’
45 Continuing: ‘2. A medical procedure is an act carried out on patients. 3. A patient is one o f a set o f
persons who are prepared to some degree to undergo medical procedures. 4. A medical world is 
the totality o f all medical systems. 5. A medical system is a framework for the enactment of  
medical procedures by doctors.’
46 The ‘Myth’ o f the aesthetic attitude was discussed in chapter two, above; Stephen Davies discusses
Dickie’s predicament in this regard in Op. Cit. (1991) p. 110.
47 George Dickie (2001) Art and Value, Oxford, Blackwell, p. 3.
48 Ibid. pp. 5-6.
49 Noel Carroll offers the following list o f works denied art status by some philosopher for definitional
reasons: ‘Duchamp’s readymades, Jackson Pollock’s drip paintings, Merce Cunningham’s 
choreography, Ropert Mapplethorpe’s photography, and, more recently, Damien Hirst and 
Janine Antoni’, in Noel Carroll (1999) Philosophy o f  Art: a Contemporary Introduction, 
London, Routledge p. 252. James O. Young excludes almost the whole o f the avant garde o f the
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and closely tied in with reproductive behaviour and evolution. He does not even 
consider the possibility that human art-making might have evolved under similar 
selective pressures over a period of millions of years, and that these factors might still 
be operative today in a significant proportion of artistic activity. This question will be 
addressed in chapter six, which will examine the evidence for evolutionary aesthetics, 
and again in chapter eight.
The psychological theories to which Dickie is opposed include mimesis and 
expression theories, and in an interesting move, he classifies such theories as ‘natural 
kind’ theories. This brings the discussion into an area where philosophy of language and 
ontology overlap. A natural kind cannot be defined by argument alone, but requires 
expert empirical data, such as the atomic number of gold. Dickie’s argument is that the 
definition of art is not a question for scientists, but for members of the artworld. It is a 
‘cultural kind’, a category which includes institutional, historical and intentional 
theories.
At this point it is necessary to introduce Stephen Davies’ distinction between the 
‘functionalist’ and ‘proceduralist’ theories of art, which align roughly with ‘aesthetic 
realism’ and ‘aesthetic non-realism’, though the distinction also rests on a difference of 
emphasis placed on the supposedly ‘intrinsic’ aesthetic properties of artworks, and their 
supposed ‘extrinsic’ ties, such as historical provenance. In this thesis, Davies’ 
distinction between the ‘functional’ and the ‘procedural’ will be challenged.
Meanwhile, suffice it to say that he classifies Beardsley’s aesthetic definition of art as 
‘functionalist’ and Dickie’s Institutional Theory as ‘proceduralist’.
Returning to the argument of this section, Dickie finds a) Danto’s criterion that 
works of art are ‘about’ something to be ‘functionalist’, in the old manner of essentialist 
theories, and b) he finds Danto’s emphasis on history ‘proceduralist50’. Dickie seems to 
accuse Danto of muddled thinking: the man should come down on one side of the 
argument or the other! This points to one of the problems with the way some 
philosophers handle definitions. The desire seems to be irresistible to find a single 
essentialist explanation to trump all the others. The idea that ‘reality’ might be more 
complicated, that light can be a wave motion and a particle, seems inconceivable. 
Perhaps a fuller consideration of the ontology of art would allow us to accept that a
visual arts in his (2001) Art and Knowledge, London, Routledge, even arguing for its 
destruction.
50 George Dickie Op. Cit. (2001) p. 36.
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phenomenon as complex as art might just be both a natural kind and a cultural kind. 
Dickie’s response to the counter-evidence presented by his critics is to marginalize its 
significance, though his stance of scepticism against the aesthetic had clearly softened 
by the time he wrote:
. . .  a cultural-kind theory of art will not deny that the content of art can involve 
natural-kind activities, for example, the enjoyment of the basic aesthetic 
qualities of the kind Beardsley has in mind, but it would not make such activities 
defining51 (my italics).
Thus he upholds his project to define art above the (surely more rewarding) task of 
trying to give an adequate account of the bigger picture. Similarly, he responds to the 
many criticisms which assert that the institutional theory is a-historical by replying that 
‘All the talk about art history . . .  is perfectly consistent with the institutional theory’, it 
is just not involved ‘in the defining of “art”’ .
However, Dickie finally comes up with a surprising confession:
I have always thought of the institutional theory and all the other theories of art 
as having an ontological function rather than an epistemic one. It seems 
perfectly reasonable to me that even if one had a completely adequate definition 
of ‘art’ that it would still be possible that one might not be able to tell whether a 
given object is a work of art. For example, if the object’s history is unknown, it 
might be impossible to tell if it is an artwork53.
This lends support to the view that behind the different ways of defining art 
must lie an ontological question: what kind of a thing a work of art is. Furthermore, this 
thesis insists that, behind that question, lies another, which asks what kind of a thing the 
‘aesthetic’ is. That seems to be the fundamental question that might unlock the others, 
and it is argued here that the solutions found will be Realist rather than non-Realist.
3.2.4 Summary and Conclusion
This section reviewed four different non-realist approaches to the aesthetic, 
giving several reasons to reject the first of the new Sceptical Hypotheses:
ANR: The Aesthetic is Not Real.
Kant’s idealism saw aesthetic values as, a priori, free from natural laws, whose 
determinations would have rendered aesthetic values ‘realist’ in his terms. This thesis
51 George Dickie Op. Cit. (2001) p. 49
52 Loc. Cit.
53 George Dickie Op. Cit. (2001) p. 43.
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would reject the argument that aesthetic properties would be ‘real’ only if entirely 
predetermined by natural causes, such as genetics. Instead, the view is taken that 
aesthetic values are ‘emergent’ properties of the physical and biological worlds, an 
argument from Margolis that also resists the reductionist pleadings of Positivism, 
Behaviourism and Physicalism that seek to deny the ‘realism’ of mental properties.
This section’s review of the development of Dickie’s thought found that he 
remained a convinced ‘Institutionalist’ in the definition of art, though his anti- 
aestheticism has lost its edge, as he came to accept that aesthetic properties play a role 
in art, even if they are not ‘definitional of art’. It would appear that, unlike the Dickie 
of 1964, the Dickie of 2001 would not support our new Sceptical Hypothesis:
ANR: The Aesthetic is Not Real.
3.3 Intentional/Historical Definitions of Art: ‘Ur-Art’
Now we come to the next sceptical stance of deflationary aesthetics to be 
considered in this chapter, expressed as our hypothesis IHD:
IHD Art should be defined by its Intentional and Historical Properties
This hypothesis, in attempting to exclude the ‘aesthetic’ from the definition of 
art, would support Carroll’s position, shown in the diagram in Fig. 1 at the beginning of 
chapter one, showing the aesthetic to be contingent, rather than necessary to art. 
However, it will be argued this attempt was not successful, as it still left a gap open for 
the aesthetic in ‘Ur-Art’, requiring another new sceptical hypotheses, AUA:
AUA The Aesthetic is necessary only in Ur-Art.
3.3.1 Intentional and Historical Definitions
The first Intentional/Historical definition was proposed by Jerrold Levinson54, 
and Noel Carroll has followed with an historical narrative method for identifying works
54 The sources used in this study were J. Levinson (1979) “Defining Art Historically”, BJA, Vol. 19,
reprinted in J. Levinson (1990) Music, Art and Metaphysics: Essays in Philosophical Aesthetics, 
Ithaca New York, Cornell University Press, pp. 3-25, and the original 1989 article “Refining Art 
Historically”, JAAC, Vol. 47, pp. 21-33.
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of art55. These definitions are interpreted here as further attempts to define art in 
‘extrinsic’ terms, rather than according to either the formalists’ ‘intrinsic’ or ‘plastic’ 
properties of artworks, or in terms of the ‘aesthetic’ mental properties which were 
denied by physicalist, behaviourist and positivist perspectives.
Despite staking their claims to historical definitions, Levinson and Carroll were 
by no means the first philosophers to point out the importance of history to an adequate 
understanding of art. That honour is usually bestowed upon Hegel who is widely 
credited for making the most important contribution by a philosopher to the History of 
Art56. Nor were Levinson and Carroll the first to point out the potential of intentionality 
as a route to defining art, an honour ascribed to Mandelbaum57. Definitions in Anglo- 
American analytical aesthetics, thereafter, usually included the intention to make art, as 
a way of separating artworks from natural objects and other ‘mere real things’, as in 
Beardsley’s definition of an artwork as ‘something produced with the intention of 
giving it the capacity to satisfy the aesthetic interest58’.
In this thesis, the question of ‘intention’ will be turned through 180 degrees, to 
become one of detecting ‘agency’, making the viewpoint that of the percipient of the 
artwork, not the maker. This means that sometimes percipients respond unbidden to 
what Danto would refer to as ‘mere real things’ in ways that are more appropriate to 
artworks, responding to the sensory structure as they find it, while also seeing agency in 
it. The animist, pagan and Christian see agency in the events of nature, as Augustine
55 The version studied is in N. Carroll (1999) Philosophy o f  Art: a Contemporary Introduction, London,
Routledge, pp. 249-264.
56 Gary Shapiro writes, ‘It is indeed the case that Hegel’s aesthetics played a fundamental role in the
formation o f literary history and the history o f art in the nineteenth century’; Gary Shapiro 
(1992) ‘Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich’ in D. E. Cooper (Ed.) (1992) A Companion to 
Aesthetics, Oxford, Blackwell, pp. 182-8. p. 182. However, Hegel was not a lone voice. Michael 
Inwood credited other aestheticians o f the times with investigating the history o f art. He writes 
that these aestheticians ‘paid as much attention to the content of art as to its formal aspects. 
Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803) [A whole generation before Hegel] stressed that poetry 
springs from the religion, language and customs o f a people, and explored the early ‘folk poetry’ 
of the Germans.’ Michael In wood (1993) “Introduction” to Hegel Introductory Lectures on 
Aesthetics, trans. Bernard Bosanquet (1886), edited by Michael Inwood, London, Penguin, (pp. 
ix-xxxix) p. xii.
57 Maurice Mandelbaum (1965) “Family Resemblances and Generalisations Concerning the Arts”,
American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 9, pp. 219-228, reprinted in A. Neill and A. Ridley 
(Eds) (1995) The Philosophy o f  Art: Readings Ancient and Modern, Boston Massachusetts, 
McGraw Hill, pp. 192-201.
58 Monroe C. Beardsley (1983) “An Aesthetic Definition o f Art”, first published in H. Cutler (Ed.) What
is Art? New York, Haven Publications, pp. 15-29. The Edition referred to here is the reprint in P. 
Lamarque, and S. H. Olsen (Eds.) (2004) Aesthetics and the Philosophy o f  Art: the Analytic 
Tradition, Oxford, Blackwell, (pp. 55-62) p. 58).
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saw the world as God’s poem59. Such an aesthetic perception, full of heightened 
awareness, did not ‘make the world into a work of art’ for other percipients, only for the 
person or persons who perceived it in that way, with a ‘free play’ between their 
‘understanding of God’ and their vision of the world as his ‘work of art’.
Baumgarten echoed this idea twice in his Reflections on Poetry: ‘We observed a 
little while ago that the poet is like a maker or a creator. So the poem ought to be like a 
world’, and ‘things in the world follow one another for disclosing the glory of the 
Creator, the ultimate and highest theme of some immense poem, if one may so speak60’.
3.3.2 Levinson
Jerrold Levinson declared that he wished to build an improved definition of art, 
on the model of the Institutional Theory, which, he thought, had two faults. Both 
stemmed from ‘that murky and somewhat exclusive institution, the artworlcf1’. The 
first fault was the act of conferring the status of ‘candidate for appreciation’ on an 
artefact by an artworld member, as described in Dickie’s early version of the 
Institutional Theory . Levinson wished to replace this externally applied act with a 
different process, namely the artist’s internally dnven intention to make a work of art . 
The second fault Levinson targeted was Dickie’s failure to explain satisfactorily what 
he meant by the ‘appreciation’ for which the tendered artwork was a candidate. As has 
been noted, Dickie himself could not have expressed this in terms of the aesthetic, in 
view of his rejection of that phenomenon64. Levinson’s correction to Dickie is the 
deflationary removal of appreciation, and its replacement with history. Art status is 
achieved when a) it is the artist’s intention that b) the work should be received in an 
historically accepted manner, which Levinson dubs a ‘regard’, or set of regards, each 
appropriate to the individual reception history of different art forms65. It is worth noting 
that this move severs the definition of art from any overt mention of the percipient’s 
phenomenological experience of art. Because of the problems of conceptual artists
59 K. E. Gilbert and H. Kuhn . (1956) A History o f  Esthetics (2nd Edition), London, Thames and Hudson,
p. 135.
60 Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1735; 1954 edn.) transl. K. Aschenbrenner and W. B. Holther,
Berkeley, University o f  California Press. §68, p.63 and §71, p. 64.
61 Jerrold Levinson Op. Cit. (1990) p. 4.
62 George Dickie Op. Cit. (1997) p. 8.
63 Jerrold Levinson Op. Cit. (1990) p. 21.
64 George Dickie Op. Cit. (1964).
65 He explains that ‘regard-as-a-work-of-art’ is ‘regard in any o f the ways works o f art existing prior to it
have been correctly regarded’; Jerrold Levinson Op. Cit. (1990) p. 6.
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‘dubbing’ public buildings and natural features as their artworks, there is also a curious 
phrase about ownership. Here is his definition in its simplest form:
X is an artwork at / = df X is an object that a person or persons having
the appropriate proprietary right over X, 
nonpassingly intends for regard-as-a-work-of-art -
i.e., regard in any way (or ways) in which prior 
artworks are or were correctly (or standardly) 
regarded66.
As Levinson was aware, and as Dickie was happy to re-emphasise when discussing 
‘similarity art’67, this gives Levinson a problem with what he calls ‘wr-art’, namely an 
infinite regress to something which was not art, which therefore threatens to reverse the 
arthood of everything which had been carefully traced back to ur-art. To prevent this 
reversal, examples of ur-ari must already have become art by a different process than he 
is expounding through his historical theory. As Dickie points out, Levinson undermines 
his own historical definition before he has even set it out, when he describes a thought 
experiment, designed to attack the Institutional Theory. He imagines a solitary 
Amazonian Indian who:
. . .  steals off from his nonartistic tribe to arrange coloured stones in a clearing, 
not outwardly investing them with special position in the world. Might not this 
also be art (and note, before any future curator decides that it is)68?
Dickie observes that this passage shows that Levinson, at this moment at least, sees art 
as a natural kind, not a cultural kind, and therefore this shows that he is at heart a 
‘functionalist’, not a ‘proceduralist’69. However, Levinson is not secure on this issue, as 
is shown by two of his other thought experiments, which point to contradictory 
conclusions.
The first thought experiment attempts to apply one of the necessary conditions 
contained in his definition, that the artist or curator must have ‘the appropriate
7Hproprietary rights over X’ . This is clearly a cultural, i.e. ‘procedural’ factor. He asks 
us to imagine, mounted ‘for regard-as-a-work-of-art’ in an art museum ‘a strange ornate 
receptacle whose original purpose is unknown’. This object originates from ‘an ancient
66 Ibid. p. 9.
67 George Dickie Op. Cit. (1997) pp. 32-3.
68 Jerrold Levinson Op. Cit. (1990) p. 5.
69 George Dickie Op. Cit. (2001) p. 48.
70 Jerrold Levinson Op. Cit. (1990) p. 9.
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Mexican culture thought to have died out71’. In the story, a fully informed and 
documented descendent of the tribe unexpectedly turns up and demands the removal 
from public display of this ‘sacred ritual object’, not intended ‘in any sense for 
appreciation’. Levinson concludes from this:
I maintain that the object in question does not just revert to being nonart -  it 
never was art at all, because our present art establishment unknowingly lacked 
the right to make it such72.
Thus Levinson gives priority to the cultural context of the object’s original creation over 
either the aesthetic criterion that the bowl was ‘a strange ornate receptacle’, or the later 
classification of the object as art by the curator. Levinson seems to accept Sceptical 
Hypothesis 5 from chapter one:
SH5 The historical aspect of art ‘trumps’ the aesthetic.
What seems strange about this thought experiment is the view that a) the ritual purpose 
of the object and b) its status as an artwork should be mutually exclusive (an example of 
inappropriate bi-valent logic imported from science to art). At a stroke, such a view 
would eliminate a vast number, if not the majority, of pre-modem works of art. It is 
argued here that the historical informs interpretation, but does not determine an object’s 
classification.
By contrast, the second thought experiment seems to reverse Levinson’s 
priorities, in favour of the object’s aesthetic properties and against the definitional 
determination of preceding art-regards. This will be labelled the ‘Z’ thought experiment, 
and it is an extrapolation upon Levinson’s account of how Duchamp’s readymades 
could graduate, from their initial non-art status, to become artworks :
A naive art-unaware creator makes an object Z at t, which he intends for a kind 
of treatment or regard that is not a correct way of regarding any artworks 
existing prior to t\. However, it is a kind of treatment or regard that will be 
correct for certain artworks 0 existing 200 years after. I think we want to say that 
the naive creator’s work is art beginning around t2 (= t\ + 200) but not before74.
71 Ibid. p. 10.
72 Ibid. p. 11.
73 Ibid  p. 12.
74 Ibid  p. 13.
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Here the art status of the piece is entirely dependent on a kind of regard which became 
possible only hundreds of years later75. This seems to be inconsistent with Levinson’s 
earlier Amerindian thought experiment, in which the piece was art from the time it was 
made. He adds to the ‘Z’ thought experiment that:
Z becomes art 200 years after its intentioned creation, when the history of art, so
♦ 7 Ato speak, catches up with what Z’s creator was engaged in .
The problem is that Levinson is confusing the work’s ontological status (as art) 
with the quality of its critical reception. Levinson contradicts himself here. He says in 
his definition that the object had been intended ‘for a kind of treatment or regard that is 
not a correct way of regarding any artworks existing prior to t \ .  However, though not 
‘correct’ at the time t\, clearly the artist at time t\ must have conceived it, and therefore 
it must have been possible, at that time, even if only for that one person. Therefore, it 
seems more rational to argue that the work Z was art from the outset, but was only 
recognised and appreciated as such, when the history of art, and with it critical 
appreciation, had ‘caught up’. The case of the Eighteenth Century Welsh painter,
77Thomas Jones, comes to mind . His oil sketches of Neapolitan buildings were ignored 
in the eighteenth century, and were soon entirely forgotten in family archives. However, 
by the mid-Twentieth century, cultural sensibilities, which had been shaped by 
photography, impressionism, surrealism and even abstraction, had evolved to the point 
where this handful of tiny, meticulous sketches could be identified as rare
7 0
masterpieces . It seems reasonable to assume that they were art from the beginning, 
even if dismissed as merely strange sketches until the history of art had ‘caught up’.
This supports the contention of this thesis that for art the most important role for history 
is in interpretation and evaluation, rather than in art’s definition or classification against 
non-art. Although Levinson’s historical definition suffers from the problem of infinite 
regress, blocked only by ur-art, which has, therefore, to become art by a different, 
functional, and (therefore contradictorily) wow-historical criterion, his historical 
approach does give valuable insights into the way in which works of art are experienced 
and interpreted in the light of earlier artworks and ‘art regards’.
75 This raises another question o f how a new ‘art regard’ could arise, if art regards are validated by
historical precedent.
76 Jerrold Levinson Op. Cit. (1990) p. 13.
77 Some philosophers reject studies and preparatory sketches as art, such as Ian Ground (1989) Art or
Bunk? London, Bristol Classical Press, p. 2.
78Ann Sumner and Greg Smith (Eds.) (2003) Thomas Jones (1742-1803): An Artist Rediscovered, New 
Haven and London, Yale University Press, plates 110-116, pp. 220-226.
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3.3.3 Carroll
Noel Carroll’s criticism of Levinson differs from Dickie’s. Carroll does not find 
ur-ari to be a problem. Echoing both Levinson’s Amerindian stone composition thought 
experiment and the one involving the Mexican ritual bowl, Carroll imagines an object 
made by a pre-artistic Neolithic tribesman. Carroll proposes that the piece attains art 
status retrospectively, because it happens to elicit an art regard, which was destined in 
later history to become a standard way of looking at art79. This interpretation may be 
trying to explain how we see cave art as art, even though it may have been a by-product 
of shamanistic ritual. The argument appears to be as follows:
* 1. x is a piece of ur-art, but it is not yet art because it elicits a regard which has 
not yet become an art regard.
2. y is a later piece of acknowledged art, which by chance happens to elicit the 
same kind of regard as x.
*3. Retrospectively, x can be accorded art status by those able to see that x
elicits the same kind of regard as y80.
This retains an echo of Dickie’s first version of the Institutional Theory, with members 
acting on behalf of the artworld, although it differs in being retro-active across the 
millennia. The argument, however, seems to be counter-intuitive. It will be argued in 
chapter six that the strict separation of ‘nature’ from ‘culture’ implicit in this stand-off 
cannot be sustained. This would seem to suggest that an wr-artwork was art from the 
beginning, as art is first of all just as much a natural kind as a cultural kind.
Furthermore, even today many of the characteristics of art are still those of a natural 
kind, though they are now closely intertwined with the cultural accretions integral to 
human art. Step two of the above argument can stand unchanged, though steps one and 
three should be reworded:
1. x is a piece of wr-art, which had not at the time been recognised as ‘art’.
79 Noel Carroll (1999) Philosophy o f  Art: a Contemporary Introduction, London, Routledge, pp. 242-3.
This, at least, is how I construe the following passage: ‘We recognise the Neolithic tribesman’s 
stones as art, even if he and his culture lacked the concept o f art and an artworld, because his 
intention that the stones be regarded as sources o f visual pleasure, even if  only by him, happens 
to correlate with a historically well-precedented artistic intention’.
80 This is my attempt to search out the underlying argument; it might be a distortion o f Carroll’s
argument.
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2. y is a later piece of acknowledged art, which by chance happens to elicit the 
same kind of regard as x.
3. Later, x can be recognised as art by those able to see that it elicits the same 
kind of regard as y.
Carroll’s criticism of Levinson is that his Historical definition is too broad, 
because old ‘art regards’, far from setting the criteria for arthood, can become obsolete, 
and admit too many unworthy things to art status. He gives the example of 
verisimilitude, which was still appropriate as an ‘art regard’ even a century ago. 
However, Carroll argues that verisimilitude as an art regard has now been overtaken by 
commonplace ‘home videos or Polaroids81’. It seems here that Carroll is making the 
same mistake as he has found among advocates of Formalism and what he calls ‘neo­
formalism’, namely to confuse a classificatory definition with a commendatory 
definition. ‘Neo-formalism’, according to Carroll’s terminology, accepts as art that 
which satisfyingly combines form and content. This, according to Carroll is a 
commendatory definition, not a classificatory one, making neo-formalism into:
. . .  a theory that tracks only good art, art worthy of commendation for its
satisfying marriage of form and content. But this overlooks all the bad art82. . .
However, he himself used this criterion earlier in the same book, when he expressed 
reluctance to accept the verses in commercial greetings cards as art, as they expressed 
generalised rather than particular feelings . Also, we have just seen Carroll reject the 
possibility of art status both for commonplace technological image making, and he 
extends his fatwa to such highly designed but mass-produced objects as motorboats
Of O £
and production automobiles . Strangely, he accepts architecture as art , though he 
offers no argument to explain why architecture is art, but other highly designed though 
functional manufactured goods are not. There appear to be different factors at work. In 
the case of home videos and Polaroids, history changed the evaluative status of items 
achieving verisimilitude, but not their classificatory status as art. Here Carroll is making 
an evaluative not a classificatory move. In the case of the motorboats and automobiles,
81 Noel Carroll Op. Cit. (1999). p. 246.
82 Ibid p. 134; for a similar comment regarding Formalism, see p. 115.
83 Ibid. p. 62.
84 Ibid. p. 175.
85 Ibid. p. 180.
86 Ibid. p. 32.
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commonplaceness again seems to be a factor, effecting a critical evaluation, rather than 
classification:
Cars too often afford occasions for aesthetic experience . . .  buyers purchase 
such vehicles in order to say something about themselves to the world . . .  But 
our highways are not jammed with artworks87.
The question of rarity or commonplaceness as aesthetic properties will feature in the 
biological account of art to be set out in chapters six and seven. However, Carroll’s 
philosophical stance requires him to minimise the role of the aesthetic in identifying 
artworks, and in this he is very much the disciple of Dickie, though he stops short of 
Dickie’s early claim that the aesthetic attitude is a myth88. Carroll’s position is to limit 
the aesthetic to matters of interpretation and response, rather than to allow the aesthetic 
a fundamental role in the identification of art, a function he allots to history. The present 
thesis will seek to reverse this emphasis, allotting to the aesthetic the prime moving 
force in art, with history playing a supportive role in its interpretation and evaluation, 
expressed as statement H (for ‘history’):
H Historical factors affect the ontology and interpretation of art rather than 
its definition and classification.
Having found Levinson’s historical definition to contain valuable insights, Noel 
Carroll subtracted from it Levinson’s ambition to use history to define art in general. 
Instead, Carroll took on the valuable, if  humbler, task of explaining how we recognise 
individual artworks as artworks, whether ordinary ones or the wilder offerings of the 
avant-garde. Carroll emphasises that this is not just an academic question:
Should a scattering of dirt and grease on the floor be interpreted or cleaned up? 
Should we attend to the expressive properties of a (sic) amalgam of crushed and 
mangled automobile chassis or consign them to the junkyard?89
Carroll argues that, despite unsuccessful past attempts, one should not conclude 
that defining art is impossible90. However, Carroll felt that a definition of art is not
87 Ibid. p. 180.
88 Noel Carroll Op. Cit. (2001) p. 3.
89 Noel Carroll, Op. Cit. (1999) pp. 249-50. Such inadvertent pieces o f well-meaning vandalism are
reported from time to time, as in the Guardian o f  13/01/05, when a sculpture o f yellow plastic 
sheets, assembled by German artist Michael Beutler, was mistaken for rubbish and incinerated 
by Frankfurt bin men. Thirty o f them were subsequently sent to modem art classes to try to 
ensure that the same mistake would never happen again. As Danto would say, a dose o f theory 
might help, though artists’ originality should ensure a good future supply o f ill-fated 
indiscemibles.
90 Ibid. p. 251.
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really needed, as in general we are proficient at distinguishing art from non-art91. But 
Carroll had observed that, whenever disputes arise, solutions seem to be sought in the
Q7presence or absence of links with earlier art . Carroll draws the analogy between art 
and speciation according to the phylogenetic method of classification, which stresses 
the line of descent, rather than the phenetic method, which classifies organisms
• • • • Q1according to structural similarity . This is one of several references to evolutionary 
biology by Noel Carroll, some of which would tend to support a naturalistic account of 
art and the aesthetic. For example, he says we see expressive properties in artworks 
because:
. . .  natural selection has invested us with such a hair-trigger capacity to 
recognize the ‘shape’ of emotion in others that it often kicks in even when we 
are attending to nonhuman things94.
This question of the evolutionary origins of the aesthetic will be examined in chapters 
six and seven, so this is not the point at which to examine the issue in detail. The aim 
here is to challenge the limitations which Carroll is attempting to place on the aesthetic 
in art. For example, in one of his remarks on Duchamp’s Fountain95, Carroll says that it 
was designed to afford no ‘aesthetic experiences in any “ordinary” sense of the 
phrase96’, which he insists must include ‘disinterested contemplation’. He argues
0 7elsewhere that aesthetic experience need not include disinterested contemplation , and 
it is therefore not open for him to use this argument here in order to prove the absence 
of an aesthetic intention in Fountain. It is correct that, with Fountain, Duchamp was 
attacking ‘retinal98’ art, and that the work was ‘one in the eye’ to formalists, both 
addressing, and then confounding, their ‘retinal’ expectations. But it is clear that there 
are other forms of response to art which may not be ‘retinal’ but involve the mind, and
91 Loc. Cit.
92 Noel Carroll, Op. Cit. (1999) p. 252.
93 Ibid. pp. 256-7. Quite independently, in 2 0 0 0 ,1 made a similar analogy between the evolution o f
species and art forms, in the thesis for my M.A.Fine Art, (2000) Reflections on Art and
Evolution: towards a descriptive taxonomy o f  contemporary art forms, (M. A. Fine Art 
Dissertation), University o f Wales Institute, Cardiff.
94 Noel Carroll, Op. Cit. (1999) p. 100.
95 Marcel Duchamp’s 1917 submission to the Independents exhibition, but not shown. This image is so
familiar, it seemed unnecessary to reproduce it here. For an account see Calvin Tomkins (1997) 
Duchamp: a biography, London, Chatto and Windus, pp. 180-86.
96 Noel Carroll, Op. Cit. (1999) p. 180.
97 Ibid. p. 179.
98 Calvin Tomkins writes, ‘It was Gustave Courbet, [Duchamp] argued, who had turned art into a retinal
affair; until Courbet, art had appealed to the intellect in many different ways . . .  but the powerful 
example o f Courbet had ruled all that out -  with disastrous consequences,’ in his Op. Cit. (1997), 
p. 58.
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are nonetheless aesthetic. After just two more paragraphs, Carroll himself draws 
attention to Duchamp’s Paris Air, a glass vial of fifty cubic centimetres of the 
eponymous gases. Carroll calls this piece ‘impish’ because it ‘affords an aesthetic 
experience of quality of impishness99’. Surely ‘impishness’ is no more ‘aesthetic . . .  in 
any “ordinary” sense of the phrase’ than words one could use to describe Fountain, such 
as ‘outrageous’, ‘original’, ‘cheeky’, ‘abject’ or ‘witty’. Carroll goes on to claim that 
Paris Air is impish ‘just because it is an artwork’. This conforms to Sceptical 
Hypothesis 7, from chapter one:
SH7 The source of the aesthetic lies in art rather than in nature (paraphrase of 
Hegel)
This seems counter-intuitive. It would still be impish if sold in a Paris tourist 
information office as a souvenir100. The point which Carroll is trying to make is that an 
artwork’s aesthetic properties are dependent on our classifying it as an artwork, and of 
course the perception of agency is one of the factors which colour our aesthetic 
response to anything we encounter101. Ian Ground plays with this issue in Art or Bunk? 
in which he asks the reader to consider which properties would match an object which is 
a meteorite, compared to the properties of its identical counterpart, which happens to be
109a Henry Moore sculpture . The point here is that the classification of the object as art 
will change the aesthetic response, but this is not always a factor, as people often 
respond aesthetically to objects they know to be natural forms (e.g. the Malvern Hills) 
or to man-made objects they do not really consider to be works of art. Examples of the 
latter would be the Eiffel tower or the Clifton suspension bridge, which could equally be 
considered as feats of engineering. To claim that aesthetic properties devolve upon the 
classification of an object as a work of art is far too limiting a claim, and does not
99 Noel Carroll, Op. Cit. (1999) p. 181. Note: the expected definite article before ‘quality’ is absent in
Carroll’s text.
100 This statement adopts Carroll’s viewpoint for the sake o f argument, which assumes that he would not
classify such a souvenir as an artwork. According to the inclusive ontology to be proposed later 
in this thesis, a souvenir equivalent o f  Paris Air would indeed be accepted as an artwork, even if  
only a piece of ‘folk art’.
101 Julian Opie plays with this factor brilliantly, in his piece H, in the Tate collection. It is a subtly
abstracted imitation o f a wall heater, designed to catch out art-lovers who are fearful o f being 
caught lavishing their aesthetic attention on mere fixtures and fittings. In this case, if  they are too 
cautious, they will miss the work entirely. See Plate Id, in Appendix E. 
http://www.tate.org.uk/servlet/ViewWork?cgroupid=999999961 &workid=20363&searchid=961 
3.
102 Ian Ground (1989) Art or Bunk? London, Bristol Classical Press, p. 26.
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reflect the full range of our traffic with the aesthetic in nature and everyday life, let 
alone in art.
In his deflationary impulse to restrict the remit of the aesthetic, Carroll 
misrepresents Baumgarten’s position:
Baumgarten chose this label [aesthetics] because he thought that artworks 
primarily address sensory perception and very low-level forms of cognition. The 
important thing to notice about Baumgarten’s usage of the term is that he looked 
at art from the reception side of things. He conceived of it from the perspective 
of the way in which art addresses spectators103.
Although the aesthetic movement in the Nineteenth Century might have rendered the 
concept of the aesthetic rather effete, it is inaccurate historically to attribute such a 
position to Baumgarten, who emphasised cognition in his definition of the aesthetic as, 
‘the science of sensuous knowing’ (scientia cognitionis sensitivae )104. Nicholas Davey 
has written that Baumgarten’s aesthetics are often underestimated because few seem to 
realise that he went on to develop his concept into the more active ‘science of sensuous 
representation and expression ’ (my Italics) (scientia sensitive cognoscendi et 
proponendi)m . A fuller discussion of Baumgarten and Kant’s aesthetics will follow in 
Chapters Four and Five. All that is necessary to say here is that Carroll’s conception of 
the aesthetic, while much more balanced and comprehensive than that of his mentor 
Dickie in 1964, nevertheless gives an unwarrantedly restricted account of both the role 
and the importance of the aesthetic dimension in the arts:
One can at least imagine a philosophy of art that renders questions of aesthetics 
peripheral, particularly in terms of the definition of a r t . .  .106
. . .  a philosophy of art would not regard aesthetic experiences or aesthetic 
properties as necessary ingredients in all art (although it might recognise them as 
important)107.
Hence the diagram in Fig. 1, in section 1.3.1, which shows the aesthetic as contingent 
rather than necessary in art. Carroll’s estimation of the role and importance of the
103 Noel Carroll Op. Cit. (1999) p. 156.
104 Quoted from Aesthetica § 1 by Nicholas Davey (1992) “Baumgarten”, in David Cooper A Companion
to Aesthetics, Oxford, Blackwell, 41-3, p. 40 Col. 1. The translation is Davey’s own; when I 
translate the word sensitive I use the word ‘sensorily’, following the example o f  Paul Guyer 
(2005) Values o f  Beauty: Historical Essays in Aesthetics, Cambridge, CUP, p. 29, on the basis 
he gives that the words ‘sensitive’ and ‘sensual’ have other connotations.
105 Nicholas Davey (1989) in “Baumgarten’s Aesthetics: a Post-Gadamerian Reflection”, British Journal
o f  Aesthetics (Vol. 29), 101-115, p. 107.
106 Noel Carroll Op. Cit. (1999) p. 159. The quotation is given more fully in Section 1.3.1, above.
107 Loc. Cit.
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aesthetic might well have been adequate if aesthetic properties were in fact delimited in 
the way he describes. Ironically for the advocate of an historical/narrative account, 
Carroll fails to take account o f the way the context of history itself modifies aesthetic 
properties. His cut-down model of the aesthetic as merely ‘design awareness’ means 
that Carroll, who presents himself as the advocate of an ‘historical account’, is arguing 
for a version of aesthetic properties which are conceived in a-historical terms, as 
described by Sibley , which are supervenient, in Carroll’s words, on the ‘bare 
properties’ of artworks:
1) Expressive properties (sad)
2) Character properties (bold)
3) Gestalt properties (unified)
4) Taste factors (garish) and
5) Mental States (sublime, beautiful)109.
The mistake Carroll seems to be making is to see the aesthetic exclusively in 
psychological, or even physiological, terms, as responses to the primary and secondary 
properties instantiated in the physical objects of art. To be fair to Carroll, he finds 
plentiful historical and contemporary evidence for this narrow and arguably 
inappropriate application of what he calls, ‘beauty theory’ to aesthetic theory110. 
However, his response is not to try to broaden the current use of the term ‘aesthetic’ in 
analytical philosophy of art, but he chooses to follow Dickie in trying to ensnare the 
meaning of the aesthetic within the tunnel vision of formalism111.
Carroll was indeed correct to identify an influential ‘formalist tendency’ running
1 1 “7through Hutcheson, parts of Kant, through Schopenhauer and Bell to Beardsley . 
However, this formalist tradition was not the sole tradition within aesthetics to place a
108 F. Sibley (2001) Approach to Aesthetics: Collected Papers on Philosophical Aesthetics, Oxford, OUP.
109 This is a compressed summary o f  Carroll’s account o f ‘The aesthetic dimension’, in Op. Cit. (1999)
pp. 182-201, which includes the dimension o f ‘design appreciation’ he had earlier described in 
his section on artistic form, pp. 137-152. At the end of the section on ‘The aesthetic dimension’ 
he tries unconvincingly to qualify his position, in a statement rather out o f keeping with the tenor 
of the rest o f the book. Perhaps one can detect the hand o f an editor or a well-wisher trying to 
spare the author possible criticism: ‘Limiting the scope o f the aesthetic in this way does not 
disparage it. Aesthetic experience is o f overwhelming importance to art’ (p. 201). One could not 
have guessed it from reading he rest o f his account.
1,0 His gives a particularly hard-hitting attack on aesthetic theories o f art in Noel Carroll (1991) “Beauty 
and the Genealogy o f Art Theory” The Philosophical Forum, Vol. 22n no. 4, pp. 307-34, 
reprinted N. Carroll (2001a) Beyond Aesthetics: Philosophical Essays, Cambridge, CUP, pp. 20- 
41.
m Paul Guyer criticises Carroll for his unbalanced account o f the history o f these issues in his (2003) 
“History of Modem Aesthetics” in Jerrold Levinson (Ed.) (2003) The Oxford Handbook o f  
Aesthetics, Oxford, OUP (pp. 25-60).
112 Noel Carroll Op. Cit. (1991; 2001a edn.) pp. 20-41.
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high premium on the sensory in art. A different tradition saw sensory cognition and 
expression as defining factors of the aesthetic, as we shall see in our study of 
Baumgarten, in chapter four. Carroll seemed unaware, when he made the following 
assertion, of this vigorous alternative aesthetic tradition to formalism:
One way to attempt to save the aesthetic approach is to effectively redefine what 
is meant by ‘aesthetic’ in such a way that anything that is an appropriate 
response to art is redesignated as an aesthetic response113.
However, Carroll claims that to make this move would be:
. . .  at best a stipulative redefinition, if not a downright misuse of language. 
Moreover, and more important, to redefine ‘aesthetic’ in this way is tantamount 
to giving up the core of aesthetic theories of art, viz., the reliance on a unique 
aesthetic experience, different in kind from those of other realms of human 
activity, and therefore, suited to separating art from morality, utility, knowledge, 
and so on114.
This is not a balanced account of the ‘traditional’ meaning of the term aesthetic, nor 
even of the beauty theory of Hutcheson or Kant, though it might represent a strand 
which included Schopenhauer or Bell. The view that the aesthetic and the moral are 
separate realms is neither necessary nor universal, as we saw in the case of Hume, in the 
last chapter. If any ‘redefinition’ has taken place, it was the redefinition of the term 
‘aesthetic’ by the ‘art for art’s sake’ movement, continuing in Modernist formalism115, 
which Carroll persists in trying to pin to the chest of the ‘aesthetic’, despite plentiful 
counter-evidence to invalidate such a move. His account of Kant’s aesthetics is based 
on the first 22 (out of 60) sections of the Critique o f  Aesthetic Judgment, and Carroll 
ignores dependent beauty and the aesthetic idea, apart from giving one nominal mention 
to each116. He even denies that Kant had a philosophy of art117, and there is no mention 
of Kant’s theory of Genius, in which Kant claimed that the artist presents, in sensory 
form, the abstract Ideas of Reason, such as freedom and morality.
Carroll’s position tries to rob aesthetic properties of their purchase on cognition, 
morality and utility, because of the historical accident that the same word, ‘aesthetic’, 
has been employed in at least two different ways, a) the narrow formalist sense 
associated with beauty theory and Bell, and b) the broader cognitivist sense as coined by
113 Ibid. Footnote 51, printed on p. 399.
114 Ibid. Footnote 51, continued on p. 400.
115 Paul Guyer Op. Cit.{2003) and Kai Hammermeister (2002) The German Aesthetic Tradition,
Cambridge, CUP.
116 Noel Carroll Op. Cit. (1991; 200la edn.) p. 31.
117 Loc. Cit.
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Baumgarten, of which Carroll seems ignorant. The account of the aesthetic presented in 
this thesis is trying to reclaim the vision of Baumgarten, who taught that aesthetic 
knowledge is different from scientific knowledge, but is still to be valued for the way it 
communicates by means that are not available to logic. Carroll seems unaware that the 
responses to art that he terms ‘artistic’ were originally classified as aesthetic. The term 
‘aesthetic’ in this sense is employed as Baumgarten intended, not in the way in which it 
was used after being diverted away from cognition, as began to happen, it appears, 
following Kant’s definitions o f ‘free beauty’ (See sections 5.3.1 and 5.5.1, below).
Nor does Carroll seem to appreciate that the very aesthetic properties that he is 
trying to restrict and cut loose from history, are in fact integrally shaped by the 
historical context of each artwork. It will be argued in this thesis that aesthetic 
properties are not fully or adequately accounted for as properties supervenient upon 
physical properties, transmitted by raw light-waves or sound pulses to act upon our 
sense-processing systems, called ‘input-systems’ and ‘transducers’ by Fodor. They are
1 1 ftalso affected by ‘top-down’, ‘isotropic’ and ‘Quinean’ systems . In overlooking the 
role of ‘higher processing’, Carroll is forcing upon any aesthetic account of the arts a 
crude ‘empiricist’ model of aesthetic properties, which Currie showed to be 
untenable119. The historical context of the creation of any artwork will have a crucial 
bearing on a work’s aesthetic properties, as Danto demonstrated in his paper, ‘Art and
19ftMeaning ’. This features the three versions of the Brillo Box: the ‘commercial art’ by
Harvey, the ‘original’ by Warhol and the ‘appropriation’ by Bidlo. Although (in theory)
‘indiscernible’ from each other, all three installations had very different aesthetic
properties, depending on their place in the narrative. Each makes a separate contribution
to the ‘conversation’ that is the story of art, as Carroll’s own historical narrative theory 
1^1fully acknowledges , although he fails to acknowledge the reciprocity between the 
historical and the aesthetic122. In other words, in his attempt to force the ‘aesthetic’ back
118 See chapter two, section 2.4.1.
119 Gregory Currie (1989) An Ontology o f  Art, Basingstoke, Macmillan, Chapter 2, “Empiricism”, pp. 17-
45.
120 Arthur C. Danto (2000) “Art and Meaning” in N. Carroll (Ed.) Theories o f  Art Today, Madison,
University o f Wisconsin Press, (pp. 130-140).
121 Noel Carroll Op. Cit. p. 255.
122 The nature o f this link is not a new discovery, but was even commented upon by the ancients, who
were well aware that the new realism differed from the earlier archaic style, a matter which Plato 
apparently deplored, but o f which Quintillian approved: ‘For indeed there is very little grace in a 
body which stands upright; the face, for example, looks straight ahead, the arms are allowed to 
hang down, the feet are joined, and the work as a whole is rigid from head to toe. But the 
familiar relaxed curvature and, as I might even call it, movement, provides a kind o f liveliness
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into the formalist straitjacket, Carroll is guilty of ignoring the relevance to aesthetic 
experience of history, history being, supposedly, his major contribution to the 
philosophy of art. Carroll’s model of the aesthetic as ‘design awareness’ would have no 
way to deal with the aesthetic discriminations made by Danto between the three Brillo 
Box installations.
Finally, Carroll distinguished two uses of the word ‘art’, standing for 1) the
1 -j'*
practice of art and 2) the artwork . He finds that an equivocation over these two uses 
of the word is the flaw in the Neo-Wittgensteinian124 account: 1. ‘art’ as practice is an 
open concept, but 2) ‘art’, meaning the objects of such practice, is closed. Rather than 
say that it is impossible to define art, Carroll sidesteps the task, choosing to hold to the 
prize of explaining how we identify individual artworks through narrative, a process 
especially useful with avant-garde artworks. However, this still leaves Carroll with 
Levinson’s problem of regression to the wr-arts, and he returns to this problem at the 
end of his book, Philosophy o f  Art. He seems to accept Dickie’s criticism of Levinson’s 
explanation of ur-art, which requires an earlier, ‘prt-histor'icaV functional definition. He 
wafts the objection aside, however, as he claims that this functional definition is only 
very limited. He claims that ‘protosystems’, like tribal art, are outside the Western 
artworld and therefore require different criteria. However:
Historical narration does not collapse into functional analysis, since functional 
analysis only makes sense with respect to protosystems12 .
Faced with a similar explanation for art and ur-art by Levinson, George Dickie had 
joked about someone being ‘just a little pregnant126’. So, apparently, a naturalistic 
aesthetic is needed only to ‘kick-start’ art, and history takes over thereafter. Carroll even 
manages to draw comfort from this inconsistency:
The fact that we employ more than one method for identifying art merely 
reflects the complexity of the phenomenon127.
and emotion.’ (translated J.J. Pollitt (1965) The Art o f  Greece 1400-31 B.C.: Sources and 
Documents, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice Hall, p. 63.
123 Noell Carroll Op. Cit. (1999) p. 219.
124 This is an allusion to a famous paper by Morris. Weitz (1956) “The Role o f Theory in Aesthetics”,
JAAC, Vol 15, pp. 27-35, reprinted in A. Neill & A. Ridley (Eds.) (1995) The Philosophy o f Art: 
Readings Ancient and Modern, Boston, McGraw Hill, pp. 183-92. Weitz argued that ‘art’ was 
an ‘open concept’, where it was inadvisable to try to define art, which might set boundaries to 
possible future developments.
125 Ibid. p. 263.
126 George Dickie Op. Cit. (2001) p. 42
127 Noel Carroll Op. Cit. (1999) p. 264.
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Dickie, too, realises that his artworld is beset by a similar problem, and his response to 
it is also unconvincing:
For the institutional theory, the first arts are those that have a place within the 
institutional structure that is the artworld when that structure gels -  the gelling 
may take place over a considerable period of time. Ur-arts are things that 
resemble later art but that do not yet have an artworld to fit into128.
It seems that little thought has been given to the nature of that phenomenon being 
invoked, on all sides, by the term ‘aesthetic’ and which is both disparaged while being 
seen by these deflationists as the spark which ignited Ur-art. In chapter two, a start was 
made to investigate the nature of the aesthetic in art by looking to see if there is any 
empirical evidence for the ‘aesthetic attitude’. It appeared that there was. Chapters six 
and seven will try to probe further into the scientific evidence, for there must be some 
more fundamental factors at work than narrative, and it will be argued in this thesis that 
those factors are the aesthetic and the perception of agency.
3.3.4 Summary and Conclusion
This chapter section examined and found wanting the arguments advanced in 
favour of two of the new Sceptical Hypotheses (IHP and AUA):
*IHP Art should be defined by its Intentional and Historical Properties
*AUA The Aesthetic is necessary only in Ur-Art.
The arguments advanced by Levinson for IHP again removed the 
phenomenology of aesthetic experience from the discourse, replacing it with observable 
behaviour (a ‘regard’) which had been sanctioned by an institutional process, ‘history’. 
It was argued, against IHP, that although history has an important role in artistic 
response, it is in the domain of art’s interpretation and evaluation, not in its definition 
and classification, where, against AUA, the role of the aesthetic is necessary to all art, 
and not contingent to all bar Ur-Art, as claimed. Thus the role of history was formulated 
as item H:
H Historical factors affect the ontology and interpretation of art 
rather than its definition and classification.
128 George Dickie Op. Cit. (2001) p. 42.
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It was observed as an irony that Noel Carroll, advocate of narrative history as a 
means of identifying works of art, ignores the relevance of history in shaping the 
aesthetic qualities of artworks, which he insists in portraying in empirical terms as 
‘design awareness’ and responding to the (physicalist) ‘bare properties’ of art objects, 
ignoring the ‘top-down’ conceptual factors which will be explored in chapter seven on 
cognitive neuroscience and the aesthetic.
It is now time to challenge the widely accepted distinction made by Stephen 
Davis between ‘functional’ and ‘procedural’ theories of art.
3.4 Questioning Davies’ Functional/Procedural Distinction
The case for deflationary aesthetics has been cemented firmly into the fabric of
recent Anglo-American analytical aesthetics by Stephen Davies’ book on Definitions o f 
1
Art of 1991 , a remarkably comprehensive survey of all the relevant publications on
that topic over the previous 30 years, with rigorous analytical arguments at every twist 
in the story. He thereby succeeded in structuring the subsequent conduct of this debate, 
most notably with his claim for a principled distinction between ‘functional’ and 
‘procedural’ art theories. He has repeated this message recently in his undergraduate 
textbook of 2006, named, like Carroll’s undergraduate textbook, in the Hegelian
13ftmanner: The Philosophy o f  Art . He also followed Hegel and Carroll in ignoring the 
aesthetics of nature. Like Carroll, he also avoids proffering his own a definition of art. 
After his 1991 book on that subject, he wrote that it had not been his aim to arrive at a 
‘formulaic definition’:
Rather than settling the issue of the definition of art, my aim has been to
demonstrate the usefulness of an approach to aesthetic issues -  problems of
ontology, evaluation, and interpretation, as well as of definition -  which views
the debates involved in terms of a distinction between functional and procedural1^1conceptions of the nature of art
129 Stephen Davies Op. Cit. (1991).
130 Stephen Davies (2006) The Philosophy o f  Art, Oxford, Blackwell. Hegel might be seen to have
launched the sceptical approach to the term ‘aesthetic’, at a time when was the word was 
unavoidable as the title o f his lecture series o f the 1820s. He explained why he would have 
preferred to call his lectures Philosophy o f  Art or Philosophy o f  Fine Art: ‘By adopting this 
expression we at once exclude the beauty o f nature’. See chapters 1 to 3 o f Hegel's Introduction 
to Aesthetics, reprinted in A. Neill & A. Ridley (Eds) Op.Cit., (pp.139-149) p. 139. Their source 
was From Hegel's Introduction to Aesthetics, being the Introduction to the Berlin Aesthetics 
Lectures o f  the 1820s, (1975) trans. T.M. Knox, Oxford, Clarendon Press.
131 Stephen Davies Op. Cit. (1991) p. 218. It is worth remarking that, in this instance, his use o f  the word
‘aesthetic’ is much broader than the narrow meaning he tries to pin to Beardsley’s chest.
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Stephen Davies makes it clear that this distinction between the functional and the 
procedural follows from Danto’s view, based on such thought experiments as the ‘can 
opener’, simultaneously, but independently, created by a) an artist and b) an inventor; 
the one a sculpture and the other, though physically identical, a mere kitchen utensil132. 
Thus Danto compares the artwork, with its artistic properties, to its ‘indiscernible’ 
doppelganger, which lacks artistic properties. Davies says that Danto taught him that,
. . .  whatever aesthetic properties artworks may share with their real counterparts 
(should they have them), they take on other aesthetic properties when seen 
properly as artworks falling within artistic traditions1 3.
The question arises as to whether this functional/procedural distinction will stand up to 
analytical questioning.
The tactic employed by Dickie, Carroll and Davies is to confine the aesthetic to 
a very narrow base, an extreme version of formalism that even Clive Bell could not 
confine himself to emotionally, when it came to his own enthusiastic response to 
William Frith’s painting of Paddington Station, which spills over into his appreciative 
criticism of the work he is supposedly dismissing as ‘not art’134. When Stephen Davies 
also pigeon-holes the ‘traditional aesthetic view’ into the very untypical position that 
‘aesthetic interest’ can refer only to the intrinsic, plastic properties of the work, and not 
at all to the work’s extrinsic relationships, he is either guilty of a deliberate 
misrepresentation in order to diminish the aesthetic by a reductio, or he is mistaken in 
his understanding of ‘the traditional aesthetic view ’.
Stephen Davies’ argument (or his assumptions) would seem to go like this 
(items that are in my opinion false are marked with an asterisk):
*1. Traditional (‘functional’) aesthetics acknowledges as aesthetic properties 
only those intrinsic features which are directly, sensorily, perceivable to the 
respondent.
2. However, the (‘procedural’) philosophy of art has revealed the importance to 
the classification and understanding of art of extrinsic factors such as those 
revealed by historical knowledge.
132 Arthur C. Danto Op. Cit. (1981) pp. 29-30.
133 S. Davies, Op. Cit. (1991) p. 69.
134 See Clive Bell (1949) Art (New edition; first published 1914) London, Chatto and Windus, p. 18. The
painting, by William Powell Frith (1819-1909) is The Railway Station (1860-2) at Royal 
Holloway College. It is illustrated in Lionel Lamboume (1999) Victorian Painting, London, 
Phaidon, Fig. 321, p. 265.
135 See Stephen Davies Op. Cit. (2006) chapter 3, especially sections 3.3-3.4, pp. 60-68.
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*3. Therefore traditional aesthetics did not acknowledge the importance of 
history in the classification and understanding of art.
One is inclined to ask whether (3) is true. It takes only a few minutes to find
evidence to the contrary .The appreciation of art has long been historical, if not from the
beginning136. The importance of history to art was the not the discovery of Danto,
Levinson, Carroll, Davies or even of Hegel. Vasari wrote of Giotto as a ten-year-old
boy, talent-spotted by Cimabue and brought to his workshop in Florence, where:
. . . .  in a very short space of time, Giotto not only captured his master’s own 
style but also began to draw so ably from the life that he made a decisive break 
with the crude traditional Byzantine style and brought to life the great art of 
painting as we know it today . . . .  137
If the conclusion (3) is false, it must be because either one or both of the premises were 
false. The deflationists’ aunt sally version of the aesthetic, given in statement (1), is a 
myth, as Dickie might say, constructed by them for the sake of argument, as Carroll 
admitted, when commenting on Dickie’s ‘demolition job’ . This account of the 
aesthetic is a myth that both Noel Carroll and Stephen Davies continue to present in 
their recent undergraduate textbooks139.
It is important, therefore, to challenge this ‘functional/procedural’ dichotomy. 
The argument used by the early Danto, and later by Carroll and Davies could be 
summarised as follows:
1 Both artworks and ‘mere real things’ have ‘intrinsic’ aesthetic properties that 
have been described as ‘supervenient’ upon their physical properties.
*2 Artworks also have ‘extrinsic’ relations with entities outside their own
boundaries, and these relations determine the artwork’s ‘artistic’ properties, but 
only once the artwork is identified as art.
*3 Only the extrinsic (‘procedural’) artistic properties depend on external relations, 
such as their place in history.
136 If tribal arts are any guide to what might have been going on in ur-art, Denys Dutton reports that,
among the potential additional candidates for his list o f eight elements characteristic o f tribal 
arts, is one summarized by Dutton as follows: ‘the inherent tension between artistic tradition and 
novelty.’ See Denys Dutton (2000) “But They Don’t Have Our Concept o f Art” in N. Carroll 
(Ed.) Theories o f  Art Today, Madison Wisconsin, University of Wisconsin Press, (pp. 217-238) 
p. 232. Dutton found this in H. Gene Blocker, (1993) The Aesthetics o f  Primitive Art, Lanham, 
Md., University Press o f America, p. 148.
137 Giorgio Vasari (1568) Lives o f  the Artists, translated George Bull (1965) Harmondsworth, Penguin, p.
58.
138 See Section 1.3.2.
139 Noel Carroll Op. Cit. (1999) and Stephen Davies Op. Cit. (2006).
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*4 Therefore the artwork’s intrinsic (‘functional’) aesthetic properties do not depend 
on relations with entities outside their boundaries, such as their place in history.
This thesis argues that this is a flawed argument and seems to reflect a 
misunderstanding of the aesthetic, which, on the contrary, is itself essentially 
contextual, or relational. Red berries have evolved to be red, because selective 
pressures favoured species of trees whose fruits were easily visible to birds and primates 
with colour vision: red dots against a background of green, a relational property. This 
example also has a temporal dimension: the fruits were green, but are now red, 
signalling a significant change. Clearly, all ‘aesthetic’ choices operate against a 
background of contrast, which can be spatial or temporal (i.e. historical), whether 
visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, haptic or in any other possible perceptible way. In 
music, aesthetic properties are relational; a note by itself cannot exist without the 
contrast of relative silence, and the contrasting pitches of other notes, whether 
contemporaneous, preceding or following. In the above argument, (2), (3) and (4) 
appear to be false, and with them the claim that ‘procedural’ artistic properties are 
relational or extrinsic, while ‘functional’ aesthetic properties are intrinsic to the object, 
and therefore different in kind, because they are not relational. If my argument is 
accepted, the corrected argument should be:
1 Both artworks and ‘mere real things’ have ‘intrinsic’ aesthetic properties that 
have been described as ‘supervenient’ upon their physical properties.
2 All objects also have ‘extrinsic’ relations with entities outside their own 
boundaries, and these also contribute to objects’ aesthetic and other properties.
3 Therefore, an artwork’s intrinsic (‘functional’) aesthetic properties are affected 
by their relations with entities outside their boundaries, including their place in 
history.
The point of the above is not to argue that there are no differences between artworks 
and ‘mere real things’, but that the nature of the aesthetic, and the functional/procedural 
dichotomy has been misrepresented by deflationary aesthetics. There is no principled 
way to separate the ‘artistic’ properties claimed by Danto, Carroll and Davies as 
exclusive to art, from the common or garden variety of mere ‘aesthetic’ or ‘functional’ 
properties. This does not remove from Danto his insight, as Davies summarises it, that 
‘artworks stand to their real (including representational) counterparts as actions stand to
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mere movements and persons stand to their bodies140’. Rather, it is arguing that there is 
only one aesthetic, for nature, interpersonal relationships and art. For this reason,
Davies misread the state of affairs when he believed that, after Duchamp,4 the 
procedures of art making have parted company with point of art141’, revealing the nature 
of art as essentially procedural rather than functional. This thesis will argue that it never 
was ‘functional’ in Davies’ sense, nor ‘procedural’, but invariably both at the same 
time, as both factors are always present and interactive.
The conclusion, therefore, is that Sceptical Hypothesis F/PT is invalid:
*F/PT Davies’ Functional and Procedural distinction is Tenable
Finally, it is apparent that the prior dominance of formalism has been 
exaggerated in rhetoric designed to aggrandise the supposed historical and institutional 
revolution brought about by the concerted deflationist interventions. All that is needed 
to confirm that their claims are exaggerated, is to consider one aspect of the pedagogical 
history of Humanities teaching in American colleges. A textbook from the 1950’s 
reveals that the undergraduates of that time were taught a catholic combination of 
‘design appreciation’ together with history. The experience of teaching generations of 
freshmen had shown the professors that there was a task to be done, to open the eyes of 
novices to the rhetorical devices of artistic media. The following quotation comes from 
a 1957 textbook, Learning to Look, compiled from the handbook which had been 
developed to support the University of Chicago’s required Humanities I course, 
comprising literature, music and art. Joshua C. Taylor, describes the book’s rationale:
In the presentation of each of the arts, it has been a guiding premise of the 
course staff that all study, whether critical or historical, logically begins with the 
work of art itself. This in no sense means, as becomes clear during the progress 
of the course, that the study of a work stops with what can be immediately seen 
or heard. This is only the beginning. But unless the student has become critically 
aware of and has learned to define his own immediate experience in confronting 
a work of art, the superstructure of history, critical theories, and other 
elucidating systems (including those of purely formal analysis) may effectively 
smother the all-important spark of vitality that separates the meaningful study of 
art from a routine academic exercise. Seeing, we have found, is sometimes more 
difficult for the student of art than believing142.
140 Stephen Davies Op. Cit. (1991) p. 69.
141 Ibid. p. 218.
142 Joshua C. Taylor (1957) Learning to Look, Chicago, University o f Chicago Press, p. v.
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In chapter two we saw what seems to be involved in ‘learning to see’ in the context of 
drawing, and why it might be helpful to teach it. It is something of an exaggeration to 
claim that 1964 was the Damascene moment when the fogs of formalism were pierced 
by the light of history and institutional common sense. As Sheldon Richmond has 
commented:
Given that Gombrich and other historians of art, including Malraux and Marxists 
such as Ernst Fischer, have discussed works of art, and traditions of images, as 
part of traditions and institutions, Dickie’s theory of art appears commonplace 
and unoriginal143.
The argument now turns to a different case of scepticism towards the aesthetic, 
from an unexpected quarter, Ernst Gombrich. The solution to the conundrum this poses 
provides a very useful way into considering the realism of the aesthetic, from Karl 
Popper, in a way complementary to the approach suggested already in this chapter by 
Joseph Margolis. Also, the next chapter section follows the development of Danto, 
particularly in the last chapter of the Transfiguration o f  the Commonplace, from 
physicalism to aesthetic realism.
3.5 Bevond Deflationism: Gombrich. Popper. Danto and Margolis
The names in the above heading do not look an immediately obvious grouping. 
Gombrich looks a less likely choice than Goodman, whose approach to exemplification 
will be touched on in the chapter on Baumgarten. Nor is Popper known for his 
aesthetics.
Gombrich’s relevance arises from his scepticism towards expressions of 
aesthetic value. Sheldon Richmond has shown that in the area of aesthetic value, 
Gombrich failed to apply Popper’s philosophy in the way he had used it to address 
questions of interpretation and the history of representation and style144. An argument 
by Richmond that Popper’s principles can also be applied to aesthetic values will be
143 Sheldon Richmond (1994) Aesthetic Criteria: Gombrich and the Philosophies o f  Science o f  Popper
and Polanyi, Amsterdam, Rodopi, pp. 88-9. Also, space did not allow me to include W. G. 
Gallie’s compound anticipations (by nearly a decade) o f Danto’s ‘artworld’, Dickie’s ‘Institution 
Theory’ and Levinson and Carroll’s ‘Historical’ approaches, in two brilliant but neglected 
papers, his (1956a) ‘Essentially Contested Concepts’ in the Proceedings o f  the Aristotelian 
Society, Vol. 56, pp. 167-198 and 1956b) ‘Art as an Essentially Contested Concept’, The 
PhilosophicalQuarterly, Vol. 6, pp. 97-114.
144 Sheldon Richmond Op. Cit. (1994).
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quoted here as a counter-argument to aesthetic non-realism. In a footnote, Richmond 
comments on the way Dickie’s attack on the aesthetic attitude leads to relativism:
. . .  [Dickie’s] theory of art is an improvement over the a prioristic approach and 
the over the ‘attitudinal’ approach with one reservation: unlike Gombrich he 
equates the aesthetic with the social conventions of critics, and hence falls into 
relativism . . .  The a prioristic and attitudinal approache[s] escape relativism. ‘A 
priorists’ postulate universal rules of criticism. ‘Attitudinalists’ postulate an 
inter-subjective aesthetic attitude or aesthetic stance. Because Dickie equates the 
aesthetic with the conventional standards of critics, he relativizes the aesthetic to 
the variety of historical standards of critics145.
The same criticism of relativism also applies to socially motivated sceptics who view 
the aesthetic as merely a ‘snob’s charter’ (to be discussed in section 8.5.2.2, below).
Although Danto was caught in the cross-currents of positivism and played a role 
in deflationary aesthetics, here it will be argued that, in the last chapter of The 
Transfiguration o f the Commonplace146, he presents an approach to art that can be seen 
as Realist, and congruent with Baumgarten’s account of the aesthetic. The last name in 
our line-up, Margolis, for long a scourge of Danto’s aesthetic scepticism, argues both 
for aesthetic realism and for the possibility of a plurality of interpretations which is 
close to Popper’s account of ‘guesses’ open to peer review that he sees as the test-bed 
for cultural values.
3.5.1 Gombrich and Popper
Ernst Gombrich opened the Story o f  Art with one of the most famous 
expressions of aesthetic scepticism: ‘There really is no such thing as Art. There are only 
artists147’. Paradoxically, Gombrich will enjoy two incarnations in this thesis, both as a 
sceptic of the aesthetic, here, and as its advocate in chapter six. While known primarily 
for his application of Popper’s philosophies of Sociology and Science to a) the history 
of art and b) to the history of representation148, Sheldon Richmond has shown that 
Gombrich rarely addressed the aesthetics of ‘fine art’149, and that when he did it was in
145 Ibid. p. 89.
146 Arthur C. Danto Op. Cit. (1981) The Transfiguration o f  the Commonplace: a Philosophy o f  Art,
Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press.
147 Ernst Gombrich (1950; 1963 edn.) The Story o f  Art, London, Phaidon, p. 5.
148 Ernst Gombrich (1960) Art and Illusion: a study in the psychology o f  pictorial representation
(consulted: 1963 reset o f 2nd Edition, 1962), London, Phaidon.
149 Sheldon Richmond Op. Cit. (1994). Although Richmond does not mention the fact, Gombrich does
discuss the aesthetics o f decorative art, in Ernst Gombrich (1979) The Sense o f  Order: A Study in 
the psychology o f  decorative art (consulted: 2nd edition, 1984) London, Phaidon.
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sceptical vein, revealing an inconsistency in Gombrich’s application of Popperian 
principles to art. Although Gombrich applied Popper to the historical, sociological and 
representational problems of art, he failed to apply the same principles to art’s 
aesthetics150.
Richmond says that the aim of Popper’s sociology was to explain the intended 
and unintended consequences of people’s rational actions151. To apply this, Gombrich 
drew on three Popperian principles for the study of technical and sociological problems 
in art history to explain why artists work in different styles in different traditions:
1. Artworks are the outcome of rational actions (called the ‘zero method’).
2. The task of art history is to show how artworks are the result of individual 
artists ’ actions on the basis of their individual aims (called ‘methodological 
individualism’).
3. Artists work in historical contexts. These contexts a) set problems for artists 
to solve and b) supply them with certain expectations, styles and techniques 
(both together are called ‘situational logic’).
Gombrich was also indebted to Popper’s advocacy of methodology in the
1 Ophilosophy of science , in the form of ‘trial and error’. This Gombrich applied to the 
history of representation, in which artists refined their techniques to achieve illusions by 
improving upon their less successful attempts, in a process of ‘making and matching’, 
analogously to scientists testing and improving their theories by trial and error.
However, Richmond observed that in the case of aesthetics, Gombrich took up a
1position similar to Michael Polanyi’s rejection of methodology in science on three 
grounds: a) historical, b) psychological and c) logical154. Polanyi argued that history 
confirmed that scientists did not work according to method, but often ignored 
inconsistent results. His psychological argument stated that, in order to understand a 
theory, scientists needed to like it, being committed to the tacit understandings of an 
authoritative ‘master scientist’. His logical argument was that scientific method was
150 Richmond gives an outline o f all the arguments in the Introduction (Chapter One), Op. Cit. (1994) pp.
9-19.
151 Karl Popper (1957) The Poverty o f  Historicism, London, Rouledge and Kegan Paul.
152 Karl Popper (1959; 1972) The Logic o f  Scientific Discovery, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul.
153 Michael Polanyi (1958) Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy, London, Harper.
154 Sheldon Richmond Op. Cit. (1994) pp. 13-14, expanding his arguments in footnotes and in Chapter 3,
pp. 54-89.
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defeated by Meno’s paradox, which held that if you are searching but do not know what 
you are looking for, you won’t know when you’ve found it155.
Richmond summarises Popper’s known replies to these arguments. To the 
historical and psychological arguments, Popper replied that methodology is not 
designed to give a) an historical account of scientific practice, or b) to take the tacit 
understandings of experts into account. Instead, its role is to give ‘guidelines’, so that 
explicit results can be openly discussed and tested. Finally, c) Meno’s paradox is not 
relevant, because science is not a process of ‘finding truth’, so much as ‘removing 
error’.
Because Gombrich did not discuss these issues explicitly, Richmond gathers 
scattered comments from his writings. These reveal that Gombrich’s scepticism towards 
the aesthetic is analogous to Polanyi’s scepticism towards scientific methodology, 
particularly in addressing the prime question: ‘How do you know if an artwork is any 
good?’
Richmond shows that Gombrich’s objections, like Polanyi’s, are a) historical, b) 
psychological and c) logical. Gombrich argued that, a) historically, with changes of 
fashion, artists have regularly over- or under-valued other works of art. His 
psychological argument b) claimed that, in order to understand a work and respond to it 
aesthetically, you need the expert knowledge of a connoisseur (equivalent to Polanyi’s 
tacit understandings of the master-scientist), and also you need to like an artwork. 
Gombrich’s logical argument c) is that the words used in aesthetics are vague (echoes 
of Wittgenstein) and are rendered more precise only by the application of ‘non- 
aesthetic’ frameworks, such as using historical principles to select a group of works for 
comparison. This refusal o f ‘non-aesthetic’ frameworks in making aesthetic judgments 
suggests that Gombrich had adopted some of the formalists’ separation of the ‘aesthetic’ 
from other aspects of art, which had been one of George Dickie’s objections to 
formalism.
Richmond shows that Gombrich is consistent, however, in his application of 
Popper’s sociological rules: 1) artists have their own aims156, 2) artists act rationally157 
and 3) artists solve the problems presented to them by their social contexts . This
155 Ibid., in summary pp. 13-14, expanded in chapter three, pp. 54-89.
156 ‘methodological individualism’.
157 ‘zero-method’.
158 ‘situational logic’.
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gives Gombrich his explanation for the rapid turnover of styles in the twentieth century. 
Artists were faced by a choice: to remain ‘traditional’ or to do something new, a choice 
which he called ‘The Logic of Vanity Fair159’, leading to polarised groups, with artists 
caught up in the ‘logic of fashion’ which compromised their independence and made 
critical evaluation impossible.
Just as Polanyi had insisted that tacit knowledge and attraction to a theory 
underpinned scientific understanding, Gombrich insisted that appreciation of an artwork 
depends on human psychology, contingencies of individual background, such as 
erudition and connoisseurship, leading to a personal involvement and liking for a work, 
making ‘objective’ evaluation, according to universal rules or principles, impossible160. 
This is consistent with Stolnitz’s view that appreciation and criticism are incompatible, 
discussed in section 22.2.2 , above, and expressed in our issue AvC:
AvC Are appreciation and criticism incompatible mental states?
However, such a view is in direct opposition to Popper’s principle of learning by 
trial and error, with debate and discussion, leading to improved understanding, in all 
areas of human activity. Richmond makes it clear that this divergence from Popper did 
not mean that Gombrich was a relativist. Although Gombrich believed in objective 
aesthetic values, he thought that they were applicable only on a case-by-case basis, as 
all masterpieces are singular161, and thus not subject to general categories and 
principles162.
Richmond then interpolates three ‘Popperian’ replies to Gombrich163:
1) To Gombrich’s historical argument: although aesthetic theories might at times 
be historically false, their role is not to produce definitive (‘universal’) 
evaluations of art, but the means of critically discussing them, as method in
159 Ernst Gombrich (1965;1974) ‘The Logic o f  Vanity Fair’ in The Philosophy o f  Karl Popper, Ed. Paul
Arthur Schilpp, La Salle, Illinois, Open Court, pp. 925-55, summarised by Richmond, Op. Cit. 
pp. 35-8.
160 Sheldon Richmond Op. Cit. (1994), pp. 63-5.
161 On the scholastic principle o f indivduum est ineffabile, Ibid. p. 59.
162 Ibid. p. 84, footnote 41: Richmond contrasts Gombrich’s position with George Boas, who ‘argues
similarly to Gombrich that there cannot be universal rules for the discussion o f aesthetic norms 
because o f the bias o f the variety o f cultural backgrounds’. Boas argues for aesthetic relativism, 
all evaluations being ‘equally true’, allowing room only for interpretation and analysis. 
Gombrich rejects Boas’ relativity, holding, in Richmond’s words, that ‘aesthetic judgments can 
be true or false, depending upon one’s competence or expertise’.
163 Ibid. pp. 138-9.
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science provides a means of discussing theories critically, rather than a fail-safe 
determination o f ‘eternal truths’.
2) To Gombrich’s psychological argument: although aesthetic theories might be 
embedded in tacit frameworks familiar to connoisseurs (just as master scientists 
hold tacit understandings), by agreeing on aesthetic principles, contingencies can 
be sidelined and artists can adopt critical attitudes to artworks.
3) To Gombrich’s logical criticism that aesthetic terms are so vague that it would 
be impossible for critics to contradict each other, the Popperian reply would be 
that, although aesthetic terms might be inexact, there can be discussion of their 
use, and critical norms can be established.
To Gombrich’s claim that artworks are unique and ineffable, Richmond frames this 
reply:
. . .  the aim of aesthetic criticism is not to capture the uniqueness of each work 
of art, but rather to place them in a spectrum of aesthetic values164.
In conclusion, this Popperian framework clears a space for the debate of 
aesthetic concepts, which through criticism can refine the evaluation of artworks. Like 
competing scientific theories, different aesthetic evaluations are competing ‘guesses’ 
supported by evidence and argument. Incompatible aesthetic evaluations are therefore 
not the ‘death of realism’ in aesthetics, but serve to identify areas of debate which, in 
dialogue, can move in the direction of future consensus (‘the test of time’).
3.5.2 Danto, Margolis and Popper
Although in section 3.4 above, Danto’s name was grouped with others I have 
dubbed, ‘aesthetic deflationists’, he is the least deserving of this rather pejorative 
characterisation, because of his love of art, knowledge of its history and role as a 
contemporary art critic in New York165. His credentials as a sceptic of the aesthetic are 
mixed. Early in the Transfiguration o f  the Commonplace, Danto accepted, unlike 
Dickie166, the reality of ‘distancing’, saying any object can be the focus of the aesthetic
Ibid. p. 139.
165 Margolis has pointed out the paradox that Danto’s work as an art critic is ‘about what, on his own
theory, does not and cannot exist’; Joseph Margolis Op. Cit. (2001) p. 41.
166 See chapter two, section 2.2.1 above.
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attitude, adding that this is why the aesthetic attitude cannot be used to define art167. He 
also had no problem accepting the phenomenology of aesthetic perception, which he 
parodies in this example to show how it can be morally compromised:
- to see a riot, for instance, in which police are clubbing demonstrators, as a kind 
of ballet, or to see bombs exploding like mystical chrysanthemums from the 
plane168.
Immediately after this apparent acceptance of the realism of ‘distancing’, Danto 
surprisingly praises Dickie for rejecting it:
It certainly was no aim of the art of the high Baroque to be perceived 
disinterestedly: its aim was to change men’s souls. For this reason, then, I rather 
applaud the polemic of George Dickie, who contests what he speaks of as “the 
myth of psychic distance” and says that what prevents us from attempting to 
intervene in actions we see on a stage is not due to some mysterious sort of 
attitude, but to the fact that we know how to look at a play: we have mastered 
the conventions of the theater169.
Here Danto is confusing ‘distancing’ with ‘disinterestedness’, assuming they are linked
1 70in the way formalists like Stolnitz had taught. This led Danto to conclude that a) 
aesthetic experience and b) the framing conventions of art are alternative, rather than 
complementary factors in artistic response. After flirting with the Institutional Theory, 
Danto rejects it, as it cannot explain the conditions under which certain objects, and not
171others, are deemed by the ‘experts’ to be artworks .
We have just seen how Danto’s linking of the ‘aesthetic’ with ‘disinterestedness’ 
shows the imprint of formalist assumptions on his thinking. There are other signs of 
empiricist formalism in the Transfiguration. Here, near the opening to chapter four, on 
‘Aesthetics and the Work of Art’, Danto asks if:
. . .  our responses, aesthetically speaking, would be the same to objects that are 
outwardly exactly the same, though one is a work of art and the other a mere 
object, however spectacular.
He replies:
167 Arthur C. Danto Op. Cit. (1981) p. 22. The idea that the ‘aesthetic attitude’ could be used to define art
was a mid-twentieth century formulation o f theorists like Beardsley and Stolnitz, rather than a 
central concept o f ‘traditional aesthetics’ as deflationists are wont to claim.
168 Loc. Cit.
169 Arthur C. Danto Op. Cit. (1981) p. 23.
170 In his Op. Cit. (1964), Dickie uses Stolnitz’s aesthetic definition o f art as a paradigm o f formalism.
See chapter two, above.
171 Arthur C. Danto Op. Cit. (1981) p. 31. Dickie claimed this was a misreading o f the Institutional
Theory (see his 2001 Art and Value, Malden, Mass., Blackwell, ch. 3) but seems to me to have 
been a likely interpretation o f his 1974 definition, discussed in section 3.2.4, above.
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Such a question raises serious philosophical questions, for should our responses 
differ -  and I shall argue that they must -  it will be extremely difficult to 
suppose that aesthetic response is at all like a form of sense-perception, all the 
more so if our knowledge that one is an artwork makes the difference in how we 
respond. In that case aesthetic response must be conceptually mediated in ways 
it will be instructive to identify172.
Here Danto is making a separation between ‘sense-perception’ and ‘aesthetic 
response’, in which he sees ‘aesthetic response’ (and not ‘sense perception’) to be 
‘conceptually mediated’. The manner in which Danto makes this distinction reveals two 
assumptions: a) that ‘mere’ sense-perception is not ‘conceptually mediated’, which will 
be disputed in chapters six and seven, and b) he seems to think that realising that 
aesthetic response is ‘conceptually mediated’ might be considered to be some sort of a 
revelation. As we shall see, Baumgarten’s originality consisted in a) his rejection in 
1735 of Rationalism’s comparatively a-cognitive model of sense perception, together 
with b) Baumgarten’s advocacy of the jointly cognitive and sensory nature of aesthetic
17^experience, as encapsulated in his expression, ‘imaged concepts ’. Nor should 
postulating the cognitive nature of artistic response appear revelatory to readers of 
Kant’s Critique o f  Judgment, if they have persisted beyond the ‘formalist’ section of the 
‘Analytic of the Beautiful174’ to read his descriptions of the sublime175, artistic beauty176 
and the aesthetic idea177.
Margolis has drawn attention to Danto’s reiterated separation of artworks from 
‘mere real things’, a refrain which can be read to imply that, unlike their objects, 
artworks themselves are not real. Margolis writes that:
. . .  speaking of art is, for Danto, purely a rhetorical flourish regarding things 
that are real (‘mere real things’) but are never, qua real, artworks!178
Margolis argues that all Danto’s instances of ‘indiscemibles’ rest on a physicalist model 
of artworks, where the physical properties of the art object (the ‘mere real thing’) are 
real, but where the intentional properties which viewers ‘assign’ to artworks to 
constitute and interpret them are ‘not real’. Danto, he says, understands better than
172 The two quotations here form a continuous piece o f text, Arthur C. Danto Op. Cit. (1981) p. 91.
173 Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten Op. Cit. (1735; 1954 Edn.) §22, p. 46.
174 Immanuel Kant Op. Cit. (1790; 1987 edn.) Book I, §§1-22, Ak 203-43, pp. 43-95.
175 Ibid. §§23-9, Ak. 244-67, pp.97-126.
176 Ibid. §48, Ak 311, p. 179.
X11 Ibid. §49, Ak. 313, pp. 181-2.
178 Joseph Margolis Op. Cit. (2000) ‘The Deviant Ontology o f Artworks’ in Noel Carroll (Ed.) Theories 
o f  Art Today, Madison, University o f Wisconsin Press (pp. 109-129), p. 109.
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Beardsley the historical and intentional complexities of art, but his ‘realism’ remains 
‘essentially committed to the constraints of physicalism179’, making the expressive and 
representational ‘attributes’ of artworks merely ‘imaginatively’ ascribed, not
|  OA
'perceptually discernible ’.
Margolis protests that we do see a painting, not a ‘mere real thing’, and 'hear 
the sonata form’, not merely the sensorily discernible sounds181:
We do see painted representations of things. Any refusal to admit that we do will 
[mean] that we never see anyone doing anything, we see no more than ‘bodily 
movements’ (or sense data answering to them), which we imaginatively invest 
with the intentional features of human actions. If that were true, we would never 
hear speech: we would hear no more than sound . . .  like language and action, 
artworks are the culturally apt utterances of culturally formed selves 
(ourselves)182.
Therefore Margolis is sceptical of Danto’s claim that theory is something added 
that the ‘eye cannot de(s)cry’, because:
. . .  sensory perception is always and already freighted with conceptual elements 
. . .  There is no mere “sensory” perception that we can report, except that we 
agree to abstract from the culturally freighted perceptual reportings that we 
normally learn to make183.
The realism espoused by Margolis includes 1) ‘selves’ (uniquely languaged, 
‘second natured’ human agents), and 2) ‘Intentional utterances’ (intrinsically
1 Sdinterpretable artworks, histories, deeds, speech acts) . One of the questions which this 
thesis asks, while accepting Margolis’ criticisms of Danto on this point, is ‘Why only 
human agents?’ Animals also have intentional states and many make ‘Intentional 
utterances’. This question will be discussed in the final chapter, in the context of the 
bowerbird.
Margolis’ ontology of artworks as ‘cultural entities’, ‘Intentional’ rather than 
physical objects, enables him to question philosophers like Beardsley, Wollheim and 
Stecker who model their theory of artworks, including interpretation, on the 
metaphysics of physical objects185. For Margolis, no way exists ‘to construe “cultural
179 Joseph Margolis Op. Cit. (2001) p. 29.
180 Ibid. p. 57.
181 Ibid. pp. 60-1.
182 Ibid. p. 61.
183 Ibid. p. 62.
m  Ibid. p. 35.
m Ibid. p. 104.
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entities” (artworks or selves) as entities on a par with physical entities186’. Steelier, for 
example, tries to apply bivalent logic to the interpretation of artworks, which Margolis 
believes can have objective, valid but incompatible interpretations187, such as the two 
incompatible interpretations available for Wordsworth’s Lucy poems188. Contrary to the 
fears o f some, aesthetic realism and incompatible critical interpretations can be seen to 
be compatible189.
The way artworks and other cultural items such as language can have Intentional 
properties has been described by John Searle as ‘derivative Intentionality’, as distinct 
from the ‘intrinsic Intentionality’ of mental life itself190. Dale Jacquette refers to 
Heidegger’s description of the way an artefact, such a hammer, has ‘derivative 
Intentionality’. A tool or utensil is a product of thought; it embodies purpose, so much 
so that it becomes even more conspicuous when damaged (Auffalligkeit):
. . .  as Heidegger charmingly puts it in Being and Time, even on the rubbish heap 
it ‘bids farewell’ to we thinkers and makers 91.
Jaquette’s ontology, which proposes subcategories of 1) physical entities and 2) 
abstract entities, proposes a third subcategory, 3) ‘Qualia-bearing intentional entities’,
following Searle’s terminology in describing this class as comprising both ‘intrinsicany
• 10') intentional entities’ (minds) and ‘derivatively intentional entities ’:
If cultural artefacts are as much dual aspect entities as the minds that create 
them, then, like the mind, they require special provision in a third main category 
of a preferred existence domain. The world of culture, as Karl R. Popper, in 
Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach, for quite different reasons, 
has also maintained, is a third distinct ontological realm, a World 3.193
Popper’s philosophy of critical debate, combined with Margolis’ model of the multi- 
valent interpretation and evaluation of Intentionally-structured cultural entities, 
combined with Currie’s ontology, and Danto’s view of art as rhetorical ellipsis, t0 be 
discussed below, all combine to give us a good framework for understanding the nature
186 Ibid. p. 103.
lil Ibid. p. 105.
188 Ibid. p. 127.
189 John W. Bender Op. Cit. (2003).
190 John R. Searle (1983) Intentionality: an Essay in the Philosophy o f  Mind, Cambridge, CUP, p 2 7 .
191 Dale Jacquette (2002) Ontology, Chesham, Acumen, p. 271.
192 Ibid. p. 272.
193 Ibid. p. 273; footnote 3 refers to K. R. Popper (1972) Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary
Approach, Oxford, Clarendon Press, esp. pp. 31, 74-5 and 106-28.
103
of cultural and artistic life, to be tested and possibly extended by studying Baumgarten 
and Kant, and empirical evidence from evolutionary theory and cognitive neuroscience.
A postscript is therefore required to complete our picture of Danto, and to 
further rehabilitate him from the charge of aesthetic deflationism.
In the final chapter of The Transfiguration o f the Commonplace, helpfully 
analysed in great detail by Michael Lafferty194, Danto points out the importance, to an 
understanding of art, of rhetorical ellipsis, which he introduced separately as rhetoric 
and ellipsis. Lafferty quotes Danto on the rhetorical element:
. . .  it may just be one of the main offices of art less to represent the world than 
to represent it in such a way as to cause us to view it with a certain attitude and 
with a special vision195.
The ellipsis comes into play by leaving a missing element, which the respondent 
has to fill in. It is not a simple matter of ‘reading a message’, but of supplying the 
missing element as part of the interpretative process. In Danto’s words:
. . .  works of art, in categorical contrast with mere representations, use the means 
of representation in a way that is not exhaustively specified when one has 
exhaustively specified what is being represented 96.
Danto then compares the rhetorical merits of enthymeme and metaphor as 
devices in rhetoric and art, enthymeme requiring specific knowledge to complete, and
1 07  • »metaphor allowing for wider interpretation . Lafferty summarises Danto’s conclusions 
about the rhetorical nature of art:
1) Artworks cannot be paraphrased.
2) Artworks are not ‘basic objects in the world’, but are interacted with in a 
two-way process of interpretation.
3) Artworks are contextual: historical knowledge is needed to understand the 
metaphors and close the enthymemetic gaps 98. (My summary of Lafferty)
This anticipates the three elements (albeit in a different order) in my adaptation of 
Gregory Currie’s Ontology of Art, to be described in the next section, OA:
194 Michael Lafferty (2006) Arthur Danto ’s Philosophy o f  Art, Ph.D. thesis (unpublished) Warwick
University pp. 123-94.
195 Ibid. p. 131; Arthur C. Danto Op. Cit. (1981) p. 167.
196 Quoted by Lafferty, Ibid. p 133, from Arthur C. Danto Op. Cit. (1981) p. 147-8.
197 Ibid. p. 150; from Arthur C. Danto Op. Cit. (1981) p. 170-1.
198 Michael Lafferty Op.Cit. (2006) pp. 154-7.
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OA Artwork = Sensory structure + Heuristic + Response appropriate 
to art.
The ‘sensory structure’ is the ‘intensional’ element that ‘cannot be paraphrased’ 
but requires interpretation. The second element in Lafferty’s summary of Danto 
corresponds to my third element, ‘a response appropriate to art’. Finally, the ‘heuristic’ 
in Currie corresponds to the contextual nature of artworks in Danto.
It would be a diversion to discuss Danto’s further account of metaphor, 
intensionality199, expression and style in art, much of it highly contestable. Instead, this 
chapter will consider the project’s underlying ontology of art adapted from Currie and 
Searle. There will then be a concluding summary of these discussions and a review of 
the sceptical and deflationary questions raised at the opening of chapter one, to see if 
any of them have yet been adequately addressed, and to identify those to be further 
considered in the next four chapters.
3.6 Ontology of Art: Adapting Currie and Searle
Ontology deals with the nature of ‘being200’. What kinds of entities exist in the 
world? What is the nature of their ‘being’? It might be felt that the description of art by 
Collingwood at the end of the section 2.4.1, that ‘Every utterance and every gesture that
on  i  •each one of us makes is a work of art’ was a trifle over-inclusive. However, the 
expressive impact of the baby’s cry he had referred to, fifty pages before, could find a 
place in an ontology of art which adopted a continuum model, rather than either an
ono  ' i n ievaluative , an intentional , or a definitional model furnished with necessary and 
sufficient conditions204. The baby’s cry could belong in an ontology that saw the 
category o f ‘art’ as a continuum stretching from a Dulux ceiling to the Sistine ceiling, 
with the aesthetic deployed to different degrees, and with different levels of complexity,
199 For a discussion o f Intentionality, see Joseph Margolis Op. Cit. (2000) pp. 109-129. For Margolis,
artworks are real objects with ‘emergent’ Intentional (i.e. both intentional and intensional) 
properties. Michael Lafferty gives a very clear explanation o f Danto’s view o f intensionality in 
metaphor and art: intensional expressions cannot be straightforwardly substituted, e.g. ‘Juliet is 
the sun’ does not mean ‘Juliet is the small star at the centre of the solar system’; there is a gap 
which has to be filled by interpretation. See Michael Lafferty Op. Cit. (2006) pp. 157-69.
200 Dale Jaquette Op. Cit. (2002).
201 R. C. Collingwood (1938) The Principles o f  Art, Oxford, OUP, p. 285.
202 Such as the normative model proposed by Gordon Graham (1997; 2000 edn.) Philosophy o f  the Arts:
an introduction to aesthetics, London, Routledge.
203 Such as proposed by Monroe C. Beardsley Op. Cit. (1983).
204 Such as that proposed by George Dickie Op. Cit. (1984; 1997 Edn.)
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all the way down, and all the way up205. The artist and philosopher, Michael G.
9 HALafferty has recently proposed a ‘spectrum of artistic presence’ which could, I 
believe, accommodate the wilful cry of a baby at the very edge of a sonic map that had 
Verdi’s Requiem somewhere near its apex.
I believe it might be possible to derive such a continuum from Gregory Currie’s 
ontology of art207, which can be summarised, without too much loss, as follows208:
a) A work of art is an ‘action type’. This is Currie’s ‘Action Type Hypothesis’. 
He relates ‘action types’ to C. S. Peirce’s type/token distinction209: shutting the 
door is an example of an action type, shutting it at 10.15am and again at 
12.30pm are two action tokens of that type.
b) The ‘action type’ that constitutes a work of art comprises the following 
essential elements: 1) the production of a ‘sensory structure’, which can be 
linguistic, musical, sculptural, and so forth. This is produced 2) by means of a 
heuristic process, which Currie compares to a scientist’s struggle of discovery210. 
The ‘sensory structure’ and the ‘heuristic’ are the two factors evaluated by 
critics. Currie believes that his account of the resource-constrained heuristic 
process of art-making is a theoretical formulation of the art historical practices 
described by Michael Baxandall in Patterns o f  Intention211. In this heuristic 
process, the producer of the artwork has to solve problems, and it is vital, in 
interpreting and evaluating the work:
205 This would fit in with Daniel C. Dennett’s visualisation o f ‘one design space’ in (1995) Darwin's
Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meaning o f  Life, London, Penguin, pp. 107-13.
206 Michael G. Lafferty Op. Cit. (2006) pp. 198-214.
207 Gregory Currie Op. Cit. (1989). Currie’s ontology o f  art has so far received little support from other
philosophers, apart from David Davies, who has attempted to develop the ideas further, in his 
(2004) Art as Performance, Oxford, Blackwell.
208 This is a slightly simplified summary o f  Gregory Currie; Ibid. Ch. 11 ‘Works as Action Types’, pp.
66-71.
209 Ibid. p. 3.
210 Ibid. pp. 64-5. He says the following are ‘inessential’ components to the constitution o f  a work: 3) the
identity o f the agent or agents, and 4) the time. These are left as inessentials to allow for the 
possibility o f  the same action types being constituted on ‘twin earths’ or at other times by 
different artists, provided they follow the same heuristic.
2,1 Ibid. p. x. Michael Baxandall describes the factors which combined to influence the design o f the
Forth Bridge, a painting by Chardin, and Picasso’s analytical Cubist portrait o f Kahnweiler, in 
his (1985) Patterns o f  Intention: on the Historical Explanation o f  Pictures, New Haven, Yale 
University Press.
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1) to have some idea of the artist’s heuristic or discovery trail leading to the 
final ‘shape’ of the artwork’s embodiment in its ‘sensory structure’ or 
‘action token’, and
2) to appreciate the intellectual, material and technological resources that were 
available for constructing the ‘action token’ of the artwork.
The resulting ‘action token212’ is the artwork’s publicly available ‘sensory 
structure’ (e.g. the manuscript of a novel, a dance performance, a painting).
c) Once this ‘action token’ has been constructed, it can then be embodied in 
many ‘instances’, which are ‘tokens’ of the sensory structure (e.g. printed copies 
of the novel, performances of the dance, copies of the painting, etc.). The 
multiple instances are not tokens of the work (which is the full ‘action type’), but 
they are tokens of the sensory structure element of the work. Thus, Currie 
argues that the sensory structures of visual artworks may exist in multiple 
instances, contrary to the opinion of earlier philosophers, such as Richard 
Wollheim , who separated those works that are physical objects with a single 
instance, from other kinds of works of art which he thought could be multiply 
instanced. Currie rejects this dualism, along with Goodman’s similar 
autographic/allographic distinction214. Instead, Currie advances an ‘Instance 
Multiplicity Hypothesis’, to assert that all works of art share the same ontology. 
It is possible to reduce Currie’s ontology of artworks as ‘action types’ to:
Artwork = Sensory structure + Heuristic
It is the somewhat counter-intuitive result of an artwork being an‘action type’, 
that no artwork is simply an object. This has been a stumbling block for some 
commentators215. However, Currie contends that the object associated with an artwork 
is only part of the ‘action type’ that is the full artwork, because its apprehension as art
212 The action type is normally instanced in one token, made up from all the elements listed in b), above.
However, in theory, in the special circumstances o f a thought experiment, more than one action 
type with an identical token could occur, for example by a different artist, either at a different 
time, as with Borges’ Menard, discussed by Danto Op. C//.(1981), pp. 33-6, or on a ‘twin earth’, 
as with Putnam’s thought experiment which Currie references to Hilary Putnam (1975) “The 
Meaning o f Meaning” in Mind, Language and Reality, Philosophical Papers, Vol. 2, London, 
Cambridge University Press.
213 Richard Wollheim (1968;1980 edn.) Art and Its Objects (2nd Edition), Cambridge, CUP.
214 Nelson Goodman (1976) Languages o f  Art: an Approach to a Theory o f  Symbols (2nd Edition)
Indianapolis, Hackett. He introduces the autographic.and allographic distinction on pp. 112-5.
215 For example Stephen Davies Op. Cit. (2006) p. 82.
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also requires some knowledge of the heuristic process. However, the heuristic process 
is not always displayed explicitly, like a picture frame, as part of the sensory structure. 
Though clues may be present in the work, a great deal depends on the respondent’s 
prior knowledge, a point which is often overlooked, because so much is assumed by us 
in our engagement with works from a cultural background familiar to us. Marcel 
Duchamp216, as Currie points out217, was exceptional in the relative emphasis he placed 
on the heuristic process as opposed to the sensory structure (See Plate la).
The object associated with an artwork, then, is an instance of the work’s sensory 
structure, not an instance of the artwork itself. There could be other objects which 
correctly instantiate the same sensory structure, but they are not instances of the full 
artwork, either, because the artwork is an action type, not an object. Therefore, this 
sensory structure is not self-sufficient, but depends upon contextual knowledge, part of 
the work’s heuristic. The necessity for a ‘sensory structure’ gives Currie an argument 
against the ‘mentalism’ of Croce and Collingwood, because the method of application 
of the paint, for example, is so important that it is not possible to speak of the ‘work in 
the artist’s mind’ as being ‘the work’218.
I believe that Currie’s ontology of art helps to explain why we continue to value 
works of art that are either ephemeral, have been damaged or even destroyed, provided 
there is some memory or record of their existence. As long as we know about the 
heuristic, and have at least an inkling of the sensory structure, that can be sufficient for
n i Q
an artwork to ‘live on’ in our imaginations . Gustave Courbet’s Stonebreakers (1848) 
used to hang in the State Picture Gallery in Dresden, but was destroyed in 1945. 
Nevertheless, it enjoys an afterlife in art-book illustrations . The famous Bamiyan 
Buddhas, destroyed by the Taliban in February 2001, are more vividly present on the
216 Marcel Duchamp is an exception to this, as he placed great emphasis on the heuristic process, and
sometimes published his preparatory notes, for example for the The Large Glass in The Green 
Box, in an edition o f 300, with 10 luxury boxes which included an original sheet each in 1934; 
Calvin Tomkins Op. Cit. (1997) p. 297.
217 Gregory Currie Op. Cit. (1989) p. 77.
2xi Ibid. p. 91.
219 One’s experience o f a play or opera is not confined to the period between entering and leaving the
theatre, but can be mulled over and revisited in the imagination for the rest o f one’s life. 
Something similar applies to all the arts, in a way which favours permanent art forms which can 
be revisited in a more concrete form than simply in memory, even though the respondent will 
probably perceive the same artworks differently, having meanwhile had other experiences.
220 H. W. Janson Op. Cit. (1962) Fig. 736, p.489.
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internet and in the world’s imagination now, than they had been before their 
destruction221.
The Action Type Hypothesis echoes speech act theory222. Rather than ‘doing 
things with words', artworks are ‘doing something communicative with objects'. Works 
of art also share, with language, Grice’s distinction between ‘utterance meaning’ and 
‘utterer’s meaning223’. Both need to be accommodated in an adequate account of art. 
The buyer, commissioner, or thief, are all ‘doing something’ (utterer’s meaning) by 
their acts of acquisition, apart from responding to the aesthetic properties and internal 
meanings of a work (utterance meaning). Artists are also ‘doing something’ (utterer’s 
meaning) apart from fashioning art objects (utterance meaning). Artists and patrons are 
all engaged in dialogues, in ‘conversations’, and these can bridge centuries, and can 
include many ‘eavesdroppers’. First Donatello made a bronze statue of David, an 
emblem of Florence224 (See Plate 2). The slight, effeminate figure is full of a certain 
classical beauty and grace, which Michelangelo took as a challenge to make an elegant
'j'yz # # ,
colossus . This rather static and closed work was, m turn, a challenge to Bernini, to
• • • 0 9 Amake a work which projects its impact on to the space around it . This has become a 
dialogue of objects, not only between the artists, but between the patrons, entire cities
and even generations of tourists, across centuries. This helps to explain how the
0 0 8aesthetic/perceptual and the historical/interpretive aspects of art are joined. It is 
the aim of this thesis to demonstrate how and why both aspects, synchronic and 
diachronic are integral to art, though their relative importance varies with different 
artworks.
This application of Currie’s ontology, however, reveals an omission in his 
formulation which until now I have summarised as ‘artwork = heuristic + sensory 
structure’. It will be argued in this thesis that Currie’s formulation needs to be expanded
221 http://ne ws.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1664713.stm.
222 J. L. Austin (1962) How To Do Things With Words, Oxford, Clarendon Press.
223 H. P. Grice (1968) ‘Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence-Meaning and Word-Meaning,’ Foundations o f
Language, Vol. 4, pp. 224-42; reprinted in his (1989) Studies in the Way o f  Words, Cambridge, 
Mass., Harvard University Press, ch. 6, pp. 117-137.
224 H.W. Janson Op. Cit. (1962) fig. 481, p. 312.
225 Ibid. fig. 534, p. 357. Janson refers to Michelangelo’s David as ‘the civic-patriot symbol o f the
Florentine republic’. The size o f  Michelangelo’s David derives from the fact that it was 
commissioned originally to stand high on one o f  the buttresses o f Florence cathedral (pp 358-9).
226 Ibid. fig. 609, p. 408.
227 synchronic: SvD l, an a-historical, aestheticising, synchronic account of art
228 diachronic: SvD2, an historicising, anti-aesthetic, diachronic account of art.
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to include the respondent, who is also a necessary contributor to the ontology of art, 
expressed in this thesis as ‘OA’:
OA Artwork = Sensory structure + Heuristic + Art-appropriate Response.
This formulation introduces an element of circularity, which seems to be
• * * •  229unavoidable in this area of philosophy , and the reasons for this will be discussed 
further in later chapters. Fodor gives an instance of a similar circularity, which occurs in 
the perception of speech. He writes that the brain’s ‘computational systems’ for 
perceiving speech ‘operate only upon acoustical signals that are taken to be 
utterances230’. This appears to be circular, in a way mirrored by the reception of 
artworks. In the differential processing of speech or non-speech sounds, there is the 
opportunity for corrective action. If speech is mistaken for non-speech briefly, a swift 
‘gear-change’ can be made, to bring the correct ‘computational systems’ into play. The 
same kind of ‘gear change’ seems to apply to the reception of artworks, and the same 
metaphor was used, famously, by Edward Bullough to describe ‘distancing’, which puts 
a phenomenon ‘out of gear with our practical, actual self; by allowing it to stand outside 
the context of our personal needs and ends231’. Bullough saw ‘distancing’ as:
. . .  one of the essential characteristics of the “aesthetic consciousness,” - i f  I 
may describe by this term that special mental attitude towards, and outlook 
upon, experience, which finds its most pregnant expression in the various forms 
of Art232.
Julian Opie made a sculpture that plays with exactly such a ‘gear-change’ (Plate lc). 
Gallery-goers see what looks like a wall heater, and might overlook it completely, 
unless they happen to notice the label, or they might have begun to scrutinise the object 
as a sculpture, before nervously shifting back to ‘real life’ mode, for fear the object 
really is a heater after all, as they do not wish to be observed lavishing an unreserved 
aesthetic attitude on to a mere fixture (‘a mere real thing’ in Danto’s terms). Then, if 
they notice the museum’s label, they can resume their intense scrutiny of the object.
229 Hence the title o f George Dickie’s book The Art Circle: a Theory o f  Art on art as an ‘inflected
concept’, Op. Cit. (1984; 1997 edn.).
230 Jerry A. Fodor (1983) Modularity o f  Mind: an Essay on Faculty Psychology, Cambridge, Mass., MIT
Press, p. 49.
231 Edward Bullough (1912) “Psychical Distance”, British Journal o f  Psychology (Vol. 5); reprinted in
Alex Neill, and Aaron Ridley (Eds) (1995) The Philosophy o f  Art: Readings Ancient and 
Modern, Boston Massachusetts, McGraw Hill (pp. 297-311), pp. 298-9.
232 Ibid. p. 299.
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John Searle wrote that,4 . . .  the literary is continuous with the non-literary. Not 
only is there no sharp boundary, but there is not much of a boundary at all’. Whether 
something is ‘literature’ is, according to Searle, for readers to decide, reflecting, ‘a set 
of attitudes we take towards a stretch of discourse, not the name of an internal property 
of this stretch of discourse ’. If we rephrase this and substitute ‘arf  for ‘literature’,
‘respondent’ for ‘reader’ and ‘work:’ for ‘stretch of discourse’, we have another 
statement of the ontology of art to guide this thesis, designated as S (for Searle):
S Whether something is art is for respondents to determine according to the 
nature of their response, reflecting a set of attitudes that they take 
towards a work, not the name of an internal property of the work.
Just as a work of literature is produced from the same raw materials as non-literary 
discourse, so are works of art produced from the same raw materials as non-art objects. 
The difference lies in how the works are perceived and responded to. Certainly, there is 
a ‘fact of the matter’ concerning the artist’s original intention, but this is only indicative, 
not necessarily decisive. The artist may fail to inform or convince potential respondents 
that an item is intended to elicit an art-appropriate response. On the other hand, even 
though the concept of ‘art’, or the word for ‘art’ may be absent, this would not preclude 
any particular focus of attention from being an artwork, if there is a) a sensory structure 
b) an heuristic process and c) an art-appropriate response. This sketch of an ontology 
will be tested as the thesis unfolds.
3.7 Summary and Conclusion
3.7.1 Summary and Conclusion to this chapter
Chapter three has continued this project’s pursuit of answers to its two main 
research questions, RQ1: ‘What is the aesthetic?’ and RQ2: ‘What is the relationship of 
the aesthetic to art?’
233 John R. Searle (1979) Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory o f  Speech Acts, Cambridge, 
CUP, p. 59.
I l l
The method in this chapter has been to expand on the first two chapters’ 
analyses of the aesthetic scepticism that has been so influential in recent Anglo- 
American analytical philosophy. In attempting to answer RQ1 (What is the aesthetic?) 
this chapter has touched on the influences of positivism, behaviourism and physicalism. 
Despite the influence of this intellectual background, the conclusion of this chapter is 
that aesthetic values, like other cultural properties are (in the words of Margolis) 
‘emergent’ properties of the physical and biological worlds, a viewpoint to be 
developed in chapters six and seven. As such, these properties can stake a claim to 
realism, and a level of stability that makes their ‘objective analysis’ possible, so they 
can be publicly debated and the ideas refined, in the same way as other ideas, though 
with different standards of proof from the bi-valency (two-place answers: yes/no; 
true/false) that applies in logic and the hard physical sciences. Multi-valency is the 
condition of World 3, in Popperian terms, and the reality of aesthetic values is refined in 
a process of inter-subjective exchanges of observation and argument. Therefore our 
aesthetic hypothesis ANR can be set aside already, even though further arguments for 
the realism of the aesthetic will be added as the thesis progresses:
* ANR The Aesthetic is Not Real.
Similarly, historical factors (such as the precedence of earlier ‘art regards’) fail 
to secure non-Realism concerning the aesthetic, and in any case they have to appeal to a 
‘primitive aesthetic’ to ‘kick-start’ ‘Ur-art’. It has been argued that the ‘historical’ is 
most pertinent to the interpretation and evaluation of art, and is not decisive in the 
classification or definition of art. Therefore IHD and AUA fail, and H is accepted:
* IHP Art is defined by its Intentional and Historical Properties.
*AUA The Aesthetic is necessary only in Ur-Art
H Historical factors affect the ontology and interpretation of art 
rather than its definition and classification.
It was argued that it is not possible to sustain Davies’ distinction between the 
‘functional’ and ‘procedural’ properties of artworks, as his functionalist hypothesis is 
based on a physicalist model of the art object, and his proceduralist hypothesis involves 
the ‘attribution’ of non-Real properties to artworks, in the manner proposed by Danto 
in the early chapters of the Transfiguration. It was argued, in place of this dichotomy, 
that both artworks and ‘mere real things’ have the equivalents to both ‘functional’ and
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‘procedural’ properties, which are inter-connected. Thus, so-called ‘procedural’ factors, 
such as historical provenance, modify the perception of so-called ‘functional’ 
(‘aesthetic’) properties, nullifying the basis in principle of Davies’ 
functional/procedural distinction. Hence F/FT fails:
*F/PT Davies’ Functional/Procedural distinction is Tenable.
Danto had an epiphany in the last chapter of the Transfiguration', there is 
something different about art from that which we expect from ‘mere real things’, in art’s 
use of enthymeme and metaphor, to affect the respondent by the wav an ‘aboutness’ is 
conveyed. Among the deflationists, Danto leaves open the largest gap through which 
the aesthetic can be smuggled back into art. Such a smuggling operation is the aim of 
the remaining chapters of this thesis, and a start has been made by accepting various 
insights into the nature of art:
1) Margolis’ characterisation of artworks as ‘derivatively Intentional entities’,
2) Danto’s vision of art as intensional expression through enthymeme and 
metaphor,
3) my adaptation of Currie’s ontology of the artwork as ‘sensory structure + 
heuristic + art-appropriate response, and
4) Lafferty’s model of ‘artistic presence’ in a continuum throughout human 
activity234.
Chapter three mentioned another variety of scepticism towards the aesthetic: that 
taking a socio-political view, to be discussed in section 8.5.2 2, below. Chapter three 
also examined the interesting case of art historian and theorist, Ernst Gombrich.
Gombrich’s scepticism about the aesthetic was based in the turbulent conflict of 
twentieth-century art movements and partisan critical opinion among artists who 
stridently espoused opposing styles and theories. Sheldon Richmond has performed a 
signal service in showing how Karl Popper’s philosophies of sociology and science, so 
successfully employed by Gombrich in his treatments of representation and style, can 
also lend support to the realism of aesthetic values, refined through criticism and debate, 
through the exploration of inter-subjective experience.
3.7.2 Review of the informal ‘Sceptical Hypotheses’
234 Michael G. Lafferty Op. Cit. (2006) pp. 198-214.
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In chapter one, section 1.3.1,1 listed seven sceptical or deflationary statements, 
imagined as puzzled or puzzling utterances voiced in Art College studios or seminars. 
Some of these have already been dismissed at the end of the last chapter. The remaining 
ones will be briefly reviewed here:
*SH2 It’s putting it in an art sallerv that makes it art.
This appears to be the way Dickie’s Institutional Theory and Danto’s 
contextualism have diffused their influences into the minds of art students, some 
members of the general public, and even some curators who are paid good salaries from 
the public purse. One of my conclusions from these first three chapters would be that 
derivatively Intentional objects and the concepts surrounding them are endlessly 
contestable, there being few hypotheses about them, outside experimental psychology 
and cognitive neuroscience, which can be tested experimentally, unlike the 
methodology available to physical science. For derivatively Intentional objects, there is 
only debate and consensus, in a lebensformlich manner, or Popperian critical debate.
Unfortunately, therefore, I have to disagree with Michael Lafferty when he says 
the ‘arthood’ of readymades is ‘a matter of fact’ (because they have been accepted as art 
by art history) . The contested nature of ‘derivitively Intentional objects’ must allow 
for the possibility that the present curatorial consensus could crumble at some time in 
the future. The tedious ‘urinal, hat-stand and comb’ experiences of my own exposure to 
the Duchamp collection in Rome’s Museum of Modem Art were enough arouse my 
own scepticism towards these ‘masterpieces’.
SH3 The word ‘aesthetic’ connotes passive receptivity.
The process of learning to draw from observation provided some preliminary 
evidence in chapter two that aesthetic activity, in the production and self-performance- 
monitoring processes of drawing, are close to the processes involved in responding to 
and evaluating artworks, and are intensely active mental processes. However, this 
question will be the subject of further discussion in later chapters.
*SH4 Duchamp proved that the aesthetic is merely optional in art.
This opinion does not hold, unless one is working from a physicalist model of 
works of art, which would claim that their only ‘real’ properties are the primary and
235 Ibid. p. 55.
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secondary properties which apply in virtue of their being objects in the universe, like 
rocks photographed by a landing craft on Mars. However, there is good evidence, in the 
form of descriptions of Duchamp’s works, such as Fountain, that artworks have other 
Intentional properties, which Margolis counts as ‘real’ and Goodman describes as 
‘metaphorical exemplifications’. To take the case of Fountain, it was described by 
Danto, despite his underlying physicalist model of artworks, as: ‘daring, impudent, 
irreverent, witty and clever236’, though at the time he rather inconsistently seems to have 
held these not to be ‘real’ properties, but imaginatively assigned by the viewer to a 
‘mere real object237’. The terms he applies to Fountain, like ‘impudent’ and ‘witty’, are 
‘aesthetic’ because they show how the respondent’s feelings have been engaged. 
Baumgarten gives an example of a piece of verse that obeys the rules of Latin prosody, 
but fails as poetry partly because it does not engage our emotions238. It is ‘perfectly 
formed’ as verse and as logic, but is not ‘poetic’, a term which seems to be equivalent in 
Baumgarten to ‘aesthetic’ or ‘artistic’ in modem usage. A scientific discovery will 
engage the feelings and emotions of the discoverers, but though these feelings will be 
motivational, they are ultimately incidental to the science, where value is placed on the 
logical conclusions reached. In art, the sensations and feelings are the point of the 
activity, albeit often closely intermeshed with concepts. Aesthetic properties such as 
‘daring’ and ‘irreverent’, though unrelated to an artwork’s physical properties, are 
nevertheless emergent properties of Intentional objects, available to inter-subjectivity, 
and hence it is argued here that they are real.
*SH5 The historical aspect of art ‘trumps’ the aesthetic.
Jerrold Levinson, in his thought experiment about an ornate receptacle from an 
ancient Mexican tribe, ‘caved in’ in the face o f ‘historical evidence’, in a bi-valent style 
of arguing (i.e. ‘It’s art’ or ‘It’s not art’) without acknowledging the Popperian 
possibility of debate, and equally valid divergent opinions (see section 3.5.2). There is a 
case that artworks can be identified on the basis of agency and aesthetic properties, with 
only the loosest connection with history, which offers a way of interpreting the
236 Arthur C. Danto Op. Cit. (1981) pp. 93-4.
237 This at least is Margolis’ interpretation o f Danto’s ontology o f art, in such essays as his Op. Cit.
(2000) pp. 109-129, and I find his argument persuasive.
238 Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten Op. Cit. (1735; 1954 Edn.) §14, p. 42. This is discussed in more detail
in section 4.5, below.
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‘heuristic’ component of the model of art’s ontology expressed in the formulation OA, 
adapted from Gregory Currie:
OA Artwork = Sensory structure + Heuristic + Response appropriate 
to art.
History itself is most valuable in its contribution to interpretation. Once more, 
this opinion will be carried over into the second half of this thesis, for further debate. 
There are two arguments relevant to this issue: the ontological and the empirical. So far, 
the argument already presented has been philosophical, and this would tend to counter 
the view expressed in *SH5 above. The sceptical hypothesis *SH5 depends upon the 
separation of a work’s ‘empirical’ aesthetic properties from its ‘extrinsic’ properties, 
possible only upon a physicalist model of the art object, whereas the present thesis 
accepts an ontological model of the artwork as a ‘derivatively Intentional object’, which 
holds that the artwork’s Intentional properties are equally as real as the primary and 
secondary properties of the '‘mere real thing \  as Danto would identify the object which 
‘embodies’ (in Margolis’ terms) the artwork . The second counter-argument will 
follow in the second half of this thesis, where it will be argued that the sensory and 
biological dimensions of the aesthetic have generally been rather underestimated in 
philosophical aesthetics, and need to be reassessed and, if found relevant to the debate, 
asserted more strongly.
*SH7 The source of the aesthetic lies in art rather than in nature (paraphrase of 
HeeeH.
Once again, this view can be dismissed, as it is based on a non-Realist model of 
the artwork, whose properties are ‘imputed’ to ‘mere real things’. One of the aims of 
this thesis is to trace the aesthetic back to its roots in biology.
In summary, as far as this thesis is concerned, discussion of all but one Sceptical 
Hypothesis raised at the beginning of chapter one will now be considered as concluded. 
Even the one which remains has been questioned by the level of activity involved in the 
drawing process described in chapter two (sections 2.4.2 and 2.4.3). SH3, will however 
be carried forward into the second half of the thesis for further evidence:
SH3 The word ‘aesthetic’ connotes passive receptivity.
239 Following Margolis and Popper, I would argue that an artwork’s Intentional properties are 
‘determinable’ in debate, rather than ‘determinate’ through hypothesis and testing.
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Finally, there have been many other issues raised in this thesis. Some of them 
have been dealt with and, at least for the purposes of the present argument, concluded. 
However, there are other outstanding issues from the first three chapters and these will 
help to structure the shape of forthcoming chapters.
The next chapter will look at the foundational aesthetics of Alexander Gottlieb 
Baumgarten, to examine his thinking on the aesthetic and its relationship to art, insofar 
as it is possible to make such comparisons across 250 years. What did he intend by his 
coinage, ‘aesthetics’? How did he conceive of the aesthetic’s relationship to art?
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ABSTRACT
The quest for an understanding of the ‘aesthetic’ brings this enquiry to 
Baumgarten, who, most notably among Enlightenment philosophers, followed 
Epicurus in valuing, for both knowledge and beauty, the senses, which have 
more usually been distrusted by philosophers since Socrates. The two primary 
sources studied, one translated into English from Latin for the first time, claim 
for the senses a central role in providing to the arts and sciences ‘imaged 
concepts’, sensory images which make abstract concepts more tangible in the 
imagination, perhaps most notably in metaphor.
4.1 Introduction
After studying the attacks on aesthetics by positivists and their allies, this thesis 
now turns to the work Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1714-62), the philosopher 
respected on the Continent as one of the founders of aesthetics, but often known in the 
Anglophone tradition for little more than christening the discipline, ‘aesthetics’.
4.1.1 The Place of this Chapter in the Argument
There are many questions that exercise students of aesthetics today. They stem 
not only from decades of philosophical combat, but also from many new puzzles of 
interpretation and evaluation arising from the contemporary arts. There are also ethical 
problems, usually ignored in aesthetics, involving the nexus of art, power and crime. 
Also, with our present-day knowledge of brain function and the natural world, empirical 
evidence may be available to help us to understand some aspects of aesthetic experience 
and to ask whether the arts are, indeed, an exclusively human attainment. These issues 
were outlined in chapter one. In trying to tackle them against a background of 
philosophical scepticism towards the aesthetic, I concluded that the problems all 
revolved around questions concerning the nature and role of the ‘aesthetic’ itself. This 
led to the project’s two research questions:
RQ1 What is the aesthetic?
RQ2 What is the relationship of the aesthetic to art?
I decided that in order to reply to deflationary arguments, it was necessary to 
understand all the issues raised by the deflationists, beginning with George Dickie’s
119
1964 paper, ‘The Myth of the Aesthetic Attitude1’, analysed in chapter two. In chapter 
three, the wider philosophical sources of aesthetic scepticism were examined, and 
challenged. However, the debate now requires a positive account of the aesthetic, 
attempted here by posing the research questions to the founder of the modem discipline, 
Baumgarten. Next, the same questions will be asked of Kant’s more influential 
aesthetics. Then there are two chapters that will extend the preliminary investigation 
into the empirical evidence for the aesthetic attitude begun in chapter two. The final 
chapter draws conclusions in favour of the realism of the aesthetic and re-examines any 
unresolved issues that might be addressed by future research.
4.1.2 The Structure of this Chapter
The argument in this chapter begins by sketching in the background to 
Baumgarten’s thought, followed by an introduction to the present state of Baumgarten 
studies in the Anglophone world, including problems in gaining access to his ideas.
Then there will be a section on the meaning of the aesthetic in Baumgarten, and another 
on the relationship of the aesthetic to art. In the course of these arguments, there are a 
number of related questions designed to test Baumgarten against the sceptical opinions 
surveyed in the first three chapters. Three questions arise from Dickie, including his 
claim that the concept of the aesthetic is ‘vacuous’, his denial of qualitative differences 
between aesthetic experience and ordinary ‘attention’, and his denial of the realism of 
the aesthetic attitude. These issues have been framed in the following Baumgarten 
questions (Bl, B2 and B3):
B1 Did ‘the aesthetic’ have a substantive meaning for Baumgarten? Did he 
consider ‘the aesthetic’ to exist?
B2 Did Baumgarten identify any qualitative differences between aesthetic and 
non-aesthetic states of mind?
B3 Are there any clues in Baumgarten’s writing for the existence of an ‘aesthetic 
attitude’?
There are three other issues which have been carried over from the first chapter 
which are relevant here. There are the two ‘sceptical hypotheses’ (SH3 and SH5),
1 1 George Dickie (1964) ‘The Myth o f  the Aesthetic Attitude’, The American Philosophical Quarterly, 
Vol. 1, pp. 56-65.
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imagined in chapter one as voiced in an Art College context, but also found in the 
writings of Noel Carroll2:
SH3 The word ‘aesthetic’ connotes passive receptivity.
SH5 The historical aspect of art ‘trumps’ the aesthetic.
Then there is an ontological statement3, adapted from John Searle (S) to be discussed in 
this chapter:
S Whether something is art is for respondents to determine according to 
the nature of their response, reflecting a set of attitudes which they take 
towards a work, not the name of an internal property of the work.
The following issues will be tackled after considering the aesthetic in 
Baumgarten (section 4.4): RQ1, B l, B2, and SH3. After considering the relationship of 
the aesthetic to art in Baumgarten (section 4.5), the following questions will be tackled: 
RQ2, B3, SH5 and S.
4.2 Rationalism. Sensual Pietism and Poetry
Baumgarten was a philosopher who tried to innovate while remaining within the 
German rationalist tradition of Leibnitz and Wolff. His aesthetics could be seen as a 
pre-Kantian attempt to bridge the gap between the rationalism of Descartes, Leibnitz 
and Wolf, and the empiricism of Locke.
It appears that the insights that led him to propose a new science, ‘aesthetics’, 
were derived from the unique circumstances of his upbringing and education, according 
to Steffen W. Gross4. Also, given his reputation as a rather dry scholar, it is perhaps a 
surprise to discover his evident love of the ancient poets, a cast of mind that may have 
been the reason he continued to write in Latin, rather than in the vernacular5. Had he 
been alive today, he might have been considered as much a classicist as a philosopher.
2 Noel Carroll (1999) Philosophy o f  Art: a Contemporary Introduction, London, Routledge. p. 156
(‘passivity’ o f Baumgarten’s aesthetics) and pp. 240-264 (historical definition o f art).
3 See chapter three, section 3.6, above, where this thesis offers a second ontological statement (OA):
QA Artwork = Sensory structure + Heuristic + Art-appropriate Response.
This is my adaptation o f Gregory Currie’s ontology o f art.
4 Steffen W. Gross (2002) ‘The Neglected Programme o f Aesthetics’ BJA, (Vol. 42) pp. 403-414.
5 There is one exception: in 1741, Baumgarten published a series o f weekly philosophical letters in
German, under the pen name ‘Alethiophilus’, the second one o f which was reprinted by Hans 
Rudolf Schweizer, pp. 67-72 in his his dual-language (Latin and German) edition o f §§501-623 
of the Metaphysica, published as A. G. Baumgarten (1983) Texte zur Grundlegung der Asthetik, 
extracts from the Metaphysica and other texts, published with Introduction, Translation into 
German, Hamburg, Felix Meiner Verlag.
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Poetry was his passion6 and is the paradigm for the arts in his aesthetics. Aware perhaps 
that Leibnitz had given little thought to the arts7, he feared that many would consider 
the subject of poetry to be ‘too trifling and remote to deserve the attention of
o
philosophers Also, Ernst Cassirer says that, although Baumgarten followed an 
academic career in philosophy, he had personal experience as a poet, and Cassirer 
believes this had given Baumgarten an insight into the difference between the scientific 
and poetic uses of language9. Perhaps this enthusiasm for poetry made him feel that 
philosophers, since Plato, had undervalued the arts. Whatever the motivation, 
Baumgarten was the first German philosopher to lecture regularly on aesthetics10, and 
he was clearly hoping to make a major contribution to philosophy with his Aesthetica, 
sadly left unfinished at the time of his premature death in 1762, aged only 4711.
The rationalists’ distrust of the senses, familiar since Plato12, was confirmed by 
Descartes who ruled that: ‘. . .  comprehension by the senses is in many instances very
1 ' X  •  •obscure and confused ’. Leibnitz systematized this further. Kai Hammermeister gives a 
useful precis of Leibnitz’s psychological theory14, based on his theological world view, 
strongly influenced by a puritan Pietism and the mortification of the flesh. According to 
Leibnitz, there is a hierarchy of perception, from the unconscious level of our ‘petites 
perceptions’, which are too obscure even to allow recognition of its objects, to the 
complete comprehension which is available only to God. I have attempted to diagram 
the continuum in Fig. 3. below:
6 Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1735) Meditationes philosophicae de nonnullis adpoem a
pertinentibus, reprinted in facsimile with an Introduction and Translation into English by Karl 
Aschenbrenner and William B. Holther (1954) with Notes, as Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten 
Reflections on Poetry, Berkely and Los Angeles, University o f California Press, p.35.
7 Such is the view o f Aschenbrenner and Holther, in their Introduction, Op. Cit. (1735; 1954 Edn.) p. 5,
and confirmed in a qualified way by other scholars, such as Mary G. Gregor, who says Leibnitz 
saw the arts as valuable mainly for moral education, in (1983) ‘Baumgarten’s Aesthetica’ in 
Review o f Metaphysics (Vol. 37, pp. 357-385) p. 363. In the Reflections, Baumgarten quotes 
Leibnitz on the topic in §22, Op.Cit. (1735; 1954 edn.) p. 46. However, Gilbert and Kuhn (1956) 
A History o f Esthetics (2nd Edition), London, Thames and Hudson, pp. 227-8, give a more 
positive account o f Leibnitz’s estimation o f  the arts.
8 Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten Op. Cit. (1735; 1954), p. 36.
9 Ernst Cassirer (1951) The Philosophy o f  the Enlightenment (trans. Fritz C.A. Coellin and James P.
Pettegrove (1968 Edition), New Jersey, Princeton University Press, p. 349.
10 Paul Guyer (2005) Values o f  Beauty: Historical Essays in Aesthetics, Cambridge, CUP, p. 3.
11 Baumgarten died a few weeks short o f his 48th birthday: b. July 17, 1714, d. May 26, 1762.
12 Plato (1993) Republic, Translated with Notes and an Introduction by Robin Waterfield, Oxford, OUP
Book 3,410, pp. 99-100, where Socrates held up his fingers, arguing that the senses could not 
make reliable distinctions, possible only by intellect and measurement.
13 Rene Descartes (1997) Descartes: Key Philosophical Writings, Translated by Elizabeth S. Haldane and
G. R. T Ross, Edited Enrique Ch&vez-Arvizo, Ware, Herts., Wordsworth Classics o f World 
Literature, in the ‘Sixth Meditation’ (first published in Latin in 1641), 80, p. 182.
14 Kai Hammermeister (2002) The German Aesthetic Tradition, Cambridge, CUP. pp. 3-6.
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Fig. 3: Leibnitz’s continuum of perception.
An example of an obscure perception would be the sound of one individual 
wave, lost in the general roar of the breakers. Obscure cognition is contrasted with clear 
cognition. At the higher end of clear perception, cognitions can be ‘clear and distinct’, 
where it is possible to list all the separate features, thereby enabling a complete 
definition of something, such as gold, to be given15. Nevertheless this perception 
remains ‘inadequate’ until described scientifically or given mathematical expression, 
such as gold’s specific gravity, or atomic number, which would make the description 
‘adequate’. Only the all-knowing God himself enjoys the highest level of perception, 
both ‘adequate’ and ‘intuitive’.
At the lower end of clear perception, the object is described as ‘confused’. An 
object perceived as clear and confused will include many sensible features, but they 
(con)-fiise together, so that they cannot be listed separately. This form of cognition is 
‘rich, multi-faceted, lively, even emotionally charged16’, and it is at this level that 
Leibnitz locates art and beauty. However, for Leibnitz, our aesthetic judgments are not 
justifiable, but mere ‘statements of emotional response’, triggered by a ]e ne sais quoi’ 
factor, making beauty a by-product of flawed human cognition.
It is here that Baumgarten’s epistemology makes a break not only with Leibnitz, 
but with Plato and puritanical forms of religion. He turns the negatively-conceived 
senses into a positive link between the obscure ‘petites perceptions17’ of Leibnitz and 
rational cognition18 (see Fig. 4, overleaf). As Baumgarten wrote in the Aesthetica:
151 am indebted to Mary J. Gregor’s example o f gold in her Op. Cit. (1983) pp. 361-2.
16 Hammermeister’s summary, Op. Cit. (2002) p. 5.
17 Loc. Cit.
18 At this point, Hammermeister, Ibid. pp. 7-8, references Baumgarten’s Aesthetica §7 and §41,
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It is objected . . .  that confusion is the mother of errors. I reply that it is the sine 
qua non of discovering truth, without which nature could not make the leap from 
obscurity to distinctness. The growing light of dawn leads us from the darkness 
of night to the clarity of mid-day19.
Concrete
The senses 
make science 
possible
Intensity of 
isory stimulation, whether 
natural or artistic __
Abstract
Clear ClearObscure
and and
Confused Distinct
Fig. 4: Baumgarten’s adaptation of Leibnitz’s continuum of perception.
Here the senses usher in both the arts and the sciences. When, at the end of the 
Reflections on Poetry, Baumgarten proposed a new science of aesthetics, he was well 
aware that ‘The Greek philosophers and the Church fathers’ had ‘carefully distinguished 
between things perceived [aia0r|xa] and things known [voqxa] ’. However, as 
Baumgarten was also surely aware, there had not been unanimity among pre-Christian 
philosophers on the inferiority of sensory perceptions. The Stoics and Epicureans had 
rejected Plato’s stance. J. C. A. Gaskin writes that Epicurus argued for ‘an epistemology 
affirming the veridical nature of perception21’. Although suppressed by an alliance of 
Platonism, the Stoics and Christianity, Epicurean ideas were rediscovered in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and became ‘a major influence on modem science 
and humanism22’. Cassirer makes a link between Baumgarten and this Epicurean 
revival23, which appears to have influenced the sensual and emotional form of Pietism 
practised in Halle, where the eight-year-old Baumgarten was sent to a progressive 
orphanage after both his parents had died in Berlin24. Though Baumgarten was raised in 
that institution’s unique strain of benevolent Pietism, which rejected rationalism and
19 My translation, from Baumgarten (1750/58) Aesthetika (2 Vols ) reprinted (2007) Asthetik, in 2
Volumes (Vol. 1 §§1-613) and (Vol. 2 §§1-614-904) with Translation into German, an 
Introduction, Notes and a Glossary, by Dagmar Mirbach, Hamburg, Felix Meiner Verlag, p. 14, 
§7: Obi. 5) Confusio mater err or is. Rsp. a) sed conditio, sine qua non, inveniendae veritatis, ubi 
natura non facit saltum ex obscuritate in distinctionem. Ex nocte per auroram meridies..
20 Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, Op. Cit. (1735;1954) §116, p. 78.
21 J. C. A. Gaskin (1995b) ‘Epicurus’ in Ted Hondenrich (Ed.) (1995) The Oxford Companion to
Philosophy, Oxford, OUP, (pp. 240-1) p. 240.
22 Ibid. p. 240.
23 Cassirer cites Lametrie, ‘The Art o f Enjoyment’, Saint Evremont, Rimond le Grec, Agathon ou
dialogue de la Volupti (1702), in Op. Cit. (1951) p. 35 5 .1 have not been able to follow this up.
24 Steffen W. Gross Op. Cit. (2002).
124
theological disputation, his education included a thorough-going training in Wolffian 
rationalism. The young Baumgarten, therefore, had witnessed this clash between the 
sensual and emotional Pietists and the dogmatic rationalists, apparently leading him to 
conclude that neither bias, taken alone, could give a full account of human experience 
and knowledge. These seem to have been the unique circumstances, argues Steffen W 
Gross , which motivated Baumgarten’s innovatory and integrative approach to 
philosophy. Thus Baumgarten’s aesthetics can be captured in his oxymoron, combining 
the senses with reason: ‘Imaged Concepts26’, anticipating Kant’s ‘aesthetic idea27’ by 
some fifty years.
4.3 Baumgarten Scholarship
Paul Guyer wrote recently that Baumgarten was the first philosopher to combine 
sensory perception, cognition and affect into a coherent aesthetic theory28. These 
remarks are part of a growing interest in Baumgargen’s relatively neglected 
achievements, his reputation having suffered from his close identification with the 
rationalists and his relative eclipse after Kant’s epoch-making Critical philosophy . 
Nevertheless, though the claim is disputed by Copleston , Baumgarten is accepted by 
Cassirer, and by many other commentators, to be the founder of modem philosophical 
aesthetics31.
The relative neglect of Baumgarten has been most acute in Anglophone 
philosophy, probably because only one of his works has so far been published in 
English, the Reflections on Poetry32, written when he was twenty-one, and lovingly 
translated by Karl Aschenbrenner and William B. Holther as late as 1954, and long 
since out of print. Baumgarten’s Metaphysica, published just four years after the 
Reflections, expanded gradually to 1000 sections over seven editions. This work was
25 Ibid.
26 Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten Op. Cit. (1735; 1954), §29, Scholium , p. 49.
27 Immanuel Kant (1790; 1987) Critique o f  Judgment, translated and edited by W.S. Pluhar Indianapolis,
Hackett, §49, Ak. 313, pp. 181-2.
28 Paul Guyer (2003) ‘History o f Modem Aesthetics’ in Jerrold Levinson (Ed.) (2003) The Oxford
Handbook o f  Aesthetics, Oxford, OUP (pp. 25-60) p. 25, and Op.Cit. (2005) Ch. 1 ‘The Origins 
of Modem Aesthetics 1711-1735’, pp. 3-36.
29 Baumgarten receives only one mention in Ted Hondenrich (Ed.) (1995) The Oxford Companion to
Philosophy, Oxford, OUP.
30 As mentioned by Nicholas Davey (1989) in ‘Baumgarten’s Aesthetics: a Post-Gadamerian Reflection’,
British Journal o f  Aesthetics 29, 101-115, p. 101.
31 Ernst Cassirer,Op. Cit. (1951) p.339.
32 Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten Op. Cit. (1735; 1954).
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used for many years by Kant as a teaching text33. It included a section (§§501-623) on 
‘empirical psychology’, translated here from Latin into English for the first time (see 
Appendix D)34. The full Latin text of the Metaphysica is now available on the internet, 
and is being translated into English by Dr. John Hymers, who at the time of writing had 
reached §35035. Apart from the reprint by Hans Rudolf Schweizer36 of the chapter from 
the Metaphysica on empirical psychology, the Metaphysica has been out of print for 
over 200 years, apart from a Latin facsimile of 196337. Paul Guyer suspects that the 
reason for Baumgarten’s comparative neglect, despite his importance to Lessing, Kant, 
Schiller and Hegel38, may lie in the inherent difficulty and subtlety of his work, written, 
as it is, in a rather dry academic Latin39, which might have encouraged even Kant to 
rely on Meier’s German language popularisation of his ideas, The Beginner’s Guide to 
All the Fine Arts40, rather than to read, ‘Baumgarten’s own intricate and lengthy Latin 
magnum opus’41. Baumgarten’s Aesthetica had to wait until 1961 for its second 
printing, in facsimile42, and although Schweizer opened up access to the Aesthetica in 
1973 by publishing some extracts in a dual-language (Latin and German) edition, with
33 Hans Rudolf Schweizer (Ed.) Op. Cit. (1983) p. X.
34 Translated from Ibid. pp. 1-65.
35 The mechanically scanned in Latin text, with inevitable errors, can be found at http://www.ikp.uni-
bonn.de/kant/agb-metaphvsica/svnopsis.html. The on-going translation by Dr John Hymers, at 
the Catholic University o f Leuven, o f the whole o f the Metaphysica into English can be found at: 
http://hvmers.eu/dr hvmers/research baumgarten.htm. This is a joint project with Courtney 
Fugate, who is concentrating on Meier’s translation. At the time o f writing, Hymers had reached 
§350 (website last updated 15 May 2007). Recently, Meier’s German translation o f  the 
Metaphysica (in the 1783 edition published by Joh. Aug. Eberhard) has been reprinted as 
Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (2004) Metaphysik, with an introduction, concordance and 
bibliography by Dagmar Mirbach, Jena, Dietrich Scheglmann Reprints. This version is relatively 
compressed, running to 743 sections, matched in the concordance against the 1000 sections o f  
the 1779 edition, which is the one usually quoted by scholars.
36 Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten Op. Cit. (1739; 1983).
37 Listed in the bibliography o f Hans Rudolf Schweizer Op. Cit. (1983) p. 101.
38 Paul Guyer (1998a) ‘Baumgarten, Alexander Gottlieb’, in Encyclopedia o f  Aesthetics, ed. Michael
Kelly, Oxford, OUP, (in 4 Volumes) (Vol. 1, pp; 227-8) p. 227 Col. 2.
39 Apart from his first work, Reflections on Poetry, which has a much lighter touch, Op. Cit. (1735; 1954).
40 This is my translation o f the title from the German: Anfangsgriinde aller schdnen Wissenschaften, o f
1748, two years before the first volume o f  his teacher’s Aesthetica appeared. A literal translation 
would be Rudiments o f  All the Fine Arts. Despite its importance in the history o f  aesthetics, 
Meier’s book was out o f  print for over 200 years, though it was reprinted in 1976 in the series 
Documenta linguistica, Deutsche Grammatiken des 16. bis 18. Jahrhunderts, Hildesheim: Olms.
41 Paul Guyer (1998a) Op. Cit. p. 227, Col. 2.
42 Loc. Cit.
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an extensive commentary43, it was only in September 2007 that the full work became 
available in a dual language, Latin and G erm an, edition44.
This study of Baumgarten uses two primary sources, his Reflections on Poetry, 
and the ‘Empirical Psychology’ section o f h is  Metaphysics, in its seventh printing of 
1779. Together, these two sources offer a concise account that should enable us to infer 
his answers to our research questions, helped  by occasional references to the Aesthetica.
4.4 The ‘Aesthetic’ in Baumgarten
Although Reflections on Poetry w as published before the Metaphysics, it will be 
discussed after the Metaphysics, as it deals m ore directly with the arts. Sections 501-623 
of the Metaphysics deal with ‘empirical psychology’, and will be studied to find out 
how Baumgarten viewed the role of the sen ses  in cognition and the aesthetic. The full 
translation is given in Appendix D.
When Baumgarten coined the w ord ‘aesthetic’, it had a specific meaning, 
inherited from the ancients, referring to know ledge acquired through the bodily senses, 
as opposed to the operation of reason45. Baum garten’s originality lay in seeing 
aesthetics, the science of the body’s ‘sensory  knowledge’, as the ‘younger sister’ of 
logical analysis46, a partner that was vital t o  both the arts and the sciences (See Fig. 4, 
above).
Baumgarten’s psychology places t h e  word ‘aesthetics’ in a context where it is 
appears to be synonymous with the m odem  use of the word ‘perception’:
§502 Psychology comprises the f ir s t  principles of theology, aesthetics, logic 
and the practical sciences . . .
43 Hans Rudolf Schweizer (1973) Aesthetik als P h ilo soph ie  der Sinnlichen Erkenntniss: eine
Interpretation der ‘Aesthetica’ A. G. B aum gartens mit Teilwiser Wiedergaber des lateinishen 
Textes und deutscher Ubersetzung, B asel, Schwabe. It was decided to concentrate on the basis o f  
Baumgarten’s aesthetics presented in the tw o  early primary texts chosen for consideration.
44 Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten Op. Cit. (1750; 1758; 2007).
45 Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten Op. Cit. (1735; 1 9 5 4 ) §116, p. 78 (See section 4.2, above).
46 In the Aesthetica §13, Baumgarten writes that ‘O u r  Aesthetics (§1), just like her older sister logic, is . .
. . ’ comprised o f theory, heurisitics, m eth o d  (lucid order); (Aesthetica nostra (§1), sicuti logica, 
soror aeius natu maior, e s t . . . )  (My translation from Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten Op. Cit. 
(1750/58; 2007 Edn) p. 16.
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The inclusion of theology in psychology shows that he is still carrying much of the 
baggage o f ‘rational psychology’, later jettisoned by Kant in the ‘Transcendental 
Dialectic47’ of The Critique o f  Pure Reason.
In §511, however, Baumgarten also makes a break with rationalist orthodoxy. 
Rather than dismiss obscure perceptions as the mother of all errors, he writes:
There exist obscure perceptions in the mind (§510). All of these, [taken] as a
complex, are called the FOUNDATION of the MIND48.
These ‘obscure perceptions’, as a ‘complex’, making the ‘foundation of the mind’ 
would seem to anticipate John Searle’s account of what he calls ‘the Background’ 
which shapes our concepts and expectations49. Searle also proposed a neuro- 
physiological basis for the Background, which could, perhaps, be viewed as an updated 
account of Baumgarten’s concept50. Finally, Baumgarten’s later account, in the 
Aesthetica, of how associations of obscure ideas can give rise to the ‘artistic impetus’, 
would seem, according to Mary J. Gregor, to anticipate Twentieth Century ideas of 
creativity emerging from the subconscious51.
For Wolff, obscure ideas had been ‘simply a defect of vision’, a ‘darkness’ of 
the soul . By contrast, Baumgarten claimed that obscure ideas formed a ‘complex’, 
through association, which allowed obscure ideas both to coalesce together and to 
associate themselves to construct a greater clarity. Beginning, ‘Reality is true 
knowledge’, Baumgarten emphasises the cognitive achievements of the senses in 
§§515-517. Knowledge is either increased through the effects of more numerous 
‘qualities’ or sensory stimulations, or reduced by fewer. After his definition of 
associations in §516, he compares confused perceptions with distinct ones:
§516 PERCEPTIONS which combine some partial elements with others to 
make totalities are called ASSOCIATIONS; such associations of the 
strongest perceptions RULE (are dominant in the mind).
47 Immanuel Kant (1781/87; 1993 edn.) Critique o f  Pure Reason, revised and expanded translation based
on Micklejohn, Edited by Vasilis Politis London, Everyman, A292/B348 -  A470/B371, pp. 233- 
466.
48 Hans Rudolf Schweizer Op. Cit. (1983) p. 4. From now on, no more quotations from, or allusions to,
my translation will be referenced to Schweizer’s book, as the paragraph numbers are identical in 
his reprint and in my Appendix.
49 John Searle (1995) The Construction o f  Social Reality, London, Penguin, especially pp. 127 ff.
50 Ibid. p. 130.
51 Maiy J. Gregor discusses the link in the Aesthetica between obscure ideas and the ‘aesthetic impetus’,
without, however, referring to Freud: Op. Cit. (1983) pp. 367-8. The relevant passages are in 
Baumgarten Op. Cit. (1750/58; 2007) Vol. 1, Section V, Impetus Aestheticus §§78-95, pp. 62-77.
52 Mary J. Gregor Op. Cit. (1983) p. 367. She quotes from Wolff’s Psychologia Empirica §38.
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§517 The more qualities53 a perception comprises, the stronger it is (§23, 515). 
An obscure perception, comprising many qualities, is stronger than a 
clear perception, and a confused perception comprising many qualities is 
(also) stronger than a distinct perception. PERCEPTIONS which include 
many qualities are called PREGNANT . . .
This claim that a ‘con-fused’ perception could be stronger than a distinct perception is 
also a clear break with Leibnitz and Wolff, who, it appears54, would have accorded a 
superior status to a distinct perception (See figures 3 and 4, in Section 4.2). Baumgarten 
is pointing out the sensory impoverishment that seems to accompany any increase in 
abstract analysis. In §531 he writes:
The CLARITY of clear qualities is more INTENSIVE, the multiplicity of 
[obscure55] qualities, it could be said, is MORE EXTENSIVE. A clearer 
extensive perception is VIVID. The vividness of an IDEA and of an ORATION 
is its RADIENCE (splendour), and its opposite is ARIDITY (a thorny kind of 
thinking and speaking). Both kinds of clarity impart PERSPICUITY .
Here, the link in Baumgarten’s aesthetics between the persuasive ‘extensive57’ 
sensuality of rhetoric, against the abstractions o f ‘intensive’ logic, becomes clear. Later, 
in §531 he adds, ‘Sensory certainty is PERSUASION, intellectual [certainty is] 
CONVICTION’.
One of the most quoted paragraphs from the Metaphysica is his second 
definition of aesthetics:
§533 AESTHETICS is the science of sensorily knowing and proposing (the 
logical faculty of lower cognition, the philosophy of the graces and the 
muses, lower epistemology, the art of thinking beautifully, art as an 
analogy to reason).
Baumgarten’s first definition of ‘aesthetic’, in Reflections on Poetry, had less scope:
53 The Latin word is notas, which Mary J. Gregor translates as ‘notes’, with an obvious link to the units o f
sensation which combine to make a tune. I have chosen to translate notas with the more general 
term, ‘qualities’, by way o f alluding to qualia.
54 This is an assumption which could be clarified by further research into Leibnitz and Wolff.
55 The word obscure is absent, but the balanced nature o f the sentences, and the overall sense, would seem
to demand it.
56 My translation.
57 The term ‘intension’ refers to the meaning o f  a word, and ‘extension’ to the objects in the world which
are referenced by that word, corresponding to the distinction between connotation and 
denotation. See A. W. Sparkes (1991) Talking Philosophy: a wordbook, London, Routledge, pp. 
56-7.
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Therefore, things known are to be known by the superior faculty as the object of 
logic; things perceived [are to be known by the inferior faculty, as the object] of 
the science of perception, or AESTHETIC58.
There is not space here to explore the full implications of §533, but it is clear that by 
adding ‘proposing’, Baumgarten had emphasised the active side o f aesthetics, as 
observed by Nicholas Davey, who finds in these words an indication of Baumgarten’s 
pioneering interest in semiotics59. The reference to aesthetics as ‘the philosophy of the 
graces and the muses’ shows how he is now generalising the remit of aesthetics beyond 
poetry to include all the arts, and ‘lower epistemology’ asserts the validity of sensory 
perceptions as knowledge. Nicholas Davey60, Kai Hammermeister61, and Steffen W. 
Gross62 all have very interesting and sometimes conflicting views on the full 
interpretation of ‘the art of thinking beautifully’, which is elaborated upon in the 
Aesthetica, but space does not permit further discussion here.
The expression, ‘art as an analogy of reason’ has a pedigree that will need to be 
considered here, however. Schweizer explains how Baumgarten developed, by adapting 
from Wolff’s empirical psychology, the idea that aesthetics provides the ‘lower 
cognitive faculty’ with an analogue to the role played by logic in the ‘higher cognitive 
faculty’. Wolff, in turn, derived the term ‘analogue for reason’ from Leibnitz, whose 
example was of a dog, which becomes frightened, as a human would, when threatened
/ ' i
with a stick. Wolff also calls this capacity in the dog, ‘an analogue for reason ’. For 
two dogmatic Rationalists, this thought seems surprisingly counter to the thinking of 
Descartes: a) the attribution of Mind to a mere animal, and b) the very comparison of 
animal capacities to the human. This anticipates the later chapters of this thesis, which 
consider the biology of the aesthetic. As Schweizer points out, Baumgarten puts to good 
account Leibnitz and W olffs concept of the ‘analogue for reason’ in the ‘lower 
cognitive faculty’. The way Baumgarten does this would possibly have surprised his 
intellectual mentors, because Baumgarten repeatedly claims a complementary parity
58 Translation by Aschenbrenner and Holther; Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten Op. Cit. (1735; 1954 edn.)
§ 116, p. 78. In the original this reads: Sunt ergo v6tit(x cognoscenda facultate superiore obiectum 
logices, a\'a0r|Ta e7rtgr||j.r|^  ata0r|TixTi<; siue AESTHETICAE (facsimile p. 39).
59 Nicholas Davey, Op. Cit. (1989).
60 Ibid.
61 Kai Hammermeister Op. Cit. (2002).
62 Steffen W. Gross Op. Cit. (2002).
63 Hans Rudolf Schweizer Op. Cit. (1983) pp. XX and footnote 201, p.97. Kant also uses the same
expression, in Op. Cit. (1790; 1987 Edn.), §90, Ak 464, footnote 30, p. 356.
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between sensory and intellectual cognition64. At the core of Baumgarten’s argument is a 
continuity with Leibnitz and Wolff (and Socrates) that the senses are inherently 
‘confused’, and the function of the intellect is, as it says in the Republic, to separate the 
‘soft’ from the ‘hard’ as ‘distinct’ qualities65. But Baumgarten turns this hitherto 
derogatory notion o f ‘confusion’ into a positive ‘con-fusion’, or joining together of 
sensations into a unified aesthetic perception with all the ‘extensive’ richness of sensory 
experience, as compared to the relatively dry abstractions o f ‘intensive’ concepts and 
definitions. As Baumgarten famously asked in the Aesthetica (§560):
What is abstraction, then, if not a loss? By a similar process, you cannot cut a 
sphere of marble from an irregular block, except by such a loss of material, to 
win the prized rotundity66. (My translation)
As we have seen, this defence of the richness of sensory knowledge and 
expression, as compared to the parsimony of intellect, had already been extensively
6 7  68developed by Baumgarten in the Reflections and the Metaphysics , and receives 
confirmation in the contrasting, and even competing, roles of the left and right 
hemispheres of the brain (See sections 2.4.2 and 2.4.3, above).
In the Metaphysics, Baumgarten had argued in §544 that ‘in sensations which 
are also distinct there is always some admixture of confusion’, concluding that:
EXPERIENCE is the knowledge o f clear senses; AESTHETIC acquisition and 
experiential expression is called EMPIRICAL69.
Again, he places the emphasis as much on ‘experiential expression’ as on ‘aesthetic 
acquisition’ (reception). Sensitive to possible criticism from sceptics over the reliability 
of the senses, Baumgarten writes, in §546 that ‘internal and external sensations’ 
perceive ‘actualities’: they are ‘the greatest truths of the whole world (§184), and not 
one of them is a trick of the senses’. This does not rule out the possibility of errors from 
hasty judgment, or deliberate deception through sleight of hand (§§546-7). Then
64 For example, Metaphysica §§531-2 (See Appendix D).
65 Plato Op. Cit. (1993) Book 3, 410, pp. 99-100.
66 Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, Op. Cit. (1750/1758/2007) Vol. 1, §560, p. 538: Quid enim est
abstractio, si iactura non est?Pari ratione ex marmore irregularis figurae non efficias globum  
mormoreum, nisi cum tanto saltim materiae detrimento, quantum postulabit maius rotunditatis 
pretium. My attention was drawn to this section o f  the Aesthetica by Kai Hammermeister Op. 
Cit. (2002) p. 10.
67 Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten Op. Cit. (1735; 1954) §§15-55, pp. 42 -57 .
68 Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten Op. Cit. (17391983) §§515-533 pp. 6-16.
69 EXPERJENTIA sit cognitio sensu clara, AESTHETICA comparandae etproponendae experientiae est
EMPIRICA, Ibid. p. 22.
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Baumgarten makes some very striking observations when he returns to the relativity of 
sensory perception70:
§549 Accordingly, another stronger perception obscures a weaker (§529); for 
the same reason the weaker perception brightens [or acts as a foil to] the 
stronger (§531). Hence if a different, clearer, stronger perception 
succeeds upon the perception o f a weaker object, that which is new, in 
the field of clear sensations, is perceived the more intensely71(§529). 
Therefore, a clear, stronger, sensation, following upon other weaker 
ones, is highlighted by its very novelty (§542, 534). Hence weaker 
things in contrast with another thing illuminate it [or act as a foil to it] 
(§91, 531). Opposites when juxtaposed enhance each other.
This kind of knowledge is the ‘bread and butter’ o f the artist, who knows that if the next 
colour applied to a painting is too dark or too intense in hue, it will make the rest of the 
painting look ‘washed out’, even though, before that blunder, the colours had operated 
well within a smaller scale of values. What is particularly striking about this paragraph, 
however, is that Baumgarten introduces a temporal dimension into perception, even 
visual perception, usually considered to be ‘visual-spatial’, as distinct from so-called 
‘time-based’ forms, such as music and the literary arts. He shows the relevance of time 
to all forms of what he calls ‘experiential expression’. Novelty; originality; the new 
look, the new colour; novelty acknowledged as an ‘aesthetic property’. This provides an 
argument against those who claim that Duchamp’s readymades ‘prove’ that artworks 
can sometimes be ‘non-aesthetic’. There are arguments that can be advanced for novelty 
as an aesthetic property: a) novelty stimulates the senses and alerts the mind, in a way 
suggested by Kant’s term, the ‘quickening o f both faculties (imagination and 
understanding)’72 (my Italics); b) the aesthetic is not restricted to artistic contexts, 
though it is actively deployed in them, including in rhetoric, where novelty can capture 
the attention and stimulate thought.
Novelty, however carries a risk. As Baumgarten writes:
§550 If a sensation . . .  is made up of absolutely the same set of many
complete perceptions immediately in succession, it shines, in the first 
instance, with the light of novelty (§549). This diminishes in part the 
following time . .  . always reducing in this way, until it is very obscure 
(§529). Therefore sensations . . . become obscure just by the passage of 
time (§539).
70 This theme was already mentioned, Ibid. §542,
71 magis, translated by Schweizer as ‘starke wahrgenommen’, i.e. more strongly distinct.
72 Immanuel Kant (1790; 1952 edn) The Critique o f  Judgement, translated James Creed Meredith, Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, §9, Ak 219, p.60. Most o f  my quotations from CJ come from Pluhar, but I think this 
one is preferable.
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Although all art might be at risk from the kind of over-familiarity that Baumgarten 
describes, the fewer rewards a work has to offer the subject, the greater its dependence 
on sheer novelty, the more the work will suffer over time, however sedulously we might 
try to recreate in our imaginations the historical circumstances o f its original creation.
For the concluding five paragraphs of Section III on the senses, Baumgarten 
describes extreme states of consciousness, beginning, in §552, with ecstasy. He begins 
by stating that in a normal state of mind, a subject’s ‘individual sensations . . . have their 
accustomed level of clarity’. But:
If any of these sensations become so vivid that it noticeably obscures the others,
HE IS ENRAPTURED (forgets himself, is not with himself). The status o f the
internal senses snatched outside o f a person is ECSTASY (vision, the mind
moved, excess of mind).
This captures the intensity of response which occurs, perhaps not routinely, but 
frequently enough to keep art lovers, concert-goers, opera buffs, film-goers, novel 
readers, soap-opera fans and football supporters coming back for more, again and again, 
and why they are willing to continue risking disappointment as they once again adopt 
the aesthetic attitude towards whatever object is before them.
Now it is necessary to review our questions.
ROl What is the aesthetic?
For Baumgarten, the aesthetic is closely related to the senses, supplying sensory 
knowledge that is different from, and complementary to, logic.
B1 Did ‘the aesthetic’ have a substantive meaning for Baumgarten? Did he 
consider ‘the aesthetic’ to exist?
Yes, to both parts of the question; the aesthetic was about sensory perception 
(knowledge) and about employing sensory means for communication: ‘sensorily 
knowing and proposing’. It might be objected by a non-realist that the aesthetic could 
exist as ‘a way of seeing the world’, but ‘without the aesthetic existing in the world’73.
In reply I would argue, first, that embodied subjects exist, with their evolved abilities to 
perceive colours and other secondary properties, which are widely accepted as ‘real’.
The non-realist’s question concerns whether aesthetic properties, which are freighted 
with feelings, emotions and learned expectations are also ‘real’, although they do not 
share the same ontology of primary and secondary properties. Margolis’ ‘cultural
731 am grateful to my supervisor Andrew Edgar for pointing this out to me.
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realism’, is based upon their classification by Popper as ‘World 3’ properties. I would 
argue that, as Baumgarten’s psychological approach to the aesthetic included ‘affect’ 
within the category of the ‘poetic’, treated as synonymous with ‘artistic’ and the recent 
use of the word ‘aesthetic’, his position would align with Margolis’ view of aesthetic 
properties as Intentional and emergent. This position can also be seen, in terms of 
neuroscience, as the real ‘embodiment’, or in Ingold’s terms, the ‘incorporation’ of the 
propensity for aesthetic response, and hence for its realism, when it occurs74. This 
embodiment is instantiated in a) the evolved and b) the learned neural networks of 
organisms, as will be argued in chapters six and seven.
B2 Did Baumgarten identify any qualitative differences between aesthetic 
and non-aesthetic states o f mind?
Yes, the aesthetic was sensory, the intellectual, abstract. At its best:
A clearer extensive perception is VIVID. The vividness of an IDEA and 
of an ORATION is its RADIANCE (splendour), and its opposite is 
ARIDITY (a thorny kind o f thinking and speaking)75.
*SH3 The word ‘aesthetic’ connotes passive receptivity.
The firmest rebuff to that view comes from Baumgarten’s definition of the 
aesthetic in the Metaphysica, as ‘the science o f sensorily knowing and proposing’ (my 
Italics).
4.5 The Relationship of the Aesthetic to Art in Baumgarten
After looking at Baumgarten’s more theoretical work in empirical psychology to 
see how he viewed the aesthetic, we now turn to his early masterpiece, his Reflections 
on Poetry. From the opening paragraphs, Baumgarten places the emphasis on the 
‘sensory76’:
74 Timothy Ingold’s arguments for the ‘incorporation’ or embodiment o f  culture within neural, muscular
and skeletal structures will be discussed in section 6.6, below.
75 Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten Op. Cit. (1739; 1983) §531 (My translation).
76 Although Aschenbrenner and Holther chose the word ‘sensate’ to translate the Latin sensitiva, several
other commentators use the more similar-sounding word, ‘sensitive’. In this quotation, I have 
replaced ‘sensate’ with Paul Guyer’s preferred word, ‘sensory’. He says he avoids the word 
‘sensitive’, because, ‘ . . .  in contemporary English that term might connote a special degree o f  
refinement in discernment, [so] I have instead adopted the translation ‘sensory’ or ‘sensorily,’ 
which does not have that connotation.’ See his Op. Cit. (2005) footnote p. 2 9 .1 have decided 
that Guyer made the right choice, as ‘sensory’ is more likely than ‘sensate’ to be understood by
134
§3 By sensory representations we mean representations received through 
the lower part of the cognitive faculty77.
He points out that all discourse, however abstract, has to have recourse to some sensory 
element, and conversely, that all sensory discourse will inevitably have some
•  78intellectual content . The word ‘sensory’ {sensitive in Latin) seems to mean something 
like the ancient meaning of ‘aesthetic’, and a blend o f the modem meanings of 
‘sensory’, ‘perceptual’ and ‘aesthetic’:
§6 The various parts of sensory discourse are: (1) sensory representations,
(2) their interrelationships, (3) the words, or the articulate sounds which 
are represented by the letters which symbolize the words, §4, §1.
§7 By perfect sensory discourse we mean discourse whose various parts
are directed toward the apprehension of sensory representations, §5.
§8 A sensory discourse will be the more perfect the more its parts favor the
awakening o f sensory representations, §4, §7
The ‘awakening of sensory representations’ lies at the heart of ‘perfect sensory 
discourse’; the more evocative o f the senses, the more ‘perfect’. He defines a poem as ‘a 
perfect sensory discourse79’, and contrasts it with the abstraction of logical argument. 
The word ‘sensory’ is now replaced in his definitions by the word ‘poetic’, which seems 
to be equivalent to the contemporary phrase, ‘aesthetically satisfying’. When he comes 
to the scholium for §14, Baumgarten has some fun demonstrating the difference 
between a) verse which is clear and confused {i.e. poetry) which ‘awakens sensory 
representations’ and b) verse which is clear and distinct, evoking abstract ideas but 
without evoking the senses (i.e. doggerel). He states his theorem:
§14. Distinct representations, complete, adequate, profound through every
degree, are not sensory, and, therefore, not poetic, § 1180.
He proceeds to give an example of verse, which, though clear, is distinct (abstract), 
rather than confused (sensory):
the reader as meaning ‘through the senses’. Therefore, I have substituted ‘sensory’ for ‘sensate’ 
whenever that word occurs in my quotations from Aschenbrenner and Holther’s translation, and 
also used it in my translation from the M etaphysica  in Appendix D.
77 Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten Op. Cit. (1735; 1954) p. 38.
78 Ibid. §4, pp. 38-9.
79 Ibid. §9, p. 39.
80 Ibid. p. 42.
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Refutation is the p ro o f that others err.
No one refutes unless he proves thereby 
Another’s fallacy. But i f  you want to prove 
Such things, it ’s clear you have to study logic.
When you refute, you 're sure to get it wrong 
I f  you 're no logician- by verse one*1.
Baumgarten claims that the content o f the verse is flawless, and the Latin verse 
impeccable. However, the failure o f this mere ‘verse’ to rise to the level of ‘poetry’ 
serves to demonstrate that distinct abstract cognition is the province of logic, philosophy 
and science, rather than of poetry. Nevertheless, he will go on to make a strong claim 
for the cognitive value of sensory imagery. Not only poetry, but also science and even 
philosophy also depend upon sensory imagery to communicate their abstract ideas.
A picture is beginning to emerge o f the way confused sensory representations 
aggregate quantitatively to produce an ever-increasing clarity. In the scholium  to §16, 
Baumgarten again aligns his terminology with the established philosophical distinction 
between a word’s intension, understood as its conceptual meaning, and its extension, 
understood as the things in the world to which the word refers. It is worth quoting §16 
and its scholium in full:
When in representation A more is represented than in B, C, D, and so on, but all
are confused, A will be said to be EXTENSIVELY CLEARER than the rest.
We have had to add this restriction so that we may distinguish these
degrees of clarity from those, already sufficiently understood, which,
through a discrimination o f characteristics, plumb the depths o f  cognition
82and render one representation intensively clearer than another .
The phrase, ‘already sufficiently understood’ shows that, at this point, Baumgarten is 
declaring his departure from Leibnitz and Wolff. While philosophy and science make 
meanings intensively distinct, his reply to them is that poetry plays its part in making 
meanings extensively clear, dense, rich and con-fused (fused together). Poetry here can 
be taken to represent ‘sensory discourse’ in general, for Baumgarten later included 
painting, in §§39-4083. Meanwhile, Baumgarten develops this quantitative theme 
further. In § 17, he states that extensively clearer representations contribute more to the 
perfection of a poem, and therefore are ‘especially poetic84’. In §18, he says that the 
more determinate the representations are, the more that is gathered into the confused
11 Loc. Cit. Gilbert and Kuhn offer a different translation o f  the same verse, Op. Cit. p. 292.
12 Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten Op. Cit. (1735; 1954) p. 43.
13 Ibid p. 52.
14 Ibid p. 43.
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representations, the more extensive clarity is achieved; the more determined it is, the 
• • • xs •more poetic it is . As individuals are ‘determined in every respect’, their 
representations are, ‘in the highest degree poetic86’. In the scholium, Baumgarten 
illustrates this with a reference to the story o f Actaeon in the Metamorphoses, when 
Ovid gives details, by name and character, o f many of the hounds ‘who rend their 
master to shreds87’.
As the species is more specific than the genus, it is also more poetic88. Hence, 
‘Olympic dust’ is more poetic than ‘the dust of the games field’, and Baumgarten gives 
many more examples. Indeed, the word ‘example’ is his next definiendum, in §21:
By EXAMPLE we mean a representation o f something more determined which 
is supplied to clarify the representation o f something less determined89.
His illustration comes from the classroom. When the algebra teacher replaces letters 
with numbers, the relationships immediately become clearer. The scholium then shows 
how figures of speech, which he calls ‘non-proper locutions’ make conceptual words 
more comprehensible, even in cases where science does not yet have a full rational 
explanation. One of Baumgarten’s examples o f such a ‘non-proper’ definition is o f the 
word ‘fever’ described as ‘the war instigated against disease by the powerful force of 
the spirit90’. This demonstrates perfectly the way the use of the confused, sensory 
language of poetic imagery can bring clarity. Indeed, his point is that they bring more 
clarity to the understanding than can be gleaned from the ‘distinct’ (or abstract) 
representations they are used to exemplify. This is how he begins Theorem §22:
Examples confusedly represented are representations that are extensively clearer 
than those for whose clarification they are offered, §21; hence they are more 
poetic, §1891 . . .
These few paragraphs offer the first hint o f what Kant was to call the ‘aesthetic idea92’, 
which is perhaps the main borrowing by Kant from Baumgarten.
In the scholium to §22, Baumgarten quotes Leibnitz, who wrote that, ‘The chief 
object of history, as well as of poetry, should be to teach prudence and virtue through
K Loc. Cit.
*Loc. Cit. §19.
17 Ovid (1921 Edition) Metamorphoses, London, Heinemann, Translated by Frank Justus Miller, Vol. 1, 
Book III, 11. 206-224, pp. 138-9. 
u Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten Op. Cit. (1735/1954) §20, p. 44.
K Ibid p. 45.
90 Ibid p. 46.
91 Ibid, §22 p. 46.
92 Discussed by Immanuel Kant Op. Cit. (1790; 1987 edn.) Comment I, Ak 342-4, pp. 214-7.
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examples93’. Here Baumgarten’s poetics stake their claim to a role in educational 
psychology, as well as in bodying forth abstract concepts with sensory exemplifications. 
Goodman has also been identified as a follower o f Baumgarten, and these paragraphs 
could have been the starting point for some o f his reflections on exemplification94.
With §25, Baumgarten introduces a new theme, the place of affect in poetry95. It 
is worth quoting the full theorem:
Since affects are rather marked degrees o f pleasure or pain, their sense 
representations are given in the representing o f something to oneself confusedly 
as good or bad. Therefore, they determine poetic representations, §2496; and 
therefore, to arouse affects is poetic, §1197.
In §26, he says that ‘we represent more in those things which we represent as good or 
bad for us than if we do not so represent them’, so they are extensively clearer, and
n o
therefore more poetic . The case o f Patient S in chapter two comes to mind (section 
2.4.4). Something was missing in her perception o f sinister-looking faces because she 
did not experience the negative ‘affects’ usually experienced by people with functioning 
amygdalae. Baumgarten continues: stronger impressions are clearer than weaker ones, 
and are further strengthened if accompanied by affects: ‘Therefore it is highly poetic to 
excite the most powerful affects99’. This marks a difference between Baumgarten and 
Kant; the latter considered emotion to be inimical to judgments of beauty, though 
appropriate in judgments of the sublime100.
With §28, Baumgarten begins a section on images, which he calls the 
‘reproduced representations of the senses101’, and, in §29, he re-emphasises the great 
importance of affect as a supplement, to re-enforce mental imagery:
[Mental102] Images are less clear than sense impressions, therefore, less poetic, 
§17. Therefore, since aroused affects determine sense impressions, a poem
w Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten Op. Cit. (1735; 1954) p. 46.
* Paul Guyer Op. Cit. (1998a) p. 228.
** This could well have been from the influence o f  Dubos. Paul Guyer Op. Cit. (2005) gives a useful 
summary o f  Dubos’s aesthetics (pp. 16-20).
96 §24 states: ‘By SENSE REPRESENTATIONS we mean representations o f  present changes in that 
which is to be represented, and these are sensory, §3, and thus far, poetic, §12’. Alexander 
Gottlieb Baumgarten Op. Cit. (1735; 1954) p. 47.
* hoc. Cit.
* Ibid.
" §27, Op. Cit. p. 48.
W Immanuel Kant Op. Cit. (1790; 1987 edn.) §13, Ak 226, p. 69: ‘Any taste remains barbaric if  its liking 
requires that charms and emotion be mingled in, let alone if  it makes these the standard o f  its 
approval’ . . .  ‘But sublimity (with which the feeling o f  emotion is connected) requires a
different standard o f  judging from the one that taste uses as a basis’ (§14, Ak. 226, p. 72).
Wl Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten Op. Cit. (1735; 1954) Scholium  to §28, p. 48.
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which arouses affects is more perfect than one which is full of dead imagery, §8, 
§9, and it is more poetic to arouse affects than to produce other images .
The scholium begins with a quotation, which Aschenbrenner and Holther translate as:
It is not enough fo r  poems to be beautiful: they must also be charming and lead 
the mind o f  the listener where they please104
They have somewhat weakened the effect by using two words, ‘charming’ and ‘lead’
for a single more forceful word in the Latin, the 3rd person plural imperative in the
active voice: ‘agunto’, from ago, ‘I do’ or ‘I act’, a verb also employed for giving a
rousing speech to a crowd or for driving cattle. I would suggest the following
translation, which turns the linguistic clock back a little105:
Beauty is not enough! All poems shall,
Where ’re they will, the listener’s soul compel!
Later in the same scholium Baumgarten again re-emphasises the value of sensory 
images in making abstract concepts more comprehensible:
According to §22, when the poet performs, we develop a more universal notion 
from these specific instances and sharp determinations, as it were from 
examples. Certainly no other notion will be found under which these things can 
be classified except that o f imaged conceptsl06(my Italics).
We can see, in Baumgarten’s imaged concepts, another anticipation o f Kant’s aesthetic 
ideas107.
Baumgarten then proceeds to give a detailed account of how figures of speech 
harness the sensory and affective resources o f the body’s senses to assist the mind’s 
understanding, whether in rhetoric, poetry, or in ‘clear and distinct’(i.e. scientific) prose, 
k is also possible to recognise the similarities between the recent findings o f cognitive 
neuroscience and the anciently perceived difference between abstractly cognitive and 
sensorily emotive forms of cognition. In chapter two, these differences were considered 
to yield different states of mind, which have been broadly described (in ‘short-hand’) as 
‘left-’ and ‘right- brain’ modes o f functioning, however differently the functional
m I have interjected the word ‘mental’ here, to show that the word ‘images’ in this context (phantasmata) 
does not refer to physical perceptions.
143 Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten Op. Cit. (1735; 1954) p. 48
104 Ibid. pp. 48-9; the facsimile (p. 14) reads: Non satis est pulchra esse poem ata  - -
Et quocunque volent, animum auditoris agunto.
105 In my translation, 1 have tried to preserve the theme and rheme as they occured in the Latin.
106 In the facsimile, the two Latin words translated here as ‘imaged concepts’ are notiophantasmatum ,
Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten Op. Cit. (1735; 1954) Facsimile, p. 15.
107 Discussed by Immanuel Kant Op. Cit. (1790; 1987) Comment I, Ak 342-4, pp. 214-7.
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modules might in fact be located, anatomically, in individual people. These modules 
cannot all function simultaneously for very long at full intensity, because the blood-flow 
supplying the necessary oxygen and glucose would be insufficient108. When individual 
brain modules increase their level o f activity, or hormones are released into the 
bloodstream, they nuance the state o f consciousness, engendering different levels of 
awareness of mind, body, environment, memory, concept or emotion.
As the ancient philosophers realised two and a half thousand years ago, and as 
Baumgarten realised two and a half centuries before fMRI scans were invented, our 
sensory and emotional intuitions are, in important ways, different from our abstract 
cognitions. However, it is possible, and often necessary, for both forms o f cognition to 
collaborate, to help abstract concepts become more concrete and meaningful to us; only 
consider the use o f metaphor in scientific and philosophical discourse. In chapter seven, 
this will be discussed in the context o f cognitive neuroscience as ‘top-down’, ‘bottom- 
up* and ‘re-entrant processing109’.
In §§30-36, Baumgarten considers how to intensify sensory imagery. The first 
ihetorical or poetic technique110 for adding ‘clarity’ is to represent ‘the whole with a 
partial image111 ’. It might at first seem paradoxical that a partial image could have a 
greater sensory impact than a full representation, but the imagination, stimulated by a 
partial disclosure, conjures up the whole mental image in a creative rush o f ‘Aha!’ 
recognition. In the last chapter o f the Transfiguration o f  the Commonplace Arthur 
Danto tries to harness this form of rhetorical ellipsis to define art. He states his thesis 
thus:
. . .  that works of art, in categorical contrast with mere representation, use the 
means of representation in a way that is not exhaustively specified when one has 
exhaustively specified what is being represented112.
m See section 2.4.2, above. It appears that ‘flash-bulb’ memories are exceptional, in that most o f  the
brain seems to have been imprinted with a memory, for example enabling people to remember 
exactly where they were, when they heard John Kennedy had been shot.
** See Michael I. Posner and Marcus E. Raichle (1994) Images o f  Mind, New York, Scientific American, 
pp. 99-103 and pp. 242-3.
110 Baumgarten regards rhetoric and poetry as forming a continuum, not a divide; Op. Cit. (1735; 1954) 
§117, pp. 78-9.
He is, presumably, referring to synecdoche or metonymy; Op. Cit. (1735; 1954) §30 p. 51.
112 Arthur C. Danto Op. Cit. (1981), p. 1 6 7 .1 am indebted for this insight to the third chapter, ‘Art as
Rhetorical Ellipsis: Metaphor, Expression, Style’, in Michael G. Lafferty’s unpublished (2006) 
Ph.D. thesis, Arthur D an to’s Philosophy o f  Art, Warwick University, pp. 123-194.
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This brings a work of art and a metaphor in very close alignment, and emphasises the 
need for interpretation in both, as we found in the quotation from Danto in chapter one, 
that ‘metaphors are minor works o f art113\
Next, in section b) (§§37-42), Baumgarten surveys other kinds of images 
including dreams (§37114). In §38, he states that,
The more clearly images are presented, the more they will be similar to sense 
impressions, so that they are often equivalent to rather weak sensations. Now, to 
represent images as clearly as possible is poetic, §17. Therefore, it is poetic to 
make them very similar to sensations115.
This description of mental images as, ‘equivalent to rather weak sensations’ is a 
remarkable anticipation of what has now been learned about brain function. If 
something is imagined in a sense modality, the same areas of the brain are activated that 
become active in the real-time processing o f external sensory stimulation in that 
modality, only to a lesser degree1,6. In this qualitative difference, that which is ‘real’ is 
distinguished by its vividness from the ‘imaginary’, apart of course for a subject 
undergoing a hallucination, whose illness or drug causes an important mental barrier to 
be transgressed. The discussion of imagery leads Baumgarten directly to the question of
117painting, and the famous saying o f Horace, ut pictura poesis (§§39 ). Here is the 
whole of §39, together with the quotation, which begins the scholium'.
It is the function of a picture to represent a composite, and that is poetic, §24; 
the representation of a picture is very similar to the sense idea to be depicted,
and this is poetic, §38. Therefore, a poem and a picture are similar, §30.
118Poetry is like a picture
This leads him, in §§40-1, to a more extended comparison between painting and 
poetry. The inclusion in a poem of different viewpoints and actions adds to the 
extensive clarity of the representation, but in the next paragraph Baumgarten denies that 
he is ‘trying to affirm a prerogative to a poem over a picture’. He explains that the 
‘greater intensive clarity’ arising from the ‘symbolic clarity’ of words can contribute
1,3 Ibid., p. 189.
114 Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten Op. Cit. (1735; 1954), pp. 51-2.
115 Ibid. p. 52. The above is the full text for §38, which does not have a scholium.
116 Rita Carter (1998) Mapping the Mind, London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, p. 125. The example given is
the task o f  imagining one’s room in which the same regions o f  the brain become active, as would 
when looking at the room in reality.
117 Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten Op. Cit. (1735; 1954) p. 52.
118 In footnote 49, the editors give the reference as Horace’s Ars Poetica, 361 ff.
141
‘nothing to extensive clarity, the only clarity that is poetic’. This is supported by another 
quotation from Horace:
Less vividly is the mind stirred by what finds entrance through the ear, than by 
what can be seen through o ne’s own trusty eyes -  what one can see fo r  oneself
The key is either a) the directly sensuous, or b) the senses evoked. In poetry or prose, 
the way to do that is through figurative language, called in the classical way, ‘nonproper 
terms’ (voce impropria), in §79, putting us firmly back on the cognitivist agenda
Nonproper meaning lies in the nonproper word. Nonproper terms, since most of 
them are appropriate to sensory representations, are poetic figures, because (1) 
the representation which approaches a thing through a figure is sensory, hence 
poetic, § 10, § 11; and (2) these terms supply complex confused representations in 
abundance, §2312°.
Once more, in the next paragraph, Baumgarten relates figurative language to 
what is now thought of as ‘aesthetic ideas’, when he says, ‘ . . .  it is poetic to 
communicate non-sensory representations by means of nonproper terms121’, i.e. to 
communicate abstract ideas through figurative language. After commending clarity over
1 O')obscurity , Baumgarten explains and approves, as highly poetic: metaphors,
1 "73synechdoches and allegory . Baumgarten then goes on to the poetic use of words 
themselves:
§91. Words, in the respect that they are articulate sounds, belong among 
audible things; hence they elicit sense perceptions124.
In §105 he repeats the view already demonstrated so ably in §14, that, ‘Not every 
instance o f  verse is a poem125’. What is lacking in a piece of verse that fails as a poem? 
Baumgarten explains as follows:
. . . there can be meter in a discourse in which there are no sensory 
representations, no lucid order, no purity, no elegance of arrangement, and so 
on; and there can even be verse from which [all] these things are missing126.
119 Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten Op. Cit. (1735; 1954) p. 53. In footnote 51, the editors refer to Ars
Poetica, 11. 180-2.
120 Ibid., p. 67.
121 Ibid  §80, p. 68.
122 Loc. Cit., §82.
123 Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten Op. Cit. (1735; 1954) §§83-5, pp. 68-9. These have already been
discussed in relation to Danto, above.
124 Ibid. p. 69.
125 Ibid. §105, p. 74.
126 , r,..
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Therefore, he says in the scholium to §105, ‘We distinguish with great care between 
poets and versewrights127’.
In the penultimate paragraph o f his Reflections, Baumgarten comes to his first 
justification for, and definition of, the new discipline of aesthetics:
The Greek philosophers and the Church fathers have already carefully 
distinguished between things perceived [aiaOrjTa] and things known [v6r|ia]. It 
is entirely evident that they did not equate things known with things of sense, 
since they honoured with this name things also removed from sense (therefore, 
images). Therefore, things known are to be known by the superior faculty as the 
object of logic; things perceived [are to be known by the inferior faculty, as the 
object] of the science of perception, or AESTHETIC128.
Mental imagery belongs, therefore, to the realm of psychology, allied to, though not 
identical with, sensory perception. In the final paragraph (§117), Baumgarten makes 
some further generalisations. First, he comments on the philosopher’s approach to 
‘sensory discourse’. Unlike the poet, the philosopher:
. . .  has no interest in terms, so far as they are articulate sounds, for as such they 
belong among the things perceived. But he who presents sensory subject matter 
is expected to take much greater account of terms129.
In other words, of course, the sounds o f words matter a great deal to a poet, but much 
less to the scientist or philosopher. Then Baumgarten seems to draw a distinction 
between two domains within aesthetics:
GENERAL RHETORIC may be defined as the science which treats generally of 
unperfected presentation of sensory representations, and GENERAL POETICS 
as the science which treats generally o f the perfected presentation of sensory
130representations
For example, the use of metaphor or other sensory resources for communication by 
scientists or philosophers (or politicians), though properly part of the aesthetic realm, 
would belong to ‘general rhetoric’; their use by poets and other artists would belong to 
‘general poetics’. To rhetoricians, he assigns the task of defining genres. On the other 
hand:
The philosophers should be busy in general in drawing boundary lines and 
especially in defining accurate limits between poetry and ordinary eloquence.
The difference is, to be sure, only a matter o f  degree\ but in the relegation of
127
128
Ibid.
Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten Op. Cit. (1735; 1954) §116, p. 78.
129 Loc. Cit.
130 Ibid.
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things to one side or the other it requires, we think, no less capable a geometer
than did the frontiers of the Phrygians and the Mysians (my Italics)13 .
This view of Baumgarten’s would seem to lend support to an ontology of art based on a 
continuum model. The difference between a) scientific prose and diagramming and b) 
art prose and fine art painting is indeed only a matter of degree, not of kind.
4.6 Discussion and Conclusion
It is now time to review the remaining issues raised at the beginning of this 
chapter.
RQ2 What is the relationship o f the aesthetic to art?
The aesthetic, according to Baumgarten is the means both of engaging with and 
producing works of art. This involves not only the bodily senses, but also the emotions, 
concepts and memories. There is a temporal dimension to art, and to aesthetic 
properties, in all the arts, affecting our responses to them, and this temporal dimension 
is a matter of both immediately preceding experience, longer term memory and 
knowledge of history (e.g. an awareness that blue in renaissance paintings is made from 
powdered lapis lazuli, a precious stone).
B3 Are there any clues in Baumgarten’s writing for the existence of an 
‘aesthetic attitude’?
There is evidence for an aesthetic attitude in Baumgargen’s comparison of 
poetry with doggerel, in §14 of the Reflections on Poetry (section 4.5, above). This can 
be compared to Elisio Vivas’ example o f reading a poem ‘as history’ rather than ‘as 
poetry’ discussed by Dickie (see chapter two, section 2.2.2.1, above). However, even 
stronger evidence comes from §552 in the Metaphysics, when he describes a state of 
ecstasy, when a sensation, perhaps a tune or set of harmonies, a painting, the interior of 
a church, or a fog at sea (Baumgarten is not specific) becomes so vivid it obscures other 
sensations, so that a person becomes ‘enraptured (forgets himself, is not with himself)’ 
so that, to borrow a phrase from Bullough, he is ‘out of gear’ with his ordinary life. In 
such circumstances, it seems reasonable to accept that someone has adopted, or been 
snatched up into, an ‘aesthetic attitude’.
131 Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten Op. Cit. (1735; 1954) p. 79.
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*SH5 The historical aspect of art ‘trumps’ the aesthetic.
As we have seen from §§549-50 of the Metaphysica, the temporal dimension is 
an integral part of aesthetic properties, not, as the deflationists would have it, extrinsic 
to aesthetic experience. Therefore, to give precedence to ‘history’ over the ‘aesthetic’ is 
to misunderstand the nature of the aesthetic and the impact of history on aesthetic 
properties (see the example given, above, to RQ2).
S Whether something is art is for respondents to determine according to the 
nature of their response, reflecting a set of attitudes which they take towards a 
work, not the name of an internal property of the work.
In the last paragraph of Reflections on Poetry, Baumgarten closes with the difficulty of 
drawing a line between ‘poetry and ordinary eloquence’, for which one could substitute, 
‘art and non-art’. Both art and non-art use similar resources, the objects of sense used 
directly, whether awake or in dreams, or evoked indirectly through imagination, 
memory or language. Searle’s comment about the distinction between literature and 
non-literature seems to be congruent with Baumgarten’s position, when he says the 
dividing line between ‘poetry and ordinary eloquence . .  is, to be sure, only a matter o f  
degree132’ (my Italics).
Next, the thesis will bring to bear on to the research questions the wisdom of 
Kant’s ‘Critique of Aesthetic Judgment133’.
132 Loc. Cit.
133 Kant’s ‘Critique o f  Aesthetic Judgment’ forms Part I (§§1-60) o f his Critique o f  Judgment. Part II is
the ‘Critique o f  Teleological Judgment’, §§61-91; Immanuel Kant Op. Cit. (1790; 1987 edn.)
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ABSTRACT
This chapter examines Kant’s account of aesthetic judgment, disinterestedness 
and the aesthetic idea. Some comparisons are made with Baumgarten’s 
aesthetics. It is concluded that Kant’s moral misgivings about the senses, low 
estimate of their cognitive potential and the requirements of his own 
philosophical system, led to inconsistencies in his account, and reinforced a 
formalist tendency already present in the tradition. However, these failings are 
compensated by his sensitive accounts of aesthetic experience, his understanding 
of disinterestedness, and despite his initial separation of the aesthetic from 
concepts, his eventual grasp o f their interaction, expressed by him in such 
memorable phrases as ‘the free play of the imagination and understanding’ and 
‘aesthetic ideas’.
5.1 Introduction
The single most influential work in Western aesthetics is Kant’s ‘Critique of 
Aesthetic Judgment’ (CAeJ)1, Part I o f the Critique o f  Judgment (CJ). After 200 years, 
it is still much discussed in both the Analytical and Continental schools. Though a 
difficult work to read, full of complexity and unresolved tensions, its status, for many, is 
almost scriptural. Paul Guyer confides that:
. . .  it seems to me at least that the . . .  theory of Kant continues to offer greater 
enlightenment than any o f its more single-minded successors, and provides a 
model of the kind of complexity, rather than simplicity, that ought to be the goal 
of any continued attempt to provide a philosophical account and theory of both 
artistic objects and aesthetic experience and judgment2.
As the present thesis returns to questions raised by Kant, whose answers had broadly 
defined the ensuing debate, the CAeJ is an unavoidable philosophical mountain to be 
climbed, but the views afforded repay the effort involved.
5.1.1 The Place of this Chapter in the Argument
Having surveyed the arguments of aesthetic deflationists and sceptics, this thesis 
has turned for enlightenment to two of the founders of aesthetics, Baumgarten and Kant. 
Baumgarten’s relationship to the aesthetic seems easy and unproblematic (see chapter 
four). However, he does not deal with all o f the problems raised by the deflationists,
1 Immanuel Kant (1790; 1987 edn.) Critique o f  Judgment, translated and edited by W.S. Pluhar
Indianapolis, Hackett. The ‘Critique o f  Aesthetic Judgment’ (CAeJ), forms Part I (§§1-60) o f the 
Critique o f  Judgment (CJ). Part II is the ‘Critique o f  Teleological Judgement’, §§61-91 (CTJ).
2 Paul Guyer: (1997) Kant and the Claims o f  Taste (2nd Edition), Cambridge, CUP, p. 366.
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such as ‘disinterestedness’, or the formalists’ perceived chasm between aesthetic 
judgment and morality3. Therefore, this chapter looks at Kant, who did address 
disinterestedness, aesthetic judgment and also morality’s relationship to the aesthetic. 
After Kant, this thesis adds to the collection of empirical evidence for the aesthetic 
begun in chapter two, turning to evolutionary theory and cognitive neuroscience. In the 
final chapter, there will be a review of these arguments and a return to the three case 
studies mentioned in chapter one: 1) the art o f the bowerbird 2) the nexus of art, power 
and crime and 3) sound sculpture.
5.1.2 The Structure of this Chapter
This chapter will consult Kant on the project’s two prime research questions: 
RQ1 What is the aesthetic?
RQ2 What is the relationship of the aesthetic to art?
The first part of the chapter (5.2 to 5.4) will tackle RQ1: ‘What is the 
Aesthetic?’ This will involve first trying to sketch Kant’s aesthetics into the context of 
his philosophical system, and then considering how his accounts of beauty, the sublime, 
disinterestedness and ‘purposiveness without a purpose’ affect the following issues:
*SH6 The term ‘aesthetic’ by definition excludes the cognitive, historical, or 
moral, (from section 1.3.1)
*IIiA Is Dickie correct in his claim that differences in motivation result in no 
qualitative differences in attention or aesthetic experience? (from section 
2 .2 .2 . 1)
*IIiB Is Dickie correct in his claim that the ‘aesthetic attitude’ is a myth,
because there is only ‘attending’ more or less ‘closely’? (from section 
2 .2 .2 . 1)
IliiB Is disinterestedness a necessary condition for the aesthetic attitude?(from 
section 2.22.2)
Three o f the above issues were discounted in chapter two, though further support for 
those conclusions will be sought here. The fourth issue, disinterestedness, received 
some support in chapter two from Hume and from the pedagogical evidence from
3 At least, he does not deal with these in the two primary texts I have studied.
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cognitive neuroscience, though it was decided to carry the topic forward to the present 
chapter.
The second part of the chapter (5.5) tackles RQ2: ‘What is the relationship of the 
aesthetic to Art?’ This will also ask how to relate Kant’s accounts of Adherent Beauty, 
the Aesthetic Idea and Genius to the following issues:
SvD The ‘synchronic’ v ‘diachronic’ dialectic (from section 1.3.2)
AvC Appreciation and criticism are incompatible mental states.
(from section 2.2.2.2)
OA Artwork = Sensory structure + Heuristic + Response appropriate to art. 
(from section 3.6)
The summary and conclusion will also test my definition of the ‘aesthetic 
attitude4’ against the findings of this chapter.
5.2 The Place of the Aesthetic in Kant’s Philosophy5
When he wrote the first Critique, Kant attacked Baumgarten, saying the term 
‘aesthetic’ should be confined to ‘the science o f the laws of sensibility6’. By 1790 he had 
come to accept Baumgarten’s application o f the term to questions of taste, because he
7 fisaw aesthetic and teleological judgments as the link he needed between the conceptual 
and the moral realms, or as he puts it in his second ‘Introduction9’, the link between the 
realms o f ‘nature’ and ‘freedom’, governed respectively by ‘Understanding’ (in the
4 §14 ‘To adopt the aesthetic attitude is to take ‘time out’ from the flux o f work-a-day practical
necessities, and in a vigilant state o f  mind to scrutinise an object or cognition in order to focus on 
the full range o f  feelings and cognitions it engenders in the subject. This ‘time out’ factor is the 
origin o f the term ‘disinterestedness’ in the context o f  aesthetics’ (see Appendix A, §14, or 
section 2.5, above). The final version, changed after discussion, is given in the Appendix.
5 1 have found particularly useful Stephan KOmer (1955) Kant, Harmondsworth, Penguin; Werner S.
Pluhar “Translator’s Introduction” to his (1987) edition o f  CJ, Indianapolis, Hackett; Paul Guyer 
Op. Cit. (1997); Guyer’s masterly essay (1998c) “Kant, Immanuel 1724-1804)” in Routledge 
Encyclopaedia o f  Philosophy, (Ed. E. Graig) London, Routledge, (Vol. 5, pp. 177-200) and the 
same author’s (2005) Values o f  Beauty: Historical Essays in Aesthetics, Cambridge, CUP. Also 
useful has been Douglas Burnham (2000) An Introduction to K ant’s Critique o f  Judgement, 
Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press.
6 Immanuel Kant Op. Cit. (1781/87; 1993 Edn.) footnote p.49.
7 Immanuel Kant Op. Cit. (1790; 1987 Edn.) §§1-60.
* Ibid. §§61-91.
9 Ibid. Part I, Ak 171-4, pp. 9-12.
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Critique o f  Pure Reason (CPR10) and ‘Reason’ (in the Critique o f  Practical Reason 
(CPrR11).
The aim, and the success, o f Kant’s Critical Philosophy was to mediate between 
the claims of the Empiricists, mainly Locke and Hume, who could not account for such 
concepts as space and time from sensory experience alone, and the Rationalists, like 
Descartes and Leibnitz, whose arguments attempted to make rational claims about God, 
the soul and immortality which reached beyond the legitimate claims of empirical 
experience. Kant set out the new relationship between the elements of his system in a 
table at the end of the second “Introduction” to CJ12, shown as Fig. 5, below, from 
which it is apparent that he drew hard distinctions between the cognitive powers dealing 
with the natural world and the moral realm (Understanding and Reason), rather than a 
continuum between the Lower and Higher Cognitive Faculties as we saw in 
Baumgarten.
All the Mental Powers Cognitive Powers A Priori Principles Application to
cognitive power understanding lawfulness nature
feeling of pleasure and 
displeasure
judgment purposiveness art
power of desire reason final purpose freedom
Fig. 5. Table from second “Introduction” to CJ (Akl98)
The senses are confined to ‘lower sensibility’, whereas the ‘higher sensibility’ offers a 
priori concepts and ideas. These divisions show up in the structure he gives to the 
Faculty of Sensibility’ (See Fig. 6, overleaf).
10 Immanuel Kant (1781/87; 1993 edn.) Critique o f  Pure Reason, revised and expanded translation based
on Micklejohn, Edited by Vasilis Politis London, Everyman.
11 Immanuel Kant (1788; 1976 edn.) Critique o f  Practical Reason, translated and edited with an
introduction by Lewis White Beck, New York, Garland.
12 Immanuel Kant Op. Cit. (1790; 1987) A 198, p. 38.
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HIGHER
- Independent of world and 
body
- ‘prior’ to natural laws
LOWER
- Bound to world and body
- Subject to ‘laws’ e.g. 
Psychology
PASSIVE
‘Pure INTUITION’
e.g. source of our a priori 
presentations of the form of 
space and time
‘SENSATION’
content e.g. colours, sounds, 
feelings of warmth.
ACTIVE
‘Productive (or ‘Free’) 
IMAGINATION’
Active and independent; not 
bound to previous 
sensations.
‘Reproductive IMAGINATION’
Ability to sense things no 
longer there and to form 
associations.
Fig. 6. Kant’s ‘Non-Legislative’ faculty of Sensibility
(Table adapted from Douglas Burnham13.)
Whereas Baumgarten had accorded to the senses a considerable burden of cognition 
with their own richness and value, even if  only analogous to logic, Kant relegated 
‘Sensation’ to a level which Baumgarten would have called ‘obscurity’, in contact with 
‘matter’, merely perceiving colours and so forth. ‘Pure Intuition’ seems somehow to be 
separated, on a higher level, from the more bodily senses, where, uniquely, it could 
perceive ‘form’. This split is carried by Kant directly into his distinction between ‘pure 
judgments of taste14’, based on beautiful forms, and ‘impure judgments of sense15’, 
based on the gratifications of appetite.
Kant, however, is not consistent. He wished to hold on to a link between taste 
and cognition, because it was the way he was able to assert the universality of aesthetic 
judgments, as cognition is public and objective, when compared to the pure subjectivity 
of aesthetic judgments of the bodily senses (e.g.’Canary wine is agreeable to /we’16). 
Kant, therefore, does not completely reject Baumgarten’s cognitivist account of the 
senses and art. In a clever move, he links the ‘manifold of perception’ to concepts 
indirectly, when he describes the experience o f beauty as the 'free play of
13 Douglas Burnham Op. Cit. (2000) p. 13.
14 Immanuel Kant Op. Cit. (1790; 1987) §2, Ak 204-5, pp. 45-6 and §5, Ak 209-10, pp. 51-3.
15 Ibid. §3, Ak 205-7, pp. 47-8 and §5 pp. Ak 209-10, pp. 51-3.
16 Ibid. §7, Ak 212, p. 55.
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Understanding and Imagination17’ (my Italics). He therefore makes a kind of parity 
between Judgments of Understanding (i.e. concepts, which are universal and 
determinate because publicly accessible through the language of a community) and 
Judgments of Taste (Beauty), subjective and indeterminate, which cannot be proved by 
argument, but which are, nevertheless, related, in ‘free play’, to concepts, and can 
thereby still claim universality.
Kant had shown in the First Critique how the overweening power of Reason 
sometimes caused its claims to overshoot the empirical evidence, as it had led dogmatic 
rationalists to make the empty metaphysical claims which he scorned18. Later, we shall 
consider how Kant’s aesthetics may have somewhat fallen prey to his own Reason’s 
tendency towards over-ratiocination, when he overstates his claims for the systematicity 
of the aesthetic.
Having set Kant’s aesthetics in the context of his philosophical system, the next 
task is to tackle question RQ1: ‘What is the Aesthetic?’
5.3 Beauty, the Sublime and Brain Laterality
5.3.1 Beauty and Right-Brain Thinking.
In chapter two (above), evidence was produced, from the drawing class and 
from neuro-psychology, for a degree of modular separation within the brain for different 
perceptual and cognitive tasks (section 2.4.2). The experience of students learning to 
draw confirms that verbal/cognitive and visual/spatial forms of thought are in some kind 
of inverse ratio, not to say competition, where increased activity in one area diminishes 
available blood supply, and therefore activity, in the other19. When beginner students of 
drawing are trying to concentrate on their visual experience in order to draw something 
from sight, they find it helpful to suppress verbal and conceptual thought, which would 
otherwise superimpose its cognitive stereotypes in place of direct observation (see Plate 
7b).
17 This expression, or something like it, crops up repeatedly in various permutations, as when Kant speaks
o f  the “cognitive powers . . .  in free play because no determinate concept restricts them to a 
particular rule o f  cognition”, Ibid. §9, Ak 217, p.62.
18 In the ‘Transcendental Dialectic’; Immanuel Kant Op. Cit. (1781/87; 1993 edn.) A292/B348 -
A470/B371, pp. 233-466.
19 The same principle underlies injunctions to refrain from speaking to the driver o f  a bus as Picasso is
said to have replied to a more theoretically inclined Cubist, ‘Don’t speak to the driver!’
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It is astonishing that Sperry’s neurological discoveries and Betty Edwards’ 
teaching methods should confirm so powerfully the ancient division between aestheta 
and noeta, the sensory and the cognitive. In their turn, both Baumgarten and Kant 
upheld this division, though with differing degrees of rigidity and sensory suppression. 
Kant opens the CAeJ with a clear statement in §1, that, ‘A Judgment of Taste Is 
Aesthetic’; in other words, a judgment of taste refers to a sensory perception, not to the 
Understanding for subsumption under a determinate concept. A judgment of taste 
refers:
. . .  to the subject and his feeling of pleasure or displeasure. Hence a judgment of 
taste is not a cognitive judgment and so is not a logical judgment but an aesthetic 
one, by which we mean a judgment whose determining basis cannot be other 
than subjective1®.
Kant’s rigidity on this point leads him to discount any cognitive content to the feelings 
of pleasure or displeasure experienced in a judgment of taste (§1), whereas Baumgarten
had accepted cognition as an important part of the combined sensory, emotional and
0 1cognitive package which he took a work of art to be . Recent evidence from cognitive 
neuroscience has come down on the side o f Baumgarten rather than Kant on the 
question of the cognitive nature of emotional content, as is evinced from the case of 
Antonio Damasio’s patient S (See Section 2.4.4, above). On the other hand, Kant’s 
description of a ‘pure’ judgment o f taste does undoubtedly describe a rapt state of visual 
absorption, or ‘right-brain’ state which reveals Kant’s sensitivity to aesthetic 
experience, and his ability to analyse it, when he writes in §16 about ‘free beauty’, like 
flowers and birds of paradise, which ‘belong to no object determined by concepts as to 
its purpose’:
. . . thus designs a la Grecque, the foliage on borders or on wallpaper, etc., 
mean nothing on their own: they represent [vorstellen] nothing, no object under 
a determinate concept, and are free beauties. . . 22
. . .  When we judge free beauty (according to mere form) then our judgment of 
taste is pure. Here we presuppose no concept of any purpose for which the 
manifold is to serve the given object, and hence no concept [as to] what the
20 Immanuel Kant Op. Cit. (1790; 1987 Edn.) §1, Ak 203, p. 44. This, and all other quotations from CAeJ
are from this translation by Werner S. Pluhar.
21 Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1735; 1954) Rejlections on Poetry, reprinted in facsimile with an
Introduction and Translation into English by Karl Aschenbrenner and William B. Holther, 
Berkely and Los Angeles, University o f  California Press, §25, p. 47.
22 Immanuel Kant Op. Cit. (1790; 1987 Edn.) §16, Ak 229, pp. 76-7.
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object is [meant] to represent; our imagination is playing, as it were, while it 
contemplates the shape, and such a concept would only restrict its freedom23.
This challenges Dickie with yet more testimonial evidence for the realism of 
aesthetic experience of an intense kind, distinct from matter-of-fact states of mind, 
answering negatively the following item (IliB):
*IIiB Is Dickie correct in his claim that the ‘aesthetic attitude’ is a myth, 
because there is only ‘attending’ more or less ‘closely’?
Kant identifies the contemplation of lines and shapes without cognitive content 
as an exemplary case of aesthetic experience, a kind teachers of visual design aim to 
foster in their students. Kant’s account provides us with substantive evidence that to 
adopt an ‘aesthetic attitude’ is to enter a spell o f contemplation, where experience is 
savoured for all the feelings it arouses in us, as the imagination ‘plays’ with the forms 
and with whatever concepts they might evoke. This is, in Kant’s famous expression the 
‘free play’ of the Imagination and the Understanding24, which he was able to introspect 
upon, but was able to explain only in the vaguest terms. Today, however, neuro-science 
helps us to understand it just a little better, so that we can see that it is a real, not a 
mythical, state o f mind, different in kind from a purely cognitive or factual evaluation 
of an object of attention, as with the botanist’s scientific understanding of a flower .
5.3.2 The Sublime and Left-Brain Thinking
As we have just seen, for Kant, a pleasurable experience of beauty (i.e. a 
‘Judgment of Taste’) results from the ‘free play’ o f the Imagination and the 
Understanding. Then, for his second kind o f aesthetic judgment, the Sublime, Kant 
postulates an analogous interaction between the Imagination and a different form of 
thinking, which he calls ‘Reason’ (in this case, analytical, mathematical thought), which 
Sperry would classify as ‘left-brain thinking’ (See Fig. 2, section 2.4.2). But Kant says 
the ‘likings’ of the two (beauty/the sublime) are ‘very different in kind’:
For the one liking ([that for] the beautiful) carries with it directly a feeling of 
life’s being furthered, and hence is compatible with charms and with an 
imagination at play. But the other liking (the feeling of the sublime) is a pleasure 
that arises only indirectly . . .  and . . .  it seems to be seriousness, rather than play,
23 Ibid. §16, Ak 229, p. 77.
24 This expression is introduced and discussed at length in, Ibid. §9, Ak 217-9, pp. 61-4.
25 Ibid. §16, A k229, p. 76.
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in the imagination’s activity . . .  the liking for the sublime contains not so much 
a positive pleasure as rather admiration and respect, and so should be called a 
negative pleasure .
Once again, the manifold of perception is being presented to the subject, not to 
the Understanding or Reason. In his description of the sublime Kant makes some of his 
most acute contrasts between aesthetic and rational thought:
. . .  all logical estimation o f magnitude is mathematical. .  .[whereas]. . .
. . .  all estimation of the magnitude of objects of nature is ultimately aesthetic 
(i.e., determined subjectively rather than objectively)27 (my Italics).
In mathematical calculation, all sizes are relative, whereas in an aesthetic experience of 
the ‘Mathematical Sublime’, intuition senses ‘absolute magnitude’, which in itself is a 
failure to find determinate dimensions. However, according to Kant, this only serves to 
bring home to us the value of reason, through a feeling of self-respect, which we 
nevertheless (by a process of ‘subreption’) project on to a sublime object in nature. 
However, the respect belongs properly, not to the mountain or high waterfall, but to a 
‘respect for our own vocation’ which makes:
. . .  intuitable for us the superiority o f the rational vocation o f our cognitive
•  •  •powers over the greatest power o f sensibility .
Thus we feel displeasure at ‘the imagination’s inadequacy, in an aesthetic estimation of 
magnitude29’, though this serves usefully to remind us of our ‘supersensible vocation30’, 
through reason, to overcome the dominance o f nature within us . Kant’s series of huge 
steps of arithmetical estimation in §26, beginning with the unit of a man’s height, to the 
infinity of the universe, is a virtuosic display of Reason at work, and this suggests that a 
high level of education is needed to enjoy such trains of argument, and with them, the 
Sublime. He quotes the example of a peasant who calls ‘anyone a fool who fancies 
glaciered mountains32’. This clash of opinions between two rational human beings 
might have given Kant pause over the dogmatism of his assertions, driven, perhaps, by 
the over-systematic ordering of his philosophy by his own ‘power o f reason’, to claim
26 Ibid. §23, Ak 244-5, p. 98.
27 Ibid. §26, Ak 251, p. 107.
28 Ibid. §27, Ak 257, p. 114.
29 Ibid. §27, Ak 257, pp. 114-5.
™ Ibid. §27, Ak 257, p. 115.
^ Ibid. §28, Ak 260, p. 119.
32 Ibid. §29, Ak 265, p. 124, quoted by Kant from Horace B6n6dict de Saussure (1779) Voyages dans les 
Alpes.
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too much for the universality of his interpretation of aesthetic judgments. In fairness, he 
does admit that:
. . .  what is called sublime by us, having been prepared through culture, comes 
across as merely repellent to a person uncultured and lacking in the development 
of moral i d e a s .
Although elsewhere he does qualify his position when he calls the sublime a ‘mere 
appendix to our aesthetic judging of the purposiveness of nature34’, he denies that the 
sublime was merely a cultural convention35. However, the peasant’s remark does not 
give him serious pause. Though he considers all human beings would have the same 
response to beauty, expecting their judgments to be shared by others, he does 
acknowledge that more cultivation is necessary to appreciate the sublime.
To the modem reader, Kant’s interpretation of the sublime seems farfetched, i.e. 
that the sublime is a reminder of our freedom before nature to legislate for ourselves a 
moral law, resisting the blandishments of sense. Kant seems to be extending his 
arguments beyond the available evidence, in the manner of the dogmatic rationalists, 
bending them to fit the symmetry and desired coherence of his own philosophical 
system. However, his insightful distinction between the ‘rational’ calculation of sizes 
and the ‘aesthetic’ estimation of size seems perfectly valid, and consistent with current 
knowledge about brain laterality. However, the modem observer can imagine other 
explanations for the aesthetic experience o f the sublime. It is undeniable that urban man 
does feel awe in the presence of the immensity o f nature and its forces, akin to fear 
when exposed to physical danger, even though one might, in fact, be safe. A shared 
human make-up, the desire for self-preservation, the novelty of the grandeur witnessed, 
a sense of rebuke to human hubris, an awareness of death and a recently developed 
sense of environmental fragility, seem to be more than sufficient to account for our 
aesthetic responses to the sublime in nature.
Kant’s contrast between the logical calculation and the subjective estimation of 
the immensity of a mountain or the universe corresponds with Sperry’s research on 
brain laterality. The mental approach chosen determines the nature of the experience, 
rational or aesthetic. This therefore negates another of Dickie’s claims:
*IIiA Is Dickie correct in his claim that differences in motivation result in no 
qualitative differences in attention or aesthetic experience?
33 Loc. Cit.
34 Ibid. §23, A k246, p. 100.
35 Ibid. §29, A k265, p. 125.
156
5.4 Kant's Account of Disinterestedness
In chapter two, following a discussion of Dickie’s attack on Stolnitz’s version of 
disinterestedness (in section 2.2.2.2), an undertaking was made to consider Kant’s 
‘disinterestedness’. The time has come to fulfil that promise. However, it might be 
helpful, first, to recall the context of this issue within the argument of the present thesis.
Stolnitz had declared disinterestedness to be an essential part of the aesthetic 
attitude. Dickie decided that, if he could disprove Stolnitz’s version of disinterestedness, 
he would be able to declare the aesthetic attitude to be a ‘myth’. Stolnitz’s version of 
disinterestedness principally held a) that the aesthetic attitude should preclude 
consideration of the moral content of artworks, and b) that it should also preclude 
criticism. Dickie found arguments to defeat both these positions, and he claimed thereby 
to have demolished the case not only for disinterestedness, but also for the aesthetic 
attitude itself. However, a little historical research was able to establish that the version 
of disinterestedness espoused by Stolnitz was atypical, with little support to be found 
among eighteenth century philosophers, such as Hume36. Therefore, Dickie’s case 
against the aesthetic attitude was considered to have failed, as it had been ‘achieved’ 
only by demolishing a flawed account o f disinterestedness. That raises the question of 
what an ‘orthodox’ version of disinterestedness might look like. That chapter found that 
Hume’s analysis of aesthetic response required both criticism and moral values (section 
2.3). Nevertheless, an undertaking was made to look at Kant’s version of 
disinterestedness, because of his authority within aesthetics.
5.4.1 Form, Matter, Taste and Sense
Crucial to Kant’s attempt to define the parameters of aesthetic judgment is his 
intricate account of disinterestedness, carved from the pillars of earlier aesthetic 
theories37, elegantly thinned by a series o f negatives: no sensory appeal (§3), no concept 
of the good (§4), no emotion (§§13-14), no determinate purpose (§15), no art collector's
36 See section 2.3, above.
37 Paul Guyer gives fascinating accounts o f  the archaeology in Op. Cit. (1997) and his (2005) Values o f
Beauty: Historical Essays in Aesthetics, Cambridge, CUP.
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cupidity (§43). A Platonic and Pietistic38 denial of the flesh seems almost ubiquitous. 
For Kant, aesthetic judgments occur when the object is presented to the ‘subject’, who 
reflects on the feelings of pleasure or displeasure engendered thereby. A lowly 
‘Aesthetic Judgment of Sense’ occurs when the senses are gratified by the physical 
pleasures of the Lower Sensibility (See Fig. 6, section 5.2, above), and Kant is 
contemptuous of anyone ‘who has no feeling  for beautiful nature . . .  and sticks to the 
enjoyments of mere sense that he gets from meals or the bottle39’. It is perhaps 
comments like this which led Pierre Bourdieu, at the end of Distinction: a Social 
Critique o f  the Judgment o f  Taste, to carry out his assault on ‘traditional philosophical 
or literary aesthetics’, with their advocacy o f the ‘indivisibility of taste’: the ‘pure’ 
versus the ‘impure’ or the ‘coarse’ 40.
The concept of disinterestedness among Kant’s Eighteenth Century Anglophone 
predecessors also betrayed a certain wariness towards the temptations of sense, not to 
mention possession and consumption41. However, Kant’s own version of 
disinterestedness is even more prohibitive than theirs. Very early in the text, Kant 
argues that, although the aesthetic gives rise to pleasure, it is not a question of 
enjoyment, which arises from ‘agreeableness’, or the gratification of the senses. In §4 
he tries to secure a link between judgments o f taste and the austere ethics of CPrR:
Agreeableness is enjoyment. But if our sole aim were enjoyment, it would be 
foolish to be scrupulous about the means for getting i t . . .  But reason can never 
be persuaded that there is any intrinsic value in the existence of a human being 
who lives merely for enjoyment. . . even if  he served others, all likewise aiming 
only at enjoyment, as a most efficient means to it because he participated in their 
gratification by enjoying it through sympathy. Only by what he does without 
concern for enjoyment, in complete freedom and independently of whatever he 
could also receive passively from nature, does he give his existence an absolute 
value, as the existence of a person42.
38 This is the usual Puritan variety o f  Pietism, compared to the apparently unique ‘sensual and emotional’
Pietism o f the Halle o f  Baumgarten’s childhood. See Stefan Gross (2002) “The Neglected 
Programme o f  Aesthetics” BJA (Vol. 42) pp. 403-414.
39 Immanuel Kant Op. Cit. (1790; 1987 Edn.) Ak 303, pp. 169-70.
40 Pierre Bourdieu (1979) “Postcript: Towards a ‘Vulgar’ Critique o f ‘Pure’ Critiques” in Distinction: a
Social Critique o f  the Judgement o f  Taste trans. R. Nice (1984; 1986 edition used) London, 
Routledge, pp. 485-500.
41 Dabney Townsend (1992) “Shaftesbury, Lord” in Cooper, D. (Ed.) A Companion to Aesthetics, Oxford,
Blackwell, pp. 395-7 and Dabney Townsend (1998b) “Cooper, Anthony Ashley” in M. Kelly 
(Editor in Chief) Encyclopedia o f  Aesthetics, Oxford, OUP, (Vol. 1, pp. 445-8).
42 Immanuel Kant Op. Cit. (1790; 1987 Edn.) Ak 208-9, p. 50.
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Kant, therefore, tries to draw an analogy between the ‘categorical imperative43’ 
and judgments of taste. The categorical imperative universalises ethics on the basis of 
disinterested fairness (rather than the urgings of ‘inclination’) and Kant tries to secure 
an equivalence for judgments of taste (e.g. that the form of a flower is beautiful) by 
means of an equivalent demand that others concur. Judgements of taste, based on form, 
the manifolds of ‘Pure Intuition44’, such as the shape of the flower, are independent of 
what Kant presumes to be the more variable ‘inclinations’ of sensory preference. Thus 
we might or might not find the flower’s violet colour or its heavy scent ‘agreeable’. By 
contrast, judgements of beauty, like morality, are expected to be universal. However, 
like moral judgment, this ‘universal’, based on ‘form’, is subjective, autonomously 
derived, and a priori, unlike logical judgments, which are valid objectively45.
This argument by analogy from ethics to aesthetics is open to challenge on at 
least two counts. First, Kant is not comparing like with like: moral and perceptual 
judgments belong to different realms, and it is not valid to make such a direct transfer, 
even though Kant offers an ‘ordinary language’ argument, that the form in which we 
express a judgment of taste does indeed demand agreement from others46. Secondly, his 
argument is made to depend on a questionable distinction between ‘form’ and ‘matter’, 
apparently corresponding to the division between ‘pure intuition’ and ‘sensation’ in the 
passive side of the Faculty of Sensibility (See Fig. 6, above). The emotions are 
condemned in judgments of taste as ‘matter’47. For Kant, Form comprises measurable 
shapes48, and matter49 is colour in painting and tone in music, closely allied to base 
sensual pleasures. Kant himself wavers a little on this last point, when he considers a 
theory that light might comprise ‘vibrations’, as do musical notes50. That would imply a 
mathematical description which might make them qualify as ‘forms’, too. In the end, he 
abandons both to the lowly status o f ‘matter’. Composition, on the other hand, qualified
43 Roger Crisp (1995) “Categorical Imperative” in Ted Hondenrich (Ed.) The Oxford Companion to
Philosophy, Oxford, OUP, p. 125.
44 “Pure Intuition” is the “Higher” form o f  “Passive Sensibility”, part o f  Kant’s proposed “Faculty o f
Sensibility” (See Fig. 5, above).
45 Immanuel Kant Op. Cit. (1790; 1987 edn.) §8, Ak 215, p. 59.
46 Ibid. §8, Ak 214, p. 57.
47 Ibid. §14, Ak. 226, p. 72.
48 “The beautiful in nature concerns the form o f  the object, which consists in [the object’s] being
bounded.” (Ibid. §23, Ak 244, p. 98); ‘All form o f  objects on the senses (the outer senses, or 
indirectly the inner sense as well) is either shape or p la y . .  . ’ (Ibid. §14, Ak 224, p. 71).
49 \  . .  what is essential in all fine art is the form that is purposive for our observation and judging, rather
than the matter o f  sensation (i.e. charm or emotion)’ (Ibid. §52, Ak 326, pp. 195-6).
50 Ibid. §14, Ak 224, p. 70. Pluhar tells us in footnote 39, that the theory o f  light as vibrations, eventually
vindicated, was advanced by the Swiss Leopold Euler (1707-83).
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as ‘form’51. Kant could have found support for this viewpoint in Vasari’s Florentine 
prejudice in favour of design, as opposed to the Venetians’ colour52. It seems likely that 
Kant also found his opinions confirmed by the widespread Renaissance and Eighteenth 
Century practice of disseminating artists’ compositions in monochrome engravings (the 
‘form’ of the works, in precis), implying that colour would have had little to add. Kant’s 
error here is to overstate the divide between form and colour. Most of the major and 
obvious changes in the history o f the visual arts have, indeed, been ones of form in 
Kant’s sense, rather than colour, but that does not mean that colour is not an important 
‘formal’ element.
The germ of later formalism can be detected here. Ironically, there is some truth 
in what Kant says. The formal/spatial structure of an artwork is processed in the brain 
separately from colour, and, without ‘form’ in his sense, all art of the past (and any 
other visual perception) would be indecipherable, even the work of extreme colourists 
(See Plate 11). However, Kant is trying to put aesthetic judgments of ‘form’ on an equal 
‘universal’ footing with his argument about moral judgment, egged on, possibly, by his 
own rejection of ‘impure’ sensuality. The net result is to place Kant at the synchronic 
end of the ‘Synchronic versus Diachronic’ dialectic (SvD):
SvDl an a-historical, aestheticising, synchronic account of art.
It might be objected that, at this early stage in CJ, Kant is discussing judgments 
of beauty, rather than the nature of art, but this section (§14) is headed ‘Elucidation by 
examples’, and his conclusions begin,
In painting, in sculpture, indeed in all the visual arts, including architecture and 
horticulture insofar as they are fine arts, design is what is essential. (Kant’s 
Italics)53
In his search for a universal standard, Kant fails to take account of the reality of art as it 
is practised and understood, in differing historical contexts and cultural traditions54. As
sx Ibid. §14, Ak225, p. 72.
32 Giorgio Vasari (1568) Lives o f  the Artists (2nd Edition, translated by George Bull, 1965), London,
Penguin. Vasari is constantly praising artists involved in the revival o f  classicising art, after the 
medieval period, for their drawing after nature and for their ‘design’. In his life o f  Titian, Vasari 
reports that Michelangelo’s praise o f  Titian’s “colouring and his style” had followed some mild 
criticism o f  Titian’s drawing, as reflecting the inferior way Venetian artists were trained (p. 455).
33 Immanuel Kant Op. Cit. (1790; 1987 edn.) §14, Ak 225, p. 71.
34 John Onians shows how descriptions o f  the impact o f  the environment on local cultures had been given
by Montesqieu (1689-1755) and Wickelmann (1717-1768) in (2007) Neuroarthistory: From 
Aristotle and Pliny to Baxandall andZeki, New Haven, Yale Univeristy Press, pp. 67-78.
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Baumgarten showed, time is integral to the aesthetic experience of even static art, in terms of 
preceding experience, affected by chronological proximity and such temporally related factors 
as familiarity or novelty. In other words, whereas Baumgarten saw aesthetic experience as 
broadly synonymous with sensory experience, Kant’s philosophical system demanded the 
rigid separation of judgments o f ‘taste’ from judgments o f ‘sense’, with form as an absolute 
standard. The result was that he underestimated the importance and cognitive value, within 
aesthetic experience and expression, of the broader spectrum of the senses, which for 
Baumgarten included memory and emotion55.
5.4.2 Purposiveness without a Purpose
Kant also proposes another kind of disinterestedness which is not affected by moral 
qualms over sensuality. This stems from a distinction he draws between two kinds of 
perceived purposiveness, the subjective and the objective56. In Kant’s table, reproduced in 
Fig. 5, he gives ‘purposiveness’ as the a priori principle applicable to judgment and to the 
‘feeling of pleasure and displeasure’. In §IV of the 2nd Introduction, Kant states:
Judgment in general is the ability to think the particular as contained under the 
universal. If the universal is given, the judgment is determinative . . .  But if only 
the particular is given and^judgment has to find the universal for it, then this 
power is merely reflective .
There are two stages to a determinative judgment First, the manifold of sense data is gathered
and unified by the Imagination, which presents it to the Understanding. Second, the
Understanding ‘subsumes’ this under a concept. Kant calls this concept the object’s purpose,
58and its ‘harmony’ with concepts is the ‘purposiveness of its form’ . However, where no 
definitive concept awaits the presentation by the imagination (e.g. unfamiliar object, or unclear 
purpose), the process of reflective judgment still finds the formal unity of the object purposive 
because ‘its presentation is connected with the feeling of pleasure’. Because this purposiveness 
is not based on a concept, the pleasure is attributed to the ‘harmony of imagination with 
understanding’ as they toy mentally with the object, which appears to lack either a definitive 
concept or a determinate purpose. In Kant’s words, a subjective pleasure in purposiveness is:
55 Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten Op. Cit. (1735; 1954) on affect, §§ 24-6, and memory (1739; 1983
edn.) Texte zur Grundlegung der Asthetik, extracts from the Metaphysica and other texts, 
published with Introduction, Translation into German, and Notes by Hans Rudolf Schweizer 
Hamburg, Felix Meiner Verlag, §§579-88 (see my translation in Appendix D, pp. 306-8.
56 Immanuel Kant Op. Cit. (1790; 1987 edn.) 2nd Introduction, §VII Ak 192-3, pp. 22-3.
57 Ibid. 2nd Introduction, §IV Ak 179, pp. 18-9.
58 Ibid. 2nd Introduction, §IV Ak 180, p. 20.
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. . .  the harmony of the form of the object . . .  prior to any concept. .  . with 
cognitive powers . . .  [this] kind of purposiveness rests on the pleasure we take 
directly in the form of the object when we reflect on it59.
However, an objective pleasure in purposiveness:
. . .  does not refer to the object’s form in its apprehension, to the subject’s 
cognitive powers, but instead to a determinate cognition of the object under a 
given concept, the presentation of this purposiveness has nothing to do with a 
feeling of pleasure in the thing but rather with the understanding in our judging 
of them60.
Once again, Kant gives an almost uncanny description of the felt difference between 
cognitive and sensory thinking, by now familiar from the drawing classroom. The link 
with ‘disinterestedness’ is that, without a determinate concept, the imagination is free to 
‘play’ with the perception, but, by contrast, the presence of a determinate concept 
imposes an interest, in the sense of some kind o f pragmatic response to an object in the 
world. Without such a requirement, perception is free just to contemplate the forms of 
the object:
Hence we may regard natural beauty as the exhibition of the concept of formal 
(merely subjective) purposiveness, and may regard natural purposes as the 
exhibition of the concept o f a real (objective) purposiveness, the first of which 
we judge by taste (aesthetically, by means of the feeling of pleasure), and the 
second by understanding and reason (logically, according to concepts)61.
This leads to his definition of Beauty in the explication at the end of the third 
Moment:
Beauty is an object’s form of purposiveness insofar as it is perceived in the 
object without the presentation o f  a purpose62. (Kant’s Italics)
Komer63 identifies the third ‘Moment’ (Relation), with its a priori intuition of 
purposiveness, as the most important among of Kant’s four ‘Moments’, set out in the 
‘Analytic of the Beautiful’ (Book I o f the CAeJ). This is because ‘Purposiveness’ is the 
most obvious concept uniting the faculty o f Judgment with Understanding and Reason: 
we perceive the universe as purposive to our ability to understand its laws64; we
59 Ibid. 2nd Introduction, §VII Ak 192, p. 32.
60 Ibid. 2nd Introduction, §VII, Ak 192, pp. 32-3.
61 Ibid. 2nd Introduction, §VII, Ak 193, p. 33.
62 Ibid. §17, Ak 236, p. 84.
63 Stephan KOmer Op. Cit. (1955) p. 184. The other a priori principles in the four moments are that an
aesthetic judgment o f taste is universally valid §37.
64 Immanuel Kant Op. Cit. (1790; 1987 edn.) 2nd Introduction §V, Ak 183, pp. 32-3.
162
perceive a paradoxical65 mutual purposiveness between the parts and the whole of an 
organism, where the one seems to generate the other66; and, we classify objects of 
perception definitively according to concepts conceived in terms of purposes. The drive 
for this comes from the imagination, which gathers up and unifies the manifolds of 
sense for them to be presented by Judgment for subsumption under a concept of the 
Understanding.
Kant, who seems to have had extraordinary powers of introspection, noticed that 
there was an inverse relation between conceptual thought and the perception of beauty:
If we judge objects merely in terms of concepts, we then lose all presentation of 
beauty67.
Alternatively, he might have been simply reflecting the thinking of Baumgarten, for 
example in §14 of his Reflections on Poetry:
Distinct representations [i.e. concepts], complete, adequate, profound through 
every degree, are not sensory, and, therefore, not poetic, §1168 (my interpolation 
in square brackets).
Kant uses his observation about the incompatibility of judgments of taste and 
cognition to emphasise that we cannot be persuaded that something is beautiful by 
logical argument alone. We need to submit the object to the test of our own eyes. Our 
pleasurable perception of ‘purposiveness without a purpose’ also enables Kant to claim 
that the ‘pure’ perception of beauty (i.e. a ‘pure’ judgment of Taste) has nothing to do 
with perfection, which he links to ideas of the determinate concept of the good (and the 
fit-for-purpose)69. Also, ‘purposiveness without a purpose’ has nothing to do with 
‘agreeableness’, whose purpose is, to him, only too obvious: the gratification of bodily 
desires through the pleasures of the senses (which he calls ‘Judgments of Sense’). This 
is the link between ‘purposiveness’ and ‘disinterestedness’, with which Kant begins the 
‘Analytic of the Beautiful’. By attributing judgments of Taste to ‘Pure Intuition’ as 
opposed to ‘Sensation’ (see Fig. 6), the agreeable (the ‘fleshly’) is eliminated, and also
65 ‘Paradoxical’ because it is difficult to see how both could be true: the whole is the purpose o f  all the
parts, and the parts are driven by purpose o f  the whole.
66 Stephan Kdmer quotes from CTJ (Ak 376), on the subject o f  the Idea o f  purpose in nature: “An
organised product o f nature is that in which everything is reciprocally both means and ends”. Op. 
Cit. (1955) p. 205.
67 Immanuel Kant Op. Cit. (1790; 1987 edn.) §8, Ak 215, p. 59.
68 Alexander Gottlieb Op. Cit.(1735; 1954) p. 42 (my explanatory addition in square brackets).
69 One o f Kant’s challenges to rationalist aesthetics is over the beauty o f  regular geometrical figures. Kant
claims that our pleasure in them is cognitive, not aesthetic, as we perceive that simple shapes 
would be easier to calculate their areas (Op. Cit. Ak 241. p. 92).
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interest of ownership and possession, as mentioned in earlier accounts of 
‘disinterestedness’ given by Hutcheson and Shaftesbury before him70. At the end of the 
CAeJ, Kant compares most favourably the good-heartedness of a lover of natural beauty 
against the cupidity of the art collector’s interest in his objects71.
Enough has been said to be able to agree with Kant that ‘disinterestedness’ is an 
integral component to adopting the aesthetic attitude, enabling us to answer ‘Yes!’ to 
another of our questions arising from Dickie’s scepticism:
IliiB Is disinterestedness a necessary condition for the aesthetic attitude?
Space does not permit any further discussion of Kant’s version of 
disinterestedness, though much more could be said, particularly on the relationship 
between the beautiful and the good. However, Kant’s exclusion o f ‘the good’ from 
judgments of taste may have encouraged the ‘a-moral’ tendency in formalism among 
readers who did not fathom the central role o f freedom and morality in Kant’s overall 
philosophical system. That is an argument that cannot be pursued here, for reasons of 
time and space, but it clearly contributed to the discounted item we have designated as 
Sceptical Hypothesis 6:
*SH6 The term ‘aesthetic’ by definition excludes the cognitive, historical, or 
moral.
This, in turn, contributed to the synchronic weighting which Kant added to in the 
‘Synchronic versus Diachronic’ dialectic. As we shall see, Kant himself argued against 
the position represented by SH6.
The two components of Kant’s version of disinterestedness which have been 
examined here have been his exclusion, from ‘pure judgments of taste’, o f a) much 
sensory content and b) concepts. Baumgarten had been happier to accept both of these 
into his aesthetics. For Kant, judgments of sense were cognition-free acts of sensory 
gratification, shared with ‘non-rational animals72’. By contrast, Baumgarten used the 
term ‘judgments of sense’ very differently in §92 of his Reflections on Poetry:
A confused judgment about perfection o f sensations is called a JUDGMENT OF
SENSE, and is ascribed to the sense organ affected by the sensation73.
70 Paul Guyer Op. Cit. (2005) quotes examples from both, on p. 9.
71 Immanuel Kant Op. Cit. (1790; 1987 edn.) §42, Ak 300, p. 167.
12 Ibid. §5, Ak 210, p. 52.
73 Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten Op. Cit. (1735; 1954) p. 69.
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Baumgarten then gives examples of popular sayings in French, Hebrew, Latin and 
Italian which give an ordinary language argument for the cognitive burden carried by 
sensory perception74. Even at the animal level, if a dog smells the presence of a hidden 
rat, the smell will evoke in his doggy mind some sort of, admittedly wordless, concept 
of a ‘rat’, unless of course, he lives in a hybrid animal/human community75, as on a 
farm, when his familiarity with speech will be enough to start him barking excitedly 
when he hears the word ‘rats’, even in the absence, so far, of any tell-tale scent.
Kant does not reject the animal side of human nature entirely, it is only the 
embarrassingly hedonic ‘Lower Passive Sensibility’ which he rejects, but in his system 
the ‘Higher Passive Sensibility’ (Fig. 6) is indispensable to aesthetic experience:
For beauty and sublimity are aesthetic ways of presenting [things], and if we 
were nothing but pure intelligences (or for that matter in thought we put 
ourselves in the place of such [beings]), we would not present [things] in this 
way at all76.
However, according to Kant, humans beings, ‘who are animal and yet rational’ are the
7 7only creatures able to appreciate beauty . This is a view that will be challenged.
5.5 Adherent Beauty. Imaged Concept and Aesthetic Idea
5.5.1 Beauty With or Without a Concept?
Given Kant’s opening strictures on beauty being ‘without a concept’, when he 
comes up with something called an ‘aesthetic idea’, it reads somewhat like an 
oxymoron. As mentioned by Guyer, Kant had husbanded so many arguments, that,
78reluctant to abandon any, he even reinstates some he had previously discarded . 
Because there are tensions between some o f the viewpoints represented, he is unable to 
make them all fit together.
Up to and including §15, he has been belabouring the fact that Judgments of 
Taste are ‘without a concept’. Then suddenly, in §16, we are told that this stricture
74 Ibid. p. 70.
751 have borrowed this phrase from Tim Ingold, who was talking about chimpanzee language being the 
result, not o f  an “inbuilt capacity for language”, but a product o f “chimpanzee-in-an- 
environment-of-humans”, i.e. “a hybrid animal/human community”; in Chapter 21 o f  his (2000) 
The Perception o f  the Environment: Essays on livelihood, dwelling and skill, London, 
Routledge, p. 378.
76 Immanuel Kant Op. Cit. (1790; 1987 Edn.) “General Comment” following §29, Ak 271, p. 131.
11 Ibid. §5, Ak 210, p. 52.
78 Paul Guyer Op. Cit. (1997) Ch. 1 “Kant’s Early V iews”, pp. 12-28.
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applies only to ‘Free’ beauty, or ‘Pure’ judgments of taste. Concepts, which earlier were 
portrayed as the destroyers of beauty, now find a place as part o f ‘Adherent’ beauty, or 
im pure’ judgments of taste. In fact, a close reading shows that the change was not 
altogether unheralded. In §15, it seems that we can choose whether to submit an object 
to a conceptual or an aesthetic judgment:
In fact, as I have already pointed out, an aesthetic judgment is unique in kind 
and provides absolutely no cognition (not even a confused one) of the object; 
only a logical judgment does that. An aesthetic judgment refers the presentation, 
by which an object is given, solely to the subject; it brings to our notice no 
characteristic of the object, but only the purposive form in the [way] the 
presentational powers are determined in their engagement with the object79.
Here we have another clear description of the phenomenology of the aesthetic
attitude in deeply ‘right-brain80’ mode, as the subject blocks out conceptual thought as
he or she concentrates fully on the sensory experience offered by the presenting object.
Again, we are reminded of the drawing student turning the model image to be copied
upside-down, to distance the mind from the ‘left-brain-type’ concepts attached to the
shapes being isolated and studied in ‘right-brain mode’, so they can be seen and drawn
as mere shapes (See section 2.4.2, above, and Plate 7). In the above quote, we can see,
in Kant’s use of the rationalist term ‘confused’, an indication that Kant is arguing with
Baumgarten. In the next few sentences, he rejects Baumgarten’s term, ‘confused
concepts’, as a misnomer, insisting rather on a clean divide between sense and
understanding. This then forces him in § 16 to say that the beauty we might see in a man,
woman, child, horse or church is merely an ‘accessory’ or ‘adherent’ beauty, because it
is not based on a pure judgment of taste, but on a rational judgment, because it
81 * •  •presupposes a concept, a purpose and hence a perfection . In this instance, it does 
appear to me that Kant is again defending the structure of his philosophical system, with 
its separation o f ‘sense’ from ‘understanding’ against contradictory evidence from 
ordinary experience. His uncertainty forces him into an inconsistency in coining the 
term ‘adherent beauty’ (my Italics), because, according to his own argument, as a 
rational judgment it should lose its beauty. He had stated in §8:
79 Immanuel Kant Op. Cit. (1790; 1987 Edn.) §15, Ak 228, p. 75.
80 The term ‘right-brain’ is used as short-hand for a state o f  mind where attention is acutely focused on the
sensory experience o f  the moment, and where the subject becomes more conscious o f  the 
activities o f  the sense-processing modules than is possible when thinking more cognitively, 
owing to limitations on blood supply. See section 2.4.1, above.
81 Immanuel Kant Op. Cit. (1790; 1987 edn.) §16, Ak 2230, p. 77.
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If we judge objects merely in terms of concepts, we then lose all presentation of 
beauty82 (my Italics).
Then, by the end of §16, he explicitly allows the subject to choose between adopting a 
cognitive or an aesthetic attitude to an object:
A judgment of taste about an object that has a determinate intrinsic purpose 
would be pure only if the judging person had no concept of this purpose, or i f  he 
abstracted from it in making his judgment*3. (My Italics)
So, apparently, we can choose whether to judge something according to its 
concept and purpose, or we can choose to ‘abstract’ from both and just concentrate on 
the form. This would seem to confirm the twofold conflict observable in brain laterality: 
in responding to nature, between sensory pleasure and conceptual classification, and in 
responding to art, between ‘appreciation’ (sensory, aesthetic) and ‘criticism’ (cognitive, 
conceptual). This introduces one of our questions:
AvC Are appreciation and criticism incompatible mental states?
Kant believed that many differences in critical judgements are due to some 
people ‘judging an object as a free beauty’, and others as an ‘accessory’, ‘even though 
each is judging correctly in his own way84’. On the other hand, one could add, some are 
able to (or have learned to, or choose to) allow their ‘imagination’ (perception) and their 
‘understanding’ (concepts) to shift in ‘free play’ back and forth into ‘right-brain’ and 
‘left-brain’ thinking, as Humphrey Ocean demonstrated in his account of his drawing 
process, while others, such as those who do not (or have not yet learned how to) make 
the shift (e.g. have not learned to draw from sight), might remain locked into ‘left- 
brain’, matter-of-fact thinking, and fail to enter a state of mind which puts them in 
contact with the earlier processing stages of vision, experienced in the visual arts as an 
aesthetic state of mind (sometimes called adopting the ‘aesthetic attitude’). So the 
answer to question AvC (above) has to be ‘Yes’ and ‘No’, because the answer depends 
on the cognitive and aesthetic development of the individual subject and the context, 
situation, level of preparedness, state of health and many other contingencies which 
might play a role in any particular encounter with a work of art.
Both Baumgarten and Kant were keen to establish the autonomy of aesthetic 
experience, and its place in epistemology, although ultimately their solutions differed.
n  Ibid. §8, Ak 215, p. 59.
83 Ibid. §16, Ak 231, p. 78; a botanist could choose to respond to form or concept (§16, Ak 229, p. 76).
84 Loc. Cit.
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The first step was to argue for that autonomy. If, in the case of Kant, readers managed 
only the first 15 sections of CJ, they might gain an impression of total autonomy for the 
aesthetic from any concepts at all, including concepts of the good. Could such a 
curtailed ‘formalist’ reading have ever happened? I strongly suspect so.
The difference between Baumgarten and Kant here is that Baumgarten never 
doubted the cognitive capacities of the sensory, unlike Kant. For Baumgarten, the richer 
the sensory input, the more fully the idea is realised, in terms of vividness and
O f
radiance . Although abstract concepts were seen by Baumgarten as necessary for 
‘distinct’ thought, particularly in logical and symbolic operations, as in science and 
algebra, he set out to defend the ‘clear and confused’ thinking of the arts and of 
scientific discourse which also uses aesthetic, sensory, figurative language.
In fact, Baumgarten argued that ‘non-proper’ language, i.e. imagery or figures of 
speech, were supremely useful in fleshing out abstract concepts, making them more 
tangible to the human mind, by clothing them in the sensory qualities lacking in 
‘distinct’ (abstract) concepts themselves. As quoted earlier in this chapter, Baumgarten 
wrote in theorem 22 of his Reflections:
Examples confusedly represented are representations that are extensively clearer 
than those for whose clarification they are offered, §21; hence they are more 
poetic, § 1886.
Then, in the scholium to §29, he writes:
According to §22, when the poet performs, we develop a more universal notion 
from these specific instances and sharp determinations, as it were from 
examples. Certainly no other notion will be found under which these things can 
be classified except that of imaged concepts87 (my Italics).
5.5.2 Kant’s Aesthetic Idea
The ability to produce aesthetic ideas is one of several features attributed to 
artistic genius as it is described by Kant in §§46-50 and in Comment I, following §57 in 
CJ. Here is his opening definition:
85 Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten Op. Cit. (1739; 1983 edn.) §531 (see my translation in Appendix D,
pp. 297-8).
86 Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten Op. Cit. (1735; 1954 ) §22, p. 46.
87 In the facsimile, the two Latin words translated here as “imaged concepts” are notio phantasmatum,
Ibid. p. 15.
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Genius is the talent (natural endowment) that gives the rule to art88.
The allusion to nature is meant literally, as we learn from the next sentence:
Since talent is an innate productive ability of the artist and as such belongs itself 
to nature, we could also put it this way: Genius is the innate mental 
predisposition (ingenium) through which nature gives the rule to art89.
Unlike scientists90, artists cannot devise the rules of their practice logically91; hence 
their dependence on nature within them. However, they also have to learn their craft, 
without which they could realise nothing. But, as genius cannot be learned, its ‘foremost 
property must be originality’92. The products of a genius must be exemplary models to 
be emulated but not copied slavishly by others93. The genius cannot, however, forsake 
taste, which is needed not only forjudging beauty, but also for producing it94. Kant now 
revives a word more associated with Baumgarten, ‘perfection’, as a work of art has a 
purpose:
And since the harmony of a thing’s manifold with an intrinsic determination of a 
thing, i.e. with its purpose, is the thing’s perfection, it follows that when we 
judge artistic beauty we shall have to assess the thing’s perfection as well, 
whereas perfection is not at all at issue when we judge natural beauty95.
According to Kant, much art is merely ‘useful and mechanical’: beautiful presentations 
o f things based on concepts and following the essential precepts of good taste, but with 
no spark of genius, and therefore unworthy to be called ‘fine art96’. For ‘fine art’, an 
artist needs spirit (Geist), that quickens the soul, imparting to it ‘a purposeful 
momentum’, giving ‘the ability to exhibit aesthetic ideas', defined by Kant as:
88 Immanuel Kant Op. Cit. (1790; 1987 Edn.) §46, Ak305, p. 174.
89 This recalls Martin Heidegger’s description o f  art as the earth jutting into the world, in (1935/6) “The
Origin o f the Work o f Art”, trans. Albert Hofstadter; extracts reprinted in Clive Cazeaux (2000) 
The Continental Aesthetics Reader, London, Routledge, (pp. 80-101), e.g. p. 92.
90 Kant compares the achievements o f  artistic genius unfavourably with the incremental learning possible
in science, leading to greater achievements in the long run; Ibid. §47, Ak 309, p. 177. The 
Romantic idea o f genius seems to be powerfully realised in certain great talents, but a Popperian 
would question Kant’s sharp division. Artists do learn from others, and ‘great’ scientists like 
Einstein emerge from time to time. Collaborative art forms, like cinema, do perhaps make 
greater achievements possible than by individual inspiration and effort.
91 This opinion is part o f the Romantic reaction against the Rationalist procedures o f the Academy, but
Popper gives us a more logical account o f  how artists work, adopted by such art historians as 
Gombrich and Baxandall, which would have allayed Kant’s worries expressed in the previous 
footnote.
92 Ibid. §46, Ak 307, p. 175.
93 Ibid. §47, Ak 309, p. 177. This passage is very evocative o f  Vasari’s roll-call o f  al the artists, including
Raphael, whose art was raised to a new level by studying Michelangelo’s cartoon o f  the Battle o f  
Cascina in Florence; Giogio Vasari Op. Cit. p. 342.
94 Ibid. §48, Ak 311, p. 179.
95 Loc. Cit.
96 Op. Cit. §48, Ak 312-3, p. 180-1
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. . .  a presentation of the imagination which prompts much thought, but to which 
no determinate thought whatsoever, i.e., no [determinate] concept, can be 
adequate, so that no language can express it completely and allow us to grasp it
He quickly adds that it is easy to see that this is the counterpart to his ‘rational idea’. It 
is perhaps necessary to reconsider at this point the difference for Kant between a 
‘concept’ and an ‘idea’. There are two kinds of concept: a) a priori concepts, or the 
categories, which structure our experience of the world, and b) a posteriori or empirical 
concepts. Both arise in the Understanding. Empirical concepts are forged, by judgment 
and the faculty o f sensibility working in harmony with the Understanding, from the 
unified ‘presentations’ gathered by the Imagination from the ‘lower’ sensations 
generated by our sensory experience of objects. These objects of perception and their 
representations may manifest adherent beauty. ‘Rational Ideas’, however, are quite 
other; they belong to Reason, not to the Understanding; they do not originate in the 
faculty of Sensibility, because, as noumenal entitities, they cannot be experienced, as
Q Q
they are objects only o f thought , unlike objects of sense (men, children, women, 
horses and churches). Ideas are generated by Reason to enable us to understand how we 
can function as free, autonomous persons, rather than as objects determined by natural 
laws. Although Baumgarten, on the other hand, distinguished between empirical and
Q Q
rational psychology , he does not make this hierarchical segregation between 
‘concepts’ and ‘ideas’, but sees the sensory and the abstract as complementary modes of 
understanding and expression.
Kant is setting the bar very high for artists, in a way demanded by the symmetry 
of his philosophical system (ideas versus concepts) rather than accepting the sometimes 
more humdrum reality of art in people’s lives. He evidently thought his description of 
the aesthetic idea would apply to only a tiny number of artists who have ever lived, the 
absolute pinnacle o f achievement, which might be appropriate for the term ‘genius’, but 
is an unreasonably restricted cut-off point for qualification as ‘fine art’. He is 
undoubtedly describing something o f the mystery and inscrutability of art, its ‘truth- 
telling’ power in the sense of Heidegger’s ‘earth jutting into the world100’, and its power
97 Ibid. §49, Ak. 313, pp. 181-2.
98 For a definition o f  the noumenon, see Immanuel Kant Op. Cit. (1781/87; 1993 edn.) B306, p. 211.
99 In the Metaphysics, paragraphs on rational psychology follow those on empirical psychology. (See
http://www.ikp.uni-bonn.de/kant/agb-metaphysica/synopsis.html)
100 Martin Heidgegger in (1935/6) “The Origin o f  the Work o f  Art”, trans. Albert Hofstadter; extracts
reprinted in C. Cazeaux (2000) The Continental Aesthetics Reader, London, Routledge, (pp. 80- 
101), p. 92, p. 9 6  etc.
170
to hold our imaginations so that we return again and again for fresh insights, in a way 
which we feel we cannot pin down precisely. It seems to me that the problem with his 
account is that it is too ‘high flown’, and that Baumgarten’s more down-to-earth 
expression, ‘imaged concepts’ does the work of both prongs of Kant’s account of 
‘aesthetic ideas’ and their disparaged cousins, the tasteful presentations of determinate 
concepts. Strangely, Kant’s own examples o f ‘aesthetic ideas’ are rather prosaic, and are 
emblems familiar from iconography, rather than complete artworks101.
Baumgarten’s account is superior to Kant’s in having a much more general 
application to human expression and art practice, including our penchant for metaphor. 
Baumgarten is simply more in touch with the reality of how art is actually practised, 
whether within the hothouse of Sturm und Drang, or without.
If asked to classify some of the most significant images of the past 50 years, 
perhaps not always recognised as ‘works of art’, it would an interesting exercise to see 
how many would qualify as ‘aesthetic ideas’ as opposed to ‘imaged concepts’. The 
famous image, ‘Earthrise’, taken by an unidentified astronaut on Apollo 8, despite its 
familiarity, has been one of the most powerful and influential images of the late 
twentieth century, the earth literally jutting its environmental truth of resource limitation 
into our complacent world (Plate 12a). The pictures of polar bears struggling for 
survival in the melting arctic ice (e.g., Plate 12b), have recently had a comparable 
impact, especially in short video clips on the global news. These deal with very real 
‘determinate’ concepts, and pace Kant, but with Baumgarten, they are very emotional 
images, that ‘compel our souls’ in very definite directions. This adverse interpretation 
of the ‘aesthetic idea’ relative to ‘imaged concepts’ could, perhaps, be mitigated by
considering these images as works of the sublime, rather than of taste, in which case it
10?seems that Kant would approve of their emotional and cognitive burden
5.6 Discussion and Conclusion
In this chapter, Kant’s account of the aesthetic (RQ1) was found to be more 
sharply split than Baumgarten’s between the ‘higher’ and Tower’ levels of sensory 
experience, with a greater separation between works o f ‘genius’ dealing with the Ideas
101 ‘Thus Jupiter’s eagle with the lightning in its claws is a attribute o f the mighty king o f heaven, and the
peacock is an attribute o f  heaven’s stately queen.’ Immanuel Kant Op. Cit. (1790; 1987 edn.)
§49, Ak 315, p. 183.
102 See Kant’s ‘General Comment on the Exposition o f  Aesthetic Reflective Judgment’, Ibid. Ak 272 (pp.
132-3).
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of Reason, and works o f merely Adherent Beauty, dealing on a level o f craftsm anship 
with the Concepts of Understanding (RQ2).
No support was found for Dickie’s contentions that differences in m otivation 
had no effect on differences in aesthetic experience (*IIiA), or for his claim  that the 
‘aesthetic attitude' is a ‘myth’, there being only ‘attending’ more or less ‘closely’
(*IIiB). Kant was found to have given a complex and credible account o f  
‘disinterestedness’ as a necessary condition for the aesthetic attitude (*IIiiB), which 
helped to explain the aesthetic attitude in a way compatible with recent findings from 
cognitive neuroscience, also helping to explain the relationship o f the aesthetic to art 
(RQ2). The descriptions of aesthetic judgment in the early section o f CAeJ would seem 
to support the view that the term ‘aesthetic’ excludes by definition the cognitive, 
historical and the moral (*SH6), but for readers who persist beyond the opening 
sections, the fruits of Kant’s later thoughts reveal that, as his ideas developed, he 
contradicted those opinions, making room in art and the aesthetic for concepts, the 
historical dimension and morality103. Although evidence o f the tensions between the 
sensory and the cognitive were found, it was argued that because the human brain is 
able to make rapid shifts in levels o f engagement, there is no incompatibilty between 
appreciation and criticism (AvC).
Although in section 5.4.1, above, Kant was placed at the ‘synchronic’ end o f  the 
synchronic/diachronic dialectic, his theory o f genius and originality gives him a nudge 
back towards the diachronic end of the spectrum, because originality can only be 
gauged against a knowledge o f historical precedent. We have, therefore, assembled all 
the ingredients for our model for the ontology of the artwork, adapted from Gregory 
Currie (see section 3.6, above):
OA Artwork = Sensory structure + Heuristic + Response appropriate to art.
The aesthetic is an integral part o f the artwork, both in the ‘sensory structure’, 
and also in the sensory, aesthetic, response o f receivers. Although we confirm ed there 
are inbuilt tensions between the ‘aesthetic’ and the ‘cognitive’, which have their basis in 
separate brain structures and functions, the divisions are not insuperable, but are 
‘juggled’ in consciousness and memory, in a process which, amazingly, Kant was able 
to introspect upon, and which he described memorably as the ‘free play o f  Imagination
Paul Guyer gives an account o f  the development and unresolved tensions in Kant s thought in the CJ
in his Op. Cit. (1997).
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and Understanding', which could be rephrased as the enjoyable interplay between the 
senses and concepts, or in Baumgarten’s words: ‘imaged concepts’.
Finally, this project's definition o f the ‘aesthetic attitude’ needs to be reviewed 
in the light of the above arguments, to see if  it needs revision:
§14 To adopt the a e s t h e t i c  a t t i t u d e  is to take ‘time out’ from the flux of 
work-a-day practical necessities, and in a vigilant state of mind to scrutinise 
an object or cognition in order to focus on the full range of feelings and 
cognitions it engenders in the subject. This ‘time out’ factor is the origin o f  
the term ‘ d i s i n t e r e s t e d n e s s ’  in the context of aesthetics.
In general, this definition seems to fit the arguments, though in line 3, the 
broader reference o f ‘thought’ should replace ‘cognition’, and the following added after 
‘time out’ factor: ‘(i.e. not immediately pragm atic)'. These modifications have been 
made to the version in Appendix A.
The ground has now been prepared to test these ideas against the empirical 
evidence now available from evolutionary science and cognitive neuroscience, which 
were for Baumgarten and Kant either unimaginable or matters of introspection.
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ABSTRACT
This chapter redescribes Kant’s sensus communis in evolutionary terms, using 
arguments based on discoveries in biology unavailable to Kant. Based on 
Darwin’s principle of continuity between nature and man, this chapter considers 
the gradual evolution of the sensory in Baumgarten’s terms as aesthetic 
knowledge and aesthetic communication necessary for the competitive survival 
and reproduction of animal species. This approach follows Dennett’s injunction 
to ground human qualities in their evolutionary context of descent with variation 
in a single ‘design space’. Definitions of the aesthetic are offered which include 
both aesthetic reception and the use o f aesthetic resources for active expression, 
the latter seen as the context for the emergence o f ‘Ur-Art’, where aesthetic 
choices by females have shaped the course of evolution in many species, though 
there were other selective pressures that honed aesthetic sensitivity, such as the 
need to discriminate altruists from cheats.
6.1 Introduction
6.1.1 The Place of this Chapter in the Argument
This thesis asks ‘What is the aesthetic?’ and ‘What is its relationship to art?’ 
These questions seek to understand and challenge scepticism towards the aesthetic 
among some philosophers of art in the Anglo-American analytical tradition since the 
advent of twentieth century positivism. Chapters two and three analysed some sceptical 
accounts of the aesthetic. Doubts over the accuracy of some of their accounts of ideas 
originating in eighteenth century led to studies of Baumgarten and Kant in chapters four 
and five. The present chapter, on evolutionary theory, is the first of two dedicated 
entirely to examining empirical evidence for the aesthetic, an approach that began in 
section 2.4 on the pedagogy of drawing. The next chapter will look at cognitive 
neuroscience, and the final chapter will review the arguments of this thesis through the 
three case studies outlined in chapter one: bowerbird art, the nexus of art power and 
crime, and sound sculpture.
6.1.2 The Structure of this Chapter
The present chapter concentrates rather more than earlier chapters on the first of 
the project’s research questions:
RQ1 What is the aesthetic?
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In bringing this question to evolutionary science, this chapter follows the general 
direction of the whole project in defending Baumgarten’s view of the aesthetic, a view 
which maximises its cognitive value, rather than Kant’s view, which minimises it. 
Baumgarten saw the aesthetic as ‘sensory knowledge’, in a continuum stretching from 
‘obscure’ sensations to abstract reasoning (See Fig. 4, section 4.2). This contrasts with 
Kant’s model of human psychology, which separates the bodily senses, as far as 
possible, from the Understanding and from Judgments of Taste, as reflected in his 
distinction between ‘Lower’ and ‘Higher’ Sensibility (See Fig. 6, section 5.2).
This chapter follows Daniel C. Dennett in turning to evolutionary biology to 
gain new perspectives on aspects o f human life that might seem to be species-specific, 
supposedly arising from human culture or having sprung from the human genome. 
Dennett warns that to lay claim to such ‘human’ achievements as altruism or the 
aesthetic, without first explaining how they arose in pre-human evolution, is to invoke 
them by means o f ‘skyhooks’ (See section 6.3.1, below). He prefers to look for earth- 
bound ‘cranes’ as the builders of such wonders, in small Darwinian steps. No attempt 
will be made to justify Darwin’s claims, as that argument lies outside the boundaries of 
this thesis. However, the evidence collected by Darwin and his successors provides a 
credible evolutionary context for the cognitive, sensory and emotional model of the 
aesthetic proposed by Baumgarten, and advanced in the present thesis.
This chapter concludes with the recent challenge to the ‘New Synthesis’ of neo- 
Darwinism, following the acceptance o f Darwin’s second theory of evolution, by sexual 
selection, which has been claimed to explain the evolution of art. However, rather than 
seeing sexual selection as the single explanation, it is grouped with other selective 
pressures prompting the evolution of aesthetic sensitivity, such as identifying good 
group members, punishing cheats, and, in the next chapter, my own suggestion: 
grooming.
Apart from asking ‘What is the Aesthetic?’ (RC1), this chapter will consider 
some of the definitions surrounding the concept of the ‘aesthetic’ given in Appendix A, 
and consider the following issues that arose in earlier chapters:
APC What is the reason for the nexus between Art, Power and Crime?
RPC Consider the often underestimated Role of Patron and Critic
UA Ur-Art is ‘art’ from the beginning (i.e. it is NOT ‘non-art’)
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6.2 A Biological, not a Transcendental, sensus communis1
For Kant, the sensus communis is a ‘transcendental’ a priori principle which 
justifies the expectation that others ought to share our subjective judgments of taste2 
(beauty). Also, for Kant, our ability to communicate our cognitive and our aesthetic 
judgments establishes the universality o f both:
Cognitions and judgment, along with the conviction that accompanies them, 
must be universally communicable. For otherwise we could not attribute to them 
a harmony with the object, but they would one and all be a merely subjective 
play o f the presentational powers, just as skepticism would have it3.
However, it must be questioned whether such communicability is indeed a 
necessary condition for aesthetic experience in general, rather than just its human 
manifestation. In this chapter it will be argued that the universal factor in aesthetic 
experience is the organism’s response, in the form of the ‘free play of the Imagination 
and Understanding’, experienced as a feeling of pleasure or displeasure, arising from 
the sensory experience of an object or a performance, in harmony or dis-harmony with 
the organism’s drive to understand the world and its place within it. This chapter argues 
that the ‘free play of the Imagination and Understanding’ can take place even in the 
absence of the linguistic expression o f concepts, and hence in the absence of explicit 
inter-communicability. It will be further argued that, if current human aesthetic 
experience can be shown to derive from our pre-linguistic biology, this should revise 
our concept o f the arts, and also allow for the experience of beauty, and even art, among 
non-human species, through an inter-species sensus communis aestheticus4.
Kant himself conceded that animals make aesthetic judgments, though he 
restricted them to judgments of sense, denying to animals reflective judgments of taste. 
He writes: ‘Agreeableness holds for non-rational animals, too; beauty only for human
1 As Ellen Dissanayake also takes a biological approach to art, it is necessary to put in a disclaimer, to
explain why her arguments will not be discussed at length here. She orchestrates evidence from 
many disciplines to support an argument that the ‘behaviour of art’ co-evolved with the human 
species. However, her signature expression, ‘making special’, assumes, rather than establishes, 
the nature o f  the aesthetic, making her pioneering efforts rather tangential to the present 
argument. Ellen Dissanayake (1988) What is Art For? Seattle, University o f  Washington Press, 
and (1992; 1995 edn.) Homo Aestheticus: Where Art Comes From and Why? Seattle, University 
o f  Washington Press and (2000) Art and Intimacy: How the Arts Began, Seattle, University o f  
Washington Press.
2 Immanuel Kant (1790; 1987 Edn.) Critique o f  Judgment, translated and edited by W.S. Pluhar
Indianapolis, Hackett. §§20-22, Ak 237-241, pp. 87-90, and §40, Ak 293-6, pp. 159-62.
3 Ibid. §21, Ak 238, pp. 87-8.
4 This is an expression coined by Kant: Ibid, §40, Ak 295, p. 162 (footnote 24).
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beings, i.e., beings who are animal and yet rational5’. Agreeableness, for Kant, exists for 
animals on the same basis as for humans, who also make ‘judgments of sense’ which 
are ‘aesthetic and singular’, for example when humans find the smell of a rose 
‘agreeable6’. Building on Kant’s acceptance of aesthetic judgments of sense, this thesis 
argues in support of Baumgarten’s position that the senses constitute the aesthetic. The 
argument follows that it is the senses that are the basis of art, rather than the stipulative 
precondition laid down by Kant for intercommunicability, which was mainly needed to 
maintain his separation o f judgments of taste from judgments of sense, a distinction 
required by the structure of Kant’s philosophical system, but not required by 
Baumgarten.
6.3 The Evolution of the Aesthetic
In this section, the search for the sensus communis aestheticus will be taken 
back to the origins o f life. Just as scientists cannot pinpoint exactly where the boundary 
lies between life and non-life7, they cannot state, looking at the tree of life, exactly 
where sensation, perception or consciousness might have begun. However, there are 
clues that can be explored, and these suggest how pervasive the aesthetic might be in 
nature.
The definition of the aesthetic used here is based on Baumgarten’s definition of 
aesthetic in the Metaphysica (§533): sensitive cognoscendi etproponendi, ‘sensorily 
knowing and proposing8’, which incorporates both reception and transmission. This is 
reflected in the first three paragraphs defining the aesthetic in Appendix A:
§1 The a e s t h e t i c  is both an active and a passive resource for the flourishing 
of organisms.
§2 The p a s s i v e  a e s t h e t i c  comprises feelings and cognitions engendered by 
attention directed towards an external object or internal thought and/or 
feeling.
5 Ibid. §5, Ak 210, p. 52.
6 Ibid  §8, Ak 215, p. 59.
7 Peter L. Williams (Ed.) et al. (1995), G rey’s Anatomy (38th edition) Edinburgh etc., Churchill
Livingstone, p. 3, Col. 2.
8Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1739; 1983 edn.) Texte zur Grundlegung der Asthetik, extracts from the 
Metaphysica and other texts, published with Introduction, Translation into German, and Notes 
by Hans Rudolf Schweizer Hamburg, Felix Meiner Verlag, p. 16. My full translation is: 
‘AESTHETICS is the science o f  sensorily knowing and proposing (the logical faculty o f lower 
cognition, the philosophy o f  the graces and the muses, lower epistemology, the art o f thinking 
beautifully, art as an analogy to reason)’.
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§3 The a c t i v e  a e s t h e t i c  is the presentation of a sensory profile by one
organism to other organisms. The active aesthetic can be either tacit or 
expressive.
The ‘active aesthetic’ can be either the result of natural selection and 
contingencies, designated here as the ‘tacit active aesthetic’, or it can be the result of 
actions by an organism to impact upon the sensory systems of other organisms. This is 
designated here as the ‘expressive active aesthetic’:
§4 The t a c i t  a c t i v e  a e s t h e t i c  is the result of evolutionary selective
processes, in which the action of organism A has changed the sensory 
profile of organism B, which can influence the behaviour of organisms A, B 
or C etc.
e.g. predation of light peppered moths in the industrial revolution 
increased the numbers o f dark peppered moths (See Plate 13a).
§5 The e x p r e s s i v e  a c t i v e  a e s t h e t i c  is the sensory signalling of organism 
C which has the potential to influence the thoughts, feelings or behaviour of 
organism D or E or etc.
The shepherd or shepherdess (C) plays his or her harp for auto­
delectation, quite apart from any effect his or her playing might have 
on the inner state o f his or her sheep (D) or the eavesdropping lion (E). 
The expressive active aesthetic can be both:
1) a) unconscious or b) conscious
e.g. a) releasing pheromones or b) writing a letter
and
2) c) intended or d) unintentional
e.g. c) saying “Hello!” or d) blushing.
As Baumgarten admitted, in § 117 of the Reflections on Poetry, it is very difficult 
to put a boundary between the rhetorical and the poetic uses of language, and by 
extension between the rhetorical uses of all the other aesthetic forms of expression, and 
their artistic uses9; in other words, to tell ‘non-art’ from ‘art’. It will be argued here, on 
the basis of Lafferty’s claims for ‘a spectrum of artistic presence10’, that there is a
9 ‘The philosophers should be busy in general in drawing boundary lines and especially in defining
accurate limits between poetry and ordinary eloquence. The difference is, to be sure, only a 
matter o f degree; but in the relegation o f  things to one side or the other it requires, we think, no 
less capable a geometer than did the frontiers o f  the Phrygians and the Mysians’; Alexander 
Gottlieb Baumgarten (1735) Meditationes philosophicae de nonnullis adpoemapertinentibus, 
reprinted in facsimile with an Introduction and Translation into English by Karl Aschenbrenner 
and William B. Holther (1954) with Notes, as Reflections on Poetry, Berkely and Los Angeles, 
University o f  California Press, §117, p. 79.
10 Michael G. Lafferty . (2006) Arthur D anto’s Philosophy o f  Art, Ph.D. thesis (unpublished) Warwick
University, pp. 198-214.
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continuum of the artistic, which begins with the expressive active aesthetic in nature, 
leading to statement UA:
UA Ur-Art is ‘art’ from the beginning.
The basis for this rests partly on what Daniel C. Dennett calls the existence of 
one shared ‘design space’, for human and non-human animals.
6.3.1 Sky hooks or Cranes in one ‘Design Space’
Daniel C. Dennett is perhaps the pre-eminent philosopher to promote the
relevance of evolutionary biology to some philosophical questions11. His work on the
naturalisation of ethics can provide a model for a possible Darwinism naturalisation of
1 ^aesthetics. In Freedom Evolves , he confronts the paradox of a) our scientific 
acceptance of the universe as deterministic and b) our reluctance to abandon a belief in 
free will and individual moral responsibility. Challenging determinism, Dennett shows 
that Darwinism can supply us with a different narrative, showing that greater 
complexity evolves in small steps, locally, appearing, temporarily at least, to reverse the 
otherwise inevitable entropy predicated upon the second law of thermodynamics14. 
Thus, more highly evolved organisms gradually gain increasing amounts of what he 
calls ‘wiggle-room’ in the face of a pre-determined universe. In Dennett’s words, ‘Four 
billion years ago, there was no freedom on our planet, because there was no life15’. 
Adapting his words, the aesthetician might also claim, ‘Four billion years ago, there was 
no art on our planet, because there was no life’. One might add, ‘Nor rhetoric, nor the 
aesthetic’. Just as Dennett outlines the evolution of freedom, so this chapter attempts an 
admittedly much more compressed account of the evolution of the aesthetic. Dennett 
provides two main justifications for an evolutionary approach to philosophical 
questions. The first accounts for the process of adaptation, with ‘cranes’ rather than
11 Daniel C. Dennett (1995) Darwin's Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meaning o f  Life, London,
Penguin, and (2003) Freedom Evolves, London, Penguin.
12 To naturalize any area o f  culture is to treat it as continuous with the study o f the natural world,
continuous with science, according to Alan Lacey, ‘Naturalism’ in Ted Hondenrich Op. Cit. 
(1995). In naturalisation, all explanations should be based on empirical evidence, on what Quine 
calls ‘observational sentences’, which derive their meaning in the same way that a child learns 
the meaning o f  words, from ‘concurrent sensory stimulation’. See Willard Van Orman Quine. 
(1969) Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York, Columbia University Press, 
‘Epistemology Naturalised’ (pp. 69-90) p. 85.
13 Daniel C. Dennett Op. Cit. (2003).
14 Daniel C. Dennett (1995) D arw in’s Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meaning o f  Life, London,
Penguin, p. 69.
15 Daniel C. Dennett, Op. Cit. (2003) p. 137.
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‘skyhooks’. The second concerns the existence of only one ‘design space’, which is 
shared by all evolved creatures, humans included.
Dennett makes the distinction between ‘sky-hooks’ and ‘cranes’ in an attempt to 
explain the evolution of apparently unique human qualities or features. Dissanayake’s 
confident identification o f ‘making special’ within her evolutionary explanation of art, 
appears to invoke one such ‘sky hook’, as ‘making special’ is presented to us with no 
explanation for the aesthetic sense which must underpin it16. Instead o f ‘sky-hooks’, 
Dennett proposes ‘cranes’, according to a principle first proposed by James Mark 
Baldwin in 1896. The ‘Baldwin effect’ offers an alternative to Lamarkianism, the 
discredited theory that adaptive characteristics acquired by a living organism could be 
passed on directly to its offspring. By contrast, the concept of ‘cranes’ is compatible 
with the slow-working Darwinian algorithm of descent with variation, where the 
plasticity of a living organism allows it to come up with an innovative behaviour, a new 
‘trick’, which is then adopted by conspecifics and subsequent generations, thereby 
creating a selective pressure for any future genetic mutations which work in favour of 
reinforcing the new ‘trick’. The result is the spread of various degrees of a 
characteristic, with the fully-fledged behaviour and its structures (e.g. winged flight) 
standing above lesser approximations, as shown the two diagrams of Fig. 7, below:
Fig. 7: The Baldwin Effect: from ‘Sky-hook’ (left) or ‘Crane’ (right).
(Figures 3.1 and 3.2 in Dennett’ Darwin ’s Dangerous Idea, pp. 78 and 79)
The second relevant evolutionary concept emphasised by Dennett is the 
existence of only one ‘design space’ within which these changes can occur. A good 
example of intellectual discovery within one ‘design space’ is the independent 
discovery of natural selection by both Darwin and Wallace. The same kind of 
convergence has led to many other innovators being acclaimed in different countries for 
the same achievements. In nature, this phenomenon is called ‘convergent evolution’.
The characteristic structures of the Sabre-toothed Tiger evolved more than once from
16 Ellen Dissanayake Op. Cit. (1988) ch. 4, ‘Making Special: Towards a Behavior o f  Art’, pp. 74-131.
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different lineages, with placental and marsupial versions17. They represent the same 
‘design solutions’ to the same selective pressures. Dissanayake claims that art is a 
specifically human adaptation, ignoring the possibility of convergent evolution, 
dismissing the activities of bowerbirds, such as those shown in Plate 14, as merely 
‘display’ and ‘not art’18. The aim o f this thesis is to demonstrate that human art is not an 
isolated ‘skyhook’ rising from a featureless plain, but one manifestation of a larger 
cluster of aesthetic behaviours in a single design space shared by both humans and the 
other animals.
6.3.2 The evolution of perceptual knowledge
In order to avoid accepting ‘the aesthetic’ as if from a ‘skyhook’, some 
consideration will need to be given to the evolution o f the senses, which are closely 
identified in this thesis with the aesthetic, in keeping with Baumgarten’s concept of 
‘sensory knowledge’. When we think about Darwinian evolution we must remember the 
almost unimaginable periods o f time with which we are dealing (Fig. 8).
PRESENT
700  MILLION YBP 
(YEARS BEFORE PRESENT)
1 . 4  BILLION YBP
3 5 BILLION YBP
4 5 BILLION YBP
Fig. 8 Emergence and diversification of life on earth
(Figure 4.2 from Dennett (1995) D arwin’s Dangerous Idea, p. 88)
17 There are illustrations o f Marsupial and Placental Sabretooths, which exemplify evolutionary
convergence, on p. 453 o f  Mark Ridley’s introductory text, Evolution, Blackwell Science Inc., 
Cambridge, Mass., 1993. There are numerous examples o f ‘cranes’, including the eye, see 
http://www.pbs.Org/wgbh/evolution/library/01/l/real/l_01101 .html.
18 Ellen Dissanayake Op.Cit. (1992; 1995edn.) pp. 64-6. She has two other reasons for dismissing the
bowerbird’s displays as art: 1) she says Darwin based his speculation on a Nineteenth Century 
identification o f  art with beauty, now believed to be ‘tangential’ to art, and 2) the females could 
be responding directly to fitness indicators, rather than to ‘beauty’.
MULTI-CELL
ORGANISMS
EUKARYOTES
PROKARYOTES
EARTH F O R M E D ----
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For about the first billion years of earth’s existence, there is no evidence of any 
life, and only after another 2 billion years did symbiotic co-operation between simpler 
life forms19 enable more complex unicellular animals, including the Protozoa, to evolve 
sensory systems. This enabled them to find places offering optimal conditions for their 
survival and reproduction (see Plate 15b).
At the beginning of The Sense o f  Order, Ernst Gombrich quotes a passage by 
Konrad Lorenz, describing the movement o f a unicellular Protozoan viewed under the 
microscope:
Even the primitive way in which paramaecium  (one of the infusoria) takes 
avoiding action when it collides with an obstacle by first reversing and then 
swimming forward in another direction determined by accident suggests that it 
‘knows’ something about the external world which may literally be described as 
an ‘objective’ fact °.
This seems to describe Baumgarten’s ‘sensory knowledge’ (Plate 15a). Apart 
from being able to sense an obstacle and find its way around it, the Paramaecium is also
i
light sensitive, and will move towards a light source . The Amoeba, in contrast, has a
9 9‘negative photokinetic’ reaction to light . The presence of light motivates these 
relatively simple animals to move towards it or away. It may even be possible to speak 
of an ‘attraction’ or an ‘aversion’ to light, perhaps even o f ‘pleasure’ or ‘pain’. However 
one expresses it, they have ‘sensory knowledge’ which ‘propels’ them motivationally in 
one direction or the other.
6.3.3 The Aesthetic as an Evolutionary Driver
Once unicellular life forms like Paramaecium had evolved forms o f sexual 
reproduction (See Plate 16a), the horizontal exchange of DNA between conspecifics 
accelerated the rate of evolutionary change, leading to the earliest multicellular 
organisms. This prepared the stage for the ‘Cambrian explosion’, 543 million years ago, 
when there emerged most o f the groups o f species still alive today, and many now
19 L. Margulis (1981) Symbiosis in Cell Evolution: Life and its Environment on the Early Earth, Oxford,
Freeman.
20 Ernst Gombrich’s own translation (1979), in The Sense o f  Order: a study in the psychology o f
decorative art, (2nd Edition, 1984), London, Phaidon Press, p. 2.
21 www.brad.ac.uk/acad/lifesci/optometry/ resources/modules/stage 1/pvpl/Evolution.html; note: this
website has been closed down since I read this information on it.
22 Loc. Cit.
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extinct2 , including the Trilobites, which evolved the first eyes known to science, thus 
‘introducing vision to life on earth24’ (See Plate 16b). In the words of Andrew Parker:
Everything had to quickly adapt, and [this] caused an explosion in evolution . . .
. .  So once a predator has an eye, then it’s a strong pressure for the prey to have
eyes as well2 .
New research techniques and a few unusually well-preserved fossils of skin reveal that 
animals in the Cambrian quickly evolved colours for all the reasons that they have 
colours today: signalling, camouflage, and so forth. Eyes evolved in most branches of 
the animal kingdom. By a remarkable process o f convergent evolution, the eye of a 
large mollusc, the squid, is almost identical to the human eye, though better 
‘designed’26.
Equally remarkable is the way aesthetic selective pressures shaped the 
appearance of different animals. Such characteristics can only occur by mutation, and 
then by natural selection, either because predators desist from attack for fear of 
unpleasant consequences, so that a species does not need camouflage (Plate 17a), or 
because they are left unharmed by predators which have been successfully duped by 
that fear (Plate 17b), or because the best mimics survive by becoming almost invisible 
(Plate 17c).
Such changes in the appearance o f animals due to ‘aesthetic’ or ‘perceptual’ 
factors can take place quite quickly, as the famous case o f the Peppered Moth in the 
United Kingdom, during and after the Industrial Revolution (See Plate 13a). The Heike 
crab, which looks like the head of a Samurai warrior, has over the centuries apparently 
evolved an increasing likeness, from the crab-fishermen’s habit o f throwing ‘Samurai­
23 http://www.ucmp.berkeley.edu/cambrian/camb.html.
24 The words o f Andrew Parker, in BBC Radio 4 programme ‘Material World’ broadcast on 7th February
2008, in an item on colour in fossils. The discussion was between presenter Quentin Cooper, 
Professor Andrew Parker, Research Leader in Zoology at the Natural History Museum, London, 
and Dr. Phil Manning, Lecturer in Palaeontology at the School o f  Earth Sciences, Manchester 
University. The programme is still available on
http://www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/science/thematerialworld_20080207.shtml.
The major difference between the light sensitivity o f  a Paramaecium  and a Trilobite is the ability 
o f an eye to produce an image.
25 Loc. Cit. A short film about the evolution o f  a humanlike eye under selective pressure may be found on
the internet at: http://www.pbs.Org/wgbh/evolution/librarv/01/l/real/l 011 Ol.html.
26 In the vertebrate eye, light for most o f  the retina has to pass through a layer o f  blood vessels, whereas
for the squid, the image strikes the light-receptive cells directly.
http://images.google.co.Uk/imgres7imgurHhttp://webvision.med.utah.edu/imageswv/Sagschem.i 
pefrfrimprefurl=http://www.pandasthumb.org/archives/2006/l 1/denton vs squid.html&h—480&  
w=726&sz=92&hl=en&start=14&um=l&tbnid=hp3Vn3YvU8V39M:&tbnh=93&tbnw=141&pr 
ev=/images%3Fq%3Dsquid%252Beve%26um%3Dl%26hl%3Den%26client%3Dfirefox- 
a%26channel%3Ds%26rls%3Dorg.mozilla:en-US:official.
184
like’ crabs back into the water (See Plate 13b). In 6.3, above I called such changes the 
result of the ‘Tacit Active Aesthetic”.
The appearance of plants is also shaped by the perceptual responses of animals, 
at the flower stage offering a selective pressure in favour of species that attract 
pollinators (See Plate 18a), and, later in the season, those that attract seed dispersers by 
advertising their harvest of fruit through colour and pattern (See Plate 18b). The first 
point to highlight is the remarkably powerful selective pressure which the aesthetic, as 
perception, applies, in ways which alter both sides of an inter-species relationship: 
predator and prey adapt to each other, as do flowers and pollinators, as studied by 
Darwin in the co-evolution of orchids and their pollinators27. The second point is to 
speculate on whether perhaps some o f the elation of our ancestor species, in finding a 
tree loaded with colourful fruit, does not underlie our aesthetic pleasure in 
contemplating a similar abstract pattern in which we group forms by shape and colour28.
However, the old Rationalist questioning of the epistemological value of the 
senses still survives. Gregory Currie describes beliefs as conceptual, but perceptions as 
non-conceptual, on the basis that for someone to hold a belief they would have to ‘hold 
the concepts necessary for a description o f how that belief represents the world’ . This 
seems to make human language necessary to cognition, and thereby, in the footsteps of 
Kant, to downgrade, or even to deny, the cognitive content of sensory perception. John 
Searle takes a view which seems to support Baumgarten against Kant and Currie:
Why is my dog barking up that tree? Because he believes that the cat is up the 
tree, and he wants to catch up to the cat. Why does he believe the cat is up the 
tree? Because he saw the cat run up the tree . . .  seeing and smelling is 
believing30 (his Italics).
This thesis accepts the view that perceptions are a form of cognition worthy of 
being called ‘knowledge’, taking the lead from Baumgarten’s description of aesthetics 
as: scientia cognitionis sensitivae31 (the science o f sensorily knowing) in which he
27 Charles Darwin (1877) The Various Contrivances by which Orchids are Fertilised by Insects (2nd edn.),
London, Murray.
28 This idea will be pursued in chapter seven, which looks at psychology and cognitive neuroscience.
29 Gregory Currie (2004a) Arts and Minds, Oxford, OUP, p. 77.
30 Searle, J.R. (1994) ‘Animal Minds’, M idwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. XIX, 1994, pp. 206-19,
reprinted in Searle, J.R. (2002) Consciousness and Language, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press (pp. 61-76) p. 68.
31 Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1750/58; 2007 edn.) Asthetik, reprinted in 2 Volumes (Vol. 1 §§1-
613) and (Vol. 2 §§1-614-904) with Translation into German, an Introduction, Notes and a 
Glossary, by Dagmar Mirbach, Hamburg, Felix Meiner Verlag; Vol. 1, §1, p. 10.
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included perception, semiotics, hermeneutics and the arts32. However, as Baumgarten 
taught, the aesthetic also includes memory and the imagination33, both of which, as we 
shall see confirmed in the next chapter, activate the same sense modules of the brain. 
Memory allows ‘re-runs’ o f  experience and perception, as part of the learning process. 
Imagination allows ‘pre-runs’, for planning new moves. Both processes play a role in 
storytelling, providing ‘imagined alternative strategies to meet difficulties34’. This is the 
basis of the present claim: that the aesthetic is best understood as synonymous with 
perception, a resource to enable animals to survive and prosper, gaining motivational 
information about the world. The aesthetic provides a mobile organism with ‘sensory 
knowledge’ about its own inner state and about its environment, including any threat to 
it, or any potential benefit. The aesthetic also provides the means to send out signals to 
other organisms in order to influence their behaviour, which I called the ‘Expressive 
Active Aesthetic’ (§5, earlier in 6.3, above). Human speech could be interpreted as an 
extreme elaboration of something commonplace in nature: the use of sound waves for 
signalling to other organisms. However, once speech had evolved, it provided the 
medium for abstract reasoning. But the human species did not thereupon abandon all 
other forms of ‘sensory representation and expression ’. The pre-linguistic channels of 
communication survived and thrived, as media to carry aesthetic expression multiplied 
with new technological innovations. A vast accumulated repertoire of aesthetic 
activities, quite apart from ‘the arts’, so thoroughly permeate our lives that we fail to see 
many of them as ‘aesthetic’: body decoration, dress, conversation, joke-telling, 
television, cuisine, disco-dancing, sport, hill-walking, going to the beach, gardening, 
interior decoration, digital photography and computer games, and so, endlessly, on. It 
would be the aim of an evolutionary account eventually to relate all these activities to 
‘the arts’ in an integrated and inclusive account of the aesthetic.
6.4 Darwin: Continuity between the Natural and the Human
32 Nicholas Davey (1989) ‘Baumgarten’s aesthetics: a post-Gadamerian reflection’ in BJA (Vol. 29)
pp. 101-115.
33 Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten Op. Cit. (1739; 1983 edn.) Section IV on the Imagination (§557-571),
Section VI on Memory (§§579-588) and Section VIII on Foresight (§§595-605).
34 Denis Dutton (2003) ‘Aesthetics and Evolutionary Psychology’ in Levinson, J. (Ed.) The Oxford
Handbook on Aesthetics, Oxford, OUP (pp. 693-705) p. 698.
35This is a phrase used by Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten Op. Cit. (1739; 1983 edn.) §533, pp. 16-17. 
My translation is given in Appendix D.
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This section will look at the kind of evidence which Darwin presented for 
continuity between the animal kingdom and human beings, not only in the evolution of 
their bodies, but also of their minds. Darwin was, of course, a paramount observer and 
experimenter. His last book was devoted to every aspect of the earthworm, including its 
perceptual psychology36. He found that, although a worm appears to be deaf and blind, 
it is very sensitive to touch and vibration:
When the pots containing two worms which had remained quite indifferent to 
the sound of a piano, were placed on this instrument, and the note C in the bass 
clef was struck, they . . .  retreated37.
Darwin observed that, ‘The whole body of a worm is sensitive to contact. A slight puff 
of air from the mouth causes an instant retreat38’. He had also observed that the worm’s 
anterior end is sensitive to light, both in intensity and duration, though he rejected the 
idea that a worm retreats from light by a ‘reflex action’, insisting that it has attention, 
‘and attention implies the presence of a mind’39:
Judging by their eagerness for certain kinds of food, they must enjoy the 
pleasure of eating . . .  Their sexual passion is strong enough to overcome for a 
time their dread of light40.
The two key concepts for Darwin are the continuity between all species and the 
very gradual nature of evolutionary change by tiny increments over vast tracts of time. 
Both of these speculations have been confirmed by studies of DNA, providing a guide 
to relatedness, and to the probable date o f the last common ancestor41. Such tiny 
changes include not only physical but also mental capacities:
We mus t . . .  admit that there is a much wider interval in mental power between 
one of the lowest fishes, as a lamphrey or lancelet, and one of the higher apes, 
than between an ape and a man; yet this interval is filled up by numberless 
gradations.42
36 The main importance o f this study was to reveal the ecological importance o f  the earthworm; Charles
Darwin (1881) The Formation o f  Vegetable M ould through the action o f  Worms with 
observations o f  their habits, London, John Murray.
37 Ibid. p. 26.
38 Ibid. p. 28.
39 Ibid. p. 24.
40 Ibid. p. 34.
41 Steve Jones (1993) The Language o f  the Genes: Biology, History and the Evolutionary Future, London,
Flamingo, pp. 127-32. He discusses degrees o f  relatedness between humans, apes and monkeys, 
based on percentages o f  shared DNA.
42 Charles Darwin, (1871; 2nd edn. 1883) The Descent o f  Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex London,
John Murray, p. 65.
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This observation occurs in The Descent o f  Man and Selection in Relation to Sex, 
which contains Darwin’s evolutionary aesthetics. Although the two sections of his book 
appear to address separate topics, they are both of great relevance to any project to 
naturalise aesthetics. First, The Descent o f  Man presents evidence for the continuity of 
humanity with the rest of nature. Then, Selection in Relation To Sex presents the 
perhaps surprising thesis that, just as the bird fancier can shape a bantam’s plumage by 
selective breeding, so the mating preferences o f females throughout much of the animal 
kingdom had been a major force in evolution, which had ‘by a long selection of the 
more attractive males, added to their beauty or other attractive qualities’43. We will 
return to sexual selection, first considering Darwin’s observations on the continuity of 
man with nature.
In addition to pointing out anatomical and embryological similarities between 
men and the higher animals44, especially the primates, Darwin writes:
All have the same senses, intuitions and sensations, similar passions, affections 
and emotions, even the more complex ones, such as jealousy, suspicion, 
emulation and gratitude, and magnanimity; they practise deceit and are 
revengeful; they are often susceptible to ridicule, and even have a sense of 
humour; they feel wonder and curiosity; they possess the same faculties of 
imitation, attention, deliberation, choice, memory, imagination, the association 
of ideas and reason, though in very different degrees45.
In addition to Darwin’s lifelong observation of animals, he added to his vast 
store of anecdotes through correspondence and reading, and many o f the claims he 
made have been substantiated in the last fifty years by animal ethologists46. Darwin is 
confident of the ability of animals to form concepts. He writes that one dog will view 
another distant dog, ‘in the abstract’ until getting close, when, ‘his whole manner 
suddenly changes, if the other dog is a friend’47. Darwin quotes a Mr. Leslie Stephens:
A dog frames a general concept o f cats or sheep and knows the corresponding 
words as well as a philosopher. And the capacity to understand is as good a
43 Ibid p. 211
44 Ibid p. 11 and 15-17.
45 Ibid. p. 79. Darwin provides a great deal o f  evidence to support these claims, and much o f  this has been
confirmed by recent experimental studies o f  sheep and cows: BBC News, report by Helen 
Briggs, ‘Amazing Powers o f  Sheep’ on Wednesday 7th November, 2001; 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1 /hi/sci/tech/1641463.stm#TOP: and Laura Spinney ‘More than Meats the 
Eye’ in The Guardian, 17th March 2005, in the ‘Life’ Section, pp. 4-6.
46 For example, Frans de Wall (2001) The Ape and the Sushi Master: cultural reflections by a
primatiologist, London, Allen Lane and Robert M. Sapolsky (2002) A Prim ate’s Memoir: love 
death and Baboons in East Africa, London, Vintage.
47 Charles Darwin, Op. Cit. (1871; 2n<redn. 1883) p. 83.
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proof o f vocal intelligence, though in an inferior degree, as the capacity to 
speak48.
Darwin compares the learning process of a young songbird to a child learning to 
speak. Young male birds have an apprenticeship; birds can leam the songs of other 
species, and have the equivalent to regional accents49. In the field of ethics, he 
anticipates the findings o f animal ethologists in several stories of altruistic animal 
behaviour50. Then Darwin comes to what is perhaps his boldest claim: that animals have 
a ‘Sense of Beauty’, though he quickly qualifies it:
This sense has been declared to be peculiar to man. I refer here only to the 
pleasure given by certain colours, forms and sounds, and which may fairly be 
called a sense of the beautiful; with cultivated man such sensations are, 
however, intimately associated with complex ideas and trains of thought51.
Darwin has no doubt that this is a simpler form of the same sense of beauty which we as 
humans experience. The above quotation continues:
When we behold a male bird elaborately displaying his graceful plumes or 
splendid colours before the female, whilst other birds, not thus decorated, make 
no such display, it is impossible to doubt that she admires the beauty o f her male 
partner. As women everywhere deck themselves with these plumes, the beauty 
of such ornaments cannot be disputed . . .  and the playing passages of bower- 
birds are tastefully ornamented with gaily-coloured objects; and this shews that 
they must receive some pleasure from the sight o f such things52.
Darwin understood a concept denied by biologists for most of the twentieth 
century53, that many puzzling and extravagant characteristics of male animals are sexual 
in origin, whether weapons to defeat rivals in combat, or decorations to charm 
females54:
When we behold two males fighting for the possession of the female, or several 
male birds displaying their gorgeous plumage, and performing strange antics 
before an assembled body o f females, we cannot doubt that, though led by
48 Ibid. p. 89, quoted from Leslie Stephen (1873) Essays on Free Thinking etc., p. 82.
49 Ibid. p. 86.
50 Ibid. p. 103. Similar acts o f altruism against the dictates o f ‘selfish gene’ expectations, are given in a)
de Waal Op. Cit. pp. 78-81 o f  Binti, the female gorilla who rescued a three-year-old boy who fell 
in the gorilla pit in Chicago in 1996, and b) in Sapolsky Op.Cit. pp. 238-9, o f  Benjamin, a 
baboon who, against nature, risks his life to defend two unrelated youngsters from a lion.
51 Charles Darwin Op. Cit. (1871; 1883 edn.) p. 92.
52 Loc. Cit.
53 The history o f  ridicule, attack and neglect which befell Darwin’s theory o f  sexual selection is
summarised by Geoffrey Miller in the second chapter o f  his (2001) The Mating Mind, Edition 
used (2001), London, Vintage, pp. 33-67.
54 Charles Darwin Op. Cit. (1871; 1883 edn.) p. 211.
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instinct, they know what they are about, and consciously exert their mental and 
bodily powers55.
With few exceptions, throughout the animal kingdom, among birds, fish, reptiles and 
insects56, there is both more variation among males and more active courtship. The 
greater variability o f males offers females more choice of mates, and the outcomes of 
female aesthetic choices gradually accumulate to produce new subspecies and species.
The sexual preferences o f females appear to be the only reasonable explanation 
for the great differences between the male and female hummingbirds, Spathura 
underwoodi (Plate 19a), or the enormous mandibles of the beetle Chiasognathus Grantii 
(See Plate 19b). Both are ‘due to the selection by the females of the more beautiful 
males57’. Of the male beetle with huge mandibles, (Plate 19b) Darwin observes that, 
though pugnacious, his mandibles have little bite . However, Darwin did not regard 
every case of colours and forms that appear as beautiful to our sensibilities to be the 
result of sexual selection59, though he believed that in ‘higher animals’ changes in 
colour occurred either for camouflage or ‘as an attraction between the sexes60’.
Darwin noticed five very similar developments in both insects and birds, which 
today could be seen as examples of ‘convergent evolution’, i.e. the development of 
similar structures or behaviour in organisms with separate ancestry61. In both birds and 
insects, the male tended: 1) to be pugnacious, 2) to have special weapons, 3) to have 
organs for ‘vocal’ or ‘instrumental’ music, 4) to be ornamented (combs, horns, wattles 
etc.) and 5) to develop bright colours62. Despite his great regard for the mental powers 
of insects63, Darwin declares that birds are, ‘the most aesthetic of all animals, excepting 
of course man, and they have nearly the same taste for the beautiful as we have’64.
55 Loc.Cit.
56 Ibid. p. 221.
57 Ibid. pp. 387-9.
58 Ibid p. 301.
59 Ibid. p. 261.
60 Ibid. p. 311.
61 Sabre-toothed tigers evolved independently in both marsupial and placental forms, in response to
similar selective pressures. They are illustrated on p. 453 o f  Mark Ridley (1993) Evolution, 
Cambridge Mass., Blackwell Science Inc.
62 Charles Darwin Op. Cit. (1871; 1883 edn.) p. 359.
63 Darwin wrote, Ibid. p. 54, that, comparing size and functionality, ‘. . .  the brain o f  an ant is one o f  the
most marvellous atoms o f  matter in the world, perhaps more so than the brain o f  a man .
64 Ibidp  359.
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Birds, Darwin says, listen to each other’s songs65; they can be trapped, lured, 
perhaps by jealousy or rivalry, to listen to a hidden bird66. Darwin also comments that 
birds and other animals also display an active aesthetic enjoyment of their activities, 
such as robins singing in the Autumn67. The viewer of wild-life documentaries will 
doubtless picture innumerable shots o f dolphins frolicking (See Plate 20).
The aim of this section was to advance the case, based on Darwin’s evidence, 
that the foundations of ‘sensory knowledge’ or, in Baumgarten’s terms, the ‘aesthetic’ 
were laid anciently and pervasively throughout the evolution of life on earth eons before 
the evolution of human beings. Aesthetic choices, perceptual choices made on the basis 
of pleasure, made by animals, have been crucial influences on the survival, behaviour, 
reproduction and evolution of both animals and plants. In particular, females’ sexual 
choices appear to have been important factors in the evolution of new varieties and 
species, and optimising the survival and vigour o f their offspring. There is an interesting 
link with the world of human art, item RPC:
RPC Consider the often underestimated Role of Patron and Critic.
In an era still under the spell o f the Romantic ‘hero-artist’ and ‘genius’, it is only 
too easy to overlook the seminal role throughout history of the patron and critic. It 
continues today in the state salaried curator and the purchasing power of the private art 
collector, famously demonstrated in recent decades in the United Kingdom by Charles 
Saatchi, who has done more than any single artist or salaried curator to shape the 
development of British art over the same period. It is important not to forget the critic,
65 Ibidp  369: ‘Mr. Weir has told me o f  the case o f  a bullfinch which had been taught to pipe a German
waltz, and who was so good a performer that he cost ten guineas; when this bird was first 
introduced into a room where other birds were kept and he began to sing, all the others, 
consisting o f about twenty linnets and canaries, ranged themselves on the nearest side o f  their 
cages, and listened with the greatest interest to the new performer.’
66 Loc. Cit.
67 Charles Darwin (1871; 1883 edn.) p 370: ‘But nothing is more common than for animals to take
pleasure in practising whatever instinct they follow at other times for real good. How often do 
we see birds which fly easily, gliding and sailing through the air obviously for pleasure? The cat 
plays with the captured mouse, the cormorant with the captured fish. The weaverbird (Ploceus), 
when confined in a cage, amuses itself by neatly weaving blades o f  grass between the wires o f  
its cage. Birds which habitually fight during the breeding-season are generally ready to fight at 
all times; and the males o f  the capercailzie sometimes hold their Balzen or leks at the usual place 
o f assemblage during the autumn. Hence it is not at all surprising that male birds should continue 
singing for their own amusement after the season for courtship is over.’
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who can also wield great power, as in the case of Clement Greenberg68. Dealers are 
also powerful figures, and this now raises another of our issues, item APC:
APC What is the reason for the nexus between Art, Power and Crime?
At this stage it seems that some explanation for this phenomenon can be found 
in the definition of the ‘expressive active aesthetic’ (§5 in the definitions listed in 
section 6.3, above). In the bid for dominance (in current jargon: ‘Wall power’) the rich 
and powerful build houses or even palaces with an emphasis on rhetoric, beauty and 
size, and acquire art for display. These issues will be discussed in the case study o f ‘The 
Nexus of Art, Power and Crime’ in the final chapter (section 8.5.2).
6.5 Sexual Selection: the Beautiful and the Good.
This section will review the fate o f Darwin’s extensively defended hunch in 
favour of a link between sexual selection and beauty. It will consider the following 
concepts: fitness, the mode of inheritance, novelty, the handicap principle and some 
forms of altruism. It is not always possible to keep all these factors separate. Their 
combined effect on animal species has been a selective pressure for ever-increasing 
perceptual acuity, which, following Baumgarten, is viewed in this thesis as ever- 
increasing sensory knowledge.
6.5.1 Fitness
The key term in sexual selection, as with natural selection, is ‘fitness’. This term 
denotes the reproductive potential afforded by the characteristics of an organism, 
according to its environment69. It appears that perceptual systems evolved not only for 
finding food and escaping predators, but also for identifying suitable mates, i.e. those 
displaying the greatest ‘fitness’. Thus recent evolutionary theory has linked the 
beautiful with the good in a way that echoes the shared meaning of the ancient Greek 
word, kalos, which could mean both ‘beautiful’ and ‘good’. The acceptance of beauty as 
part of the evolutionary story is, however, a recent development in science, although 
Darwin had proposed it a century earlier.
68 Clement Greenberg (1909-1994), critic and influential advocate o f  Modernism. A website that includes
several o f  his key writings is http://www.sharecom.ca/greenberg/, and a biographical sketch by
Terry Fenton is at http://www.sharecom.ca/greenberg/thecritic.html.
69 Daniel C. Dennett Op. Cit. (1995) p. 343.
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Although Darwin was convinced that sexual selection was a driving force in 
evolution, he could not explain how heredity worked, nor why females seemed 
predictably to choose either the most beautiful or the most heavily armed males. The 
existence of handicapping sexual ornaments, like the peacock’s tail, and the altruism of
70the ant both appeared to challenge the theory of evolution by natural selection. There 
is now a vast literature on both subjects, which has been surveyed by Helena Cronin in 
The Ant and the Peacock71 and summarised again by Geoffrey Miller in The Mating
72Mind . Cronin recounts how Darwin’s theory o f sexual selection was rejected by his 
fellow-discoverer of natural selection, Alfred Russell Wallace, who wished to keep such 
apparent anomalies as the peacock’s tail within the compass of natural selection, on the 
basis that the females were making choices o f ‘good sense’ (e.g. vigour) rather than 
choices o f ‘good taste’ (i.e. beauty)73.
It took nearly 50 years from the first publication of The Descent o f  Man, and 
Selection in Relation to Sex before female choice for beauty was successfully explained 
as an evolutionary adaptation, and another 50 years before a real change in biological 
thinking began to bring about an acceptance of Darwin’s theory of sexual selection, and 
its integration within the broader workings o f natural selection. Cronin tells us that in 
1915 R.A. Fisher made the break-through that explained why the peahen chose the 
beautiful male with his long but impractical tail, rather than the less attractive male with 
the sensible short tail. This is where the inheritance process is important. As the females 
of the next generation were inheriting genes which gave them a preference for long, 
beautiful tails, the peahen herself would gain fewer grandsons if she produced short­
tailed rather than long-tailed sons74. It was the combination of the female’s genes giving 
a preference for the ornamental tail, together with the male’s genes for producing such a 
tail that to led to a ‘run-away’ effect o f rapid evolutionary change, producing such an 
extreme feature. Cronin confirms that the consensus now approves of Darwin’s intuition 
that the female peacock is choosing the most beautiful male, and that female choice for
70 Not that the altruism o f  the ant is related to sexual selection; it relates to kinship altruism.
71 Helena Cronin (1991) The Ant and the Peacock , Cambridge, CUP.
72 Geoffrey Miller Op. Cit. (2000;2001).
73 Helena Cronin Op. Cit. (1991). Wallace also wished to reserve altruism and an aesthetic sense as part
o f the ‘spiritual’ side o f  human beings.
14 Ibid pp. 201-3. Ramachandran and Hirstein, in their (1999) “The Science o f  Art: a neurological theory 
o f  aesthetic experience, ” Journal o f  Consciousness Studies, (Vol. 6; June/July) pp. 17-21 
describe the ‘peak-shift’ principle that offers an alternative explanation that would not require 
specific genetic encoding o f  the preference, which Ingold would consider unlikely. (See section 
6 .6).
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beauty is at work in sexual selection75. Symmetry has been shown to be important in 
mate selection, where it seems to betoken good genes, including resistance to 
parasites76. Thornhill quotes several studies, including his own, which show female 
preferences for symmetry in their mates among scorpion flies, bam swallows, rock 
lizards and humans77. There are several factors which the male thus places on display 
which cannot be perceived directly, but which have to be culled by the female in an act 
o f ‘radical interpretation78’: good genes, good energy levels, resourceful food-finding, 
robust self-defence from rivals, good general health and freedom from parasites. 
Without powers of analysis, the female makes a choice based on a global aesthetic 
judgment of beauty, based on an impression o f healthy size, vigour, good symmetry, 
glossy, well-groomed appearance, inventive singing and so forth, according to the 
species.
6.5.2 The Handicap Principle and Novelty
Symmetry and the other characteristics of beauty are expensive to maintain, and 
therein lies their value as good indicators o f fitness, and the stakes are raised further by 
adding the handicap principle and an apparently universal bias in favour o f novelty79. 
The peacock’s tail is not only beautiful, it is a dead weight which impedes escape from
OA
predators . The owner must be doubly fit, to be able to survive and compete for mates. 
The value of a fitness indicator seems to grow in direct proportion to its wasteful 
extravagance. The same holds for courtship gifts81. To understand these processes, 
theorists in evolutionary biology took a cue from the sociologist Thomstein Veblen’s 
pioneering study of conspicuous consumption82. Fitness, in terms of power and wealth, 
is displayed in idle servants standing in attendance, palaces, banquets, artworks and 
hunting expeditions. The brute fact is that there is competition for mates, with winners
75 Helena Cronin, Op. Cit. (1991) pp. 248-9.
76 Loc. Cit.
77 Randy Thornhill (2003) ‘Darwinian Aesthetics Informs Traditional Aesthetics’, in E. Voland, and K.
Grammer (Eds.) (2003) Evolutionary Aesthetics, Berlin, Springer, pp. 9-35, p. 18.
78 This is a term associated with Quine concerning the problem o f  how meaning can be construed. Quine
uses the example o f  a tribe which uses the word ‘gavagai’, which could mean many things 
including ‘rabbit’, ‘rabbiteth’ and ‘undetached rabbit part’ etc. W.V. Quine (1969) ‘Speaking o f  
Objects’ and ‘Ontological Relativity’ in O ntological Relativity & other essays, New York, 
Columbia University Press, pp. 1-25 and pp. 26-68.
79 Geoffrey Miller Op. Cit. (2000; 2001 edn.) pp. 411-416.
80Ibid. pp. 149-5land 327-30.
81 Ibid. pp. 123-4.
82 Thomstein Veblen, (1899; 1925 edn.) The Theory o f  the Leisure Class, London, George Allen and
Unwin Ltd, especially ch. 3 on ‘Conspicuous Leisure’, pp. 35-67.
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and losers, and courtship continues lifelong, albeit at a less hectic pace, in order to 
retain the pair-bond. It is here, in response to psychological preferences, that Miller sees 
the evolution of art in the human species:
novelty vs. boredom
grace vs. clumsiness
knowledge vs. ignorance
logic vs. inconsistency
kindness vs. meanness
Some of these psychological preferences have been found in the animal kingdom, as in 
Nancy Burley’s experiment with zebra finches. The females preferred to mate with 
males with white plumes glued to their heads, a feature hitherto unknown in that 
species84. This provides evidence of the power of neo-philia in mate attraction85. This 
leads to the evidence Miller presents that art among humans is an evolutionary 
adaptation, in that it is:
1 ubiquitous
2 pleasurable
3 costly (in effort)86
0 7
He points out that art is fun and easy to learn ; humans are good at producing it and 
judging it, and different styles and traditions have developed, like languages88. He 
distinguishes a ‘top-down’ or a ‘bottom-up’ view o f the evolution of art; ‘top-down’ 
referring to an approach starting with museum art, or his preferred approach, ‘bottom-
O Q
up’, starting with the visual decoration that surrounds us in our everyday lives . He 
then takes the bowerbirds (Plate 14 and Appendix C) as ‘an example of sexual selection 
for art in another species90’. Miller says the bowers built by the 18 species of 
bowerbirds are obvious examples o f female sexual selection, where small initial 
differences among rather crow-like birds have been subject to runaway selection,
83 Geoffrey Miller, Op. Cit. (2000; 2001 edn.) p. 138.
84 Ibid p. 145.
85 Ibid. pp. 411-16.
86 Ibid. p. 259; referring to higher artistic achievements.
87 This seems to contradict point 3, above; he is perhaps referring to young children’s quick understanding
o f music, dance, drawing, make-believe and creative verbal play.
88 Loc. Cit.
89 Geoffrey Miller Op. Cit. (2000; 2001 edn.) p. 266. In this respect his approach is similar to that o f  Ellen
Dissanayake Op. Cit. (1988), though she emphasises the benefits to the group rather than to the 
individual.
90 Ibid. p. 267.
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producing a characteristic sexual dimorphism91. Miller, unlike Dissanayake, accepts that 
the courtship behaviour o f bowerbirds is art, for several reasons. Bowerbirds are the 
‘only other animals [apart ffom humans] that spend significant time and energy 
constructing purely aesthetic displays beyond their own bodies . . . ,92 One could add 
that constructing, maintaining and then defending the bower from being vandalised by 
rivals is a demonstration of fitness in keeping with the handicap principle. It is also a 
demonstration o f ‘good taste’ in the choice and arrangement of the treasures displayed. 
In the final chapter, there will be further discussion of the question of whether the 
bowerbird’s courtship display is indeed art. Next, however, another link between the 
‘beautiful’ and the ‘good’ must be considered more closely: altruism, because of the 
selective pressure that it exerts for the fine calibration of perceptual sensitivity.
6.5.3 Altruism and the Aesthetic
The two usual explanations for altruism in nature are kinship and reciprocation. 
Some adults do not breed, but assist in the rearing of their kin, thereby ensuring the
Q ' X  • • •survival of shared genes . Also, observations of altruism among animals, which are not 
kin relations, indicate that the basis o f their co-operation is reciprocation. Such animals 
include vampire bats, baboons, vervet monkeys, mongooses and sticklebacks94. 
However, there is also evidence o f altruism functioning as a fitness indicator, according 
to the handicap principle. As Miller puts it, the most ‘romantic’ engagement ring is 
bought at full price in Tiffany’s, not in a bargain basement95. The most extravagant 
altruism in the natural world discovered so far is that of the Arabian babbler, a songbird 
which is found in Israel, and has been studied by Amotz and Avishag Zahavi96. The 
birds, which weigh only three ounces, compete for the high-status, but risky, role of 
sentinel duty, which involves giving alarm calls and mobbing any intruder. They share 
food, and feed the offspring of others:
91 Only male bowerbirds build and display in bowers; the females build little cup-shaped nests and raise
the young without any male assistance; see A. J. Marshall (1954) Bower-birds: their displays 
and breeding cycles, Oxford, Clarendon Press. The species vary widely in the degree o f  
dimorphism in their plumage.
92 Geoffrey Miller Op. Cit. (2000; 2001 edn.) p. 267.
93 Helena Cronin Op. Cit. (1991) p. 255.
94 Ibid. p. 259.
95 Geoffrey Miller Op. Cit. (2000; 2001 edn.) pp. 329-30.
96 Ibid. pp. 313-4.
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Only the birds in the best condition with the highest fitness can afford to act 
altruistically. Individuals seeking a mate can find good genes by finding a good 
altruist97.
All these activities require acute powers of perception and visual recall to 
recognise individuals, to keep track o f benefactors and debtors. Dennett points out that 
when animals began to co-operate, it became necessary for them to punish cheats and 
ffee-loaders, if co-operators were not to be exploited and ultimately overwhelmed by 
‘defectors’. ‘Push-overs’ who were soft with cheats also needed to be punished. Dennett 
reports on theories and research that identify this need to regulate co-operation as the 
source for the evolution of the emotions, by which the genuineness of a co-operator, or 
the fake emotion of the cheat, will be transparent to all98. Thus the identification of 
cheats becomes yet another selective pressure for developing ever finer sensory, 
aesthetic, discrimination: to see the blush, the nervous body language, the ring of 
sincerity in the voice, a sensitivity which can feed into the making and evaluation of art. 
The ‘honest signals’ o f costly fitness indicators, such as symmetry, do much to
Q Q
explain the link between high cost and beauty . However, the prestige is not confined 
to the creator of an artwork, who has often been forgotten, but extends to the 
commissioner or owner, whether that is an individual, a group, a city or a state.
Eckart Voland points out the high costs o f scarification and genital mutilation 
undergone by the young to acquire adult status and marriage rights through the initiation 
rites of some tribal societies. The suffering involves doubly costly signalling: a) making 
a lifelong commitment to the tribal group, and b) providing fitness evidence in the form 
of good immunological resistance to injury and probable infection100. The revival of 
quasi-ceremonial self-mutilation and suffering by performance artists such as Hermann 
Nitch101 echoes those initiation rites, this time signalling a costly ‘romantic’ 
commitment to art. Dennett identifies a similar high cost, high value signalling at work 
in ‘high tension’ religious cults and sects102, perhaps providing a useful model for
97 Ibid. p. 314.
98 Daniel C. Dennett Op. Cit. (2003) pp. 193-205.
99 Eckart Voland (2003) ‘Aesthetic Preferences in the world o f  Artifacts -  Adaptations for the Evaluation
o f ‘Honest Signals’?’ pp. 239-60, in E. Voland, and K. Grammer (Eds.) Op. Cit..
100 Ibid. p. 249.
101 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hermann_Nitsch.
102 Daniel C. Dennett (2006) Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon, London, Allen
Lane, pp. 193-5.
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understanding the inner workings o f pioneering art movements, and their push to artistic 
‘extremism’, often renouncing their expensively acquired, academic, artistic skills103.
Voland, however, overstates his case when he collapses beauty without 
remainder on to costliness. Certainly, there is abundant evidence that cash value is a 
factor in the market, which influences the thinking of many connoisseurs and collectors, 
in ways manifested in the existence o f huge price differentials which could not be 
justified on grounds of discernible differences alone, for example between diamonds 
and glass ‘costume’ jewellery, original oil paintings and exact copies, signed and 
unsigned (though otherwise authentic) Picasso prints, and so forth. The counter­
examples to these might be cases where the highest auction prices are paid for major 
masterpieces rather than minor works, where it is aesthetic quality that makes the 
difference104.
6.6 Criticisms of Neo-Darwinism. Neuroscience and the Nature/Nurture Divide
This section will examine some criticisms of current orthodoxies in the ‘New 
Synthesis’ of Neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory, coupled with cognitive neuroscience, 
and what might be called the standard biological approach to the ‘nature/nurture’ divide. 
I have encountered this critique in the writings and editorial activities of Tim Ingold105.
Ingold is a cultural anthropologist who makes two criticisms relevant here from 
the perspective of Ecological Psychology106 and ‘Developmental Systems Theory
103 Picasso and Willem de Kooning come to mind.
104 There must be a little room for doubt, however, as the term ‘major masterpiece’ is likely to imply
‘bigger’, and therefore more time and effort by the artist, a bigger initial purchase price, a more 
prestigious first owner, and so forth.
1051 should like to express my appreciation to Tim Ingold for his most helpful email correspondence
following his paper delivered to the Cardiff conference o f  11 September 2007. This led me to: 
Tim Ingold (1988; 1994a Edn.) ‘Introduction’ to T. Ingold (Ed.) What is an Animal? London, 
Routledge, pp. 1-16; Tim Ingold (1988; 1994b Edn.) ‘The animal in the study o f  humanity’ in 
Ibid. pp. 84-99; Tim Ingold (Unpublished, 1999, by personal contact) ‘Three in One: on 
dissolving the distinctions between body, mind and culture’; Tim Ingold (2000) The Perception 
o f  the Environment: Essays on livelihood, dwelling and skill, London, Routledge; Tim Ingold 
(2008) ‘When biology goes underground: genes and the spectre o f  race’ in Genomics, Society 
and Policy, (Vol. 4, no. 1) pp. 23-37; Stephen R. L. Clark (1988; 1994 Edn.) ‘Is humanity a 
natural kind?’ in T. Ingold (Ed.) Op. Cit. (1988; 1994 Edn.) pp. 17-34; Edward S. Reed (1988; 
1994 Edn.) ‘The affordances o f  the animate environment: social science from the ecological 
point o f  view’ in T. Ingold (Ed.) Op. Cit. (1988; 1994 Edn.) pp. 110-126.
106 He makes frequent reference to J.J. Gibson (1979) The Ecologocal Approach to Visual Perception , 
Boston, Houghton Mifflin. I have not listed this in my bibliography, as I have not consulted it, 
yet.
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107 ,  , j  •(DST) The first criticism is o f the Neo-Darwinian account of evolution, based on 
context-independent genetics leading to a ‘hard-wired’ model of cognitive 
neuroscience, extended into culture by Richard Dawkins’ supposed science of 
‘memetics’. Together, according to Ingold, these explanations fail to give an adequate 
account of the development (ontogenesis) of individual organisms, causing an 
exaggerated split between ‘nature’ and ‘nurture’. The second criticism concerns the still 
persistent scientific view of animals as Cartesian automata, leading culture to be treated 
as if it were unique to humans. We begin with the nature/nurture controversy.
6.6.1 Walking/Cycling; Talking/Writing
The two pairs of activities in the title of this section could be thought to mark a 
boundary between evolution (walking and talking) and history (cycling and writing), or 
the boundary could be said to divide the ‘genetically determined’ from the ‘culturally
1 Oftacquired’, or even to separate ‘nature’ from ‘culture’ . However, Ingold points out that 
no human infant is bom walking or talking, any more than cycling or writing. He 
questions the existence of a ‘Language Acquisition Device’ (Chomsky’s LAD), asking 
if there is also a ‘Walking Acquisition Device’, or a ‘Cycling Acquisition Device’. All 
are behaviours learned quite slowly under the careful tutelage of supportive and 
competent members of the community. Although certain genetic endowments clearly 
make the learning of these skills possible, or easier (e.g. primate foot modification for 
human walking), the learning process is effected only by the kind of practical activity 
and engagement that enables bones to grow and synapses to form in active bodies and to 
be re-configured by changing use. In other words, all these skills are greatly under­
determined by the surprisingly low figure of 20,000 human genes discovered by the 
much vaunted ‘human genome project’109. Instead of being ‘written in our genes’, these 
skills are literally ‘incorporated’ into our flesh and bone, by the learning and the doing 
o f them, as our individual anatomies are modified by the skills we learn, rather than 
solely genetically predetermined. In this sense o f ‘incorporation’, the skills usually
107 Again, he frequently references S. Oyama (1985) The Ontogeny o f  Information: Developmental
Systems and their Evolution, Cambridge, CUP; again not in my bibliography, because not yet 
consulted.
108 Tim Ingold uses both these examples in Op. Cit. (1999) and in ‘People Like Us: the concept o f  the
anatomically modem human’ in Op. Cit. (2000), (pp. 373-91) pp. 374-9.
109 Ingold pours scorn on the outcome o f  this ‘billion dollar’ project, which laboured only to yield mouse
o f an insight that ‘the environment plays a decisive role in shaping human nature’ Op. Cit. 
(2008) p. 34.
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attributed to ‘culture’ are fully ‘biological’110, despite their absence from our DNA. The 
same pattern applies to many animal behaviours.
Ingold says that ‘Developmental Systems Theory’ (DST) offers an alternative 
perspective that allows for the importance o f ontogenesis, or how the individual 
organism develops, within a support system. A baby’s genes do not come naked into the 
world, but in a nucleus, in a fertilised egg, in a womb, in a woman, in a family, in a 
society. According to Ingold, cognitive science tends to follow genetics, in erring 
towards ‘context-independence’ in building the architecture of the human mind, 
attributed vaguely to ‘genetics and natural selection’111, while other theorists have tried 
to reduce culture to rules or units which can be ‘transmitted’ by a mental equivalent to 
genes, dubbed by Richard Dawkins, as ‘memes’112.
The present thesis can take comfort that the example given in chapter two 
(sections 2.4.2- 2.4.3) of learning to draw is congruent with Ingold’s alternative model 
of apprenticeship learning, in a context, under the guidance of a more skilled member of 
the community, resulting in heightened perceptual and craft skills, incorporated into the 
student’s anatomy, even if  only at the microscopic scale of new dendritic growth and 
strengthened synapses. Ingold quotes Kandel and Hawkins, who wrote in Scientific 
American in 1992, that ‘our brains are constantly changing anatomically’ even as we 
learn"3.
The existence o f ‘one design space’ inhabited by all organisms, presented by 
Dennett (section 6.3.1), would also fit with Ingold’s developmental account of 
evolution, with the plasticity and creativity o f individual organisms finding new ‘tricks’, 
leading eventually to ‘cranes’ which can hoist into position new behaviours, perhaps 
even new bodily structures where mutations support the new developments. This is how 
we can view the evolution of our own species. This contrasts with the ‘standard model’, 
which treats organisms as the ‘site’ o f their evolution, rather than as the ‘agents’ o f it114. 
In asking whether ‘Humanity’ is a ‘natural kind’, Stephen R. L. Clark suggests:
. . .  [as] we are individual organisms having unpredictable similarities with or
differences from other creatures . . . we cannot take it for granted that all
1.0 Tim Ingold Op. CH. (2000) p. 390.
1.1 Tim Ingold Op. Cit. (1999) pp. 3-5. Apart from the quotation, my wording here is a close summary o f
Ingold’s own words.
112 Richard Dawkins (1976) The Selfish Gene, Oxford, OUP; Ingold questions the originality o f  the
‘meme’ idea, in footnote 19, o f  Op. Cit. (2008).
113 Tim Ingold Op. Cit. (2000) p. 376, ref. p. 444. to Kandel, E. R. and R. D. Hawkins (1992) ‘The
biological basis o f  learning and individuality’ in Scientific American, 267, pp. 53-60. 
m  Ibid. p. 384.
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toolmakers or all artists will also have other familiar ‘human’ or ‘personal’ 
characteristics. .  .115.
This argument can be used to support the case for the bowerbird as an artist116. As
Ingold says, if we define ‘human’ as ‘language user’, how would we classify
chimpanzees or whales if in future they developed ‘symbolic and linguistic
competences’? The converse is also true, as Clark quotes K. Thomas; are humans
lacking in ‘symbolic and linguistic competences’ sub-human or semi-animal117?
These considerations lead Clark to suggest that ‘humankind’ should be defined
according to a breeding population, rather than by the possession of a common 
118nature . This also forces us to question the status we accord to animals, and their 
ontology as either Cartesian automata or as ‘persons’ with intentionality and agency.
6.6.2 Animacy and Agency
Tim Ingold has studied, as an anthropologist, the relationships between tribal 
peoples and animals, and he deplores the Western tradition’s attitude to animals:
Every attribute that is claimed we uniquely have, the animal is consequently 
supposed to lack; thus, the generic concept o f ‘animal’ is negatively constituted 
by the sum of those deficiencies119.
In his preface to the paperback edition o f What is an Animal? Ingold says:
Every living being . . .  arises as an undivided centre of awareness and agency . . .  
Animals are not just like persons, they are persons. As organism-persons and 
fellow participants in the life-process, human beings and non-human animals are 
ontologically equivalent. It follows that it is no more anthropomorphic to liken 
the animal to the human than it is zoomorphic to liken the human to the 
animal.120.
Edward S. Reed’s essay in What is an Animal? asserts the ‘ecological reality of 
the animate’121, drawing two distinctions between a) the animate vs the inanimate and 
b) the social vs the non-social. According to Reed, these are real distinctions in the
115 Stephen R. L. Clark (1988; 1994 Edn.) ‘Is humanity an natural kind?’ in T. Ingold (Ed.) What is an
Animal?) London, Routledge (pp. 17-34.) p. 17.
116 An answer to question BB: Is the bowerbird’s bower art?
117 K. Thomas (1983) Man and the Natural World, London, Allen Lane, p. 41, quoted by Stephen R. L.
Clark Op. Cit. (1988; 1994 Edn.) p. 26 (As this quote is taken from a secondary sources, Thomas
does not appear in my bibliography).
118 Stephen R. L. Clark Op. Cit. (1988; 1994 Edn.) p. 25.
1,9 Tim Ingold Op. Cit. (1988; 1994a) p. 3.
120 Tim Ingold Ibid. p. xxiv.
121 Edward S. Reed Op. Cit. (1988; 1993 Edn.) pp. 110-12.
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environment affecting all animals, i.e. the difference between a bare rock, and a rock
with a panther sitting on it. This is a real distinction, not merely a human ‘cultural’
• • * 1 2 2  *distinction . Adopting the perspective o f J. J. Gibson’s ‘Ecological Psychology’, Reed 
summarises the ‘meaningful environment’, which makes up ‘the habitation of animate 
creatures’. The principal distinction between the animate and the inanimate is the power 
of the animate to ‘move spontaneously’, with non-repetitive movements that are seen to 
be both their own causes and effects, and to which we and other animals react123. Both 
we and they are very sensitive to the perception of this goal-directed activity, with 
breaks in mechanical rhythm, yielding a perception of ‘animacy’, related to the 
perception of causality124. The animate world, therefore, is as ‘real’ as the physical 
world; neither the physical nor the animate world is ‘socially’ constructed, but both are 
based on a shared environment, containing ‘friend and foe, predator and prey, mate and 
child125’:
In other words, subjects are not private, but public and shared -  even in the kind 
of wordless sociality that is found in birds and mammals, and certainly in human 
social relationships 26.
Even perception is public; we see the same things, follow gazes, listen to warning calls, 
interpret movements. To be socialised, according to Reed, is to be aware of what I can 
afford to you, and what the environment can afford to both of us. This is common, Reed 
says, to mammals, birds and humans, thereby challenging:
. . .  the time-worn concepts of modem social science, concepts that divide 
subject from object, observer from the environment, individual from group, and
] 2 7nature from culture 
Earlier in this chapter, we saw, in the selections made by females, that:
. . .  organisms figure not as the passive products of a mechanism -  variation
under natural selection -  that stands outside of time and change, but as active
•  128and creative agents, producers as well as products of their own evolution .
112 Ibid. pp. 112-3.
123 Ibid. pp. 114-5. Reed refers to Michotte, who had researched the visual perception o f  causality, termed 
‘self-amplified movement’. Reed writes: ‘Because other animals are aware o f  their surroundings 
(including us) and because they act on those surroundings (including us), we perceive them and 
act with regard to them in ways very different from our perceptions o f  and actions towards 
inanimate objects’ (p. 116).
m  Ibid  pp. 117-8.
125 Ibid. p. 119.
126 Loc. Cit.
127 Edward S. Reed Op. Cit. (1988; 1993 Edn.) p. 122.
128 This is a summary by Tim Ingold in Op. Cit (2000) pp. 384-5, from M-W Ho (1991) ‘The role o f
action in evolution: evolution by process and the ecological approach to perception’ Cultural
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The perception o f agency, therefore, is more primitive than the ‘abstract’ 
analysis o f cause and effect. It is part o f the pre-linguistic perception of animacy. A 
scent-mark is understood to represent another animal, and as an act indicating its 
territory; footprints and broken twigs betray the presence, the agency, of a passing 
animal. I would argue that such perceptions o f indirect agency, requiring interpretation, 
approximate to the ontology o f artworks, within the single design space occupied by 
human beings and other animals.
6.7 Summary and Conclusion
The most important message o f evolutionary theory in answering our Research 
Question 1 (‘What is the Aesthetic?’) is an explanation o f how perception developed in 
Darwinian steps, eventually forming human perceptual ability and aesthetic experience 
through a Baldwin effect: a ‘crane’, and not a ‘sky-hook’ (See Fig. 7, section 6.3.1, 
above). The implication of gradual change is that human perception, which is 
understood in Baumgarten’s sense o f the aesthetic, is not unique to the human world, 
but is continuous with similar developments in other species, which have been subjected 
to similar selective pressures. By tiny increments, these animals became increasingly 
finely tuned to detecting subtle changes in their surroundings, but also to subtle 
differences between conspecifics, scrutinised for mate selection and for reading their 
behaviours, emotions and motivations, in sum for their ‘moral’ qualities as ‘good’ or 
‘bad’ members o f the group.
The competitive character o f human artistic activity reflects the intense 
competition for breeding opportunities in nature, although the process is much more 
complex in human society. Breeding opportunities are linked to status in many species, 
and the display o f skill, including both artistic skill and connoisseurship, is one route to 
high status. The patron who commissions or purchases art, can also acquire high status, 
through the display o f wealth and good taste. The handicap principle and the selective 
pressure for novelty confer greater prestige for works at the extremes of size, rare 
materials, skill, recondite knowledge, rarity and originality, helping to explain a) the
D ynam ics, (Vol. 4, no. 3, pp; 336-54) p. 338. As this is taken from a secondary source, the 
original is not in my bibliography.
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links between art, money power and crime (APC129), and b) the importance of patronage 
and criticism, powers which shaped the history of art in a way comparable to the way 
the aesthetic choices of the females o f many species shaped the course of evolution 
(RPC130). As Baumgarten pointed out, it is difficult to draw a line between ordinary 
rhetoric and poetry, and the same problem affects the ‘active aesthetic expression’ of 
non-human species. This thesis argues that there is no difference in principle between 
non-human ‘active aesthetic expression’ and human art, resulting in position UA: Ur- 
Art is ‘art’ from the beginning (i.e. it is NOT ‘non-art’).
Both the rewards o f pleasure and the punishment of pain or boredom direct 
animals in directions optimal for their survival and reproduction. The perception of 
beauty or ugliness (which Hume refers to as 'deformity') is closely tied into the same 
reward system. In the animal aesthetics o f sexual selection, beauty seems to originate in 
a 'global' response to several factors that lie below the threshold of analytical 
comprehension: vigour, symmetry, ‘good genes’, good health, resistance to parasites, 
and the condition and size of sexual ornaments and altruism. At an instinctual level, 
these factors still affect human sexual attraction, even if some are not decisive in the 
choice of a long-term mate. However, this is still an incomplete account of the aesthetic 
in general, and of beauty in particular, topics to be further pursued in the context of 
cognitive neuroscience, in chapter seven.
Dennis Dutton points out that, in the middle of the Twentieth Century, aesthetics 
was dominated by 'the blank slate', a general-learning model of psychology, which 
played down human nature in favour o f a historically and culturally determined account 
of artistic value131. Such was the context o f Dickie's attack on the aesthetic in 1964 
(chapter two, above). This survey o f evolutionary theory has argued that the balance of 
evidence now points towards a universal, biological, sensus communis, which, it will be 
argued, can also adequately accommodate, in the human domain, the social and 
historical perspectives favoured by mid-century ‘institutional’ and ‘historical’ 
philosophies of art
Chapter Seven will address the philosophical reservations expressed about the 
contribution of cognitive neuroscience to aesthetics. In his recent survey of the field, 
Gregory Currie is rather dismissive, saying the findings ‘do little to illuminate our
129 APC What is the reason for the nexus between Art, Power and Crime?
i3° p p £  Consider the often underestimated Role o f  Patron and Critic.
131 Denis Dutton Op. Cit. (2003) pp. 694-5.
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aesthetic judgments about particular works, traditions, styles or genres132’. The concerns 
of Jennifer McMahon about the failure to distinguish the ‘beautiful’ from the 
‘agreeable’133, will be examined, together with the concerns of William P. Seeley134, in 
an attempt to harness the value o f those perspectives to an understanding of art and the 
aesthetic.
132 Gregory Currie (2003) ‘Aesthetics and Cognitive Science’, in Levinson, J. (Ed.) The Oxford
Handbook on Aesthetics, Oxford, OUP, pp. 706-721, p. 708.
133 Jennifer Ann McMahon (2000) ‘Perceptual Principles as the Basis for Genuine Judgments o f  Beauty’
Journal o f  Consciousness Studies (Vol. 7, no. 8-9) pp. 29-35, and (2001) “Beauty” in, B. Gaut 
and D. Lopez, Mcl. L. (Eds.) (2001) The Routledge Companion toAesthtics, London, Routledge, 
pp. 227-38.
134 William P. Seeley (2006) ‘Naturalising aesthetics: art and the cognitive neuroscience o f  vision’
Journal o f  Visual Art Practice  (Vol. 5, no. 3) pp. 195-213, and (2007) ‘Can Neuroaesthetics 
Earn Its Keep?’ (Conference Paper; with permission).
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Chapter Seven: Cognitive Neuroscience and the Aesthetic
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ABSTRACT
This chapter reviews the criticism, concerns and hopes of some philosophers 
about the contributions o f evolutionary psychology and cognitive neuroscience 
to aesthetics. Although few instances o f insightful criticism of particular works 
have resulted until now, these have begun to be written, and their relative 
scarcity is compensated for by the other insights into the aesthetic that these 
disciplines have contributed. These include insights into the origins, realism and 
character of the aesthetic attitude, the experience o f beauty in sensory processing 
combined with cognitive feedback, and some idea of the evolution of aesthetic 
practices in diverse activities, including courtship and procreation, food 
gathering and mutual grooming.
7.1 Introduction.
This is the second of two chapters to bring empirical evidence to bear upon the 
project’s two research questions, which ask 1) ‘What is the aesthetic?’ and 2) ‘What is 
the relationship of the aesthetic to art?’
Having tested many sceptical viewpoints against the eighteenth century 
aesthetics of Baumgarten and Kant, the findings of biological science are now being 
consulted to try to learn more about what the aesthetic itself is, to assist our 
understanding of how the aesthetic works its magic for us in the world o f the arts. 
Chapter six examined evolutionary science, which confirmed Baumgarten’s close 
association of the aesthetic with perceptual knowledge and the emotions. That chapter 
also examined some of the selective pressures that fostered the evolution of perceptual 
knowledge linked to the emotions.
Now the present chapter will look at neuro-scientiflc attempts to explain aspects 
of how the aesthetic is realised in the brain. This approach follows Baumgarten in 
treating the aesthetic as more or less synonymous with his expanded concept of 
perception, which he treated as equivalent to the aesthetic broadly conceived, 
combining sensory stimulation, cognition, the emotions, imagination and memory. This 
chapter necessarily impinges on several hotly contested areas of the philosophy of mind, 
and to try to argue fully for the position adopted in this thesis against competing 
positions would change the subject o f this thesis. Having given some thought to the 
subject, but without the space to argue for this position against its many rivals, I adopt
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the realist, biological, position o f  John R. Searle, that consciousness is something the 
brain does, as the stomach does digestion1.1 hold therefore that empirical research 
concerning the physical processes, even if  below the threshold of consciousness, 
whether in digestion or aesthetic awareness, have a place in our search for 
understanding.
This chapter considers the following criticisms, worries and ideas about the 
value of cognitive neuroscience to aesthetics. The four statements have been abstracted 
from the work of philosophers Gregory Currie2, Jennifer Anne McMahon3 and William 
P. Seeley4. The concerns expressed will be cross-checked against complementary 
arguments presented by Currie, McMahon and Seeley, and also cross-checked against 
the positions adopted by art historian and cultural theorist Ernst Gombrich5, the two 
neuroscientists Semir Zeki6 and Vilayanur S. Ramachandran7 and the psychologist 
Robert L. Solso8. The following are the ‘Cognitive Neuro-Science’ issues in the order 
they will be examined in the rest o f this chapter:
CNS1 The findings o f cognitive neuroscience tend to be banal or operative at 
the subpersonal level, hence failing to illuminate aesthetic judgments.
CNS2 Perception does not involve hypothesis-testing as this would be too slow 
to work
1 John R. Searle (1997; 1998 Edn.) The M ystery o f  Consciousness, London, Granta, p. 6.
2 Gregory Currie (2003) “Aesthetics and Cognitive Science”, in Levinson, J. (Ed.) The Oxford Handbook
on Aesthetics, Oxford, OUP, pp. 706-721.p. 708; (2004a) Arts and Minds, Oxford, OUP.
3 Jennifer Ann McMahon (2000) ‘Perceptual Principles as the Basis for Genuine Judgments o f  Beauty’
Journal o f  Consciousness Studies (Vol. 7, no. 8-9) pp. 29-35, and (2001) “Beauty” in, B. Gaut 
and D. Lopez, Mcl. L. (Eds.) (2001) The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics, London, 
Routledge, pp. 227-38.
4 William P. Seeley (2006) “Naturalising aesthetics: art and the cognitive neuroscience o f  vision” Journal
o f  Visual Art Practice (Vol. 5, no. 3) pp. 195-213; William P. Seeley (2007) “Can 
Neuroaesthetics Earn Its Keep?” (Conference Paper; with permission).
5 Ernst Gombrich (1979) The Sense o f  Order: A Study in the psychology o f  decorative art (consulted: 2nd
edition, 1984) London, Phaidon.
6 Semir Zeki (1999a) Inner Vision: an exploration o f  Art and the Brain, Oxford, OUP. p. 84; Semir Zeki
(1999b) ‘Art and the Brain’ Journal o f  Consciousness Studies (Vol. 7, nos. 8-9) pp. 76- 96; 
Vilayanur S. Ramachandran. and W illiam Hirstein (1999) “The Science o f Art: a neurological theory o f  
aesthetic experience, ” Journal o f  Consciousness Studies, (Vol. 6; June/July) pp. 15-51; 
Vilayanur S. Ramachandran (2000) “Response to Gombrich” in Journal o f  Consciousness 
Studies, (Vol. 7, August/September, pp. 17-20;Vilayanur S. Ramachandran (2001) ‘Sharpening 
up “The Science o f  Art”: an interview with Anthony Freeman’ Journal o f  Consciousness 
Studies, (Vol. 8; n o .l) pp. 9-29; Vilayanur S. Ramachandran (2003) ‘The Emerging Mind’, a 
series o f five Reith Lectures for the BBC (Broadcast weekly from 2nd April to 7 May). Still 
available on line as sound recordings: http://www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/reith2003/lectures.shtml; 
Vilayanur S. Ramachandran (contributor; undated) Transcript o f ‘Derek tastes o f  earwax’, 
Horizon, available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/sn/tvradio/programmes/horizon/derek trans.shtml.
8 Robert L. Solso (2003) The Psychology o fA rt and the Evolution o f  the Conscious Brain, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, M.I.T. Press.
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CNS3 Cognitive neuroscience in aesthetics fails to acknowledge Kant’s 
distinction between judgments o f ‘Taste’ and ‘Sense’.
CNS4 The concept of beauty can at least be partly explained by the influences of 
‘formal primitives’ and ‘top-down’ (conceptual) effects on perception.
7.2 The ‘Unproven’ Value of Neuroscience to Aesthetics
In Gregory Currie’s wide-ranging survey, called ‘Aesthetics and Cognitive 
Science’, he gives a valuable and detailed account o f several different areas of empirical 
research that make claims about, or may be applied to, aesthetics9. First, he points to 
the widely accepted studies o f ‘the relation between the visual arts and . . .  geometric 
optics or colour theory’10, that are useful to viewers and practitioners alike. Also, he 
acknowledges that aesthetics may sometimes need to acknowledge faults in some 
literary portrayals of human nature, if empirical research tells a different story11. He 
gives well-informed and astute critiques o f the dialogue between social science research 
and philosophy over creativity, perception and the imagination, and is especially 
receptive to the findings of child psychology. However, his hackles seem to rise at the 
application to aesthetics of cognitive neuroscience operating at the ‘subpersonal’ level, 
‘as when theorists of vision speak of the information that may be unavailable to the
I ^
subject herself . Currie continues:
Some philosophers influenced by Wittgenstein reject the idea o f subpersonal 
psychology altogether, arguing that it is an extension of language beyond the 
domain for which it makes sense13.
He is rather contemptuous of philosophically unsophisticated claims, such as the 
neurologist Zeki’s claim, that the functions o f the brain and visual art are the same14, 
and he clearly finds it banal that Zeki should observe that the enjoyment of colour 
pictures requires ‘a functioning mechanism for the analysis of colour15’. Currie 
concludes that cognitive neuroscience does Tittle to illuminate our aesthetic judgments
9 Gregory Currie Op. Cit. (2003).
10 Ibid. p. 706.
11 Ibid. p. 707.
12 Loc. Cit.
13 Ibid. Currie references Kenny (1984) ‘The Homunculus Fallacy’ in his The Legacy o f  Wittgenstein,
Oxford, Blackwell, and Hyman (1989) The Imitation o f  Nature, Oxford, Blackwell, chapter 3. 
Neither reference is in my bibliography, as I have not consulted these works.
14 Ibid. p. 707; Semir Zeki Op. Cit. (1999a) pp. 9-10.
15 Gregory Currie Op. Cit. (2003) p. 707.
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about particular works, traditions, styles or genres16’. Both Currie and ‘Donnya 
Wheel well’ ((Sic) pen-name) also criticise a landmark article by Ramachandran and 
Hirstein’s in the Journal o f  Consciousness Studies11; Currie for their ‘apparent 
identification of aesthetic value with capacity to stimulate limbic areas of the brain18’, 
and Donnya Wheelwell says she is ‘Against the Reduction of Art to Galvanic Skin 
Response19’. These various points are here combined to give us this statement (CNS1):
CNS1 The findings o f cognitive neuroscience tend to be banal or
operative at the subpersonal level, hence failing to illuminate 
aesthetic judgments.
Clearly it is necessary, in the context o f this project, to respond to such 
misgivings. First, there is Zeki’s claim for an equivalence of function between the brain 
and art, without attempting to define his use of either term. According to Zeki, the 
brain’s primary function is cognitive, extracting unchanging facts from fleeting sensory 
impressions, thereby helping an organism make sense of the world20. Zeki hoped, 
because a painter employs his visual brain when working in a visual medium, that 
neurobiology might be able to contribute some understanding to art. I would defend 
Zeki’s naively expressed claim that art and the brain have the same function, to this 
extent: both the brain and the visual arts are, very broadly, about making sense o f  the 
world, finding order and meaning.
Zeki’s second point, about the loss of colour vision from brain trauma, was 
about damage to one o f the 30-odd visual-processing units. He says the resulting
deficiency is circumscribed; vision and visual pleasure survive in the other units, unless
21 • •  •  22 the damage destroys the primary visual cortex , in which case full blindness results .
Despite Currie’s claim to the contrary, I find that Zeki’s explanations of how the visual
areas function and interrelate are illuminating about particular artworks, as in his
example of Alexander Calder restricting the number of colours in his mobiles to
maximise the viewer’s perception o f movement23, and thus, contrary to Currie’s
i6Ibid. p. 708.
17 Vilayanur S. Ramachandran and William Hirstein Op. Cit. (1999).
18 Gregory Currie Op. Cit. (2003) p. 707.
19 Donnya Wheelwell (2000) “Against the reduction o f  art to Galvanic Skin Response, Journal o f
Consciousness Studies (Vol. 7, nos. 8-9) pp. 37- 42. Improbable as it may seem, the above is the 
correct spelling o f  the author’s pen name.
20 Ibid. pp. 5-6.
21 Semir Zeki Op. Cit. (1999) p. 84.
22 Apart from the strange phenomenon o f  ‘blind sight’, which he describes: Ibid. pp. 78-9, and Fig. 8.3.
23 Ibid. pp. 153-7.
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misgivings, Zeki’s findings can enhance the awareness of viewers and the competence 
of practitioners, in a way which extends the information available from earlier guides to 
art and visual perception.
William B. Seeley also rejects Currie’s criticism that cognitive neuroscience has 
given few insights into the aesthetic interpretation of individual artworks24, drawing 
attention to the growing number of studies informed by neuroscience which analyse 
‘artistic value’ in individual works, most notably Margaret Livingstone’s study of the 
Mona Lisa’s smile, and the way peripheral vision, which is relatively insensitive to 
sharply defined edges, allows Leonardo’s ‘sfumato’ effect to be more telling when the 
focus of ‘foveal’ vision is not the smile itself, but elsewhere, for example on her eyes25.
Currie clearly was looking to cognitive neuroscience to supply critical insights 
into particular artworks and genres, in which regard he expressed his disappointment, so 
far26. He wonders what the aims of the ‘neurocognitive investigations of perception’ and 
the ‘psychological investigations of imagination’ were:
Is it intended merely to discover the underpinnings of responses we can describe 
and evaluate in the familiar language of criticism and connoisseurship? Or is the 
aim to interpolate unfamiliar concepts into the domain of aesthetics itself, 
leading perhaps to a revised understanding of aesthetic values? The second aim 
is much the more interesting one, but adopting it will require a great deal of 
argument that is itself philosophical in nature 1.
In the context of this thesis, which is defending the claims to realism of the aesthetic 
against the claims of deflationary aesthetics, the first of these two aims is surely 
sufficient justification for the present resort to empirical evidence. Currie himself
unwittingly reveals this kind of interest in quoting the evidence that Fodor’s
28encapsulation of the senses is permeable to concepts , provided by the finding he 
quotes that music students enrich their experience of hearing music when they learn to 
recognise a diminished fifth, rather than simply hear it. Similarly, Currie seems unaware 
that he is subscribing to Ramachandran’s criticised emphasis on the limbic system when
9 0he reports that ‘There appears to be an emotional component in face recognition’ .
24 William P. Seeley Op. Cit. (2007).
25 Ibid. pp. 13-16. Seeley gives the following references: Margaret Livingstone (2000) ‘Is It Warm?, Is It
Real? Or Just Low Spatial Frequency?’ Science. November 17, 290, p. 1299, and (2002) Vision 
and Art: The Biology o f  Seeing (New York: Henry N. Abrams, Inc.), pp. 68 - 73.
26 Gregory Currie Op. cit. (2003) p. 207 and p. 718.
27 Ibid. p. 718.
1% Ibid. p. 711.
29 Ibid. p. 710.
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Ramachandran also developed the parallels made by Zeki between the cognitive 
activities of the brain and the activities o f the artist, as exemplifying the sensory search 
for knowledge about the world. However, to Currie’s displeasure, as we have seen, 
Ramachandran places rather more emphasis than Zeki on the emotions, with his 
frequent references to the limbic system. Ramachandran stated in his first Reith Lecture 
that an emotional response to vision [read: all perception] was essential to survival, and 
this fact would help to explain why so much art is emotional. He stresses repeatedly the 
strong links that connect all sensory processing modules with the limbic system, which 
instantly gauges each experience, judging through our feelings, or ‘affects’ as 
Baumgarten would say, if something is ‘good or bad for us30’, an opportunity or a 
threat, producing a pleasurable reward or an unpleasant ‘jo lt’. This constant monitoring 
of the ‘temperature’ of the world around us, sometimes responding to apparently innate 
‘templates’, referred to as ‘form primitives31’, extends to our encounters with artworks, 
sometimes helping to explain some of our responses to them.
Ramachandran insists that the way ‘form primitives’ work is suggestive of the 
immense inter-connectivity in the brain, which assists the mind in the major function of 
the senses, namely the detection o f objects, a process greatly assisted by their 
classification. These functions involve the constant search for similarities and 
differences, particularly the similarities between disparate objects. In the eighteenth 
century, Baumgarten described such processes as ‘wit’ (finding similarities) and 
‘perspicuity’ (finding differences)32. Ramachandran and Hirstein ask why visual puns, 
metaphors and allegories are so aesthetically pleasing. Their explanation is that the 
discovery of similarities linking superficially dissimilar events triggers a reward of 
pleasure from the ever-vigilant limbic system. Thus Currie’s com plaint about 
Ramachandran’s emphasis on the limbic system seems misplaced, as aesthetic 
judgments have long been acknowledged to be based on pleasure or displeasure, and the 
limbic system is the main means of delivering those feelings to the mind. It seems
30 Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten Op. Cit. (1735; 1954 edn.) §26, p. 47. Think o f  patient ‘S ’ in section
2.4.3, above.
31 The classic instance o f  a ‘form primitive’ is Tinbergen’s discovery o f  a ‘superstim ulus’ he designed to
encourage gull chick feeding behaviour. Ramachandran says there is no predicting how we 
might be ‘wired up’ for ‘peak shifts’. Tinbergen found a big stick with three red spots on it 
activated much more vigorous feeding behaviour than the much smaller beak, with only one red 
spot, o f a real adult gull. He suggests that, in a gull’s art gallery, such as stick with red spots on 
would ‘qualify as a great work o f  art’ because it would stimulate so vigorously the cells 
responsive to that form primitive; in Vilayanur S. Ramachandran Op. Cit. (1999), p. 19.
32 Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten M etaphysica §§572-3 (See Appendix D).
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reasonable to conclude th a t designed objects intended to provoke feelings of pleasure, 
displeasure, fear, hope, love and so forth can be evaluated, to some extent at least, 
according to how in tense ly  they stimulate the limbic system. If it doesn’t ‘grab you’, it 
will ‘lose you’.
7.3 Neuroscience. Perception. Knowledge and Belief
We now turn to  C urrie’s criticism o f Gregory and Gombrich’s hypothesis- 
testing theory of percep tion33:
CNS2 Perception does not involve hypothesis-testing as this would be 
to o  slow to work.
In Gombrich’s introductory chapter to The Sense o f  Order, he says his approach to
questions of the mind i s  evolutionist, based on Karl Popper’s ‘searchlight theory’ of
perception, which re jec ts  passive empiricism34. Gombrich worked closely with Richard
L. Gregory35, whose w o rk  could be seen as a contemporary extension o f Kant’s theories
of the innate capacities o f  the human mind36, as opposed to Locke’s tabula rasa.
However, Gombrich s a y s  that Kant’s preoccupation with ‘pure reason’ meant that he
‘never asked how o ther organisms got on in this world’, saying that, for Kant, animals:
. . .  were largely  conceived as mechanisms driven by ‘instincts’, but whatever 
may have been m eant by this vague term, it should have been clear from the 
outset that an an im al must seek its goal in a complex and flexible way, avoiding 
dangers, seek ing  food, shelter and mates37.
Gombrich describes an animal’s external perceptual problems as: ‘what?’ 
(cognitive) and ‘w h e re? ’ (spatial)38: what objects exist in its environment, ‘whether any 
ire to be classified as potential sources of nourishment or of danger’, and where they
Gregory Currie Op. Cit. (2 0 0 3 )  p. 710.
M Ernst Gombrich Op. Cit. (  1979; 2nd Edn. 1984) p. 1.
35 Richard Gregory, Ernst G om brich (Eds.) (1973) Illusion in Nature and Art, London, Duckworth.
“ Richard L. Gregory (1 9 7  1 )  The Intelligent Eye, Wiedenfeld & Nicolson, London.
w Ernst Gombrich Op. C it. (  1979; 2nd Edn. 1984) p.l
* Ibid Also, see Michael 1. Posner and Marcus E. Raichle (1994) Images o f  Mind, New York, Scientific 
American, p. 15 f o r  a diagram o f  the brain, showing the ‘where?’ and ‘what’ paths. After initial 
processing in the prim ary visual cortex, all signals are analysed for depth perception. Then the 
two paths diverge, th e  ‘where?’ path up into to the parietal lobes, the ‘what?’ path down along 
the temporal lo b es .
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pare located, indicating any subsequent action to be taken. Gombrich saw these two 
problems to be ones of ‘meaning’ and ‘order’39.
The principle focus o f ‘searchlight’ perception, for Gombrich, is the junction 
between order and chaos, achieved by the brain’s ‘break spotter’ and the 
‘cxtrapolator’40. Experiments to record eye fixations indicate that our attention is drawn 
to breaks in continuity. The very narrow point o f clear foveal vision is directed to where 
there is a change, or a break, in the visual array, i.e. to junctions (Plate 22a), as shown in 
this architectural textbook diagram o f a column which has been compressed vertically 
(to avoid wasting paper). It is clear from Plate 22a that there have been relatively few 
eye fixations on the shaft of the column, where there is unbroken continuity, where the 
‘cxtrapolator’ requires only confirmation o f continuity. Thus, where the ‘extrapolator’ 
sees no break, it can be fooled, as with the ‘Devil’s tuning-fork’ (Plate 22b). In a 
wildlife context, the ‘extrapolator’ in the brain o f a predator or prey animal might lead it 
to assume that there were no breaks in the undergrowth, whereas, in fact, a meal or a 
deadly danger might be lurking there, but camouflaged. Such concealment is all too 
easily broken by an unexplained movement, or a noise, as the ‘break spotter’ is also 
alert to sound.
Gombrich follows Gestalt theory in which perception prefers the simplest 
solution, for example, in Plate 22ci, by grouping separately (by similarity) the circles 
and triangles, even when they are in a random arrangement. In a similar design, there is 
enough structured order in an apple tree laden with fruit (Plate 18b) to tell a frugivore, 
from a pattern not dissimilar to Plate 22ci, no doubt accompanied by a mental, if  not 
vocalised, ‘Aha!’ exclamation, that a particular tree in its vicinity is now in fruit.
Thus, cognitive neuroscience is coming out in support of Baumgarten rather 
than with Kant over the relationship o f the senses to knowledge. Whereas Kant put a 
dear divide between the Imagination and Understanding, assigning to the senses a 
largely non-cognitive role (See Fig. 6 in Section 5.2, above), Baumgarten elevates the 
senses to a role comparable to, though different from, logical reasoning. He postulates a 
continuum of sensory cognition from uncomprehending bodily sensations (darkness and 
obscurity) through to clarity and distinctness, with the senses falling away as cognition
* Ernst Gombrich Op. Cit. (1979; 2nd Edn. 1984) pp. 1 -2.
* These correspond to contrasting functions of, respectively, the right and left parietal lobes. See
Michael I. Posner and Marcus E. Raichle Op. Cit. (1994) and Ramachandran Reith Lectures 
(2003) on vigilance and neglect, though neither source uses Gombrich’s terms, ‘break detector’ 
and ‘extrapolator’, as such.
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is refined into symbolic abstract reasoning, as in logic or in science expressed 
mathematically (see Fig. 4, in Section 4.2 above).
According to Zeki, our ‘Understanding’, or interpretation of our visual 
experience is divided between, and integral to, each of the separate visual modules41.
The evidence for this comes from pathology. If V442 is destroyed, for example by a 
stroke, a patient suffers ‘cerebral achromatopsia’; the retina and all other visual modules 
can be perfectly healthy, and functioning normally, but ‘the patient is no longer able to 
see the world in colour but describes it in terms o f “dirty” shades o f grey instead’43. Nor 
can these patients even remember or imagine colour44, somewhat like patient S, whom 
we encountered in chapter two (section 2.4.4), who, without functioning amygdalae, 
seemed to have lost the concept o f fear. In a similar way, patients with prosopagnosia 
have suffered damage to a specific area o f the fusiform gyrus, which means they cannot 
recognise previously familiar faces45. However, in this case, only this one aspect is 
affected; they can still recognise facial expressions and describe a person’s features 
accurately.
Zeki conceives of vision as comprising many ‘micro-conscious events46’. 
Certainly, some functions are narrowly focused on one module, such as facial 
recognition, but understanding is widely distributed in the visual cortex, meaning that 
visual agnosia, or inability to recognise objects, is almost always partial and variable47. 
Zeki describes how the perception o f form begins in V I48, where there are m any cells 
specialised in analysing edges and angles in the objects o f perception. This is a 
piecemeal analysis, and ‘downstream’ from VI binding begins to occur, and greater 
integration of the information, by a process yet to be explained. However, our 
understanding of the world is not carried out separately from the separate m odules in 
which we generate our composite sense o f sight, but a measure o f understanding is
41 Semir Zeki Op. Cit. (1999) p.77.
42The first few vision modules are numbered ‘upwards’ from V I, which is the first fully ‘m apped’ area to 
combine the signals from both eyes, located in each occipital lobe at the back o f  the left and right 
hemispheres. V4, also divided between both hemispheres, collates and processes the complex 
signals from many sources needed for colour vision. An excellent diagram show ing the paths o f  
signals from the retinas to VI is on p. 1088 o f  Peter L. Williams, et al. (1995) G r a y ’s Anatomy: 
the Anatomical Basis o f  Medicine and Surgery  (38* Edition), Edinburgh, Churchill Livingstone, 
and a map o f  the thirty-odd visual processing modules o f  the monkey brain, assum ed to match 
the human, is on p. 72 o f  Michael I. Posner and Marcus E. Raichle Op. Cit. (1994).
43 Semir Zeki Op. Cit. (1999) p. 81.
44 Ibid. p. 83.
"ibid, pp. 74-5.
Ibid p. 73.
* I^bid p. 75.
See footnote 30, above.
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generated within the modules that do the processing49. But there is also two-way traffic 
between all the modules and working memory, usually called ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom- 
up’ processing. ‘Bottom-up’ processing refers to percepts arising from direct 
stimulation of the sense organs, and ‘top-down’ refers to internally generated imagery, 
as in visualisation and dreaming50. There are also ‘lateral’ connections linking all the 
sensory modules to each other51. Plate 23a shows a painting I saw in 2005 on the 
evening of my arrival in the German town of Rheinfelden, on the Swiss-German border. 
I did not like the ‘crude’ way the artist had painted the water52. The next morning, I saw 
the turbulent state of the river Rhine, after heavy rains, from the same vantage point 
(Plate 23b). After that, the artist’s handling o f the paint ‘made sense’, and ‘looked 
right’, after all53.
Zeki’s theory of multiple ‘micro-consciousnesses’ includes both understanding 
and aesthetic pleasure. With so many different modules processing so many different 
aspects of vision, he proposes that we have many different ‘aesthetic senses’:
I am empowering them [i.e. the vision modules] not only with ‘understanding’, 
but of contributing directly to the aesthetic effects produced by the attribute for 
which they are specialised 54. . .
He is not, however, claiming that the individual modules are solely responsible for 
aesthetic pleasure, but only that people can and do enjoy aesthetic pleasure arising 
directly from the activity of those o f their modules which are functioning normally, 
even if other modules have failed.
Currie’s criticism of Gombrich’s hypothesis-testing theory o f perception is, 
therefore, rather outdated55, as it is based on a narrow view of ‘encapsulation’, on 
Fodor’s model from the early 80’s. More recent research on the brain emphasises the 
amount of cognitive processing at every level of visual processing, which would support 
Gombrich and Gregory against Currie and Fodor56. Currie’s view that linguistic 
formulation is a necessary condition of belief is also unsustainable. Certainly, as
49 Semir Zeki Op. Cit. (1999) p. 71.
50 Michael I. Posner and Marcus E. Raichle Op. Cit. (1994) p. 84.
51 Semir Zeki Op. Cit. (1999) pp. 65-6.
52 This is a case o f ‘bottom up’ clashing with ‘top down’ expectations.
53 Here the ‘top down’ concepts affected the way the ‘bottom up’ signals were interpreted.
54 Semir Zeki Op. Cit. (1999) pp. 87-8.
55 Gregory Currie Op. Cit. (2003) p. 710.
56 Fodor’s theory assumes that all cognitive input would have to stem from the frontal lobes, adding 200
milleseconds to the processing time, a view now rejected; Michael I. Posner and Marcus E. 
Raichle Op. Cit. (1994; 1997), pp. 144-5 and pp. 242-3.
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Wittgenstein pointed out, language is necessary for certain kinds of belief that may, for 
example, be unavailable, to dogs57. But Currie’s scepticism over conceptual input into 
such perceptual tasks as steering a motorbike on rough ground at speed seems to be 
based on his insistence on linguistic representation for conceptual thought to take
f o %
place , whereas evidence to the contrary comes from the vast area of visual processing 
in the monkey brain, an animal that operates with concepts, but unsupported by 
language59. The two-way (‘re-entrant’) interchange between the fore- and mid-brains 
and the areas for sensory processing are now well established in both the monkey and 
the human brain. This shows, that ‘higher level thought involves the same neural areas 
usedfor sensory-specific computations60’ (my Italics). In other words, Baumgarten’s 
intuition was correct in awarding cognitive content to sensory experience, and the 
hypotheses of Kant, Carroll, Danto, Currie and other ‘linguistic’ philosophers seem now 
to have been disproved by empirical evidence.
Currie’s case against the conceptual nature of perception is based on its rough-
grained, rapid and error-prone character, as opposed to the greater time requirement of
hypothesis testing leading to a belief. His view can be challenged in two ways. First,
perception is only rapid when it needs to be, for example in an emergency, triggered
because a crude level of object identification begins extremely early in visual
processing, particularly for fast-moving objects, possibly as early as in the retina itself,
which, after all, is an extension of the brain61. When quick-fire false alarms occur, these
can be tolerated for the sake of those occasions when the danger is real. Secondly, an
unclear, possibly threatening stimulus will raise the alarm, and hence the brain’s level of
arousal, leading to closer scrutiny, that is still a part of perception, rather than entirely a
reasoning or conceptual process. In pre-linguistic animals, a linguistic process is ruled
out, even though it is both a perceptual and a conceptual process. Solso gives a very
* • 62good description of how the darting foveal gaze builds up a stable image .
57 Ludwig Wittgenstein (1953) Philosophical Investigations (2nd Edition, 1958), Oxford, Blackwell, p.
174e: ‘A dog believes his master is at the door. But can he also believe his master will come the 
day after to-morrow?’
58 Gregory Currie Op. Cit. (2003) p. 712.
59 Michael I. Posner and Marcus E. Raichle Op. Cit. (1994; 1997), p. 144. It is possible that this
discussion may hinge on how ‘conceptual’ is defined: demanding verbal articulation in one 
account (Currie’s), and not in another (Searle’s). I follow Searle, as quoted in section 6.3.3, 
above.
60 Loc. Cit.
61 Peter L. Williams, et al. Op. Cit. (1995) p. 1335.
62 Robert L. Solso, Op. Cit. (2003) pp. 89-93.
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7.4 Are there Really Judgments of Both Taste and Sense?
In her response to Ramachandran and Hirstein’s 1999 paper, Jennifer Anne 
McMahon objected that they had failed to allow for Kant’s distinction between the 
‘agreeable’ (shared with animals) and the ‘beautiful’ (unique to humans)63. This issue 
will be taken to include McMahon’s account of ‘disinterestedness’. This gives us our 
third issue:
CNS3 Cognitive neuroscience in aesthetics fails to acknowledge Kant’s 
distinction between judgments o f ‘Taste’ and ‘Sense’.
In her response to Ramachandran, McMahon rehearses Mary Mothersill’s 
revival of Kant’s antinomy of taste64. In Mothersill’s version, judgments of beauty are 
rational because based on real features o f the object, but these cannot be turned into 
‘principles’ because necessary and sufficient conditions cannot be logically adduced for 
them65 (e.g. ‘unity’). McMahon reports that Mothersill holds out the hope that 
neuroscience might offer a way out, if it could show that these principles derive from 
the ‘architecture’ of the mind, and this would explain why the qualities are ‘ineffable’. 
This discussion will be continued in the next section, on ‘beauty’. Meanwhile, although 
McMahon feels that Ramachandran and Hirstein’s approach is the most promising yet, 
she feels that it fails in the important regard o f failing to maintain Kant’s distinction 
between the ‘agreeable’ and the ‘beautiful’.
Ramachandran and Hirstein introduce eight66 Taws’, or ‘rules of thumb’ which 
they say artists commonly apply in their work. Most, like grouping, are already familiar 
from Gestalt psychology. The most provocative, in the way Ramachandran presented it, 
is his Taw’ of the ‘peak shift principle’, which he identifies with the Sanskrit art manual 
concept, rasa, translated by him, roughly, as: ‘Capturing the very essence o f something 
in order to evoke a specific emotion or mood in the viewer’s brain67’. The examples he 
chooses for demonstrating rasa are works o f Indian erotic sculpture (See Plate 21a). In 
Ramachandran’s analysis of rasa, the artist applies the law by identifying those features
63 Jennifer Anne McMahon Op. Cit. (2000).
64 Jennifer Anne McMahon Op. Cit. (2000) pp. 29-30.
65 Popper would object that Mothershill, here, is trying to apply the inappropriate standards o f  physical
science to a ‘World 3 ’ concept. See the discussion o f  Gombrich in section 3.5.1, above.
66 Ramachandran had added two more by the 2003 Reith Lectures, which are still available to “listen
again”: http://www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/reith2003/lectures.shtml.
67 Vilayanur S. Ramachandran Op. Cit. (2001) p. 11.
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in which the female body differs from the male, and emphasising them. The three 
principles of his methodology could be applied as follows: 1) the rule at work is peak 
shift; 2) his evolutionary explanation: sexual attraction results in successful 
reproduction, and 3) his (so far speculative) account of the ‘neural hardware’ involved 
is as follows:
There may be neurons in the brain that represent sensuous, rotund feminine form 
as opposed to angular masculine form and the artist has chosen to amplify the 
‘very essence’ (the rasa) of being feminine by moving the image even further 
along toward the feminine end of the female/male spectrum (Plate 4 [here, Plate 
21a]. The result of these amplifications is a ‘super stimulus’ in the domain of 
male/female differences68.
This leads McMahon to the perhaps all-too-predictable puritanical objection to 
the erotic Indian sculpture of the ‘Celestial Nymph’. She calls this classical Indian work 
‘sexually titillating69’, as she presents a partial summary of Ramachandran and 
Hirstein’s article, failing to mention much else from quite an extended paper. In fact, 
there is ample room in their account for McMahon’s preferred description of beauty as a 
pleasure comparable to the satisfaction of problem-solving. It occurs, for example, in 
their description of the ‘Aha!’ moments of progressively discovering the dog in a chaos 
of black marks (Plate 24c).
I would argue that there is no reason to bracket off a special place for the 
experience of beauty, separate from the rest of perception, because beauty, ugliness and 
indifference permeate all perception, including the mathematical and scientific. 
McMahon is correct in saying that beauty may also be found in scientific formulae, and 
her invocation of ‘top-down’ or ‘re-entrant’ mental processes is convincing and very 
relevant in this context70. However, although all beauties are clearly not equivalent, it is 
a puritanical prejudice to dismiss the body’s pleasures, even if they consist of chocolate 
or cheesecake, as somehow beneath contempt or aesthetic consideration. Epicurus, if 
correctly reflected in Lucretius, used an analysis of bodily pleasures for scientific 
theorising71.
68 Vilayanur S. Ramachandran and William Hirstein Op. Cit. (1999) p. 18.
69 Jennifer Anne McMahon Op. Cit. (2000) p. 30.
70 Ibid. p. 31.
71 ‘Moreover, the liquids o f  honey and o f  milk have a pleasant taste as they are moved about in the mouth;
but contrariwise the loathsome nature o f  wormwood and o f harsh centaury twists up the mouth 
with a noisome flavour; so that you may readily recognize that those bodies which can touch our 
senses pleasantly are made o f  smooth and round atoms, but contrariwise all that seem to be bitter 
and rough are held in connexion by atoms more hooked, and are therefore accustomed to tear 
open their way into our senses and to break the texture by their intrusion’; Lucretius (1924; 1987
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The main reason to challenge the continual resurrection of this pet distinction
72from Kant is because it is a philosophical fossil repeatedly resuscitated, even though 
its basis rests only on Kant’s obsolete psychological division between ‘Pure Intuition’ 
and ‘Sensation’ in the faculty of Sensibility (see Fig. 6, in section 5.2, above). From 
what we now know about the interconnectedness of all areas of the brain, it is 
impossible even to separate the senses from each other73, let alone to separate the senses 
from interpretation and cognition. Baumgarten’s continuum, with the senses mediating 
a spectrum of cognition (see Fig. 4 in section 4.2, above) fits better with recent findings 
in cognitive neuroscience than does Kant’s account.
Apparently, the aesthetic value o f eating cheesecake needs defending. Although 
the capacity of cuisine to carry complex meanings is limited, neither is it nil74. After all, 
the central rite of Christianity is the ceremonial breaking of bread and drinking of wine. 
More broadly, cuisine is inscribed into cultures and therefore into personal and national 
psyches. Even cheesecake can carry messages of cultural value. There was a wedding in 
South Wales a few years ago between a British bride and a German groom. His father 
brought wines from their home region and his mother prepared cheesecakes and other 
gateaux for the wedding breakfast (Plate 25). Were all the smiling guests misusing the 
English language when they talked about the ‘beautiful sparkling wine’, and the 
‘beautiful cheesecake’? To dismiss this as the ‘trivialising of beauty’ (a phrase used by 
McMahon in an equivalent context) seems to reveal a failure to understand the meaning 
of the aesthetic as a resource for human communication and self-definition, or in 
Dissanayake’s terms, for ‘making special’. Just as the bread and wine of the communion 
table stood metaphorically for the body and blood of Christ, so did the wedding wine 
and cheesecake of Rheinland-Pfalz represent the German family and their cultural 
heritage in a foreign land.
edn.) De Rerum Natura, with a translation by W. H. D. Rouse, revised by Martin Ferguson 
Smith, Cambridge Mass., Harvared University Press, 2. 398-407, p. 127.
72 Which, unfortunately, I also defended in my (2004) review o f Evolutionary Aesthetics, edited by 
Voland and Grammer in the BJA (Vol. 44, no. 4) pp. 444-5.
73David Moore, on the Radio 4 programme In Our Time edition on ‘Perception and the Senses’ broadcast 
on 28th April 2005, described the McGurk effect o f  phonemes perceived differently depending 
on whether the speaker’s lips are visible, and Richard Gregory, a few moments later in the 
conversation emphasised the importance o f  touch to vision. At the time o f  writing, this 
programme is still available under the ‘Listen Again’ service on the BBC Radio 4 website via 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/.
74 Elizabeth Telfer (1995) “Food as Art” in A. N. Neill and A. Ridley (1995b; 2002 edn.) Arguing About
Art.Contemporary Philosophical Debates, London, Routledge, pp. 9-27.
75 Jennifer Anne McMahon Op. Cit. (2001) p. 235.
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Paradoxically, McMahon’s rather puritanical version o f ‘beauty’ is undermined 
by her own theory, explained in more detail in her longer essay on beauty in the 
Rout ledge Companion to Aesthetics76, to be considered in the next section.
7.5 Beauty. Formal Primitives and Top-Down Effects.
In this separate paper by McMahon77, she offers a fresh approach to the 
application of cognitive neuroscience to the concept of beauty, in a way that begins to 
explain Kant’s sensitive introspections, expressed by him as the ‘harmony’ or ‘free
•JQ
play’ of the Imagination and Understanding . McMahon invokes the joint influence of 
sensory templates at the level of mental processing below the level of language, already 
referred to in this chapter as ‘formal primitives’. These ‘bottom-up’ perceptual 
experiences are taken as equivalent to the workings of the ‘Imagination’ in Kant. Then, 
she invokes the ‘top-down’ influence on sensory processing of culturally freighted 
ideas, taken as equivalent to the ‘Understanding’ in Kant. In an experience of ‘beauty’ 
these two aspects of mental experience inter-act and inter-play, as the subject holds 
them in their attention, now one more strongly, now the other. This mirrors the interplay 
of the verbal and the non-verbal in the mind of an accomplished draughtsman, like 
Humphrey Ocean (see chapter two, section 2.4.2). This gives us our fourth issue:
CNS4 The concept of beauty can be at least partly explained by the
influences on perception o f ‘formal primitives’ and ‘top-down’ 
(conceptual) effects on perception.
Because the initial stages of sensory processing are below the level of linguistic 
semantics, the experience is often described as ‘ineffable’, and why it is at least 
potentially universal among human beings. Because aesthetic experiences do not 
immediately appear to be ‘universal’ across cultures, McMahon proposes what she calls 
a ‘dynamic intellectual component79’ of beauty that requires background knowledge, 
helping to explain both different cultural conceptions of beauty and also the beauty of 
intellectual ideas. This is an important part of the ‘top-down’ effect in our interpretative 
responses to aesthetic experiences, whether in any particular instance these happen to be 
principally ‘bottom-up’ or ‘top-down’. This fits well with descriptions in neuroscience
76 Jennifer Anne McMahon Op. Cit. (2001) pp. 227-38.
11 Ibid.
78 This expression is introduced and discussed in Immanuel Kant (1790; 1987 edn.) Critique o f  Judgment,
translated and edited by W.S. Pluhar Indianapolis, Hackett §9, Ak 217-9, pp. 61-4.
79 Jennifer Anne McMahon Op. Cit. (2001) p. 236.
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of ‘re-entrant’ processing80, the two-way traffic between semantic, long-term memory 
and the sense-processing areas of the brain, to which Ramachandran attributes the 
quasi-synaesthesic character of concept formation and metaphor81. These ideas fit with 
McMahon’s observation that the experience of beauty occurs when our attention is 
drawn to the processes of perception82.
These insights are productive uses of cognitive neuroscience in aesthetics. 
McMahon also uses these observations to revive the concept of disinterestedness. 
However, her model o f ‘disinterestedness’ unfortunately revives the old abhorrence of 
‘biological pleasures’ expressed by ‘The Greek philosophers and the church fathers’, 
whom Baumgarten had blamed for the long neglect of the senses83. McMahon rejects 
the model o f ‘distancing’ in favour of the juridical model of disinterestedness as 
eschewing personal interest or gratification84, thus joining the puritans in ‘clamping 
down’ again on the sensory in art. This is a hangover of old moral anxieties; it is 
unhelpful and misleading in the context of aesthetics, by running counter to the 
acceptance of the sensory dimension.
An alternative version of disinterestedness in keeping with the findings of 
evolutionary science and cognitive neuroscience would keep more closely to Kant’s 
definition of beauty, as ‘the free play o f the Imagination and the Understanding’, rather 
than his spurious distinction between judgments o f ‘Taste’ and ‘Sense’. Beauty in 
Kant’s terms is the interplay between concepts and a heightened awareness o f the 
senses, and on this model, ‘disinterestedness’ is the mind’s state of contemplation 
necessary to hold the concepts and sensations in balance while sustaining the aesthetic 
attitude. Although our sensory systems are biased in favour of sight, there seems to be 
no reason why this cognitive and sensory interplay should not apply at times to the other
80 Michael I. Poser and Marcus E. Raichle, M.E. (1994) Images o f  Mind, New York, Scientific American,,
pp. 144-5 and 242-3.
81 Vilayanur S. Ramachandran (2003) Reith Lecture, no. 4; sound recording on BBC Radio 4 website, via
http://www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/.
82 Jennifer Anne McMahon Op. Cit. (2001) p. 236.
83 Ibid. pp. 232-3, where McMahon quotes Tertullian’s elision o f beauty and evil. For a balancing view,
see Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten Op. Cit. (1735; 1954 edn.) §116: ‘The Greek philosophers 
and the Church fathers have already carefully distinguished between things perceived  [aYaOqxa] 
and things known [vbryra]. It is entirely evident that they did not equate things known with things 
o f sense, since they honored with this name things also removed from sense (therefore images). 
Therefore, things known are to be known by the superior faculty as the object o f  logic; things 
perceived  [are to be known by the inferior faculty, as the object] o f the science o f  perception, or 
aesthetic’ (translation by Aschenbrenner and Holter; their Italics), p. 78.
84 Jennifer Anne McMahon Op. Cit. (2001) pp. 223-5.
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senses, including taste, the word which provided an early metaphor to describe aesthetic 
response, and therefore also to the tastes of wine and cheesecake.
Evidence for this can again be found in cognitive neuroscience, from the 
attention and vigilance circuitry of the brain. When we scrutinise something, attention 
and vigilance come into play, which activates the right parietal and frontal lobes85. In 
this state of mind, sensitivity to sensory input is raised. At such a moment, we are not 
engaged in doing anything practical, but are ‘on the lookout’. The distinction between 
this and an engaged, ‘everyday’, state o f mind is described by Roger Fry, and this is the 
model of disinterestedness which I am recommending over-against the ‘juridical’ 
model. This model of disinterestedness is based in Fry’s distinction between ‘the actual 
life’ and ‘the imaginative life’86. The first is life as ‘lived’, and the second is removed 
from the need to take action. Writing in 1909, Fry contrasts the revelatory cinematic 
projection of a train arriving at a station, which feeds the ‘imaginative life’, compared to 
the bustle of one’s own presence on a platform, where the need for action displaces the
o 7
luxury of contemplation . Looking at the street in a mirror offers a similar contrast to
leaning out of the window, and seeing a neighbour one knows, immediately becoming
engaged, wondering ‘why he looks so dejected this morning’ whereas, ‘in the mirror it
is easier to abstract ourselves completely’ . When in the ‘actual life’ mode, we simply
recognise objects by their ‘labels’, and it is this habit of mind which makes for
difficulties for beginner students of drawing, as discussed in chapter two (above). When
in ‘actual life’ mode, the semantic areas o f the brain need barely consult the sensory
areas, and this had been observed by Baumgarten: we lose awareness of long-standing
sensory stimuli89. This is how Fry describes it:
The needs of our actual life are so imperative, that the sense of vision becomes 
highly specialized in their service. With an admirable economy we learn to see 
only so much as is needful for our purposes; but this is in fact very little, just 
enough to recognize and identify each object or person; that done, they go into 
an entry in our mental catalogue and are no more really seen. In actual life the 
normal person really only reads the labels as it were on the objects around him 
and troubles no further. Almost all the things which are useful in any way put on 
more or less this cap of invisibility. It is only when an object exists in our life for 
no other purpose than to be seen that we really look at it, as for instance at a
85 Michael I. Posner and Marcus E. Raichle Op. Cit. (1994; 1997), pp. 166-79.
86 Roger Fry (1909; reprinted 1959) “An Essay in Aesthetics” in Vision and Design, Harmondsworth,
Penguin (pp. 22-39) p. 24.
87 Ibid. pp. 24-4.
88 Ibid. p. 25.
89 Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten Op. Cit. (1739; 1983 edn.) §550, pp. 24-6 (See my translation in
Appendix D).
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china ornament or a precious stone, and towards such even the most normal 
person adopts to some extent the artistic attitude of pure vision abstracted from
90necessity .
This would help to explain the heightened sensory awareness with which we scrutinise 
new objects in our environment, a normal pattern of curiosity about the new that is 
common to animals, especially domestic cats. New objects, or people, have not yet been 
covered with the ‘cap of invisibility’, but they are scrutinised with a heightened level of 
sensory awareness appropriate to the ‘imaginative life’, with its implicit cognitive 
dimension91. The difference between the two modes (‘real life’ or ‘imaginative life’) in 
the case of cheesecake, would be 1) ‘real life’: its hasty consumption to relieve hunger 
2) ‘imaginative life’: lingering over the flavour, appreciating the skills of the cook and 
cultural background of the cuisine.
It was a paper by William P. Seeley that drew my attention to this link with 
Roger Fry92. He begins with what is called the ‘inverse problem’, or the role of prior 
knowledge in perception. Vision consists of patches of light falling on an effectively 2D 
surface, the retina, and yet from this incomplete information, we construct a 3D picture 
of the world. The process can be observed in a simple experiment. In a line drawing, an 
isolated ellipse in a box is seen differently from the same ellipse when it represents a 
plate drawn in perspective on a table-top93. Test subjects, including trained 
draughtsmen, regularly see the ellipse representing the ‘plate’ to be somewhat ‘fatter’ 
than it really is, because they ‘know’ it’s a round plate. This is an aspect of the ‘top- 
down’ effect, already discussed. Artists, according to this ‘constructivist’ hypothesis, 
harness ‘the formal structure of an artwork . . .  to generate the depictive content of 
paintings . . .  by triggering the influence o f semantic knowledge in perception94’. Seeley 
sees this as compatible with Baumgarten’s concept of aesthetics. However, Seeley does 
not believe that this explains ‘the aesthetic dimension of art and aesthetic experience95’ 
(his Italics). He believes that an aesthetic theory should be able to differentiate
90 Roger Fry Op. Cit. (1909; reprinted 1959) p. 29.
91 It must be said, however, that in “The Artist’s Vision”, perhaps influenced by Clive Bell, Roger Fry
seems to overstate his case in favour o f  formalism, when he distances the experience o f  beauty 
from cognition, in his distinction between ‘curios’, where provenance is important, and ‘works 
o f art’ where he says it is irrelevant, except in questions of authenticity and price. Roger Fry 
(1919; reprinted 1959) “The Artist’s Vision”, in Vision and Design, Harmondsworth, Penguin 
(pp. 45-51) pp.47-8.
92 William P. Seeley Op. Cit. (2006) p. 198.
93 Ibid.pp. 197-9.
94 Ibid. p. 200.
95 Loc. Cit.
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‘artworks and aesthetic experiences from their ordinary counterparts96’. Seeley points 
out that the centrality accorded by cognitive neuroscience to interpretation in artistic 
perception challenges Carroll and Danto’s deflationary account of the role of perception 
in art appreciation. Their account emphasises the way artworks are placed in an 
historical context, a process which comprises ‘non-perceptual interpretive events that 
determine [an artwork’s] meaning97’. Instead, Seeley turns to Kendall W alton’s account 
o f‘imaginative perception’ to show that mental events include ‘modality specific 
perceptual properties’, and this has been confirmed by cognitive neuroscience. Stephen 
Kosslyn’s model for mental imagery uses hypothesis testing in ordinary vision, and 
Walton extends this to ‘imaginative’ seeing in our perceptual interactions with
• » OXpaintings . Seeley claims that the barrier erected by Carroll and Danto against aesthetic
theories of art are thus invalidated. Interpretation cannot be separated from aesthetic 
00response . Seeley demonstrates this by an analysis of a Cubist painting in 
neurocognitivist terms, so that we see t ha t . .  .
. . .  the act of categorising the work as a Cubist painting, an act o f  interpretation 
on Carroll and Danto’s account, functions to guide attention and shape the way 
viewers perceive the painting100.
Seeley’s conclusion is that viewers’ knowledge has a decisive influence on how 
they see artworks, as has been shown with the example of the painting o f  the Rhine at 
Rheinfelden (See Plate 23a). However, Seeley remains concerned that cognitive science 
does not explain what is special about aesthetic interest in artworks, as the mechanisms 
it describes are also at work in ‘ordinary’ vision. I would argue that the difference is 
only a matter of degree, as Baumgarten had explained, when writing about ‘ordinary 
rhetoric’ and ‘poetry’:
The philosopher should be busy in general in drawing the boundary lines and 
especially in defining accurate limits between poetry and ordinary eloquence. 
The difference is, to be sure, only a matter of degree; but in the relegation of 
things to one side or the other it requires, we think, no less capable a geometer 
than did the frontiers of the Phrygians and the Mysians101.
96 Ibid.
97 William P. Seeley Op. Cit. (2006) p. 207.
98 Ibid. p. 208.
99 Loc. Cit.
100 William P. Seeley Op. Cit. (2006) p. 209.
101 Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten Op. Cit. (1735; 1954 edn.) §117, p. 79.
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7.6 A Speculation on the Ur-Aesthetic: Grooming
In this section, I am going to try to apply the evolutionary and cognitive science 
of these two chapters to speculate a little on how the aesthetic evolved as it has in 
human beings, and why it works as it does.
Ramachandran does not refer to a ‘break spotter’ in the same way as Gombrich 
does (See section 7.3). For Gombrich, only the ‘breaks’ are significant, and unbroken 
areas are ignored, even though he does refer to an ‘extrapolator’. Ramachandran, on the 
other hand, helps us to understand the relationship between Gombrich’s ‘break detector’ 
and his ‘extrapolator’ when construed in terms of brain anatomy, as they correspond to 
the left and right parietal lobes, located just behind the frontal lobes. The parietal lobes 
are active in ‘break spotting’, the one positively, the other negatively. The left parietal 
lobe smoothes over discrepancies to such an extent that there are cases where loss of 
function in the right parietal lobe will lead a patient with an untrammelled left parietal
• 109lobe to deny their own paralysis . The right parietal lobe, on the other hand, is highly
1fHsensitive to discrepancies, as confirmed by brain imaging . This right parietal lobe is 
very active in states of vigilance, when the brain is on the alert for sensory stimuli, as 
when on sentry duty, or when in the ‘aesthetic attitude’. This is where my speculation 
begins.
Although the right parietal lobe gains satisfaction from spotting a discrepancy, 
that very discovery probably discomforts the left parietal lobe, which prefers to put a 
positive gloss on everything. However, the balance is reversed if there are no ‘blots on 
the horizon’. In that case, the right parietal lobe might become bored (as with 
Gombrich’s regular paving stones Plate 22b). The reason I am advancing this 
development of Gombrich’s ‘break spotter’ and ‘extrapolator’, is that both parietal lobes 
seem to play a major role in aesthetic response, and their evolutionary origins are 
therefore important to a Darwinian account of the aesthetic and of art.
The most general application of the break detector and the extrapolator has 
already been clearly identified with the vital task of spotting breaks in camouflage, 
whether for attack or defence. However, the second arena which I propose for this 
interplay between the parietal lobes is in grooming, a behaviour which has been honed 
through millions of years of evolution. Birds and mammals take great care in grooming
102 Vilayanur S. Ramachandran, BBC Reith Lecture no. 2, (2003) ‘What we see and how we see it’,
(Broadcast 9th April! http.7/www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/reith2003/lectures.shtml.
103 Loc. Cit.
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themselves, or in establishing grooming partnerships104. Grooming involves redressing 
disarray (feathers), finding and removing parasites (on feathers or fur), and removing 
dirt particles. The senses put to work in these tasks are both sight and touch, and for the 
primates, fine prehensile manual skills, providing an additional selective pressure for 
increasing acuity and sensitivity in all these domains.
At the outset of a spell o f grooming, the break detector becomes active and is 
probably grimly satisfied with its discoveries; at the end of the process, the extrapolator 
can look with satisfaction at the clean, well-ordered result. The first state could be 
described as an aesthetic experience of disorder, or even ugliness, and the second, an 
aesthetic experience of beauty, as reflected in such expressions as, ‘beautifully clean’, 
or it might be experienced as ‘perfection’, both in the sense of being blemish free, but 
also in the sense of a task requiring aesthetic discrimination carried out successfully.
The same perceptual/aesthetic abilities and manual skills would seem to feed 
directly into tool-making and the other crafts which require skilful hand-eye co­
ordination. Other non-human species have taken the first steps in this direction, 
including female and juvenile chimpanzees fashioning spears, sharpened with their 
teeth, to hunt bushbabies105.
Finally, I should like to add further to Ramachandran’s account of the limbic 
system’s rewards for detecting something camouflaged, with an ‘Aha!’ moment at each 
stage to motivate continued searching106. Above, I proposed extending this pattern of 
rewards to the satisfactions of grooming, to provide a model of the ‘Ur-aesthetic’, and 
by extension to a model of the satisfactions of craftsmanship, which were to become so 
highly developed in the human species. As hinted already, in the discussion about 
‘grouping’, and the picture of apples on the bough (see Plate 18b), food gathering and 
hunting must be considered as candidates for the evolutionary basis of much of aesthetic 
experience. The findings of cognitive neuroscience about the brain’s systems for 
attention and vigilance show a heightening of awareness to sensory stimulation, exactly 
what is needed to see the berries, or other prey107. The pile of berries or nuts, heaped up
104 This is well-known among primates from wild life films; however, they also exist among other
socially aware animals, including cows and horses, as reported by Spinney Op. Cit. (2005).
105 Rowan Hooper (2007) “Savannah chimps get armed and dangerous” in New Scientist, 3rd March 2007,
p. 16. Other examples o f  tool use, if  not tool fashioning, are given by Robin McKie, (2000) Ape
Man: The Story o f  Human Evolution, BBC Worldwide, London, otters p. 18 and chimpanzees
pp. 130-131.
106 Vilayanur S. Ramachandran and William Hirstein Op. Cit. (1999) p. 21.
107 The neural circuitry for visual orienting is described in Michael J. Posner and Marcus E. Raichle Op.
Cit. (1994) pp. 166-8, and the heightened activity o f  the right parietal and frontal loves in states
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at base camp, after a few hours of foraging, would have been the first still life objects of 
contemplation. Imagine the ‘Aha!’ satisfaction to a bird finding a nice fat caterpillar. 
Studies have been made of birds choosing nesting materials for their nests, and 
choosing particular kinds of insect for feeding108. The wild pig, smelling a truffle, 
digging and eating it, experiences a similar sensory and emotional cycle, to the hominid 
grubbing for roots with a digging stick. Thirsty, both would share a parallel search for 
water, finding the glint of light on the surface of a stream, and enjoying the quenching 
of thirst. Courtship and parenting would have provided other Ur-aesthetic experiences 
of beauty. A new-born is still the focus of intense scrutiny, lasting for hours over many 
days, as the new parents and other relatives study the child’s face with the insatiable 
gaze of lovers, when some kind of deep imprinting seems to be taking place. The same 
kind of cherishing of the newborn can be seen in wild-life films of many species, 
including apes and elephants. Also, to the ‘Ur-aesthetic’, I believe one can add the Ur- 
sublime: fear of pain, predation or attack by enemies, and the agon of the h u n t.
7.7 Conclusion
The conclusion of this chapter is that, far from being tangential, cognitive 
neuroscience is very useful in explaining many aspects of the aesthetic, and helping us 
to adjudicate issues over which such figures as Baumgarten and Kant did not agree, 
while confirming, with the help of empirical evidence, many of their other insights.
The aesthetic is not merely optional in art, it is the means of art’s embodiment 
and the focus for our responses to it. In the diagram in Fig. 1, the right hand option has 
been shown to have more basis than the left. Furthermore, no longer can a principled 
distinction be made between the ‘agreeable’ and the ‘beautiful’, but all experience can 
be harnessed by the imagination to express or recover meaning.
of vigilance is described, with the integration o f  the different brain circuits involved, might help 
to explain binding (pp. 174-7).
108 Helena Cronin (1991) The Ant and the Peacock, Cambridge, CUP, p. 245.
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ABSTRACT
This final chapter will review the main arguments and conclusions of this 
enquiry into the nature of the aesthetic and its relationship to art. First, the 
project’s two-chapter study of sceptical and deflationary accounts of the 
aesthetic and its relationship with art are reviewed. Then two chapters on 
eighteenth century aesthetics are reviewed; Baumgarten’s expression ‘imaged 
concepts’ and Kant’s description of ‘the free play of the Imagination and 
Understanding’ are celebrated for their insights into the artistic process, 
subsequently supported in the following two chapters by corroborative evidence 
from empirical science: evolutionary theory and cognitive neuroscience. Three 
key concepts had set the framework for this project, and these are re-examined 
in the light of the foregoing arguments, all of which are finally evaluated by 
attempting to apply them to the three case studies proposed in chapter one.
8.1 Introduction1
This chapter will review the principal arguments presented in this thesis, which 
has attempted to answer the two research questions:
1) ‘What is the Aesthetic?’ and
2) ‘What is the relationship of the Aesthetic to Art?’
Both questions were prompted by dissatisfaction with deflationary accounts of 
the aesthetic in recent Anglo-American analytic philosophy of art. In attempting to 
resist and redress deflationary aesthetics, this thesis offered: a) a critical reading of 
sceptical and deflationary arguments, b) an investigation into the modem use of the 
word ‘aesthetic’, originally in Baumgarten and in its early maturity in Kant, and c) a 
search for the empirical evidence about the aesthetic that has emerged in recent decades, 
with the revival of Darwin’s theory of sexual selection and advances in cognitive 
neuroscience. Finally, the arguments developed in this thesis will be evaluated by 
applying them to the three case studies proposed in chapter one: 1) bowerbird art, 2) the 
nexus of art, power and crime and 3) sound sculpture.
1 As this chapter is a summary and discussion, only new material will be referenced.
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8.2 Sceptical and Deflationary Accounts of the Aesthetic
Chapters two and three were dedicated to an analysis of deflationary and 
sceptical accounts of the aesthetic. The famous paper by George Dickie on the ‘Myth of 
the Aesthetic Attitude’ provided a starting point.
8.2.1 Dickie’s ‘Myth’
A close analysis of ‘The Myth o f the Aesthetic Attitude’ revealed that Dickie 
harboured a residual belief in the phenomenon he was nominally denouncing. This is 
manifested not only in some ‘slips of the pen’, but also in his overt acceptance of one 
version of the aesthetic attitude: ‘attending (closely)’, which he dismissed as ‘vacuous’. 
However, ‘attending (closely)’, though incomplete as an account of the aesthetic 
attitude, was found in chapter seven to reflect the origins of the aesthetic attitude in a 
vigilant brain state.
Thus Dickie’s paper was found to be incoherent. His position required him, for 
the sake of a superficial consistency with the title of his paper, to ignore the 
phenomenology of aesthetic experience, which is explained, in chapter three, in terms of 
the general reluctance among some philosophers, in the wake of positivism and 
behaviourism, to address questions involving mental experience. Thus Dickie ignored 
testimonial evidence, quoted in his own paper, o f qualitative differences in mental state, 
insisting, instead, that there was only ‘attention’ or ‘inattention’. Noel Carroll explained 
Dickie’s denial of the aesthetic as a preparatory to introducing the Institutional Theory.
The real quarry of Dickie’s 1964 paper, as with the later Institutional Theory, 
was the formalism espoused by Jerome Stolnitz. Formalism allowed only limited 
relevance to ‘extrinsic’ facts about artworks, it argued that appreciation and criticism of 
artworks were incompatible, and it denied the relevance of moral judgments in 
criticism. Dickie refuted Stolnitz on those points, which, taken together, comprised 
Stolnitz’s version o f ‘disinterestedness’. Dickie assumed Stolnitz had provided a 
definitive account of disinterestedness, which was supposedly a ‘necessary condition’ 
for the aesthetic attitude. Believing he had undermined the concept ‘disinterestedness’, 
Dickie felt entitled to claim he had disproved the existence of the aesthetic attitude 
itself. However, one look at eighteenth century philosopher David Hume was enough to 
show that Stolnitz’s version of disinterestedness was not at all authoritative, and
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therefore that Dickie’s argument had failed to quash either the well established concept 
of disinterestedness or the reality of the aesthetic attitude.
8.2.2 Further Sceptical and Deflationary Accounts
Chapter three then broadened the enquiry into deflationary aesthetics, looking 
at other forms of aesthetic scepticism and non-realism. The influence of physicalist 
thinking on aesthetics can be detected in Dickie’s later attempts to define art by 
external conventions, an approach emulated by Levinson and Carroll, who use 
history as the ‘extrinsic’ factor, while minimising the ‘intrinsic’ role of the aesthetic. 
Their historical accounts founder on the problem of ‘Ur-Art’, which requires them 
to fall back on the aesthetic as the ‘prime mover’, to be discounted once the 
artworld had supposedly ‘gelled’. The nub o f the problem was identified in 
Stephen Davies’ distinction between two kinds of value: ‘functional’ (aesthetic) 
and ‘procedural’ (institutional). One of the main conclusions of chapter three was 
that this distinction is unsustainable, because aesthetic properties themselves are 
inherently spatially and temporally relational, dissolving any principled 
functional/procedural distinction.
Chapter three also considered the surprising scepticism of Gombrich 
towards the aesthetic, and Danto’s shift, in the last chapter of the Transfiguration, 
from deflationism to a form of aesthetic Realism, as was identified by 
Margolis, who had long laboured to free Anglo-American analytical aesthetics 
from the bonds of physicalism.
Gombrich’s scepticism did not extend to the values of individual artworks, 
but affected the possibility of critical comparisons between periods, styles and 
cultures. Sheldon Richmond interpolated replies to Gombrich’s doubts in the 
‘voice’ of Popper, which showed how such debate is indeed possible, while 
pointing out the inapplicability of bi-valent values, which might be appropriate 
to logic and the physical sciences, but not to the realms of intentionality and 
culture. Any expectation of ‘absolute’ values, and unanimity at all times, 
is inappropriate to ‘World 3’, and should be replaced with the lesser, but 
still valuable, expectation of cogent, perhaps multivalent, debate about aesthetic 
values.
Danto’s realisation of the role o f enthymeme and metaphor in art acknowledged 
the aesthetic, because the respondent is affected by the way the content is presented,
which can transcend convention and institutional pre-determination. As we shall learn 
from Baumgarten, our response to imagery is imaginative and sensory, in other words 
ineluctably aesthetic, rather than ‘institutional’ or pre-determined by history.
8.2.3 Fodor
In chapter two, the use of empirical evidence in understanding the process of 
learning to draw was introduced by outlining Fodor’s modularity of mind. However, it 
became clear, as this project as a whole unfolded, that Fodor’s account of encapsulation 
had had to be modified in recent years to allow for more interaction (‘bottom-up’ and 
‘top-down’) between the ‘transducers’ (e.g. eyes), ‘input systems’ (e.g. vision- 
processing modules) and ‘central systems’ (thought enablers). For example, the retina is 
now understood to be an extension of the brain, and some broad-textured processing is 
carried out there already, allowing early warnings to be sent to the amygdalae before 
processing in the visual cortex. Fodor’s doubts about the acquisition of access to early- 
stage sensory-processing modules have been invalidated by autism studies, and by 
pedagogical processes, such as the teaching of drawing. The brain is not ‘hard-wired’ to 
quite the same extent as cognitive neuroscientists had once assumed, but it is configured 
uniquely in each individual in ways that depend on the learning demanded of it.
The ‘isotropic’ nature of the brain (where anything known can be put to work) 
seems to be more pervasive than Fodor’s account at first allowed, limiting inter­
communication largely to the ‘central systems’, whereas now it seems apparent that all 
perceptual and cognitive modules of the brain are to some extent interlinked, providing 
the basis for concept formation, involving noticing similarities among disparate objects, 
and therefore setting the stage for the creativity of metaphor.
To counter Dickie’s denial of differences in aesthetic states of mind, chapter two 
looked at the process of learning to draw, and the perception of ‘bad character’ in 
portrait photographs, both of which provided empirical evidence that different qualities 
of consciousness depend upon which modules of the brain are activated in any mental 
task. Evidence, from the process of learning to draw, demonstrated the existence of 
competition between verbal/cognitive (‘left-brain’) and visual/spatial (‘right-brain’) 
modes of thinking, suggesting that ‘aesthetic’ states of mind entail increased attention to 
early-stage (non-verbal) processing of sensory information.
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By way of a final comment on this topic, it could be added that, whereas Danto 
emphasised the importance of enthymeme and metaphor in art, it is important also to 
acknowledge the role o f another form of ellipsis, metonymy, where something closely 
associated with an object stands for it. This figure of speech, in Jakobson’s theory, 
includes synecdoche (part for whole)2. There seems to be a case for saying that all 
perception could be class as metonymic: we recognise objects from partial views, a 
person from their voice, a bird by its song, and so forth. This is a perceptual capacity 
that is shared by humans and animals, and is possible because of the evolved ability to 
recognise objects even when the image is only partial or degraded, and the same ability 
is available to both humans and animals to exploit in rhetoric and art. This ability is at 
least one aspect of the perceptual power that enables us to see a painting of a horse as a 
horse, and not as some coloured smudges on a surface.
8.2.4 Defining the Aesthetic, Rhetoric and Art
Also, in this project, an attempt was made, in the face of deflationary and 
sceptical accounts, to define the aesthetic, beginning in chapter two, and continuing in 
chapter three. The resulting definitions attempt to combine Baumgarten’s axiomatic 
style, his concept that the ‘aesthetic’ approximates to perception, and his emphasis on 
the active role of the aesthetic. Also the definitions take an evolutionary perspective, 
combined with insights from cognitive neuroscience and other disciplines, such as 
anthropology. The definitions have been framed in such a way that they would apply to 
also to non-human organisms, as a resource for their survival, both in providing them 
with the means of perception, but also attempting to include the way species can modify 
each other through their interactive co-evolution, and the way they influence each other 
through their signalling. In this way, the aesthetic is seen as central to an animal’s 
agency and way of being in the world.
2 David Lodge compares and contrasts metaphor and metonymy according to Roman Jakobson’s theory
in his (1977) The Modes o f  Modern Writing: Metaphor, Metonymy, and the Typology o f  Modern 
Literature, London, Arnold, esp. Part Two, pp. 72-124. The comment which follows, on the 
metonymic character o f all perception, is my own suggestion, presented here as part o f the 
conclusions o f  the thesis.
3 An awareness o f ‘agency’ can be taken as primitive, or endowed to animals by evolution, and could
therefore be characterised as instinctual. It is fully present in a newborn baby who, for example, 
‘will turn in the direction o f  a voice from a loudspeaker behind a curtain, orienting not only the 
head and ears but the eyes as well, as if  searching to see the person who calls’; see Colwyn 
Trevarthen (1987)’Infancy, Mind in’, in Richard L. Gregory (Ed.) The Oxford Companion to the 
Mind, Oxford, OUP (pp. 362-8) p. 364.
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iThere has been no attempt in these definitions to avoid what is normally 
considered to be a ‘cardinal sin’: circularity. These definitions are not structured 
according to the usual combination of ‘necessary and sufficient conditions’. Dickie, in 
my opinion correctly, following criticism that his definitions of art were ‘circular’, took 
to calling art an ‘inflected concept’, where the terms in the definition ‘bend in on each 
other’ and give mutual support4. Emulating Baumgarten’s axiomatic method inevitably 
entails circularity, as later definitions are built upon earlier ones (See section 2.5.1, 
above). The full set of these biologically-influenced definitions appears in Appendix A.
At the outset of this project, it was not intended to go beyond attempting a 
definition of the aesthetic attitude, but as the project advanced, a ‘symbiotic’ definition 
of rhetoric and art just seemed to emerge from the earlier definitions. Here they are:
§17 R h e t o r i c  is the premeditated or spontaneous deployment of the active 
aesthetic (§3), whether tacit (§4) or expressive (§5) to embody, perform or 
construct an aesthetic object (§16) with persuasive intent towards another 
organism’s behaviour. Rhetorical display is competitive. When successful, 
it assists pragmatic aims. Among social organisms, success in rhetorical 
display enhances status.
§18 A r t  is the premeditated or spontaneous deployment o f the active aesthetic 
(§3), whether tacit (§4) or expressive (§5) to embody, perform or construct 
an aesthetic object (§16) whether beautiful (§8) or sublime (§9) to bring 
insight to another organism without necessarily intending or achieving a 
pragmatic effect. The difference between rhetoric (§17) and art is a matter 
of degree, with a lesser emphasis on the pragmatic in art than in rhetoric, 
though the classification of any particular aesthetic object to either category 
will be open to interpretation, and therefore, debate. Artistic display is 
social and competitive, and success enhances an organism’s status.
This near elision of art with rhetoric follows Baumgarten’s declaration in the final 
section of his Reflections on Poetry, that the difference between ‘poetry and ordinary 
eloquence’ [read: ‘art’ and ‘rhetoric’] is only a matter of degree (See the last pages of 
section 4.5, above).
8.2.5 A working Ontology of Art: Currie, Searle, Danto and Margolis
Another strategy adopted for countering deflationary aesthetics was to consider 
the place of the aesthetic within the ontology of art. In chapter three, Gregory Currie s 
ontology of art was compressed to its essentials:
4 George Dickie (2001) Art and Value, Oxford, Blackwell, p. 62.
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Artwork = sensory structure + heuristic.
This was combined with the adaptation o f Searle’s description of literature, to cover art 
in general, to produce the following two formulations:
OA Artwork = Sensory structure + Heuristic + Art-appropriate Response.
S Whether something is art is for respondents to determine according to the
nature of their response, reflecting a set of attitudes that they take 
towards a work, not the name of an internal property of the work.
Both these ontological statements about art have been endorsed by the findings 
of later chapters. The artwork is seen as the result of agency, an action, to be 
interpreted. The link between rhetoric and art is very intimate. Both use the same 
resources of the aesthetic: perceptions loaded with meaning and emotion. Television 
wild-life films often show proto-rhetoric at work: a toad, menaced by a fox, stands on 
the points of its toes and arches its back as high as possible, to make itself look to big 
for the fox to swallow. The toad’s genetic endowment and life experiences have given it 
the means to learn about its own bite size, and to grasp the significance of relative size 
when adversaries confront each other. Such observations militate against aesthetic 
properties being dependent on either history or the prior identification of something as 
an artwork. A similar message is delivered by instances of trans-species sensitivity to 
aesthetic properties. One example involved some problematically aggressive male 
White Rhinos in a conservation project. These became calm when a recording of 
Beethoven’s ‘Moonlight Sonata5’ was played to them. This seems to confirm that 
aesthetic response is possible without understanding, but we saw, in section 3.5.2, that 
an adequate critical response requires knowledge o f the ‘heuristic’ to be understood, in 
Currie’s terms, or, in Danto’s terms, summarised by Lafferty, it requires an 
understanding of the rhetorical nature o f art:
1) Artworks cannot be paraphrased.
2) Artworks are not ‘basic objects in the world’, but are interacted with in a 
two-way process o f interpretation, as in metaphor (i.e. a cognitive process).
5 From the voice-over o f  a programme called Extinct Broadcast on ITV1 on 9 December 2006.
1
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3) Artworks are contextual i historical knowledge is needed to understand the 
metaphors and close the enthymemetic gaps .
In Margolis’ terms, works o f art are real objects with ‘emergent’ Intentional 
properties, that have sufficient realism for debate, but are not reducible to bi-valent 
logic. Margolis saw these features as those belonging to ‘uniquely languaged’, ‘second 
natured’ human agents. But it is argued here that, if non-human animals have 
intentionality by virtue o f their perceptual systems, they also have the potential for 
intensionality, in the sense of constructing aesthetic objects and performances for 
interpretation, which are ontologically equivalent to the ‘Intentional utterances’ of 
human artforms, and at least some o f which, therefore, might also be ontologically and 
epistemically classifiable as artworks.
Furthermore, philosophy could play a constructive role in questioning the 
present obsession with the ‘original’ which afflicts the visual arts, particularly in the 
West. The argument would be that a good copy gives the same aesthetic experience, 
because further ‘indiscernible’ instances o f the sensuous object can be made (i.e. further 
‘instances’ of Currie’s ‘sensory structures’) and the heuristic for these is equally 
accessible and the same, apart from the last, comparatively trivial, copying stage. When 
Gericault’s Raft o f  the Medusa was too fragile to travel to London, a full-scale copy was 
shown, with no detriment at all to the gallery-goer’s experience7.
8.3 Baumgarten and Kant
Chapters four and five developed one o f the main strategies of this thesis, to 
compare the claims of deflationary aesthetics with the claims of the foundational
6 My compressed summary o f Michael Lafferty’s account o f Danto in his (2006), Arthur D anto’s
Philosophy o f  Art, Ph.D. thesis (unpublished) Warwick University, pp. 154-7. Laffterty says 
Danto identifies a fourth factor in the interpretation o f  art: the intention o f  the artist, key to the 
interpretation o f  art, as also with rhetoric and metaphor (pp. 156-7).
7 The exhibition, ‘Constable to Delacroix: British art and the French Romantics’ was open from 5
February to 11 May 2003.
http://www.tate.org.uk/britain/exhibitions/constabletodelacroix/room2.htm. There are numerous 
other instances, including the substitution o f  a photograph in place o f  an original work, before 
the end o f the National Gallery’s El Greco show o f  11th February to 23rd May 2004. The icon, 
The Dormition o f  the Virgin, El Greco’s earliest known painting, was removed from the show 
because it was required for the customary Easter procession at the Church in Syros, Crete, which 
had originally commissioned the work. The excellent full-scale photograph that replaced the 
work was glued to a panel and was so detailed that one scarcely noticed it was not an original 
painting; only a specialist in icons o f  the period could have had real cause for disappointment. 
My thanks to Rovianne Matovu o f  the National Gallery for supplying me with the dates o f  the 
exhibition and the title o f  the work.
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aesthetics of the eighteenth century. The process had begun in chapter two, with Hume, 
and now it progressed to Baumgarten and Kant.
8.3.1 Baumgarten
Baumgarten’s relevance to the argument of this thesis lies in his acceptance of 
the senses for their epistemological and aesthetic value, which marked a break from the 
Rationalist tradition of his philosophical training, but was in keeping with the 
Epicurean-influenced sensual and emotional Pietism of his upbringing. Baumgarten 
seems to draw little distinction between perception and the aesthetic; for him, the more 
‘notes’ or units of sensory stimulation, the more ‘poetic’ or ‘aesthetic’ the result 
becomes . He demonstrates that perfectly scanned verse expressing the abstract ideas of 
logical analysis results not in poetry, but doggerel; poetry requires more: the evocation 
of the senses and emotions. His answer to our first research question, ‘What is the 
Aesthetic?’ would be that it is ‘sensory knowledge’, different from, but complementary 
to, logical knowledge. Baumgarten envisaged an epistemological spectrum with 
minimal quantities of ‘obscure’ bodily stimulation at one extreme, moving up a scale of 
increasing ‘clarity’ arising from increasing quantities of sensory ‘notes’ which are 
gradually replaced by abstract ideas at the other end of the spectrum, comprising logic 
and mathematics (See Fig . 4, section 4.2). This foreshadows the ‘left-brain/right-brain’ 
polarity described by Sperry, the clash between the visual/spatial and the 
verbal/cognitive modes o f thinking for students learning to draw (See sections 2.4.2- 
2.4.3), and the inter-connectedness o f long-term memory with sense-processing 
modules of the brain (See chapter seven).
Baumgarten sees the aesthetic as relevant, not only to the way we perceive and 
understand the world, but also because it provides the means for expression. The 
aesthetic comprises ‘sensorily knowing and proposing’. Words themselves are sensory 
objects, their sounds important to the poet more than to the philosopher. However, in 
the use of figurative language, the aesthetic is manifested in both the arts and sciences, 
combining the senses with cognition, as in Baumgarten’s coinage: ‘imaged concepts\
8 It needs to be said that this detail o f  Baumgarten’s argument is not necessarily correct, as reducing the
range o f colours in painting or drawing, or reducing the resources used in other art forms, as with 
a single guitar verses a full symphony orchestra, does not necessarily result in an 
impoverishment o f  the aesthetic experience, but could bring out other qualities, such as increased 
poignancy.
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where the senses make abstract concepts more tangible and thus comprehensible. By 
evoking the senses and stirring up emotions, the aesthetic has the power to lift the mind 
to ecstasy, making both rhetoric and art more lively, inscribing their messages more 
deeply on the imagination. Thus, for Baumgarten, poetry (art) and ordinary eloquence 
(rhetoric and non-art aesthetic production) differ from each other only in degree.
For Baumgarten, aesthetic contrasts are not only spatial, but temporal, such as 
novelty, a short-lived quality. His awareness o f the way time and memory affect 
aesthetic properties would assign to historical perspectives a role in the evaluation and 
interpretation of art, rather than its classification.
There is, of course, a question of whether the term ‘imaged concepts’ applies to 
all forms of art. Much art lacks a definable underlying concept. Abstract music and 
abstract painting and sculpture may have no explicit ‘message’, but hold the attention, 
engage us bodily in our exploration of them, and as they induce the kind of ‘ecstatic’ 
state described by Baumgarten, though ‘without a concept’, as Kant might say, they 
become significant presences in our lives, generating their own cryptic meanings as they 
enter the storerooms of our imaginations. Aesthetic experiences are difficult to write 
about, but they are greatly valued and sought after, even in the absence of overtly 
‘determinate’ meanings. Even works with ‘determinate’ meanings leave room for new 
metaphorical interpretations. The word ‘imaged’ as used by Baumgarten refers to the 
sensory component of a work, and the ‘concept’ may be very simple, or very complex, a 
matter for the ‘free play’ of aesthetic response, rather than necessarily a concept that can 
be pinned down.
8.3.2 Kant
Kant’s account of aesthetic judgment is immensely complex, and internally 
inconsistent in places, as described already in chapter five. In this context there is room 
only to pick out a few points, including: a) Kant’s sensitivity to the interplay between 
the senses and concepts, b) the question of ‘disinterestedness’, and c) a comparison of 
Baumgarten’s ‘imaged concepts’ with Kant’s ‘aesthetic ideas’.
In his descriptions of ‘free beauty’ Kant gives vivid word pictures of the 
phenomenology of ‘right-brain’ states o f mind, and describes their incompatibility with 
concepts in terms that are congruent with Sperry’s discoveries about brain laterality, as 
described in the teaching of drawing, in chapter two. In Kant’s descriptions of the
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sublime, he also distinguishes between the ‘aesthetic’ estimation of nature’s immensity 
and its calculation by reason, which also corresponds to Sperry’s ‘right-’ and ‘left-brain’ 
thinking. Kant retains an indirect link between the aesthetic and concepts, in the ‘free 
play of the Imagination and Understanding’, to establish the claim of aesthetic 
judgments to the universality afforded by shared cognitions. Except for Kant’s 
stipulation of the universality of aesthetic judgments deriving from the role of 
indeterminate concepts, this accords with other discoveries in cognitive neuroscience, 
discussed in chapter seven, with ‘top-down’ (conceptual) and ‘bottom-up’ (sensory) 
interactions when the brain is in a state of vigilance when trying to identify an 
unfamiliar object, which might look ‘purposive’, but whose ‘purpose’ (concept) is not 
yet established. This matches one of Kant’s accounts o f ‘disinterestedness’, where a 
form pleases, ‘without a purpose’. Kant also gives another account of disinterestedness 
that reflects the ancient moral nervousness about the senses and sensuality: a Puritanical 
view that a judgment of taste (beauty) shall have no sensual appeal, no concept of the 
good, no emotion, no determinate purpose, no ‘art collector’s cupidity’. This may be 
where the formalist’s separation of the aesthetic from morality and concepts originated.
After separating cognition from the perception of beauty in ‘pure’ judgments of 
taste, Kant later re-introduces cognition in what appears to be a reversion to 
Baumgarten’s aesthetics, where the representation of something ‘with a concept’ 
(purpose) is displayed to perfection, which Kant called a work of ‘adherent beauty’. 
This, however, requiring only taste and skill, did not, for Kant, count as ‘Fine Art’, 
unlike works o f ‘Genius’ that represented no determinate concept, but, instead, an Idea 
of Reason, which has no ‘extension’ in the world, thus requiring Imagination to body 
forth as something entirely original: an ‘Aesthetic Idea\ This thesis concluded that 
Kant’s distinction between works o f ‘adherent beauty’ and ‘aesthetic ideas’ was not 
sustainable, nor his distinction between ‘form’ and ‘matter’. They were only required by 
Kant’s untenable distinction between ‘Understanding’ and ‘Reason’. In all respects, 
Baumgarten’s formulations were simpler: ‘imaged concepts’ for both works of 
‘adherent beauty’ and ‘aesthetic ideas’, and his unified continuum of perception from 
the ‘obscure’ to the ‘abstract’ in place of the separation o f ‘Understanding’ and 
‘Reason’. Nevertheless, Kant’s system illuminates many subtle distinctions within the 
aesthetic, provided one replaces the absolute distinctions demanded by his philosophical 
system with Baumgarten’s continua, with differences that are not absolute, but only 
‘matters of degree’.
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8.4 The Biology of the Aesthetic
Chapters six and seven added to the empirical evidence already brought to the 
discussions in chapter two, first by introducing arguments from evolutionary science in 
chapter six, and then expanding on the second chapter’s accounts o f a) learning to draw, 
using the methods of Betty Edwards, and b) the perception of fear in Antonio 
Damasio’s case study of patient S.
8.4.1 Evolutionary Science
Chapter six examined evolutionary science, which emphasises the continuity of 
the human and animal worlds. The chapter looked at the evolutionary pressures which 
gave rise to the proliferation of perceptual systems, particularly vision. It also 
considered how the process of speciation seems often to have been driven by the 
aesthetic choices, by females, of the most beautiful and symmetrical males, which by a 
process of ‘radical translation’ is read to indicate good health, low parasitism and good 
genes. Other selective pressures for ever-creasing acuity o f perception in many species 
include the need to detect breaks in camouflage, possibly betraying the presence of 
predator or prey, and, among social animals, to monitor the behaviour o f conspecifics 
for altruistic or selfish behaviour, in order to meet out appropriate rewards and 
punishments. I have postulated grooming as an aesthetic activity involving vigilance, 
yielding a cycle of ‘aha!’ moments and an experience of ‘making beautiful’, a proto- 
craftsmanship that might have led to other forms o f aesthetic production, including art.
Human beings share a common ‘animacy’ with other animals. There are good 
reasons for thinking that the higher animals are conscious of their own powers of 
agency, and those of the other animals, including the conspecifics around them, and that 
they are sensitive to the traces of agency left by the actions of others in the environment, 
signs which need to be interpreted, providing a model for artworks and other symbols. 
Ingold has criticised the attribution o f ‘culture’ to human beings, and ‘nature’ (entirely 
genetically determined behaviour) to animals, who, according to the dominant scientific 
model, are supposed to have no ‘culture’. Ingold has described how the process of
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walking, seen as culturally freighted since the work of Mauss9, cannot be classified 
entirely as ‘natural’, merely attributed to human ‘evolution’, with bicycling classified 
entirely under ‘history’ as a ‘cultural’ activity. Both are biological, as is the rest of 
human culture, in the sense that the body has to learn skills and modify its structure, 
even if only subtly, for a person to become a proficient member of the cultural group. 
Young male birds learn their birdsong through apprenticeship, and this is thereby also 
both a ‘cultural’ and a ‘biological’ activity.
8.4.2 Cognitive Neuroscience
The evidence from the process of learning to draw and the absence of fear in 
Damasio’s patient S in chapter two had strongly countered Dickie’s account of a single 
unvarying ‘attention’ for all purposes, in favour of the realism of the ‘aesthetic attitude’. 
This evidence has shown that, in order to learn to draw from observation, adult 
beginners have to learn to engage consciously with their visual/spatial processing 
systems, which normally work at relatively unconscious (‘subpersonal’) levels. Students 
need to bring the contents of this sensory processing more fully into their awareness, in 
order to isolate elements of the visual field for analysis and retention in short-term 
memory. There is independent confirmation that this is what is happening, from cases 
like Nadia, the austistic child who drew precociously in infancy (See Plate 21b). 
Ramachandran and Hirstein quote the theory of Snyder and Thomas that such savants 
are able to ‘directly access’ the outputs of their early vision-processing modules, 
because they are less ‘concept driven’ than people with normal development10. Looking 
at an artwork in ‘right-brain’ mode will similarly activate and focus attention on the 
output of the same brain modules, the resultant qualia being an important element in 
aesthetic experience (See the Fra Angelico in plate 8).
Evidence from several sources was found in both chapters six and seven for the 
‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ interactions between the senses and concepts in aesthetic 
experience suggested so beautifully by Baumgarten’s coinage, ‘imaged concepts’ and 
Kant’s expression ‘the free play o f Imagination and Understanding’. There is abundant
9 Tim Ingold says walking and talking are, in the words o f  M. Mauss, ‘techniques o f  the body , in his
(2000) The Perception o f  the Environment: Essays on livelihood, dwelling and skill, London,
Routledge, p. 379, referring to M. Mauss (1979; 1934) Sociology and Psychology: essays,
London, Routledge & Kegan Paul.
10 Vilayanur S. Ramachandran and William Hirstein (1999) “The Science o f  Art: a neurological theory o f
aesthetic experience, ” Journal o f  Consciousness Studies, (Vol. 6; June/July) p. 25.
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evidence that prelinguistic animals nevertheless employ concepts, and, in making sense 
of the world, that they employ similar ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ exchanges during 
vigilant states of mind, involving conceptual thought and fine sensory monitoring, 
which this thesis has interpreted as the model upon which the aesthetic attitude is based. 
It was concluded, therefore, that Kant’s requirement of a linguistically mediated sensus 
communis cannot legitimately be claimed as a necessary condition for aesthetic 
experience, a step which would unjustifiably exclude animals from the realm of the 
aesthetic. On the contrary, this thesis supports Darwin’s claim that the aesthetic is 
available to many animals, and the argument presented here is that many ‘higher’ 
animals perceive and understand the world using basically the same ‘image/concept’ 
neurological processes as ourselves, minus language. Dennett’s argument against 
positing isolated human achievements installed by ‘skyhooks’, and his insistence there 
is only one ‘design space’ inhabited by all creatures, means there can be no principled 
objection to non-human animals co-evolving aesthetic sensibilities and deploying them 
actively to influence their own moods and the behaviour of others through processes 
that are ontologically equivalent to human art-making.
8.5 The Three Case Studies
Chapter one promised that the arguments presented in this thesis would be 
evaluated by testing them against the following case studies of issues relevant to the 
contemporary understanding of art and its praxis: 1) ‘bowerbird art’, 2) the ‘nexus of 
art, power and crime’, and 3) ‘sound sculpture’.
8.5.1 Bowerbird Art
8.5.1.1 The Nature of Bowerbird Art
There are 18 species of bowerbird distributed across Australia and New Guinea, 
which used to be joined as a single landmass1 *. Bowerbirds appear to be unique in the 
non-human animal kingdom in constructing complex aesthetic objects from found 
materials: plant forms, pebbles, bones, shells, and coloured or metallic rubbish or items
11 The classic study o f bowerbirds is by A.J. Marshall (1954) Bower-birds: their displays and breeding
cycles, Oxford, Clarendon Press.
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stolen from inside and around human habitations. These constructions play a role in 
courtship rituals. In Appendix C are a number of stills, numbered C l, C2, etc., taken 
from a David Attenborough film called, ‘Bower Birds -  the Art of Seduction12’. The 
film has that title because the bowers are built by polygamous male bowerbirds to 
attract females. Four species of bowerbird are featured in Appendix C, ranging from the 
maker of the simplest bower, the Stagemaker, (C2 -3 )13, to the most elaborate bowers, 
built by the Brown Gardener, or Vogelkop, bowerbird (C8-18).
Some features of their behaviour need to be pointed out. Still Cl shows a male 
Western Bowerbird adjusting the display of his collection of curiously shaped pebbles, 
bones and shells, all of which are white, a colour that flecks his plumage. The Satin 
bowerbird is iridescent blue, and collects blue objects, in addition to yellow flowers and 
‘sculpturally’ interesting shapes, like a shrew’s skull-bone. The males of several 
bowerbird species pick up such objects, and display them to females in ritualised mock- 
aggressive displays. A. J. Marshall, who wrote the classic study of bowerbirds, 
speculated that the males seem to be addressing ‘metaphorical’ male rivals who are 
somehow represented by the objects in their displays when these are the focus of 
courtship dances14. In another sense, the whole display could be seen as a metaphor for 
the male, standing in place of him, representing him to the female. In several species, 
such as the Stagemaker in C3, the courtship ritual begins with the male playing ‘hide 
and seek’, which is a way of attracting a female’s interest. Attenborough’s film shows 
the same first move in the MacGregor bowerbird’s routine (C4-7). If a female shows 
enough interest to descend on to the ‘run-way’ of his bower, the male begins the visual 
display of his dance, first glimpsed after a build-up o f peek-a-boo, round and round his 
maypole. The male’s crest is normally folded down, hidden beneath brown feathers. But 
at the climax of his display, from C6, the fiery dance of his crest contrasts brilliantly 
with the sombre colours of the rainforest floor.
With all the bowerbird species, the females scrutinise the displays and 
performances intently. The film shows the males also scrutinising their own 
constructions and displays. Before females arrive, they often make fine adjustments or 
add embellishments. They have to spend as much time as possible tending their 
displays, in case a female might chance by, but also to guard their displays from rival
12 A BBC Natural World programme first broadcast on 17th December 2000.
13 See also Plate 14b in Appendix E.
14 A.J. Marshall Op. Cit. (1954) p. 64.
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males, who seize any opportunity to steal the most prized items, and to dismantle hours 
of construction work in minutes. These birds do not only have material ‘property’, they 
have ‘crime’, as the raids on each other’s territory are furtive and nervous, lest the 
owner return to catch them in their acts of ‘vandalism’.
It is after a guided tour of the MacGregor bowerbird’s bower, and some clips of 
his flame-coloured dance, that Attenborough is ready to ask the ‘art question’. The film 
returns to clips of the male bowerbird scrutinising his maypole, adding decoration and a 
twig or two, as the film is inter-cut with sequences of land artist Andy Goldsworthy 
making a sculpture at the foot of an oak tree from its fallen branches and twigs. Then 
Attenborough points to the maypole and asks, “If Goldsworthy’s work is widely 
accepted as art, and it is, then why not this?”
Speaking to camera, he expands his argument in these terms:
We know that the females tour all the bowers in the neighbourhood, assessing 
them and presumably making a choice between them. And there must be 15 or 
20 within a mile of where I’m sitting, now. So, on what basis do they choose? 
Well, they aren’t judging as to whether the bird is going to be a good father in 
the sense of helping at the nest, because these male bowerbirds play no part in 
either building the nest or feeding the young. So the females presumably are 
judging on the way this bower has been built, how it’s been decorated and how 
he dances within it. And that means that the females must have some aesthetic 
sense, artistic sense15.
8.5.1.2 The Ontology o f Bowerbird Art
The bower of the Brown Gardener, or Vogelkop bowerbird is the most 
spectacular, and is called by Attenborough, “one of the wonders of the natural world” 
(C8-18). It provokes our bowerbird question (BB):
BB Is the bowerbird’s bower art ?
What is apparent in the film, and seems to challenge the straightforward response,
‘Well, it’s just instinct, innit?’ is the wide variation between the three Vogelkop bowers. 
Though built in close proximity, each male has a very distinctive ‘personal’ style in the 
choice of treasures and the manner of their display. At this point, we could try to apply 
our adaptation of Currie’s ontology of art:
AO Artwork = Sensory structure + Heuristic + Response appropriate to art
15 David Attenborough (2000) “Bower Birds -  the Art o f Seduction”, in the BBC Television Series, ‘The 
Natural World’, first broadcast 17th December.
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We have 1) the sensory structure; 2) the heuristic of the bird searching out choice 
display items individually arranged; and, perhaps most tellingly, 3) in the female’s 
critical gaze we have a ‘Response appropriate to art’. Also, in our own response, we, 
too, have a ‘Response appropriate to art’. But the question still needs to be asked, 
whether the female is seeing ‘art’ or ‘beauty’, or merely ‘good genes’? This question 
has already been answered. The female, by an evolved process of ‘radical interpretaion’ 
can detect signs of good genetic quality and good health, just as humans are attracted by 
beautiful and talented members of the opposite sex, for the same kind of reasons. The 
choosing female is excited by and desires a particular bird on the basis of his beauty, his 
beautiful performance and the beauty of his display.
Since the advent of installation art and land art, in the terms of Levinson and 
Carroll’s ‘historical’ definitions, human art seems to have ‘caught up’ with the 
bowerbirds, so that we can now better appreciate their bowers as art. Currie’s ontology 
is based on action theory, and the bowerbird is an agent, acting in an analogous space to 
human artists, using the same resources of design, colour, contrast, grouping, 
decoration, pattern, and so forth. Bowerbirds use ellipsis, the corner-stone of Danto’s art 
theory: when they begin their display, hiding and then partly revealing themselves, or 
imitating the songs of up to 26 other species, each mock-song a masterpiece of mimesis, 
but also metonymy, as the song ‘represents’ an absent bird, which demands the hearer 
to recognise and ‘complete’ the representation in the imagination. The entire bower is 
an act of metaphor: ‘See this display, see ME!’ The ‘treasures’ on display are rare and 
curious, triggering in the respondent ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ searchings to identify, 
and admire the forms. The use of ‘readymade’ objects displaced from their context and 
given a new meaning anticipates Duchamp by possibly millions of years.
The question of whether the female sees ‘beauty’ or just ‘good genes’ was 
Russell Wallace’s challenge to Darwin (expressed as ‘good sense’ versus ‘beauty’) and 
biologists now side with Darwin (See Cronin’s comments in 6.5.1). Miller, as we saw in 
6.5.2, accepts the bowerbird as an artist, on the basis that it alone in the animal kingdom 
spends ‘significant time and energy constructing purely aesthetic displays beyond their 
own bodies16’. He seems to have forgotten all the songbirds, whalesongs, courtship 
displays and dances of a myriad other species.
16 Geoffrey Miller (2000; 2001 edn.) The Mating Mind, London, Vintage.p. 267.
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There is another argument that can be advanced against the sceptical dismissal 
of animal art as ‘merely instinctual’. Tim Ingold has argued that the split between 
‘nature’ and ‘nurture’ in neo-Darwinism is now gradually being replaced by a 
developmental model of individual animals, including each of us. We are the authors, as 
well as the sites, of our own evolution, as we learn and adapt our learning to new 
problems, a process shared with other animals. The interpretation of DNA as a ‘book of 
life’ which pre-determines all aspects of an animal’s phenotype, including behaviour, 
has been shown to be inadequate, as it ignores the ontogenesis of each organism. Thus, 
the search for origins, like ‘Ur-Art’, to mark a boundary between nature and culture is 
wrong-headed, as there never has been a sharp boundary, as animals have continuously 
been discovering ‘new tricks’, and these are then sometimes further consolidated by 
genetic mutations. The process is still going on, as our culture is continually reinvented, 
biologically but not genetically, as through learning it is built into our nerves, flesh and 
bones. And so for the bowerbird.
In our definitions, rhetoric was distinguished from art by its greater engagement 
with persuasion towards pragmatic ends, and the male bowerbird is a polygamous 
seducer. Does that make his bower ‘rhetoric’ and not ‘art’? If anything has come 
through this study, it is the Popperian and Margolisian message that cultural matters are 
not the subject of bi-valent answers, but are a matter for debate and possible consensus. 
Darwin was convinced that robins enjoy singing, observing that they do so in the 
autumn, outside the mating season. Marshall reported the equivalent occurs with some 
bowerbirds. For them, at least, the activity seems to have become an end in itself. Art, 
rather than rhetoric.
Another parallel with the system of human art is the role of the female as a 
critic, connoisseur and patron. It is clear from the films how closely both the male and 
the female scrutinise the bower, and how he has practised every move in a long 
apprenticeship, and how closely she attends to his repertoire of artistic performances. 
The females’ choices over millions of years, combined with dispersals and habitat 
change, have generated the diversity o f species and bowers that exist today. This 
account also allows a space for individual males to deploy their skills, sensibility and 
creativity to ‘set out their stall’ in their own way, to catch a female’s eye.
Finally, our question BB, ‘Is a bowerbird’s bower artT needs to be answered. If 
bowerbird art is ontologically equivalent to human art, as I am arguing, it should be 
accepted as art. However, as a means o f sensory expression, bowerbird art is also open
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to interpretation as mere rhetoric. Also, all art is vulnerable to being conscripted or 
‘high-jacked’ into a game of competitive rhetoric.
8.5.2 The Nexus of Art, Power and Crime
8.5.2.1 The Dark Side o f the Canvas
That there is a ‘dark side of the canvas’ seems indisputable. Consider the 
extremely high prices paid at auction for certain paintings which are then hidden in 
bank vaults, or the clamour for ancient artefacts from no-matter-where, which is 
stimulating the world-wide looting of archaeological sites. On 22nd February 2001, the 
BBC carried a news story by Jeremy McDermott, under the headline, “Ancient Mayan 
cities looted”. He was reporting on the damage being inflicted on the 4000 or so 
unexcavated sites in the Central American jungle. The raiders’ motivations were clear:
Mayan Jade figurines fetch tens of thousands of dollars on the international art 
market -  a huge fortune in a country where the minimum wage is less than 
$300l7.
Tom from their contexts, these objects become little more than expensive trinkets, as
1 ftarchaeologists are wont to lament . These objects are Currie’s ‘sensory structures’, 
stripped of much of their ‘heuristic’ component, without which it is impossible to 
appreciate or evaluate them adequately. A lost heuristic is possibly more damaging to 
an artwork than a lost head is to a statuette. However, it is a testament to the power of 
the aesthetic itself, that the desire even for such cognitively truncated objects is so 
intense that it fuels a crime racket which bears many similarities to the drug trade where 
in some ways the aesthetic exerts the power o f a narcotic. We tend to dismiss such 
problems, as having ‘nothing to do with art as such \ for example: art and power, art and 
money, art and addiction, art and delusion, art and theft, art and environmental 
degradation19 and even art and murder. There is good forensic evidence that, as a part of 
a forgery, a 20- or 21 -year old Iranian woman was murdered to provide the body of a
17 //news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/americas/1184233.stm
18 Colin Renfrew (2003) Figuring It Out: What are we? Where do we come from? The parallel visions o f
artists and archaeologists, London, Thames & Hudson, discusses these issues, pp. 55-8.
19 One theory about Easter Island suggests that the culture o f carving and setting up the vast heads was
instrumental in the disastrous environmental decline on the island: Adam Hart-Davis (Editorial 
Consultant) et al. (2007) History: The Definitive Visual Guide, from the Dawn o f  Civilisation to 
the Present Day, London, Dorling Kindersley, p. 217.
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supposedly “mummified” 2600-year-old Persian princess in a gilded casket which was
on the black market for $11 million in 200120.
The most notorious artist and art-lover in history was probably the emperor
Nero, who was accused o f burning down the centre of Rome to clear space for his great
palace, the Golden House. He stole sculptures from Greece to embellish both his palace
and gardens. However, his infatuation with art went further than any other prince,
although there are many lesser equivalents21. Nero sought personal and political fame
and popularity, both through providing innovatory public entertainments and by putting
himself before the public as an artist, variously lyre player, singer, actor, impresario and 
• » 22competitor in the games . His dying words, as he committed suicide at the age of thirty, 
were, reportedly: “Qualis artifex pereo /” This is usually translated as “What an artist
O'Xdies in me! ”. An adequate account of art should explain the close association of art 
with power, and crime24 (APC) and the vast prices achieved at auction25. The issue can 
be expressed as a question:
APC What is the reason for the nexus between Art, Power and Crime?
Although this is an uncomfortable issue for art lovers, the question (APC) needs to be 
addressed by an adequate and inclusive account of art.
8.5.2.2 Art as Social Marker
20 http://www.archaeologv.org/0101 /etc/persia.html. Because o f  the vast sums traded on the art market, it
has attracted gangsters who sometimes threaten violence to upgrade connoisseurs’ opinions.
21 The Royal Academy exhibition from 12 November 2005 to 17 April 2006 demonstrated the state role
o f art in the Manchu dynasty’s adoption and promotion o f  Chinese culture, including the 
scholarly/artistic practice o f  calligraphy by the Emperors themselves; Frances Wood (2005) 
China: The Three Emperors 1662-1795 (An Introduction to the Exhibition fo r  Teachers and 
Students) London, Royal Academy o f  Arts, available as a pdf from the Royal Academy website, 
on their “Past Exhibitions” page: http://www.rovalacademv.org.uk/events/exhibitions/china-the- 
three-emperors-16621795.116.E V.html?tvpe=past.
22 Edward Champlin (2003) Nero, Cambridge Massachusetts, Harvard University Press. Champlin
attributes much o f  Nero’s extravagant and monstrous behaviour to his desire for fame and 
popularity, aligning his personal myth with the gods Apollo and Hercules on the one hand and 
with Mark Anthony and Augustus Caesar on the other. According to Champlin, the Golden 
House was not exclusively a private palace, but part o f his programme to bring aristocratic 
pleasures to the common people o f  Rome.
23 Ibid. p. 49. He also had his male lover aesthetically castrated, to increase his likeness to Poppea, the
wife he had murdered.
24 The extensive writings are surveyed by Nan Stalnaker (2001) ‘Fakes and Forgeries’ in Beiys Gaut and
Dominic Mcl. Lopes (Eds.) (2001) The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics, London, Routledge, 
pp. 395-407.
25 On 6th May 2004, Picasso’s rose period painting Boy with a Pipe (1905) sold for £58 million pounds,
including commission, making it the world’s most expensive painting, Picasso’s fourth in the top 
ten (van Gogh 3, Rubens, Renoir and Cezanne, one each). 
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/entertainment/arts/3682127.stm
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There is a non-realist strand of reductionist scepticism towards the aesthetic that 
believes it has the answer. This comes from moralising, sociological and Marxian 
approaches, which view the aesthetic as a set of conventions designed to reinforce 
power structures. Larry Shiner’s The Invention o f Art: a Cultural History26 is an 
exercise in deflationary aesthetics, encyclopaedic in its range of reference. Like 
Dickie’s 1964 paper, it also marches beneath a misleading banner headline. A more 
accurate title would have been, The Invention o f  Tine ’ Art. The book complements a 
number of other works, most famously Tolstoy’s What is Art?21, and sociological 
studies, such as those by Veblen28, and Bourdieu29, which describe patterns of 
consumption which do indeed show how the aesthetic has been (and still can be) used as 
a class barrier. Their arguments are undoubtedly relevant to this case study. However 
those studies fail to offer an argument that collapses power relations into the aesthetic, 
reducing it entirely, or even principally, to marks of social distinction, because they fail 
to demonstrate the non-realism of the aesthetic itself. Like Dickie, Shiner quickly 
abandons his ‘headline’ claim for something more nuanced. He begins to refer to both 
the ‘old system of art’ and the ‘new system of art30’, thus admitting to the existence of 
art before its supposed ‘invention’ in the eighteenth century. Although Bourdieu found 
statistics that suggest that the appreciation of fine art is in a direcrt relationship to 
formal education, money and class, this does not explain the many artists who emerge 
from all classes, or the existence of many middle and upper class philistines. Shiner’s 
historical account, designed to show the ‘invention’ (read ‘confidence trick’) of fine art, 
could equally well be used to demonstrate 1) the imperfect, but reasonably successful, 
democratisation since the Enlightenment of many hitherto exclusively courtly cultural 
forms, and 2) the encouragement of new genres and new kinds of artistic achievement 
resulting from a spreading understanding of the aesthetic among the general populace; 
nor can they prove that artworks fail to perform valuable roles in enriching individual 
lives and societies in virtue of their aesthetic properties, rather than as mere variations 
on the theme of snobbery.
26 Larry Shiner (2001) The Invention o f  Art: a Cultural History, Chicago, University o f  Chicago Press.
27 Leo Tolstoy (1898) What is Art? (trans. Aylmer Maude; reprinted in 1930 with other essays in World
Classics edition) Oxford, OUP.
28 T. Veblen, (1899; 1925 edn.) The Theory o f  the Leisure Class, London, George Allen and Unwin Ltd.
29 Pierre Bourdieu (1979) Distinction: a Social Critique o f  the Judgement o f  Taste trans. R. Nice (1984;
1986 edition used) London, Routledge.
30 Larry Shiner Op. Cit. (2001) pp. 146-7.
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Nevertheless, there is clearly a serious problem here for the aesthetic realist, and 
it is not dissimilar to the internalist versus externalist argument about belief in the
• * 3 1philosophy of mind , and clearly reflects the divide between deflationist, institutionalist 
models of art, compared to aestheticising, realist accounts. In September 2008, the 
‘emperor’s cloak’ argument re-emerged over Damien Hirst, attacked by Robert Hughes, 
and simultaneously over the Mark Rothko retrospective at Tate Modem, that has 
brought out opposing ranks o f ‘believers’ and ‘sceptics’, including Ian Hislop on the 
BBC’s Newsnight programme32. The externalist position is exemplified by rich 
collectors who are persuaded by their dealer or ‘art adviser’ that having a Damien Hirst, 
Francis Bacon or Mark Rothko on their walls will mark them out as serious collectors, 
with high-brow taste, and money. It is worth the investment, not only for its prestige, 
but as an investment which is likely to appreciate faster than the stock market, even if 
the work itself is intensely disliked aesthetically, and not at all understood, by the 
wealthy buyer. Such deals are the triumphs of the Institutional Theory, and of the 
Bourdieu, Veblen and the Tolstoy denunciations, but also the death of art as art. Further 
distortions occur when a new category of the super-rich hit the market, such as the 
Russians in London33.
8.5.2.3 Possible Philosophical and Pragmatic Solutions
When considering the ugly side of the art trade, one has to remember that the 
aesthetic has indeed long been used as a status marker, even if that is not its only, or its 
most important, role. In this respect it is equivalent to the evolutionary use of the 
aesthetic to signal strength, beauty, or size, such as the deep croak of a big bullfrog. Art 
is still conspicuously used as an instrument of state policy, as shown by the activities of 
the British Council34 and the post-devolution entry of Wales to the Venice Biennale,
31 Samuel Guttenplan (1994; 1995 Edn.) ‘Extemalism/Intemalism’ in A Companion to the Philosophy o f
Mind, Ed. Samuel Guttenplan, Oxford, Blackwell, pp 289-90, and ‘An Essay on Mind’ Ibid, 
section 1.2.3, pp. 36-45.
32 Review discussion with Kirsty Young on Friday evening, 26th September 2008.
33 The advance programme information for ‘The Great Art Invasion’, the title o f  the second programme in
Channel 4 ’s ‘Art and Money’ season, broadcast on Sunday 28th September, reads: ‘London is 
home to around 1,000 Russian multimillionaires, some o f  whom have turned their attention to 
the acquisition o f  fine art. With access to the notoriously private world o f Russia’s super-rich, 
Marcel Theroux investigates the enormous impact they are having on the art establishment. He 
finds that in Russia art and politics are seemingly inseparable. So are these art collectors buying 
up everything from Picasso to Freud purely for a love o f  art or for political motives?’ From 
Radio Times for 27 September to 3rd October 2008, p. 61.
34 The 2008 British Council’s Action Plan For the Arts, summarises the policies for five categories o f
country; 1 ‘Countries closed and in stagnation . . .  e.g. Burma’; 2. ‘Broken trust with UK and the 
W est. . . e.g. Syria’; 3) ‘Economies in exponential growth . . .  e.g. China’; 4) ‘Poor, open and
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•  • • 35beginning in 2003 . Royal and state patronage is not confined to the visual arts, but 
they are the most durable and conspicuous - and the word ‘conspicuous’ suggests the 
word ‘consumption’ and Veblen’s study of cultural displays of wealth and power, and 
art has an ugly record of sycophancy, probably brutally enforced for most of history, 
and hence, perhaps, pardonable.
Even bowerbird bowers are vulnerable to vandalism and the theft of prize 
exhibits, and this is the risk to which the visual arts are prone, especially those using 
precious materials. Margolis observes that the arts must have some physical 
instantiation to be publicly accessible and numerically identifiable36, what Heidegger 
calls a ‘thingly character’, imagining Beethoven Quartets scores stored like sacks of
37potatoes . But this reification overlooks the spontaneous artistic displays of story­
telling, song and dance that leave no trace except in living memory. Ingold has 
commented on how reification of ‘language’ into a system of rules and lexis, 
was a result of print culture38. Goodman’s account of music exemplifies this point; for 
him an instance of a work occurs only when all the ‘dots’ in the score are played
IQ
correctly, regardless of tempo .
I would argue that a similar reification of the visual arts, images painted on walls 
or carved in stone, made them paradigmatic for aesthetic expression. The visual arts are 
particularly vulnerable to reification, as collectors’ pieces and large prestige projects are 
closely associated with bids for status, and hence objects of desire for the rich, powerful 
and sometimes criminal40. Also, the obsession with owning the ‘original’ creates the
developing countries . . .  e.g. Kenya’; 5) ‘Open developed countries in strong contact with the 
UK . . .  e.g. France’. The full report is posted on the British Council website, and the quotations 
come from Annexe A. http://www.britishcouncil.org/action_plan_for_the_arts-2.pdf
35 See the website: http://www.walesvenicebiennale.org.uk/biennaleinfo.asp?currentbiennaleid=3
36 Joseph Margolis (2001) Selves and Other Texts: The Case fo r  Cultural Realism , University Park, Pa.,
Pennsylvania State University Press, p. 16: reason for physical instantiation, so they can be, 
‘suitably stable and determinate for the purposes o f  description, interpretation, criticism and 
explanation.’
37 Martin Heidegger (1971) ‘The Origin o f  the Work o f Art’, trans. Albert Hofstadter, which I read in the
shortened version edited by Clive Cazeaux (2000) The Continental Aesthetics Reader, London, 
Routledge (pp. 80-101), p. 81.
38 Tim Ingold (2000) The Perception o f  the Environment: Essays on livelihood, dwelling and skill,
London, Routledge, chapter 22, ‘Speech, writing and the modem origins o f “language origins’” , 
pp. 392-405.
39 ‘Since complete compliance with the score is the only requirement for a genuine instance o f  a work, the
most miserable performance without actual mistakes does count as such an instance, while the 
most brilliant performance with a single wrong note does not.’ Nelson Goodman (1976) 
Languages o f  Art: an Approach to a Theory o f  Symbols (2nd Edition) Indianapolis, Hackett, p. 
186.
40 Tod Volpe, a corrupt art dealer to Hollywood stars who went to prison has written his memoirs: (2002)
Framed: Tales o f  the Art Underworld, Edinburgh, Cutting Edge Press.
252
market pressure for high prices, transmutable into crime, and making it easy for forgers 
to pass off their garden shed efforts in supposedly respectable salesrooms. Recently, 
Robert Hughes, in his programme about what he perceived to be the increasing 
corruption of art by money and celebrity, observed that the art market was the last 
market to be entirely unregulated41. Volpe’s memoirs give a frightening picture of 
seemingly unaccountable wheeler-dealing with the money of the super rich, who sink 
their savings into art, knowing little about it, but depending on dealer/advisors to buy 
and sell work for them42. Such figures are seen at work at an art fair in Robert Hughes’ 
recent film, and the celebrity-struck collectors whom he interviews struggle to explain 
why they have paid so much at auction, often in the hope of having their collections 
exhibited, even if only temporarily, in a prestige museum or public art gallery, which 
they perceived as the ultimate accolade and route to immortality.
It might be possible that a change in philosophical emphasis could drain some of 
the heat out of the market, possibly by arguing that the ‘original’ by a painter is much 
more closely analogous to the manuscript for a novel than is presently believed. Current 
cultural practices are not necessary', they are open to challenge and change. There is a 
deficit of critical debate, in a press that often seems ready to print out laudatory press 
releases, verbatim. Whereas many areas o f the arts enjoy/suffer serious criticism, the 
visual arts seem to be relatively vulnerable to promotion by vested interests43.
Some good could come from the failure o f public galleries to afford the prices of 
the few very great ‘original’ works entering the market. A new possibility opens up. 
Museums could become famous for their new commissions of faithful copies, like the 
Otsuka Museum in Japan44. This could also have environmental benefits, in reducing 
the effects of long-haul mass tourism. The current emphasis on the physical relic 
associated with a supposedly unique artwork encourages fetishism for ‘originals’, rather 
than a) pointing to the work’s ‘heuristic’, encouraging an openness to the creativity of 
the artist, accessible through an explanation o f a work’s historical context and b) 
encouraging sensitivity to the aesthetic properties o f the artwork, denied or denigrated 
by the deflationists, but real and accessible directly through faithful copies.
41 ‘The Mona Lisa Curse’, the first in a season o f  documentaries in the ‘Art and Money’ season, broadcast
on Channel 4 on 21st September 2008.
42 Tod Volpe Op. Cit. (2002).
43 For example, the much criticised involvement o f  art dealers in the Turner Prize process.
44 This includes 1000 works from 170 museums from 26 countries, including a Sistine Chapel built to full
size, showing the ceiling and Last Judgment, in situ, in damp- and light-resistant photographic
ceramic tiles. See http://www.o-museum.or.jp/english/index.html
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8.5.3 Sound Sculpture
Although ‘sound sculpture’ is now a well-established cultural sub-species, one 
feels at first a little nervous about describing it as a full member of the genus visual arts. 
Trying to explain why seems to take us into philosophical territory. I will begin with the 
puzzle that helped to set me on the trail o f this research. Then I will describe two other 
sound sculptures of contrasting character, the conceptual artist Bruce Nauman’s sound 
installation in the Turbine Hall of Tate Modem in 2004, and Janet Cardiff s Forty-part 
Motet: Version One (British Edition) using a 2001 recording by Salisbury Cathedral 
choir, that toured the Liverpool Tate and the New Art Gallery, Walsall.
8.5.3.1 Three Indiscernible Sound Works
The term musique concrete!45 was once in current use, denoting a sequence of 
non-musical sounds that had been recorded from the environment, and subsequently 
replayed as music. In 1984, BBC Radio Three presented a ‘play’ with no speech, only a 
sequence of sound effects, which the listener was invited to hear as a narrative46.
Finally, in the Lift Gallery, London, in October 1998,1 encountered an artwork which 
also comprised a sequence of pre-recorded sounds from the environment; this was a 
‘sound sculpture47’. Now, imagine that all three had used the same pre-recorded 
sequence of sounds. The question is this: in what way would it be meaningful, and not 
just facetious, to call the one ‘music’, the next a ‘play’, and the third a ‘sculpture48’? 
Making the Popperian49 assumption that the people involved are rational, there must be 
an explanation.
45 The term originates with Pierre Schaeffer in 1948; See Oxford Dictionary o f  Music (1994 edn,) Ed.
Michael Kennedy, Oxford, OUP, p. 606.
46 An enquiry to the Drama & Literature Dept, o f  the National Sound Archive revealed that in 1984 Mark
Farrar, the compiler o f  the BBC’s first sound effects CD Rom, won an in-house competition for 
a “play” o f no more then five minutes, which had to make the ‘widest possible use’ o f  that CD 
Rom (personal communication).
47 The auditory sequences were interlaced with video pieces, each selectable from a touch-screen in a
darkened gallery. I learned the term “Sound Sculpture” in conversation with an M.A. Fine Art 
tutor, artist Melanie Jackson, on a London field trip in October 1998. The December 1999 issue 
o f Artist’s Newsletter reported a new degree course in “Phonic Art” at the University o f  
Lincolnshire and Humberside, p. 24.
481 am indebted to the Aesthetics lecturer on my M.A. Fine Art course, Dr. Martin Gaughan, for referring 
me to Danto, when I put this conundrum to him after leaving the Lift Gallery, on the same field 
trip as described in the above footnote. It was after this that 1 read Danto’s thought experiment o f  
the Manhattan Telephone Directory instantiating various avant-garde works, including a musical 
score, a novel, a suite o f  prints, and so forth; Arthur C. Danto Op. Cit. (1981) p. 136.
491 picked up this aspect o f  Popper’s social theory from Sheldon Richmond (1994) Aesthetic Criteria: 
Gombrich and the Philosophies o f  Science o f  Popper and Polanyi, Amsterdam, Rodopi, p. 9. 
Richmond references Karl Popper (1957) The Poverty o f  Historicism, London, Routledge and 
Kegan Paul.
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This question, therefore, arises:
SSI What is the mstification for calling the Lift Gallery works ‘sound 
sculpture’, or their indiscemibles "music’ or 4drama’ ?
First of all, different art forms have traditionally been divided according to the 
dominant ‘sense’ involved in their reception, e.g. music/hearing, or their dominant 
characteristic, e.g. dance/movement, and so forth. Just as print technology has 
encouraged the reification o f language, so has sound-recording technology re-enforced 
the view that music is entirely about sound. However, live performances o f music 
contain much visual information that enhances the aural experience, in seeing the 
melodies dancing between players and the sight of musicians struggling to achieve 
perfection, which is almost entirely subtracted from a pure sound recording, and cannot 
be captured in the glimpses chosen by somebody else which might be available on film. 
We now know how the senses are cross-linked, with several sense modalities engaged 
as a work unfolds. A poem will stimulate not only the language modules, but those for 
vision and touch. In the case of the Lift Gallery puzzle, a sound track received as 
‘music’ would encourage a search for patterns of sound, whereas a reception of the 
sounds as ‘drama’ would engage modules listening for actions in a story. When 
addressed as ‘sculpture’, the respondents would listen for a stereophonic perception of 
space, moving around the room, and possibly making imaginative extrapolations from 
sound to shape and texture. In other words, the genre of each work could be determined 
by which brain modules were most active when the percipient experiences the work, 
and an unsatisfactory encounter, such as Matthew Kieran’s confessed failure to 
appreciate Poussin50, might be explicable through a failure, so far, to learn ‘how to look’ 
at it, and how to engage the modules which the work stimulates in a more receptive 
subject.
8.5.3.2 Bruce Naumann: Raw Materials
The next ‘sound sculpture’ puzzle concerns Raw Materials, by the world- 
renowned sculptor and conceptual artist Bruce Nauman. This work was commissioned 
by Tate Modem for the Turbine Hall, where it was open to the public between 12 
October 2004 and 2nd May 2005. There are still some pages about this work on the Tate 
website51, including a textually presented interview with the artist, quoted and
50 Matthew Kieran (2005) Revealing Art, Abingdon, Routledge, p. 24.
51 http://www.tate.org.uk/modem/exhibitions/nauman/about.shtm
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referenced, below. Nauman tells us that, when he was approached by Tate Modem, he 
had to make up his mind quickly. To prepare his proposal, he flew in and looked at the 
space, and partly because o f time pressure, he decided to re-use some of his old ‘raw 
material’ recordings of speech from the past 30 to 40 years. That would allow a quick 
response, and would also give the work a retrospective character, as language has long 
been an important element o f his work, and Adrian Searle’s review explains how this 
practice is consistent with Nauman’s approach to his work as perpetually ‘unfinished’52.
The Turbine Hall is 20 x 150 meters in plan. It is an alienating space, and Bmce 
Nauman’s sound installation did little to relieve that austerity, with its 44 haranguing 
loudspeakers fixed, in facing pairs, down the length of the hall. Assistant curator Ben 
Borthwick describes the recordings:
There are statements that explore sentence construction, single words repeated 
over and over, stories that feed back into themselves and go nowhere. 
Throughout, the tone o f voice, the inflection, and variations in rhythms 
dramatically shift meanings, from diplomatic to psychotic, pleading to bullying, 
anxiety to mockery53.
Borthwick points out Nauman’s preference for the chance effects advocated by 
John Cage, who influenced Nauman’s early work. Borthwick also points out a similarity 
between some of the tapes and the rhythmic patterns of minimalist composers. Despite 
this talk of musical effects, it was a tough, unapproachable work.
Nauman told an interviewer, Robert Storr, that he realised the space presented a 
serious challenge, and he chose narrowly directional speakers facing each other across 
the hall to create wave after wave o f new sounds to draw the listener down the ramp and 
on to the lower level, and then up to the end wall54. Sometimes both loud speakers in a 
pair utter the same words in the same way, sometimes the same words in different ways, 
and sometimes each speaker says different words. Interviewed in his home studio, this 
is how Nauman described how the work was being planned:
What I’m doing is saying: “Okay, forget what the original intention was, just use 
this stuff as sound that is available and arrange it in some way that makes 
another kind of sense.” We’ll have all the texts, we’ll have the space and we’ll 
have enough speakers, and we’ll be able to begin the process. I’ve made a 
programme of the way I think I want it to work — this one goes with that one,
52 Adrian Searle (2005) ‘Inside the mind o f  Bruce Nauman’, from the Guardian o f 13th May, p. 2 o f 3 o f
version posted on ‘Guardian Unlimited’ website: 
http://www.guardian.co.Uk/arts/critic/feature/0,1169,1325197,00.html
53 http://www.tate.org.uk/modem/exhibitions/nauman/about raw.shtm
54 http://www.tate.org.uk/tateetc/issue2/soundwaves.htm
256
this is the next one -  but it may be totally inappropriate when I finally start to 
walk through it and hear it. I can change things around, maybe delete some and 
add others. There s no other way to do it, except in that space. I can guess in 
pairs here in the studio, but I can’t make the ensemble55.
He is clearly describing an intuitive working process, using trial and error, a 
cousin of Gombrich’s ‘making and matching’56. He might have intellectual 
preconceptions, but ultimately the work will have to be felt ‘on the pulse’, as these 
exchanges confirm:
ROBERT STORR You talked about the sequential progression o f  sounds. Are 
you also thinking about sequencing the tapes in terms o f  their logical or 
emotional content in a way that they might be construed as a cumulative 
proposition or statement?
BRUCE NAUMAN Up to this point I’ve tried to go from short intense pieces to 
longer, quieter ones, so it modulates all the way down the length of the hall, but 
until I actually install them, I won’t know if  that’s the best way to do it.
ROBERT STORR But are you considering using these disparate texts to 
summarise an idea? Are you working with that possibility, or ju st ignoring it?
BRUCE NAUMAN Well, ignoring it -  because of the way the space is set up.
Here we have the artist choosing his texts and deciding how to place one relative to 
another on intuitive, ‘aesthetic’ principles, which are not driven by any overall ‘scheme’ 
or rational argument. He calls the work a ‘collage of sounds’.
There are two questions which will be asked of both the Bruce Nauman and the 
Janet Cardiff sound sculptures:
552 How well do these artworks succeed, as far as one can assess on 
the evidence available?
553 Does this medium have the potential to make ‘great art’?
Strangely, it seems that sound sculpture shares a similarity with dance, which is 
characterised by the performer’s movement. It seems that sculpture is characterised, to 
an important extent, by the respondent’s movement. In viewing sculpture, we approach
• 57and retreat, move to the left, right and around, as we watch the profiles shift shape .
55 Ibid. (no pagination)
56 ‘Making and Matching’ is one o f  the main themes throughout Ernst Gombrich (1960) Art and Illusion:
a study in the psychology o f  pictorial representation  (consulted: 1963 reset o f  2nd Edition, 1962), 
London, Phaidon.
57 Robert Hopkins rather dismisses Hilderbrandt’s emphasis on the role o f the changing silhouettes
revealed by moving around a sculpture. See his (2003) ‘Sculpture’ in Jerrold Levinson (Ed.) The 
Oxford Handbook o f  Aesthetics, Oxford, OUP, pp. 572-82.
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Esther Thelen, quoted by Ingold, asks what movement is, ‘but a form or perception, a
way of knowing the world as well as acting on it?58’
Respondents explored the Naumann, tenaciously, like climbers in a gale of
antipathetic speech. Like a glaciered mountain, it was an experience of the Kantian
sublime: beauty had little or no part in it, and struggle as one might, there was no way to
grasp the work as a unity. Experiencing it presented an immense challenge, from which
one emerged exhausted, but with some altered perceptions. Adrian Searle’s review
confirmed his own classification of the work as sculpture, his acceptance o f its success
and status as great art:
Raw Materials is as much sculpture as anything else. It makes you, too, totally 
aware of the volume of the space and where you are in it. I became intensely 
conscious of my own body and its orientation -  whether I was standing a little to 
the left or right, closer to or further from one speaker or another, tracking the 
advance and retreat of different voices as I walked. I found myself looking down 
much of the time, and walking slowly, like a man who had dropped a coin or 
lost a beloved.
8.5.3.3 Janet Cardiff: Spem inAlium
The same questions as above, SS2 and SS3, will be asked of the sound sculpture 
which concludes our case studies, Janet Cardiff s Forty-Part Motet59
Her work bears some formal resemblance to Raw Materials. There are 40 loud­
speakers in eight clusters of five spaced equally around a large room. In this case, 
however, the sound from each loudspeaker had been pre-determined by a composer 
over 400 years earlier, as each played the single voice of a singer performing one of the 
40 parts in Thomas Tallis’s Spem in Alium. The motet, first performed in 1568 or 1569, 
was:
. . .  commissioned by Thomas Howard, 4th Duke of Norfolk, as a rival to 
Alessandro Striggio’s 40-part motet Ecce beatam lucem (1561) . . . The Duke is 
said to have taken gold chain from his neck and placed it round Tallis’s in 
honour of achievement60.
58 Tim Ingold (Unpublished, 1999, by personal communication) “Three in One: on dissolving the
distinctions between body, mind and culture’, p. 13, where he quotes Esther Thelen’s (1995) 
‘Motor Development: A New Synthesis’, American Psychologist, Vol. 50, pp. 79-95. Ingold 
adds that walking is a way of, ‘getting to know the environment, primarily by way o f  contact 
through the feet, but also thanks to the sights and sounds that the movement affords .
59 This was the ‘British Edition’ o f  the work, recorded by Salisbury Cathedral choir in 2001. A
description o f the work can be found at http://www.tate.org.uk/liverpool/exhibitions/janetcardiff/
60 Michael Kennedy (Ed) (1994) “Spem in Alium nunquam habui” in The Oxford Dictionary o f  Music,
Oxford, OUP, p. 833. Like the sequence o f  Davids, this was another ‘dialogue o f  objects’ (See 
section 1.2.3, above and Plate 2).
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A radio programme about this piece of music was broadcast on 29th January 2008, in the
Radio 4 series ‘Soul Music’, and it included a description of Janet Cardiff s work
among other reflections on the piece by Tallis. My transcription of the first 20 minutes
of the programme is included as Appendix B, and the voices speaking about the motet
give remarkable testimony to the power of the aesthetic, and the significance of
artworks in people’s lives, both as audience and performers. Here are the words of one
visitor who experienced Janet Cardiff s sound installation:
-  Well, I came up to the main gallery on the 3rd floor -  it’s quite a large room, 
brightly lit -  there are a lot of windows- and there were these 40 speakers - 1 
went into the room on my own, thinking, “What’s this trying to say?” . . . .  I 
looked at the notice saying what it was all about, and Spem in Alium started up -  
and the 40 speakers were individual voices, and so I thought, “Where are you 
supposed to stand?” -  so I stood in the middle, and when the waves o f music 
came over me, I don’t think I’ve ever been so moved in all my life - 1 stood in 
the middle of the room - 1 was in tears at the end, listening to it! It was amazing! 
I went back about five times . . .  because if  you stand in the middle you hear the 
whole choir, and then I discovered you can walk round and listen to each 
individual voice, or stand in one comer and listen to one five-part choir. And 
this sound sculpture just came to life for me!
The speaker’s words describe his exploration of the sculptural and musical space 
of the work, an ever-changing exploration o f groups, of different single voices and of 
the full ensemble that would not be possible in a standard live performance or a normal 
recording of the work. Question SS2 asks of sound sculpture:
552 How well do these artworks succeed, as far as one can assess on the 
evidence available?
This sound sculpture was experienced as an object of great beauty inducing a
state of ecstasy in respondents, as were performances of the music that were
experienced without any attendant visual experience, for example through earphones.
Question SS3 asks of sound sculpture:
553 Does this medium have the potential to make ‘great art’?
The answer has to be ‘Yes!’ In this case, the musical work being performed was 
not composed by Janet Cardiff, nor did she sing a word of it, as far as I know. The art 
lies in the imaginative production o f the work, and this medium has the same potential 
to be ‘great art’ as has the art o f directing a great play or opera.
8.6 Back to the Research Questions
This thesis was driven by dissatisfaction with sceptical and deflationary 
accounts of the aesthetic and art. The drive behind this thesis had two further 
motivations: 1) a desire to see how sceptical and deflationary aesthetics could be 
squared with Baumgarten and Kant, and 2) puzzlement and curiosity over some general 
and specific aspects of the aesthetic and the arts: a) interest in the possible biological 
roots of human artistic activity and its relationship to the aesthetic in the natural 
kingdom b) the nexus of art, power and crime, and c) avant-garde art forms like ‘sound 
sculpture’. The project’s research question was divided in two, and each will now be 
given a final review.
8.6.1 What is the Aesthetic?
The conclusion of this thesis is that the aesthetic is rooted in our biology, and 
connected to our interpretation of the world around us, including the world of human 
culture. The sceptical view expressed by Noel Carroll, also expressed recently by 
Stephen Davies61, is that the aesthetic is contingent rather than necessary to art. This is 
the view which this thesis has striven to refute, though it acknowledges that in World3 
there are no definitive arguments, and no ‘scientific’ tests for our hypotheses, only open 
debate and discussion, where the course o f history can overtake received opinions, and 
where rational antagonists can survey the same evidence and arrive at divergent 
conclusions.
Nevertheless, evidence has been collected which I believe challenges sceptical 
and deflationary accounts. There is empirical evidence of aesthetic experience involving 
‘right-brain’ states of mind in which ‘everyday’ states of mind, pragmatically focused, 
are replaced by states of mind where the subject tunes into earlier-stage sensory 
processing modules, with switching to ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ searches for 
concepts to aid interpretation of the phenomenon and the resulting qualia being attended 
to. That is the thumbnail sketch o f the aesthetic mindset, and the aesthetic attitude is the 
adoption of the aesthetic mindset towards an object or performance, thought or internal 
state of mind or body, either by conscious choice, or spontaneously.
61 Stephen Davies (2006) The Philosophy o f  Art, Oxford, Blackwell, pp. 66-7, e.g. ‘ Some conceptual 
artworks, such as the self-explanatory All that I once knew but cannot now remember (to use a 
rapidly growing work o f  my invention), present no aesthetic (or other) properties to 
perception.’.(p. 66);‘On the face o f  it, the traditional account o f aesthetic properties does not 
include purely narrative artforms within its ambit.’ (p. 66); ‘ . . .  it is an error to maintain that our 
concept o f art originated in and continues to reflect theories that have promoted the centrality of  
the aesthetic’ (p. 67).
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8.6.2 What is the Relationship of the Aesthetic to Art?
The aesthetic is necessary to art, and not contingent, as claimed by the sceptics 
and deflationists. As Kant argued long ago, aesthetic judgments differ from rational 
judgments in that they are ‘felt’ as pleasure or displeasure, or as ‘respect’ in the case of 
the sublime, rather than concluded by reason. This is where the deflationary 
interpretation of Duchamp is in error. Fountain is indeed experienced as an aesthetic 
object, because it provokes a felt response, as when it was first pushed into the faces of 
the hanging committee who were so disgusted that they hid it from the public, despite 
their democratic agreement to show all submitted works. Those emotions were ‘affects’, 
in Baumgarten’s terms, and they are the stimuli to the limbic system, the importance of 
which Currie accused Ramachandran of exaggerating.
As Baumgarten pointed out, the aesthetic is also vital to science, in providing 
empirical evidence and providing the means of articulating abstract ideas through 
imagery, as in metaphor. Aesthetic qualities and affect also motivate research, and guide 
the scientist by the lure of ‘elegant solutions’. However, the difference between art and 
science is that for scientists and philosophers the ‘aesthetic qualities’ of their use of 
language or other media, and the ‘aesthetic qualities’ of their solutions or their 
emotional responses towards their discoveries and ideas are only rewarding by­
products. By contrast, they are the very point of the artist’s labours. Though for the 
artist rational considerations come into play, these occur in a process of ‘switching’ in 
and out o f ‘right-brain’ states, as ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ processes interact in a 
way that Kant described as the ‘free play o f Imagination and Understanding’, and that 
process is the purpose of art in a way that it is not for science, where the ultimate 
purpose is the rational conclusion reached.
Artists harness this interplay of the senses with concepts, to produce artworks 
that combine sensory structures and concepts, by a heuristic process: ‘imaged concepts’, 
in the words of Baumgarten. The creativity involved is common to artistic and scientific 
discourse, to both art and rhetoric, the divergence between them being a matter of 
varying emphasis, either rhetoric affecting pragmatic, rational, ‘everyday’ 
considerations, or, art, stimulating insight through untrammelled enjoyment or pathos. 
But, as Baumgarten observed, to draw a line between rhetoric and art sometimes 
demands the wisdom of ‘no less capable a geometer than did the frontiers of the 
Phrygians and the Mysians’.
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Videos:
“Babytalk”, Open University Educational Enterprises Ltd., Ref. No. E362/06A.
BBC Radio 4
Andrew Cunningham’s history of medicine, broadcast from 5 February 2007 for 30 
fifteen-minute episodes; summaries on: http://www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/science/medicine.
In Our Time “Perception and the Senses” with Melvyn Bragg, Richard Gregory, David 
Moore and Gemma Calvert (still available to “listen again”) 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/historv/inourtime/inourtime 20050428.shtml.
Material World programmes available on ‘listen again’: Fossil colourisation, and 
Cambrian explosion of species with vision
http://www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/science/thematerialworld 20080207.shtml.
The Reith Lectures 2003 “The Emerging Mind” by Vilayanur S. Ramachandran 
Still available to “listen again”: http://www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/reith2003/lectures.shtml.
“Soul Music”: episode about Spem in Alium  by Thomas Tallis, broadcast on Tuesday 
29th January 2008. The programme was for a while available on ‘Listen again’, but has 
now been withdrawn.
BBC Television
Horizon: (undated, probably 2004) “Derek tastes of earwax”; a transcript is still 
available at:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/sn/tvradio/programmes/horizon/derek trans.shtml
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The Natural World, programme by David Attenborough (2000) “Bower Birds -  the Art 
of Seduction”, first broadcast on 17th December 2000 (see Appendix C).
Channel 4
‘The Mona Lisa Curse’, documentary by Robert Hughes, broadcast on 21 September 
2008, the first in a series of three programmes on Art and Money, on Channel 4.
‘The Great Russian Art Invasion’, documentary by Marcel Theroux, broadcast on 28 
September 2008, the second in a series of three programmes on Art and Money, on 
Channel 4.
Evolutionary Science
Cambrian era: Trilobite picture 
http://www.ucmp.berkelev.edu/cambrian/camb.html
Evolution of eve:
1) Evolution of the Eye
http://www.ucmp.berkeley.edu/cambrian/camb.html (crane, not skyhook)
2) http://www.pbs.Org/wgbh/evolution/librarv/01/1 /real/1 011 01 .html 
Closed webpage on eye:
3) www.brad.ac.uk/acad/lifesci/optometry/ 
resources/modules/stage 1 /pvp 1 /E volution.html
4) Squid eye superior to vertebrate (and human) eye
http://images.google.co.uk/imgres?imgurl=http://webvision.med.utah.edu/imageswv/Sa 
gschem.ipeg&imgrefurl=http://www.pandasthumb.org/archives/2006/l 1/denton vs squ 
id.html&h=480&w=726&sz=92&hl=en&start=14&um=l&tbnid=hp3Vn3YvU8V39M: 
&tbnh=93 &tbnw= 141 &pre v=/images%3 F q %3 D sq uid%252Be ve%2 6um%3 D 1 %26hl% 
3Den%26client%3Dfirefox-a%26channel%3Ds%26rls%3Dorg.mozilla:en-US:official
Light sensitivity of Paramaecium and Amoeba
1) www.brad.ac.uk/acad/lifesci/optometry/ 
resources/modules/stage 1 /pvp 1 /Evolution.html 
(these web pages now deleted)
2) Paramaecium (the Biology Web, Clinton Community College)
http://images.google.co.uk/imgres?imgurl=http://facultv.clintoncc.sunv.edu/faculty/mic 
hael.gregorv/files/Bio%2520102/Bio%2520102%25201ectures/protists/paramecium co 
niugating.ipg&imgrefurl=http://facultv.clintoncc.suny.edu/faculty/michael. gregory/files 
/Bio%2520102/Bio%2520102%25201ectures/Protists/protists.htm&h=480&w=640&sz 
=107&hl=en&start=5&um=l&tbnid=b6h s2eGgYn3FM:&tbnh=l03&tbnw=l37&prev 
=/images%3Fq%3Dparamecium%252Beukaryotic%26um%3Dl%26hl%3Den%26clien 
t%3Dfirefox-a%26rls%3Dorg.mozilla:en-US:official%26sa%3DN
Paramecium (note spelling variation)
‘Googled’ for ‘images’ will lead to images of sexual conjugation of Paramaecium and a 
detailed explanation of the lifecycle on the website of Clinton Community College,
New York.
Tate
Bruce Naum an
1) Turbine Hall Installation, Tate Modem 
http://www.tate.org.uk/modem/exhibitions/nauman/about.shtm
2) Interview with Robert Storr 
http://www.tate.org.uk/tateetc/issue2/soundwaves.htm
3) Bruce Nauman essay by Ben Borthwick 
http://www.tate.org.uk/modem/exhibitions/nauman/about raw.shtm
Copy, not original, of Gericault
Raft o f the Medusa shown in ‘Constable to Delacroix’ show at Tate Britain, 5 February 
to 11* May 2003:
http://www.tate.org.uk/britain/exhibitions/constabletodelacroix/room2.htm
Janet Cardiff s Fortv-Part Motet 
http://www.tate.org.uk/livemool/exhibitions/ianetcardiff/
Julian Qpie: wall-mounted sculpture called H  (Ch. 1 fn 47)
http://www.tate.org.uk/servlet/ViewWork?cgroupid=999999961&workid=20363&searc
hid=9613
Mike Bidlo Not Andv Warhol image
http://www.tate.org.uk/magazine/issue3/consume image3 .htm
World Wide Web
‘Amazing Powers of Sheep’: to recognise faces (report by Helen Brigs) 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1 /hi/sci/tech/1641463. stm#TOP
Baumgargen:
1) Metaphysica English translation: Dr John Hymers: 
http://hvmers.eu/dr hvmers/research baumgarten translation.htm 
http://hvmers.eu/dr hvmers/research baumgarten.htm
2) Metaphysica: Latin text
http://www.ikp.uni-bonn.de/kant/agb-metaphvsica/svnopsis.html 
British Council
The 2008 report of its public consultation, Action Plan fo r  the Arts 
http://www.britishcouncil.org/action plan for the arts-2.pdf
Bruce Nauman review bv Adrian Searle
http://www.guardian.co.Uk/arts/critic/feature/0,1169,1325197,00.html 
Buckminsterfullerene
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Allotropes o f carbon#Buckminsterfullerenes 
Buddhas of Bamivan
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1 /hi/world/ europe/1664713. stm
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Drawing research
a) Eye movements:
1) National Gallery ‘Telling Time’ experiment:
http://www.lboro.ac.uk/research/esri/applied-vision/projects/national_gallery/index.htm
2) Comparative eye movements o f portrait artist Humphrey Ocean and novice artists 
http://www.arts.ac.uk/research/drawing cognition/portrait.htm
b) Comparative fMRJ scans on Humphrey Ocean and a novice artist 
http://muse.ihu.edu/ioumals/leonardo/vQ34/34.1 solso.html#figQ2
Duchamp
1) ‘Bicycle Wheel’
http://www.tc.umn.edu/~rozaiOO 1/1017/images/duchamp2.ipg
2) ‘Green Box’
http ,7/www. tate.org. uk/servlet/ViewWork?cgroupid=999999961&workid=66623&searc 
hid=9637
3) ‘In advance of the broken Arm’
http://www.marcelduchamp.net/images/In Advance of the Broken Arm.jpg 
Einstein tram
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/teachers/ideas/2311 einstein.html 
Greenberg
http://www.sharecom.ca/greenberg/. with a biographical sketch by Terry Fenton at 
http://www.sharecom.ca/greenberg/thecritic.html
Murdered woman as fraudulent mummy o f Persian princess: 
http://www.archaeologv.org/0101 /etc/persia.html
Museum of Copies: Otsuka Museum in Japan 
shows 1000 masterpieces from 26 countries 
http://www.o-museum.or.jp/english/index.html
Performance artist Hans Nitsch
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hermann Nitsch
Picasso auction price 2004
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1 /hi/entertainment/arts/3682127.stm
Roval Academy. London:
1) Past exhibitions:
http://www. roval academy. or g .uk/ events/past-exhibitions/
2) including ‘China: the Three Emperors’:
http://www.rovalacademv.org.uk/events/exhibitions/china-the-three-emperors-
16621795.116.EV.html?type=past
Svnaesthesia at San Diego (Ramachandran et al.) 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1 /hi/health/4375977.stm
277
Thefts from Central American archeological sites 
//news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/americas/1184233.stm
Thought Experiments
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/thought-experiment/
Wales at the Venice Biennale
http://www.walesvenicebiennale.org.uk/biennaleinfo.asp?currentbiennaleid=3
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A P P E N D IX  ‘A ’
Definitions of the Aesthetic
§1 The a e s th e t ic  is both an active and a passive resource for the flourishing 
of organisms.
§2 The passive a e s th e t ic  comprises feelings and cognitions engendered by 
attention directed towards an external object or internal thought and/or 
feeling.
§3 The a c t iv e  a e s th e t ic  is the presentation of a sensory profile by one 
organism to other organisms. The active aesthetic can be either tacit or 
expressive.
§4 The t a c i t  a c t iv e  a e s th e t ic  is the result of evolutionary selective 
processes, in which the action of organism A has changed the sensory 
profile of organism B, which can influence the behaviour of organisms A, B 
or C etc.
e.g. predation o f light peppered moths in the industrial revolution 
increased the numbers of dark peppered moths (See Plate 13a).
§5 The EXPRESSIVE a c t iv e  a e s th e t ic  is the sensory signalling of organism 
C which has the potential to influence the thoughts, feelings or behaviour of 
organisms D or E or etc.
The shepherd C plays his or her harp for auto-delectation, quite apart 
from any effect his or her playing might have on the inner state of the 
sheep, D, or the lion, E. The expressive active aesthetic can be both:
1) a) unconscious or b) conscious
e.g. a) releasing pheromones or b) writing a letter
and
2) c) intended or d) unintentional
e.g. c) saying “Hello!” or d) blushing.
§6 Feelings comprise qualia, pleasure, unpleasant sensations, indifference 
and emotions, all occasioned by perceptions, thoughts or cognitions.
§7 The word q u a l ia  is used here to denote the sensations generated by early- 
stage processing o f sensory stimulation, whether pleasurable or unpleasant. 
To qualify as qualia, the stimulation must at least to a minimal degree enter 
the organism’s awareness.
§8 Pleasure is the source of beauty and takes several forms:
1) the experience o f pleasant qualia (§7). These have been selected by 
evolution for any specific organism, but are also subject to learning, 
as with ‘acquired tastes’, like fine wines. Some are due to chance 
effects on the nervous system e.g. the effect of alcohol on the brain.
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2) the rewards of positive feelings delivered to consciousness via 
stimuli to the limbic system and to pleasure centres following 
experiences viewed as favourable to the organism and its interests. 
These include the simple cognitive identification of external objects 
and implicit agency; identifying a well-loved face or voice; play 
activities; approval of actions; accomplishment of tasks; solving 
problems and seeing relationships, whether between features of 
externally perceived objects or internally generated cognitions or 
finding order and meaning (Aha! moments). The experience of 
beauty can also arise when there is consonance between a sensory 
experience (real or imagined) and a cognition.
3) the release of hormones and neurotransmitters following experiences 
generally viewed as favourable to the organism or its interests
§9 Unpleasant sensation is the source of the sublime, and also takes 
several forms:
1) the experience o f unpleasant qualia (§7). These are selected for 
specific organisms by evolution, but are also subject to learning, as 
when the image of somebody beautiful can come to be hated. 
Alternatively, it can be a chance unpleasant effect on the nervous 
system (e.g. a bad ‘trip’ on LSD).
2) the punishing negative feelings delivered to consciousness via 
stimuli to the limbic system and to pain centres following 
experiences damaging to the organism or its interests. These include 
frustrations such as the failure correctly to identify external objects 
or agency; disappointment; failure to accomplish tasks or participate 
in play activities; disapproval of actions; failure to solve problems or 
discern relationships, whether between features of externally 
perceived objects or between internal cognitions, or failure to find 
order and meaning.
3) the release of hormones and neurotransmitters following an 
experience unfavourable to the organism or its interests.
§ 10 I n d i f f e r e n c e  is a feeling experienced when there are no marked pleasant 
or unpleasant sensations, and no motivation to take action. However, as the 
mind is constantly scanning for stimulus and meaning, if the organism is 
frustrated, the mood can change to boredom, which is experienced as an 
unpleasant sensation (§9).
§11 E m o tio n s  are the feelings engendered by external stimulation or internal 
thoughts or cognitions that cause the release of neurotransmitters and 
hormones which evolved to cause an organism to respond appropriately to 
situations. Emotions can well up, even when an active response is not 
required, permitted or practicable.
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§12 D ir e c te d  a t t e n t i o n  occurs when the nervous system focuses 
consciously on external sources of sensory stimulation or on internal 
thoughts and cognitions. This distinguishes directed attention from
1) the majority of sensory stimulation which is processed 
unconsciously, such as sensory information from the inner ear 
concerning balance or the usually un-noticed pressure from body 
contact with support surfaces.
2) stable background features which, though being monitored, are 
ignored unless a sudden alteration occurs, such as the clock stopping.
§13 T h o u g h t  is the conscious planning and problem-solving activity of an 
organism, a process assisted by conscious learning or by the unconscious 
consolidation of learning, whether in sleep or automatically during the 
acquisition of practical skills.
§14 To adopt the a e s th e t ic  a t t i t u d e  is to take ‘time out’ from the flux of 
work-a-day practical necessities and, in a highly vigilant state of mind, to 
scrutinise an object or thought in order to focus on the full range of feelings 
and thoughts it engenders in the subject. This ‘time out’ factor (i.e. not 
immediately pragmatic) is the origin of the term d is in te re s te d n e ss  in the 
context of aesthetics.
§15 A e s th e t ic  ex p e rie n c e  is the heightened state of awareness following the 
adoption of the aesthetic attitude (§14). It involves a relative suppression of 
verbal and cognitive reasoning in favour of increased attention to the 
brain’s sensory processing modules. The attention is focused on:
1) the qualia (§7),
2) the positive or negative feelings resulting from positive or negative 
messages sent by the organism’s perceptual and cognitive systems to its 
limbic system, affecting mood and the emotions;
3) the search for meaning, so that the sensations, feelings and emotions 
engendered are related to cognitions stored in memory, or invoked by 
the aesthetic experience. A positive aesthetic experience will cause the 
attention to linger, finding the object interesting or even beautiful (§8).
A negative aesthetic experience is most likely to result from boredom 
caused by a lack of resonance between the perceived object and the 
organism’s cognitions. Given cognitive resonance in a mind prepared 
for the experience, ugly or even disgusting objects can yield positive 
aesthetic experiences, as in the case of the sublime (§9).
§16 An a e s th e t ic  OBJECT is the focus of the aesthetic attitude (§14) and is the 
cause of aesthetic experience (§15) engendered in an organism equipped 
with the appropriate sense-processing organs and prior learning. An 
aesthetic object can be a natural form or environment, a crafted object or
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environment, a time-based performance, a linguistic construction, a 
feeling, thought or concept, or any combination of these.
§17 Rhetoric  is the premeditated or spontaneous deployment of the active
aesthetic (§3), whether tacit (§4) or expressive (§5) to embody, perform 
or construct an aesthetic object (§16) with persuasive intent towards 
another organism’s behaviour. Rhetorical display is competitive. When 
successful, it assists pragmatic aims. Among social organisms, success in 
rhetorical display enhances status.
§ 18 Art is the premeditated or spontaneous deployment of the active aesthetic 
(§3), whether tacit (§4) or expressive (§5) to embody, perform or 
construct an aesthetic object (§16) whether beautiful (§8) or sublime (§9) 
to bring insight to another organism without necessarily intending or 
achieving a pragmatic effect. The difference between rhetoric (§17) and 
art is a matter of degree, with a lesser emphasis on the pragmatic in art 
than in rhetoric, though the classification of any particular aesthetic 
object to either category will be open to interpretation, and therefore, 
debate. Artistic display is social and competitive, and success enhances 
an organism’s status.
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APPENDIX B.
A Partial Transcript 
comprising about 20 minutes of the total 
of
“Soul Music”
A Radio 4 programme 
(broadcast on Tuesday 29th January 2008)
about
Spent in Alium 
by
Thomas Tallis
( 1505-85)
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A number o f  male speakers, difficult to tell apart, are interleaved as the music fades in 
and out.
My name is Graham Fife - 1 used to sing when I was living in Norfolk in the University 
of East Anglia choir and I joined the Aldbrough Festival Singers . . .so the deal was that 
we’d meet at Blythbrugh church in the Suffolk countryside -  it is a magical place -  
there’s heathland and marshland -  it’s quite stark -  the sky is huge, and Blythbrugh 
church almost standing there on its own, reaching up into the firmament -  I’m 
choaking up just remembering what it was like! . . . We stood there with our scores
round the font -  so we stood in a great big circle  And there is that moment of
silence -  total silence - and when that first voice came in, it really was like an 
enchantment . . .  It is like a dawn - first ray of light coming -  even the first twittering of 
the birds in the stillness . .  .
(change of voice)
There are certain bits of music that tug on heartstrings, and Spem in Alium is just one of 
those pieces of music that touches your soul . . . .  there’s a piece somewhere in my 
chest near my heart that just suddenly starts sort of coming up . . .  and catches in my 
throat - this piece of music puts you in a different world altogether . . .
(Graham Fife)
. . .  and the music began to move -  and then the other voices came in -  then I joined, 
and gradually, gradually the whole thing built and built and built and the church filled 
with the music . . . .
(Change of voice)
Sometimes, music like this challenges the way we live, in a big way, and makes you
want to just stop and listen  There’s something bigger and something more
important going on, and we need to just stop and register it every now and then . . .
(Graham Fife!
and then slowly the whole piece begins to open up — (pause) — so that in the end we 
really are swept up — and I mean swept up into the great blooming of sound . . .
My name’s Simon Halsey. . . I’m the chorus director of the City of Birmingham 
Symphony Orchestra . . . Spem in Alium  is a motet, which means it’s a piece of choral 
music with sacred words. It’s about 10 minutes long. So far, there’s nothing exceptional 
about i t . .  .What is completely exceptional about it is that it’s for 40 voices — It’s the 
largest scale piece ever attempted by any composer and no-one did anything else on a 
similar scale for hundreds o f years afterwards. It’s a fantastic one-off crazy thing—
(Change of voice)
This is Thomas Tallis taking on an immense work of creation . . .  if you like paralleling 
the complexity of ruling a kingdom, creating the universe — I mean, this is not too 
highfallutin’ -  this is what music was for -  It is praise, it is the most wonderful burst of 
joy and awe . . .
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(Change of voice)
(He starts o ff in Latin, then translates) “I have never put my hope in any other but you, 
O God of Israel, who will be angry and yet will become again gracious, and who 
forgives all the sins o f suffering men. Lord God, creator of heaven and earth, look upon 
our lowliness” . . .  I mean, for somebody who was a giant of music in the church at the 
time and pretty high up in the court to come out with a piece like th a t. .  .“Look upon 
our lowliness!’ . . . you know, and yet to come out with a piece that is so majestic ..  
expressing his feelings before God . .  . is just incredible to me . . .
(Change of voice)
Thomas Tallis is very important in our musical history because of the time that he lived. 
There have been various times in musical history where Britain was one of the top 
nations. One of those times was in the Tudor period. We had two overwhelmingly 
famous and successful composers, Thomas Tallis and William Bird . . . .  Between them 
they spanned a period from about 1500 to about 1625. They knew each other and 
worked with each other, though Tallis was a good deal older than Bird. And they were 
not only great composers, they were great politicians, in that they managed to live 
through the constant period o f flux between being Catholic, being Protestant, going 
back to being Catholic again, returning to being Protestant, and our Royal patrons in the 
Tudor time -  you have to remember that finally there was comparative peace, that the 
Tudor Kings were beginning to be able to be patrons of the arts, that there was a little 
more time to hunt, to play music, to cook, to enjoy plays, to go out safely in the street 
rather than simply scrapping over who owned what and marching on each other . . .  So, 
with this prosperity and comparative safety comes of course the end of building castles 
and the beginning of building great houses, comes the beginning of florid and glorious 
gardens, come the plays of Shakespeare and his contemporaries, and music somehow 
relaxes . . .
(Simon Halsev again?!
It’s constructed for 8 separate choirs -  each choir has 5 voices -  so 8 time 5 gives you 
40 -  each choir has a soprano, an alto, a tenor, a baritone and a bass in it. If you go to a 
performance of it, the audience is often in the middle, with the choir in a huge circle 
around them, and that’s the best way to experience it, because you see the music pass 
from left to right, great walls and blocks of sound - you then see it start from the right 
and go to the left and then go in both directions . . . .  It’s like being at a funfair -  one of 
those wonderful machines that throws you one way and then brings you back the other 
way . . .
I’m Clive Stafford Smith, and I’m the Director of the British legal charity, Reprieve, 
and we help people who are on death row and we also represent a bunch of folk in 
Guantanemo, in the American secret prisons. Every time I tried a death penalty case in 
America, I always had a song that I would have for that trial, because it’s late at night, 
you know, you come back from court at 8 o’clock at night, and work till very late 
preparing for the next day, and I’d just like one piece of music that I have on the 
headphones and I’m working . . . you want the music not to interfere with your thought 
processes — you want nothing to interfere with it, which why I listened to the same piece 
of music over and over. It was Spem in Alium , which had just struck me which I adopted 
then, for the trial I was having in Alabama — a guy called Otis Grimsley — It was an 
immensely difficult experience (all o f them are difficult) . . .  in Alabama - in the heart 
of darkness of racial discrimination. This guy was being tried in Henry County where
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no Afro-American person had not been sentenced to death on a capital charge -  And 
when we started the trial I was frankly terrified. It was hugely confrontational, and 
everyone in the courthouse was white apart from Otis, and the prosecutor was trying to 
get rid of all the black people! And I remember, they kicked 17 black people off the jury 
in a row — I had a calculator, and told the judge that the chances against the prosecutors 
doing this by chance were 37 billion to 1, and the judge later told me, no, it isn’t, it’s 1 
in 1 - it always happens! Which I thought somewhat missed the point . . . .  We were 
having this racist battle, and eventually the courtroom was filling up with black people, 
on our side of it, so there was hope! I worked from 8am to 8pm, and had an hour’s 
drive to a motel, as it was a rinky-dink town with no motel -  Well this time I chose 
Spem in Alium and I’d stay up listening to it - 1 sat with my computer and head-phones, 
and listen to it 5 times an hour -  I’d listen to it over and over again -  so I’d listen to it, 
you know, 20 or 25 times -  at the end o f the night I would have a last few listens for the 
emotional transportation - there can be nothing more different than sweating in a motel 
in Alabanma dealing with life and death, and being transported somehow into this 
idyllic world of choral voices . . . it’s just an out of body, out of mind experience and 
literally takes you away from the fear that otherwise could be quite paralysing, if you’re 
thinking, “Oh, goodness, if I screw this up , this guy is going to die a horrible death!” 
Then it’s really good to get transported away from th a t.. .  There’s no way you can 
represent someone for their life without believing in them . . .  or starting a trial without 
believing we were going to win . .. You have to have that belief, you have to have that 
hope! There’s no way you can represent someone for the life without liking them, and 
becoming emotionally close to them. We beat them quite soundly in the trial -  there’s 
no emotional experience like that -  it was just this thing of the town coming together 
and it was fantastic and Otis was the first person not to be sentenced to death, indeed, he 
was not convicted of capital murder, I’m glad to say, and to have the inspiration of this 
helped me immensely.
I’m John Davies. I’ve worked in Walsall for 30-odd years as an Anglican priest, and 
was a trustee of Walsall Art Gallery. Like most people, some of the modem art you see, 
you just think, “What’s that for?”, and “What’s it trying to say?” -  but I like being 
challenged by it, and having my thoughts provoked by it - 1 think that’s what art’s there 
for -  and some of it, if  you take the time to look at it, and listen, can just knock you over 
. . .  One of the exhibitions that came up included Janet Cardiff s “sound sculpture”. I 
thought, “That sounds interesting! What’s that?” and I expected a wet finger squeaking 
on a glass, and the old saw played with a violin bow, that sort of thing . . .  Dr. Who-type 
music from the electronic workshop — Well, I came up to the main gallery on the 3rd 
floor -  it’s quite a large room, brightly lit -  there are a lot of windows- and there were 
these 40 speakers — I went into the room on my own, thinking, “What’s this trying to 
say?” . . . .  I looked at the notice saying what it was all about, and Spem in Alium 
started up — and the 40 speakers were individual voices, and so I thought, “Where are 
you supposed to stand?” -  so I stood in the middle, and when the waves of music came 
over me, I don’t think I’ve ever been so moved in all my life — I stood in the middle of 
the room — I was in tears at the end, listening to it! It was amazing! I went back about 
five times . .  . because if you stand in the middle you hear the whole choir, and then I 
discovered you can walk round and listen to each individual voice, or stand in one 
comer and listen to one five-part choir. And this sound sculpture just came to life for 
me! It affected many people in different ways, you know . .  In pastoral terms, I think 
you could have used it as a counselling aid, and put counsellors in there to talk to people 
as they came out, in tears — because it had that effect on people................ Spem in Alium
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is on my ipod and I sometimes sit down and just plug in and listen to that -  and ponder 
the day or ponder what’s gone on before. There have been periods in my life when I’ve 
had my ups and downs, and there are times when I need to remind myself that the world 
is not an easy place, and it’s difficult, and I’ve been a bit low, at times of bereavement, 
which I’ve had, times of change and difficulty. I’ve got a son with learning difficulties 
and he’s got his own house now -  and when he went, I didn’t know what to do, because 
it’s very difficult to let somebody go, you know, and grow up and be themselves. It 
difficult when anybody goes away from home, but if they’ve got special needs . . .  and 
I found that really difficult and this piece at that period made me think, you know, he’s 
an adult, and I’ve always trusted God with him . .  . God’s there to be with us, and that 
piece expresses that more powerfully than most other pieces I’ve ever come across . . . .
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APPENDIX ‘C>
Pictures and a transcript excerpt 
from
“Bower Birds -The Art of Seduction” 
written and presented by
David Attenborough
[a. goipcwflwy]
From a poster advertising a public debate between D avid Oates and Bernard van Lierop, 
chaired by Gideon Calder. The motion was: “Is a Bowerbird really an Artist?” . The event 
took place at the Centre For Lifelong Learning, Cardiff University, on 13 June 2001.
Illustrai
a BBC Natural World programme 
Broadcast on 
17th December 2000
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Notes are supplied in brackets, and Attenborough’s 
words, later, have been put into inverted commas:
(The male o f  the Western Bowerbird Chlamydera 
maculata guttata arranging its treasures; Australia)
(The bower o f  the Stagemaker Bowerbird, 
Scenopoeetes dentirostris, with a female, in the top 
left-hand comer, showing interest; N. E. Queensland, 
Australia)
(The Stagemaker bowerbird’s courtship ritual begins, 
as with most o f  the 18 species o f  bowerbird, with the 
male hiding and reappearing to attract the female’s 
interest.)
(This is a male Yellow-crested Gardener or 
MacGregor bowerbird, Amblyornis macgregoriae, in 
New Guinea. He has a brilliant yellow-orange crest 
which is kept folded down, making him look a plain 
brown, when not performing his courtship display. He 
performs only when a female has descended on to the 
‘runway’ o f his ‘maypole-style’ bower. In this picture, 
one o f his collection o f small decorative lumps o f a 
rare black fungus has fallen down on to the ‘runway’, 
and he is returning it to where it belongs, on the top 
surface o f the boundary wall)
(This view shows the whole boundary wall, the 
‘runway’, and the lower 20% o f  the central ‘maypole’, 
which is a young tree fern. The twigs do not belong to 
the tree fern, but have been collected and attached to 
it by the male, and hung decoratively with amber- 
coloured caterpillar droppings. The top o f  the tree fern 
is growing freely, forming an umbrella-shaped canopy 
to the whole ensemble)
(This shows the beginning o f  the rarely witnessed 
climax to the male’s courtship dance. After a bout o f  
the group’s usual ‘hide and seek’ routine, he begins to 
allow the female flashing glimpses o f  the brilliant 
crest which is normally folded down, totally hidden 
from view)
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.. [and] there are these glowing orange dead leaves.. .
“ . . .  These are the acorns o f  the oak trees, the tropical oaks 
which are common around here . . .
. .  and on it the shiny wing covers o f  beetles . . .  there’s 
orange fruit there . . .
(This shows the McGregor bowerbird at the peak o f its 
display. It whirs around, its golden crest flashing like flames 
on the forest floor. After a display which has reached such a 
crescendo, the birds are now likely to mate somewhere in the 
forest, nearby. At this point in the film, Attenborough 
speculates on the female’s ‘aesthetic sense . . artistic sense’, a 
passage transcribed in the main text, in Chapter Eight. Then, 
footage of the bird adding twigs to its maypole was wittily 
inter-cut with a sequence o f  environmental artist Andy Golds­
worthy building a 7-foot high sculpture from fallen branches 
and twigs, under an oak tree. “If Goldsworthy’ work is widely 
accepted as art, and it is,” asks Attenborough, “why not the 
MacGregor bowerbird’s?”)
(Next, Attenborough shows three different bowers built 
within a small area o f the New Guinea rainforest by three 
different males o f the Brown Gardener (or ‘ Vogelkop’) 
bowerbird species, Amblyornis inornatus. Looking at the first 
one, he exclaims . . . )
“What an astonishment it is! Surely one o f  the wonders o f  the 
natural world! The bower has been completely roofed over, 
thatched with these stems o f  orchids. It’s been built around 
the base of a sapling. It has a stout pillar in the middle and 
two smaller pillars at the side to support it.
“The whole o f the ‘treasury’ is 5 or 6 yards across, and what a 
treasury it contains, or what a variety o f  treasures it contains! 
On the far side there are the black stems o f  tree ferns. Here is 
the lawn neatly planted with moss . . .
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“ . .  .Behind me are black fruits . .
“ . . .  This individual behind me, nearby, however, has 
completely different taste . . .
. .  His bower is just as large and as splendidly 
thatched, but he has taken advantage o f  a bush coming 
into bloom . . .
. .  and has decided to try to impress the touring 
females with floral decorations [soundtrack plays 
department store musak, as the camera pans over the 
blossoms on display].. .
“ [whereas] This individual is experimenting with 
browns.. .
“ . . .  and a black mushroom . .
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APPENDIX ‘D’
English Translation by Bernard van Lierop 
from the Latin of
Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten’s 
Metaphysica (§§501-623)
Working from the Latin text, edited and translated into German, by
Hans Rudolf Schweizer
in
Texte zur Grundlegung derAsthetik
(Texts Towards Laying the Foundations o f Aesthetics) 
Published in 1983, in Hamburg by Felix Meiner Verlag
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METAPHYSICS Part III
PSYCHOLOGY
INTRODUCTION
§501 PSYCHOLOGY is the science o f the mind’s general predicates.
§502 Psychology comprises the first principles of theology, aesthetics, logic and the 
practical sciences; it is, therefore, with reason (§501), relevant (§2) to 
metaphysics (§ 1).
§503 It is asserted that PSYCHOLOGY is 1) empirical, based on immediate
experience, i.e. EMPIRICAL PSYCHOLOGY and 2) rational, deduced from 
the idea of the mind’s lengthy sequence o f ratiocinations, i.e. RATIONAL 
PSYCHOLOGY.
CHAPTER I: EMPIRICAL PSYCHOLOGY
Section I: The Existence of Mind
§504 If within an entity there is an x, which can be aware of something else, that x 
is MIND. In me there exists (§55) something which can be aware of 
something else(§57). Therefore, mind exists in me (I exist as a mind)1.
§505 I think; my state of mind is altered (§125, 504). Therefore, thoughts are the
happenings of my mind (§210); for at least some of these happenings my mind 
supplies the sufficient reason (§21). Therefore, my mind is a power (§197).
§506 Thoughts are representations. Therefore my mind is a representational power 
(§505).
§507 My mind thinks of at least parts o f this universe, albeit only partially (§354). 
Therefore my mind is a force representative of its universe, at least partly 
(§155).
§508 I think of certain bodies in the universe, and o f their changes: of this body, a 
few (changes); of that body, more; and of one body, the most. This last body is 
a part of me (§155). Hence MY BODY is the one whose many changes are in 
my thoughts, more than those o f any other body.
§509 My body has, in this world, a determinate position (§85), locus, age (§281) 
and situation (§284).
§510 I think of certain things distinctly, o f others confusedly. The confused thinking 
about something does not differentiate its qualities3; nevertheless, the confused 
thinking does yield a representation or perception. Now, if the qualities, thus
1 Baumgarten does not use “x”, but in English a run o f  “somethings” and “anythings” is less clear.
2 Vis, also translatable as “force”.
3 Notas, also translatable as “notes”.
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confusedly represented, were to make distinctions, which are confusedly 
represented, the result would [nevertheless] be distinct thought; if  the qualities 
were not perceived at all, absolutely confused thought results; those 
confusedly perceived qualities provide no power to distinguish one thing from 
another. Therefore, he who thinks confusedly represents something, [but] 
obscurely.4
§511 There exist obscure perceptions in the mind (§510). All of these, [taken] as a 
complex, are called the FOUNDATION of the MIND.
§512 From the position o f my body in this universe it can be known why I might 
perceive this more obscurely, that more clearly and the other more distinctly 
(§306, 509); i.e. I REPRESENT [the world] ACCORDING to the POSITION 
of my BODY in this universe.
§513 My mind is a power (§505) which represents (§506) the universe (§507) 
according to the position o f my own body (§512).
§514 The sum of all the representations in the mind is TOTAL PERCEPTION, 
whose parts are PARTIAL PERCEPTION and the complex of obscure 
representations is the FIELD OF OBSCURITY (of darkness), which is the 
foundation of the mind, the complex o f clear representations is the FIELD OF 
CLARITY (of light) comprising the representational FIELDS OF THE 
CONFUSED, THE DISTINCT, THE ADEQUATE, etc.
§515 Reality is true knowledge (§12, 36), whose opposite is non-existent or
deficient knowledge; IGNORANCE and seeming knowledge or ERROR are 
negations [of true knowledge]. (§81. 36) Minimal knowledge is the smallest 
truth about the least, single object (§161). Therefore, the more numerous [the 
facts], the more intense5 (§160) and the truer the object shall be, the more 
clearly defined, until it achieves the greatest truth [comprised of] the most 
numerous and most intense [qualities6]. There is a scale of KNOWLEDGE. 
Where many things are known, there is PLENITUDE (copiousness, extension, 
wealth, vastness); where fewer things are known, there is NARROWNESS; 
where more truths are known, there is DIGNITY (nobility, greatness, gravity, 
majesty); where less is known, there is WANT (meagreness, short measure). 
Where there is more truth, knowledge is conjoined with greater order; that 
which is the truer (§ 184) is the more intense; the truly established 
KNOWLEDGE is EXACT (accurately hewn out); less truth-revealing 
knowledge is [only] ROUGH-HEWN. The more orderly the cognition, or 
METHOD, the greater the resulting METHODICAL KNOWLEDGE 
(didactic, disciplined); the less orderly results in a TUMULTUOUS 
MUDDLE. Knowledge and its representations in my mind are either less or 
more intense (§214); these representations, where they are reasons, or
4 Obsure, also translatable as “dark” or “darkly”.
5 maior, “greater” can mean louder, for a voice, hence my choice o f  “more intense”. It is translated by
Schweizer as “bedeutender”, or more distinct, significant or meaningful.
6 Elsewhere, I use the word “qualities” to translate notas, which Mary J. Gregor (Op. Cit. 1983 ) refers
to as “notes”, or items o f  sensory experience. Here, in the Latin, there is no substantive, only 
something understood, whereas the English requires one, which I have attempted to supply.
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EVIDENCE IN THE BROADER SENSE, are thereby given force and power 
(§197). There is no knowledge that is totally sterile (§23); however, 
knowledge is more effective if  MORE VIGOROUS and STRONGER; if  faint, 
it is WEAK, HELPLESS (feeble, ineffectual). Comparatively feeble 
representations alter a state o f mind to a lesser degree; more powerful 
representations alter a state o f mind to a greater degree (§208,214).
§516 PERCEPTIONS which combine with other partial elements to form a totality 
are called ASSOCIATIONS; the strongest one of which is the ruling one.
§517 The more qualities a perception comprises, the stronger it is (§23, 515). An 
obscure perception, comprising many qualities, is stronger than a clear 
perception, and a confused perception comprising many qualities is (also) 
stronger than a distinct perception. PERCEPTIONS which include many 
qualities are called PREGNANT. Therefore such pregnant perceptions are the 
stronger sort. For this reason, such ideas have great strength (§148). Pregnant 
concepts are EMPHATIC [concepts] (emphases). The science of these is 
EMPHASEOLOGY7. The power of proper nouns is not small.
§518 The state of mind, in which the dominant perceptions are obscure, is the
REIGN OF DARKNESS; the state of mind in which clear perceptions rule is 
the REIGN OF LIGHT.
Section II: The Lower Cognitive Faculty.
§519 My mind knows something (§506). Therefore it has a COGNITIVE
FACULTY, i.e. the ability to know something (§57, 216) (intellect in the 
broader sense, cf. §402).
§520 My mind knows some things obscurely, and other things confusedly (§510). 
Now, other things being equal, when something is perceived as different from 
other things, more is perceived than when perceiving something, but not 
distinguishing it from other things (§57). Therefore, other things being equal, 
clear knowledge is greater than obscure knowledge (§515). Hence there is a 
scale of knowledge: obscurity is lower on this scale of knowledge and clarity 
is higher (§160, 246). By the same reasoning, the confused is also lesser or 
lower, and the distinct greater or higher. Therefore, the obscure and confused 
or indistinct FACULTY, in knowing anything, is the LOWER COGNITIVE 
faculty. Therefore my mind has a lower cognitive faculty (§57, 216).
§521 Any REPRESENTATION which is not distinct is called SENSORY.
Therefore, the power o f my mind represents, through its lower faculty, sensory 
perceptions (§520, 513).
7 EMPHASEOLOGIA
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§522 I represent certain things to m yself thus: some of their qualities8 are clear,
others obscure. In a perception o f this kind, the clear qualities are distinct, and 
the obscure qualities are sensory (§521). Therefore, that perception is clear 
which has some added obscure and confused elements, and this one is sensory, 
in which some clarity is inherent. This is in accordance with the lower faculty 
of cognition (§520).
§523 The qualities of any representation are either mediated or immediate (§67, 27). 
The latter, in any perception, are to be respected as clear judgments.
§524 The qualities of any perception are either sufficient or insufficient (§21, 67), 
either absolutely necessary (§106, 107), or in themselves contingent (§108), 
either absolutely immutable and constant (§132), or variable or mutable 
(§133); the first mentioned o f these qualities are sometimes called unique, 
owing to their prominence.
§525 The qualities of a representation are either negative or real (§135). The former 
indicate a NEGATIVE PERCEPTION, and the latter is called a POSTIVE 
PERCEPTION. Negative perceptions are either TOTALLY [negative], such 
that their individual qualities are negative, so that nothing is perceptible 
(§136), or they are PARTIALLY so, such that some qualities are negative, 
either truly or apparently (§12).
§526 Of such qualities, some are more fruitful and more pregnant9 than others
(§1661, both of which can be said to be sufficient compared to the insufficient 
ones (§169, 524).
§527 We call EASY that which few forces may achieve; that which requires more,
is called DIFFICULT. Hence, something is EASY for a CERTAIN SUBJECT 
able to achieve something while engaging a small part of the powers which 
lend him strength. Something is DIFFICULT for a CERTAIN SUBJECT, 
which requires a large part o f the powers which make up a substantial part of 
their strength. Therefore, there is a scale of easiness and difficulty (§246).
§528 A perception is minimally clear whose qualities are just sufficient to
distinguish one thing from a very different other thing with the greatest 
difficulty (§161). Therefore, the more plentiful and the more the same [the 
qualities] are, the more easily I can distinguish my perception from the more 
plentiful and the more similar qualites, the clearer my perception is for me 
(§160), until, that is the clearest which, from everything else which is most 
similar to it, I am the most easily able to make distinctions (§161). Minimally 
obscure is that representation, whose qualities are just insufficient to 
distinguish something from another very similar thing (§161). Therefore, the 
more plentiful [the qualities], the greater the diversity, the greater force
* Here once more Baumgarten uses the word notae. The same word, or word stem, begins §523-6.
9gravis, “heavy”, can mean “pregnant”. See §517.
%  the Latin, the second half o f  this section comprises only three words: utrumque sufficientes 
insufficientibus. My translation o f  these three words (both . . .  insufficient) has been 
influenced by Schweizer, who puts “beides gilt fur die hinreichenden im Vergleich zu den 
night hinreichenden”.
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applied, if the perception is nevertheless unable to make a distinction, this 
intensity is its own obscurity, to the point that that is most obscure to me, 
which can distinguish nothing from anything else, however diverse, despite 
summoning all my powers to the task (§161).
§529 I ATTEND to that which I perceive clearly; that which is more obscure than 
others I AM DIVERTED FROM IT. Therefore I have the faculty of giving my 
attention to something and withdrawing it (§216), but within limits (§354), up 
to a certain extent, not to any ultimate degree (§248). The more that is taken 
away from a finite quantity, the less will be the residue. Therefore, the more I 
attend to one thing, the less can I attend to another: therefore, either a stronger 
perception will be darkened if  a weaker one seizes one’s attention, or one can 
withdraw one’s attention from a weaker perception11 (§528, 515).
§530 A PERCEPTION may contain additional qualities, which are less clear than 
those qualities to which I give most o f my attention. Such a perception is 
COMPLEX. In any COMPLEX IDEA, the complex of qualities I attend to 
most constitutes a PRIMARY PERCEPTION, and the complex of less clear 
qualities is called an ADHERENT (secondary) PERCEPTION. Hence a 
complex perception is the total o f primary and adherent perceptions (§155).
§531 Take two clear ideas with three qualities, but in the one case let these be clear, 
and obscure in the other; the first idea is the clearer. Therefore, the clarity of 
the ideas increases with the clarity of the qualities, for distinctness, adequacy 
etc. Take two clear ideas whose qualities are equally clear, o f which there are 
three qualities in one and six in the other; the latter will be the clearer o f the 
two (§528). Therefore, a multiplicity o f qualities increases the clarity (§162). 
The CLARITY of clear qualities is more INTENSIVE, the multiplicity of 
[obscure12] qualities, it could be said, is MORE EXTENSIVE. A clearer 
extensive perception is VIVID. The vividness of an IDEA and of an 
ORATION is its RADIENCE (splendour), and its opposite is ARIDITY (a 
thorny kind of thinking and speaking). Both kinds of clarity impart 
PERSPICUITY. Hence perspicuity is either vivid or intellectual, or both. A 
PERCEPTION, [is that] whose power is exerted in order that the truth o f a 
different perception should be known, and ITS POWER is PROVING things, 
whose power is to make something else clear, and ITS POWER is 
EXPLICATING (declaring), whose power is to make something else vivid, 
and ITS POWER is ILLUSTRATING (painting), which makes something 
distinct, and ITS POWER is RESOLVING things (evolving them). The 
knowledge of truth is CERTITUDE (seen subjectively cf. §93). Sensory 
certainty is PERSUASION, intellectual [certainty is] CONVICTION. He who 
thinks a) of a thing and b) o f its truth, other things being equal, knows more 
than he who thinks of only a) the thing. Hence, THOUGHTS and 
COGNITIONS which are certain, other things being equal, are more 
meaningful13 than UNCERTAIN ones, which are not certain (§515). A 
deservedly uncertain cognition is SUPERFICIAL whereas a certain one,
11 My translation o f the conclusion is heavily dependent on Schweizer s German translation.
12 The word obscure is absent, but the balanced nature o f  the sentences, and the overall sense, would
seem to demand it.
13 maior, translated by Schweizer as bedeutend.
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[thoroughly] investigated, is SOLID. The clearer, the more vivid, the more 
distinct, a cognition is, the more meaningful it is. A PERCPTION which has 
another truth as a corollary, has power either to PERSUADE or to 
CONVINCE. Transparent certainty is EVIDENCE14.
§532 Both extensively clear and intensively clear [representations] can be sensory 
(§522, 531), and then the more vivid is more perfect than the less vivid. The 
more vivid [representation] (§185) can be more powerful than the intensively 
clearer, even when the latter is a distinct perception (§517).
§533 AESTHETICS is the science o f sensorily knowing and proposing (the logical 
faculty of lower cognition, the philosophy of the graces and the muses, lower 
epistemology, the art o f thinking beautifully, art as an analogy to reason).
Section III: Sense
§534 I think [of] my present state. Therefore I represent my present state, i.e. I 
SENSE. The representations o f my present state or SENSATIONS 
(appearances) are representations o f the present state of the world (§369). 
Therefore my sensation is caused [both] by the representational power of the 
mind and according to the position o f my body (§513).
§535 I have a sentient faculty (§216), i.e. SENSE. SENSE represents either the 
Internal sate of my mind, or the EXTERNAL state of my body. Hence 
SENSATION is either INTERNAL (§508) through the internal sense 
(consciousness, strictly speaking) or EXTERNAL, actuated by the external 
sense (§534).
§536 Those parts of the body sensitive to contact with external passing objects are 
called AESTHETERIA (sense organs). Through them I have the faculty of 
sensing 1) whatever comes into contact with my body, [the sense of] TOUCH, 
2) light, [the sense of] SIGHT, 3) sound [the sense of] HEARING, 4) the flux 
[of particles] from bodies which ascends into the nose [the sense of] SMELL, 
5) the salts which dissolve in the inner part of the mouth, [the sense of] 
TASTE.
§537 The greater the impact on the sense organ, the stronger, the clearer is the 
sensation; the less [impact it has], the weaker and the more obscure is the 
external sensation (§513, 512). The place in which a stimulus can most affect 
the organ, in order to sense clearly, is the SPHERE of SENSATION. In the 
sphere of sensation is located the most responsive POINT o f SENSATION.
§538 The smaller the stimuli are, the more remote from the point o f sensation, the 
more obscure, the weaker they are in their sensation The stronger [they are], 
the clearer, the closer [they are] to the point o f sensation, the greater the 
stimuli are (§537, 288).
14 Certaperpicuitas est EVIDENTIA.
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§539 The least meaningful15 sensation would be a single thing experienced at
maximum proximity and with greatest impact, but represented at the lowest 
level o f truth, light and certitude (§531, 538). Hence the more plural, the 
smaller, the more remote the object making the least impact on the sense 
organ, [while] the greater the truth, clarity and certainty of its representation, 
the more meaningful16 it is (§219, 535)..
§540 A more meaningful SENSE [impression] is called ACUTE, a less meaningful 
is called BLUNT. The more fitting the stimulus shall be to the workings of the 
sense organs, or the more fitting it is adapted to be, the sharper is the external 
sense, or the more it is sharpened up. The more inept it is, or the more 
inappropriately delivered to the sensory organ, the blunter is the sensation, or 
the blunter is the external sense (§537, 539)..
§541 The law o f sensation is thus: in so far as the state of the world and of my own 
state march in step, their representations will in turn follow each other, in the 
present (§534). Hence the rule of inner sensation, [which states that] insofar as 
my inner sensations follow my states o f mind, so will their representations in 
the present. The rule of external sensation [states] that, insofar as my external 
sensations follow the [changing] state of my body, their representations will 
follow in turn, in the present.
§542 A powerful sensation, compared to other single perceptions, is paramount17 
(§512, 517). Hence [such] sensations obscure other individual [sensations] 
(§529). However some other weaker [sensations] experienced together 
simultaneously can become even stronger [than a powerful one]. Either one 
sensation or the other can become stronger by weakening the other and 
making it obscure. A very great sensation can be obscured by another stronger 
[one], or by many other weaker ones experienced together simultaneously 
thereby becoming the stronger [sensation] (§529, 517).
§543 An external sensation is achieved more easily [with] 1) well prepared [sense] 
organs (§536), 2) spheres of sensation, [and] assuredly 3) the greatest 
proximity o f [the body] to the point o f sensation18 (§537); 4) if the body 
excites the sense organ in the appropriate manner regarding quality (§536), 
and 5) quantity (§538), and 6) if [there is inhibition of] not only strong, 
heterogeneous sensations, but also 7) of weaker sensations, not just singly but 
on the other hand in greater numbers, [so that] assuredly 8) other 
heterogeneous perceptions are fully suppressed (§542). An external sensation 
is inhibited if 1) the sensory organ is impeded so it cannot be stimulated in the 
usual way, 2) the less [a sense organ] is stimulated, the less it will respond 
(§537); 3) if  the perceived object is distant, 4) diminished in impact, 5) [or 
even] absolutely impeded such that it is rendered absent, 6) or if another 
[even] stronger sensation were to be excited 7) by many sensations or 8) by
15 minimus “the smallest”, translated by Schweizer as geringste, “most insignificant”.
16 maior, which Schweizer translates as bedeutender.
17 robur, meaning literally oak or hardwood, but figuratively: strength, hardness, vigour, best part, elite,
flower (Codings Gem Latin Dictionary)
181 am dependent here on Schweizer’s translation owing to problems with the Latin.
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many other perceptions dispersing the attention, so that although weaker 
singly, nevertheless when taken together, these will obscure the sensation 
which is thus impeded (§542, 221).
§544 So, the senses represent the individual things in the world, and hence all kinds 
of specific things (§535, 148); however, such things are represented by 
interwoven universals. This interweaving cannot be represented without 
connections between particulars and universals (§14, 37). In every sensation 
things connected to the senses or therefore, being sensed, are represented as 
particulars, but therefore are not clear; they are mostly, for the most part20, 
obscure. Therefore in all sensations there are some obscure elements, hence in 
sensations which are also distinct there is always some admixture of 
confusion. From this [it follows that] every sensation is a sensory perception 
formed by the faculty of lower cognition (§522). In conclusion,
EXPERIENCE is the knowledge o f clear senses; AESTHETIC acquisition and 
experiential expression is called EMPIRICAL21.
§545 TRICKS of the SENSES are false representations dependent on the senses, 
which either as sensations themselves or as ratiocinations whose premise is a 
sensation, or as perceptions which, in error, are secretly smuggled [in and 
mistaken for true] perceptions (§30, 35).
§546 While sensations themselves represent the present state of the body or mind or 
of both (§535), as the internal and external sensations perceive internal as 
much as external actualities (§205, 208); hence they can also discern 
possibilities (§57) and the things o f this world (§377), so they are in fact the 
greatest truths of the whole world (§ 184), and not one of them is a trick of the 
senses. But if therefore a trick o f the senses should be a rational deduction, its 
error lies either in that form or as a premise. If on the other hand it is based on 
a different perception which in turn is based on an undetected error, then it 
becomes a case o f a double error bom o f overhasty judgment, which 
nevertheless can easily be recouped on a second occasion (§545).
§547 ILLUSIONS [or sleights o f hand] are artifices of sensory deception; if  tricks 
of the senses arise from them, they are EFFECTIVE; if not, they are 
INEFFECTIVE. Now, the more someone suffers from prejudices, having 
ordinary responses to sensations, the less he will be on his guard against a 
surreptitious deception; with such a person many illusions will be effective 
(§545). Any person free from all prejudices and immune to all surreptitious 
deceptions would be immune to the effects of illusions [or sleights o f hand] 
(§546).
§548 Propositions [such as] “Whatever I do not experience or sense clearly (§544), 
does not exist” (the THOMIST PREJUDICE), or “is impossible”; or, “That 
representation which is (partly) the same as another, is itself that same 
perception”, or, “Those things which co-exist or which succeed each other 
alternately, flow together into another single reality”, or the sophism,
191 am not sure I have understood the first half o f  this correctly (contrasting particulars and universals).
20 The redundancy is in the Latin: maximam partem  plerumque.
21 The final clause reads: AESTHETICA com parandae et proponendae experientiae est EMPIRIC A.
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“following that, therefore caused by that”. These are major first premises 
joined by tricks of the senses (§546), hence also by effective illusions (§547).
§549 Accordingly, another stronger perception obscures a weaker (§529); for the 
same reason the weaker perception brightens [or acts as a foil to] the stronger 
(§531). Hence if a different, clearer, stronger perception succeeds upon the 
perception of a weaker object, that which is new, in the field of clear 
sensations, is perceived the more intensely22(§529). Therefore, a clear, 
stronger, sensation, following upon other weaker ones, is highlighted by its 
very novelty (§542, 534). Hence weaker things in contrast with another thing 
illuminate it [or act as a foil to it] (§81, 531). Opposites when juxtaposed 
enhance each other.
§550 If a sensation, in as much as it can be observed, is made up of absolutely the 
same set of many complete perceptions immediately in succession, it shines, 
in the first instance, with the light o f novelty (§549). This diminishes in part 
the following time, and the more so in the third instance, and so forth. Hence, 
unless illuminated from some other quarter, it becomes less clear in the second 
total perception, becoming yet again less clear in the third, always reducing in 
this way, until it is very obscure (§529). Therefore sensations, which might, as 
far as one can observe them, themselves remain unchanged for a long time, 
nevertheless they do become obscure just by the passage o f time (§539).
§551 Sensations do not remain equally strong (§550). Therefore, if  they were as 
powerful as it is possible to be, they abate (§247).
§552 I AM AWAKE, as long as I sense the outside; when I begin to sense in this 
way, I become WIDE AWAKE. If individual sensations in a healthy person 
have their accustomed level o f clarity, he is said to be COMPOS [in control].
If any of these sensations become so vivid that it noticeably obscures the 
others, HE IS ENRAPTURED (forgets himself, is not with himself). The 
status of the internal senses snatched outside o f a person is ECSTASY (vision, 
the mind moved, excess o f mind).
§553 Mental ecstasy is natural to the mind, and will itself be actuated by nature
(§552, 470); if not itself actuated by nature, it will be preternatural (474), the 
which if not actuated by the natural universe will be supernatural (§474). 
Miraculous ecstasies are possible (§474, 552), even if  hypothetical (§482- 
500).
§554 If the level of clarity in the sensations o f somebody who is awake abates on
account of vapours rising to the brain from drink, he is INEBRIATED, or 
becomes DRUNK. If the same happens because of illness, that condition is 
called VERTIGO, either simple, or dark or deranged.
§555 If clear external sensations come to an end, provided vital movements of the
body, as much as they may be observed, remain almost the same, and I am
22 magis, translated by Schweizer as “stdrke wahrgenommen”, i.e. more strongly distinct.
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DROWSY (I fall asleep), or at least the sensations more perceptibly abate I 
SUFFER a LOSS of CONSCIOUSNESS.
§556 The state of obscure external sensations, in which the vital movements of the 
body, as far as they can be observed, remain almost the same as they are in the 
waking state, is SLEEP; anyone in this state IS SLEEPING; [the state] in 
which these sensations are noticeably reduced is LOSS OF MIND 
(breakdown, failing life strength, collapse); in which everything ceases 
absolutely, there will be DEATH. Therefore sleep, coma and death are very 
similar to each other (§265).
Section IV: Imagination
§557 I am conscious of my state, hence also of the earlier state of the world (§369). 
The representation of the earlier state o f the world, hence of my own past 
state, is a VISUALISATION23 (imagination, vision, apparition). Therefore I 
imagine, or, through the representative power of the mind, I form images of 
the universe according to the position of my body (§513).
§558 I have the faculty o f imagining or IMAGINATION (§557, 216). And since my 
imaginings are perceptions o f things which were once present (§557, 298), 
though now absent, when they are imagined by me, [the mental images] are of 
the senses (§223).
§559 A PERCEPTION is PRODUCED (is developed), which reduces the darkness 
in the mind; [any perception] which increases the darkness, is VEILED; a 
perception which is now veiled but was once exposed, is reproduced (it 
recurs). Now, sense is produced by the imagination (§558), hence once 
explicit (§542), it is afterwards veiled (§551). Therefore, the imagination 
reproduces perceptions, and nothing is in the imagination which was not 
beforehand in the senses (§534).
§560 The movements of the brain, which occur at the same time as the successive 
representations of the mind, are called MATERIAL IDEAS24. Hence, material 
ideas are [a matter] of sensing in the body and of imagining in the mind 
(§508).
§561 The imagination and the senses are separate (§539, 534); for this reason they 
are in general constituted as tied to each other. Whence comes the law of the 
imagination: when an idea [or image or representation] is partially perceived, 
it is recalled in its totality (§306, 514). Even now this proposition is called the 
association of ideas25.
§562 While [my mental] representation, and hence [my mental] imagery (§557), 
[depends on] the position o f my body (§512), that which I sense externally,
23 PHANTASMA
24IDEAE MA TER1ALES. ,
25 Schweizer refers in footnote 121 to “J. Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690) 2,
33”.
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will be nearer to my body than that which I imagine (§535, 558); it is 
exposed26, which is the reason why the latter [sensations] might be clearer and 
stronger (§538). Assuredly, while [physical] sensations and [mental] imagery 
coexist, the former will obscure the latter (§542); nothing is conceived more 
powerfully than that which I sense; thus however, the level of clarity in the 
imagination depends on the level o f clarity in sensation (§561).
§563 That which I sense repeatedly, I also reproduce frequently; these form a 
greater part of the total number o f all my ideas than [do] rarer [instances] 
(§514). Therefore mental imagery o f the former kind are more tightly secured 
(§561) to any perceptual qualities than are the latter (§530). Hence, the former 
are more extensively clear or more vivid (§531). That which I sense more 
rarely, I reproduce more rarely; and when it is experienced, according to the 
law of contrasts (§81), the effect is heightened by the light of novelty, 
compared to a more frequent experience (§549). Therefore, rare sensory 
experiences and their recall are, other things being equal, more vivid than 
commonplace experiences and their recall (§531).
§564 Just as sensation obscures imagination, so accordingly the same more recent 
and stronger [mental] imagery will obscure older, weaker [mental] imagery 
(§562); hence, taking equally clear sensations, there being no other 
impediment, the more recent sensation will be imagined the more clearly.
§565 A minimal mental image would we that which is a single, very strong
sensation (§562), very often reproduced (§563) and most recently (§564) with 
maximal feebleness, with the most possible earlier instances, [and which is 
now] accompanied by many different perceptions (§529), represented, 
however, most obscurely. Therefore [by contrast], the more numerous and the 
more feeble any [concurrent] sensation is, the more rarely instanced [a mental 
image may be], the longer the preceding time lapse, the stronger the 
accompanying and preceding perceptions, the truer, clearer and more certain 
in recall, the stronger it is (§219).
§566 The blunter or sharper a sensation is, by which sensation I experience an
object, the obscurer or clearer may be my mental image of the object (§562, 
540).
§567 I distinguish mental images from sensory experiences by 1) the level of clarity 
(§562), and 2) the extent to which earlier and current mental images are 
incompatible with sensory experiences (§298). Hence if  stronger mental 
images and weaker sensations occur together, as far as can be observed, with 
equal clarity, there remains at least one alternative way to discriminate 
between them, [namely their] differing circumstantial settings (§323). Against 
these factors it is apparent that [although there are two perceptions] they are 
not both sensory experiences; in the one I have a sensory experience in which
26patet, from pateo, intransitive verb: “be open, accessible, exposed, extend; be evident, known (Gem 
Latin Dictionary). The choice o f  “exposed” for direct sense experience would accord with his 
use of “veiled” for recalled mental images (§559).
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there is maximal interconnectedness and ties to associated sensations and to 
mental imagery, especially immediately preceding, and also those expected in 
the immediate future; by these perceptions I see clearly(§544). Therefore I 
know clearly that the other is not a sensation (§38, 67).
§568 A mental image is made more easily (§527) 1) if  the object imagined has been 
more clearly experienced by the senses (§562), 2) and repeatedly reproduced 
(§563), 3) [even if it is,] by intervals, increasingly feebly represented, 
provided that it always enjoys the [renewing] light of novelty (§549);4) and 
that [the mental image of the object is] not from too long ago (§564); 5) and 
that it is followed by other more feeble mental images 6) which are combined 
with heterogeneous perceptions (§516, 549), themselves accompanied either 
by nothing or by not very clear heterogeneous sensations (562), 7) followed in 
turn by combined representations, which group o f mental images recur 
repeatedly (§561).
§56927 A mental image is impeded 1) if  the [bodily] sensation of the object is only a 
little inhibited or absolutely not inhibited, according to §543; this will 2) 
especially inhibit the recalling o f the mental image, above all if  the mental 
image is 3) interrupted by weaker perceptions, when it had already been 
obscured through extended continuance (§550); 4) the same hindrance of 
recall permits very lively thinking (§564) when 5) these follow stronger 
perceptions or 6) there are gathered such combined heterogeneous sensations 
or mental images or perceptions, whether singly or bound together (§542), and 
when these 7) are never or only rarely in a small degree, or absolutely not 
bound together with the object o f the mental image (§561, 221).
§570 As in all sensations there will be some obscure elements (§544), and the
mental image will always be less clear than the sensation itself (§562); even in 
distinct mental images there will be confusion, and all mental images are 
sensory (§522), being formed by the lower cognitive faculty (§520). The 
science of imaginative thinking and the [outward] presentation of such 
thinking is the AESTHETIC o f the IMAGINATION.
§571 If in my imagination I represent what I have [previously] perceived through 
my senses, that which I visualise appears to be the truth (§546, 38), not VAIN 
FANTASY or false imaginings, even though they [the mental image and the 
sensory perception] are not both perceived with totally the same clarity (§558, 
562). The habit of conjuring up vain phantasms is UNBRIDLED FANTASY, 
a COMPULSION contrary to the practice of truthful imagining.
Section V: Insight
27 Schweizer makes this section more explicit by filling out the text with material from the other 
referenced sections, and in most places I have followed his lead here.
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§572 I perceive [both] the samenesses28 and the diversity of things. Therefore I have 
a faculty for perceiving the samenesses and diversities of things (§216). The 
first faculty is minimal, if  it is enough to visualise a single tiny sameness 
between two very strong and maximally identical perceptions against a 
background of very weak preceding perceptions and very feeble 
heterogeneous representations. Therefore, from the more numerous, from the 
least familiar, from the most diverse, from the more numerous, and the greater 
the sameness, hence the greater the congruity, equality, therefore also the 
greater the equality of ratios, or PROPORTIONS (similitudes)29, the stronger 
the interconnected, antecedent and heterogeneous perceptions, and the more 
clearly perceived, the more meaningful [or distinct] [a perception] is (§219). 
The habit of observing the samenesses o f things is WIT in the NARROWER 
SENSE30.
§573 The faculty perceiving the diversity o f things will be minimal, if  from among 
two of the strongest possible, maximally diverse perceptions it is able to 
perceive a single minimal [point of] diversity from among maximally weak 
antecedent, heterogeneous, interconnected and repeated perceptions.
Therefore, the more numerous, the less familiar, the most similar, the greater 
the diversity, and hence the greater the incongruity, inequality, that is the 
inequality in ratios or DISPROPORTIONALITY (dissimilarity), the more 
strongly [the faculty of diversity] represents, and the more meaningful [or 
distinct] the representation is (§219). The habit of observing the diversity of 
things is ACUMEN. Acuteness o f mind31 is PERSPICACIOUSNESS32.
§574 This is the law of the faculty o f penetrating perception of the samenesses of 
things, and hence of genius (§572): If a quality represented in object A is also 
present in object B, A and B correspond 3 (§38). This is the law o f the faculty 
of perceiving the diversities o f things, hence of acumen (§573). In a quality 
represented in A, but are inconsistent with B, A and B are perceived to be 
diverse (§38).
§575 I perceive the correspondences and the diversities of things; either I perceive 
distinctly, or sensorily (§521). Hence the faculties of perceiving 
correspondences or diversities, and indeed o f wit, acumen and perspicacity 
(§572,573); they are either sensory or intellectual (§402). The AESTHETICS
28 Identitates, translated by Schweizer as Ubereinstimmungen, or correnspondences. Baumgarten does 
not use the available, but weaker noun, similitudo  (similarity). I chose samenesses , because 
identiates seems to come from the stem idem, meaning “same”.
291 have added the parentheses, as the word similitudines is left hanging between commas, after 
PROPORTIONES.
30 Habitus identities rerum observandi est INGENIUM STRICTIUS DICTUM.
31 The word used here is ingenium, earlier translated by Schweizer as Witze ( wit ), the meaning a so
given by Mirbach for the word in §576. However, in this paragraph Schweizer translates it as
Geist (mind, intellect,spirit).
32 Schweizer paraphrases PERSPICACIA as “penetrating insight” (du durchdringender Einsicht)
33 Eadem, “are the same”, does not fit, so I agree with Schweizer here in using correspond . Per aps
in this translation all instances o f  “sameness” should be replaced with “correspondence .
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of PERSPICACITY is the part of aesthetics concerning witty and acute 
thinking and proposing34.
§576 As all things in this world are in part the same, in part different (§265, 269), 
representations of correspondences and differences in them, hence also the ? 
PLAY of WIT (creativity), i.e. thought dependent on wit, and SUBTLETIES, 
thought dependent on acumen, sharpened by the power of mental 
representations of the universe (§513). The play of false WIT is called 
ILLUSION and false subtlety is called INANE ARGUMENTATION.
§577 Now, the highest level of the mental faculties are skills35(§219) and the
frequent repetition of homogeneous actions or, in view of specific differences, 
similar actions, is PRACTICE; the habits36 of the mind are enriched through ’ 
practice (§162). Those HABITS o f the mind which do not depend upon 
practice are however INNATE (natural dispositions): those which are 
dependent upon practice are called ACQUIRED SKILLS, supernatural ones 
are called INSPIRATIONS, and those arising from the cognitive faculty are 
called THEORETICAL SKILLS.
§578 Acumen and wit in the strict sense, and hence perspicacity37 (§572, 573, are 
theoretical skills (§577, 519); the more pronounced these are as innate 
qualities, the easier they are to develop through practice (§577, 527). The 
same holds for the skills o f [bodily] sensing and imagining (§535, 558). 
Anyone notably lacking in wit, STUPID (of dull spirit), or in acumen, is 
BLUNT HEADED38. Anyone who is even more defective on either account, is 
a SILLY MAN . Since every error treats the false as the same as the true 
(§515) is an illusion40 of the faculty o f correspondences in [the way] it 
perceives things (§576, 572), [thus] impeding acumen (§573, 221). Hence 
errors are opportunities for astute thinking (§576, 323).
Section VI: Memory
§579 I can perceive in a reproduced41 representation, that which was once produced
[for the first time as a sensory experience] (§572, 559], i.e. I recognise it 
(recall it). Therefore I have the faculty o f recognising reproduced perceptions, 
or MEMORY (§216) and memory can be either sensory or intellectual (§575).
§580 The law of memory states: when many consecutive representations are
recalled in the present, and indeed some part of the preceding and following
34 ingeniose and proponendo both seem to require stronger English equivalents than “ingenious and
“proposing”. “O f Genius”, or “Sensory Expression” might have conveyed the meaning better, 
if rather grandiloquently.
35 habitus, translated by Schweizer as Fertigkeiten , in English, “skills”.
36 habitus, again.
37 perspicacia, translated by Schweizer as durchdringend Einsicht, in English, “piercing insight .
38 obtusum caput
39 Homo Bliteus
40 illusio, (“irony” in the Gem Latin dictionary) translated by Schwiezer as ein Versagen, in English, a
failure.
41 Reproductam, translated by Schweizer as erneuerten , in English, “renewed .
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(§572) representations share some o f the same content, then indeed, memory 
is triggered through the power o f the mind to represent the universe (6557 
576). * ’
§581 I ENTRUST to MEMORY these things being thus perceived, so they can be 
easily recognised one day. Henceforth these are reproduced repeatedly and 
more clearly, according to §557, 558, 549, 568 by attending to the 
correspondences and differences of the individual perceptions, deeply 
inscribed in memory.
§582 If a perception recurs, I am able either to recognise it clearly, then it is said to 
HOLD its MEMORY, or I cannot (§10) and I forget that object. Hence 
inability to recall a copy o f a perception is OBLIVION. In order to remember 
something I have forgotten, it CALLS to me SOMEWHAT IN MEMORY. [It 
is] through associated ideas that I somehow recall to myself a memory, i.e. I 
RECOLLECT. Therefore I have the faculty of recollecting, or [the power of] 
REMINISCENCE (§216).
§583 [The power of] reminiscence is memory (§582, 579), following this pattern: I 
remember through recollections42 which are mediated by ideas associated with 
perceptions (§580, 516). Recollection through ideas associated with place is 
LOCATION MEMORY and by ideas associated with time is 
SYNCHRONISM.
§584 A minimal memory would be when a single very small, very intense, very 
often repeated, very recently reproduced, very feeble memory is recognised. 
[Other factors causing a memory to be minimal include when it occurs] 
between very frequently repeated preceding and accompanying heterogeneous 
perceptions. Therefore, a more intensely recognised memory occurs when it is 
stronger, has more numerous [qualities], is more powerful, more frequent, and 
is more rarely reproduced43. [Other intensifying factors] which make a 
memory more significant [include] a longer period having elapsed of 
heterogeneous and very powerfully transacted perceptions (§564), stronger 
ties between antecedent, contemporaneous and heterogeneous perceptions 
(§219).
§585 A stronger44 memory is called GOOD and HAPPY, and in so far as it can
recognise many great things, it is called DIFFUSE (rich, vast) and in so far as 
it frequently is reproduced satisfactorily between strong antecedent and 
contemporaneous representations; FIRM, in so far as it can be satisfactorily 
recognised after a longer interval busy with very strong and heterogeneous 
perceptions; TENACIOUS, in so far as it is more rarely reproduced; 
CAPABLE, in so far as it is able to recognise the memory with greater
42 Reproductae, which elsewhere has been translated as reproductions or copies.
43 Schwiezer add schwacher, or “more weakly”, but there is no equivalent in the Latin, and it would be
inconsistent with the tenor o f  the section. This section comprises two very long sentences, 
both o f which have been broken into two.
44 maior, “greater” or “bigger”; does not seem to work in this context.
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intensity; LIVELY, in so far as it requires little work to be recalled as it is 
said, EASY.
§586 FORGETFULNESS is a sure sign o f a defective memory. An error dependent 
on memory is called a MEMORY LAPSE. Now, memory can place an earlier 
perception at the same level as a later perception which is not, however, the 
same [at all]. Therefore memory is LABILE, i.e. o f it, lapses are possible. 
Memory which is not very labile is FAITHFUL. Genius is not characterised 
by very reliable memory (§576) but acumen adds to its fidelity (§573).
§587 The complex of rules for perfecting the memory is the MNEMONIC ART. 
The mnemonic [art] of sensitive memories (§579) is the part of aesthetics 
(§533) prescribing the rules o f how to extend, confirm, conserve, excite, and 
increase the fidelity and truth of memory-recall (§586, 585).
§588 If an earlier mental image45 and a later sensation or perception treated as if at 
the same level, when they are not the same, a vain fantasy can arise (§571) 
through a lapse of memory (§586), from the fount of errors (§578); if  for the 
same reason (§586, 578) this is taken for a perception (§548), there arises a 
false sensory experience (§546, 545)
Section VII: Creativity
§589 I AM CREATIVE, combining and DIVIDING mental images i.e. to the extent 
that I attend to a part of several perceptions. Therefore I have a capacity of 
inventing (§216) POETRY46. Thus I combine many representations into a 
single unity, hence the faculty renders perceptible the correspondences 
between things (§572, 155); the imaginative faculty instantiates the 
representation of the universe (§557, 576), through the power of the mind.
§590 This is the law of the creative faculty: parts o f mental images are perceived as 
a single unity (§589). The perception thus engendered is a FICTION (a 
figment); the false ones are called CHIMERAS, empty fantasies (§571).
§59147 Consider the case where something which is disunited (§589) becomes
combined together, or that case where through creative invention, this [united] 
thing becomes separated, [and] through its destruction, the imagination is 
elevated, e.g. characteristics, and even being itself (§63), [and its] attributes 
(§64). Alternatively, consider that, from the created object, all chance 
compositions and relationships, or some o f them, become separated, unless
45 phantasma
46 POETICAM, by implication, other art forms, too.
47 In this section I have found both the Latin and the German rather impenetrable. The section
comprises a single very long sentence in both the Latin original and the German translation. 
The German translation includes interpolations from the earlier sections o f  the Metaphysica, 
also quoted in the footnotes o f  Schweizer’s translation, though they are absent from the Latin 
original for this section. Thus the German is perhaps less Delphic, and so I have decided to 
concentrate only on the German for the more opaque first section (up to the reference to §54, 
148). Thereafter, the Latin is just about comprehensible, and I work from that.
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other necessary compositions and relationships which make up an actual and 
individual thing (§54, 148) take their places, and that, nevertheless, the object 
of the creative activity will be presented as something unique and real (54, 
148). In all these cases chimeras (§590) will arise each time, in fact, through 
the failure of the faculty of recognising the correspondences o f things (§576, 
578). So also will empty phantasms arise (§590), which can be further 
strengthened (§588, 515) through a lapse o f memory following upon an 
illusion.
§592 The poetic faculty will be at its least, when two minimal yet very strong 
mental images are loosely bound together, or if just one tiny part o f a very 
strong mental image should be very slightly split off (§530, 589). Therefore, 
the more numerous, the greater, the less strongly combined, the more 
numerous, the greater, the more numerous and the smaller the parts o f the 
mental images, and the more strongly split up, whichever one achieves the 
highest level of intensity, that is the more significant (§219, 590)48. A great 
poetic faculty is FERTILE (fecund), with an UNBRIDLED (extravagant, 
rhapsodic) tendency towards chimeras, and the defence against that could be 
called the ARCHITECHTONIC tendency. The MYTHIC AESTHETIC is the 
part of aesthetics for the thinking out and presentation of creative fictions.
§593 [When] sleeping, if I imagine clear mental images, I DREAM. The imaginings 
of a sleeping [person] are DREAMS SUBJECTIVELY TAKEN UP49 (§91), 
either true (§571), or false (§588, 591), or engendered through the nature of 
the mind according to §561, 574, 580, 583, 590, naturally, (§470), or [else] by 
unnatural mental processes, which are themselves preternatural. If not 
engendered by the natural universe, these will be supernatural (§474).
§594 [When] sleeping, fantasies are extremely unrestrained (§571) and the creative 
imagination is much more unbridled than when wide awake (§592). Dreams 
produce more vivid imagery and fictions which are not obscured by the very 
strong [impact of direct] sensory experience (§549). Those, who are 
accustomed for their dreams to be accompanied by observable movements of 
the external body, accompanying external sensations similar to the waking 
state, are SLEEPWALKERS. Therefore, those who experience imaginings 
while awake instead o f sensations, are FANTASISTS (visionaries, the 
inspired). Those who absolutely confuse [their visions] for sensations, are 
INSANE, such that INSANITY is the state o f wakeful mental imaginings in 
place of sensations, having the habitual confusion of sensations with 
imaginings.
Section VIII: Foresight
§595 I am conscious of my state, hence o f the future state o f the world (§369). This 
representation and the state o f the world and o f my own future state is
am not at all sure I have understood this paragraph. This is a tentative offering o f  a trans ation.
49 sumpta, neuter plural past participle o f  sumo, I take, take up, assume arrogate, un erta e, put on, 
exact (Collins Gem Latin Dictionary)
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FORESIGHT. I foresee, hence I have the faculty of foreseeing (§216)50 
instantiated by the representative power o f the mind [to show] the universe 
according to the position o f my body (§513).
§596 The law of foresight is: when a sensation and a mental image are perceived, 
the common parts o f the sensation and o f the mental image produce a to ta l? 
perception of the future state o f affairs, in which the diverse parts [contributed 
by ] sensation and imagination are conjoined: i.e. the future is bom from the 
present impregnated by the past.
§597 Whenever I represent [a state o f affairs], and hence foresee [another state o f 
affairs] according to the position o f my body (§512), it is true that that which I 
sense externally is nearer to my body that that which I can foresee, some day 
at last to be sensed (§535). This is why I can experience the present state o f 
affairs more clearly and powerfully [than that which I can merely foresee] 
(§529). While present physical sensations co-exist with the [the predictions of 
foresight], the former still obscure the latter (§542); I can foresee nothing as 
clearly as I can sense it, but accordingly however, the level o f clarity o f 
foresight depends upon the level o f clarity o f future sensation (§596).
§598 That which I sense frequently, that I have often imagined, that will I foresee 
more clearly than that which I have more rarely seen and imagined (§563,
596). The mental images o f something just sensed are the strongest (§542,
558). Hence, they are even stronger than the visions of the future, which have 
not yet been sensed strongly (§597) but rather are obscured by more energetic 
sensory experiences (§529). However, a foresight o f an instance in the near 
future might be clearer than the foresight o f an instance in the remote future 
(§597). In that case, furthermore, the nearer vision o f the future will obscure 
the remoter vision, and the darkness o f  the remoter vision will [by contrast] 
illuminate the nearer vision o f the future (§549). Therefore, o f two equally 
clear [future] experiences, I can foresee the nearer instant more clearly than 
the remoter one (§549).
§599 The least ability to foresee the future is when a single very powerful and very 
proximal sensation (§597, 598), very frequently sensed and reproduced in the 
imagination, with maximal feebleness between associated and preceding 
heterogeneous perceptions is nevertheless very weakly imagined (§595). 
Therefore, the weaker the sensations, the more remote and the rarer the recall 
of either their sensory experience or their imagining, the stronger both 
previous and associated perceptions are, the stronger [the ties] between 
previous and associated perceptions, and the more strongly it is represented, 
the greater is the faculty o f foresight (§219).
§600 The blunter or sharper the senses are, so accordingly, in part, I already foresee 
sensorily; the weaker or stronger are the mental images with which I foresee 
(§565), the more obscure or the clearer will be the foresight (§596).
* This number appears to be a misprint as this clause does not appear to relate to the theme o f  §216 in 
Dr. John Hymers’ English translation:
http://hymers.eu/dr_hymers/research_baumgarten_translation.htm
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§601 I distinguish foresight from sensation and imagination because o f 1) the level 
of clarity, which [in foresight] is inferior to both sensation and imagination 
(§597, 598), and 2) the impossibility o f the coexistence of the past state of 
affairs and the present. But if  foresight were stronger, and imagination or even 
sensation were weaker, so that, as far as could be observed, [foresight were of] 
equal [strength to the others], they could however be distinguished according 
to the their characteristics (§67). Furthermore, if  I know the circumstances, 
those which are not sensations according to §567, that which is not clear I 
know to be a mental image (§38), that integrated with previous and following 
mental images, furthermore intermeshed with interconnected sensations (§557, 
357) and which could not simultaneously be sensed (§377).
§602 Foresight is facilitated (§527) if  the instance o f it 1) is more clearly sensed 
(§597), 2) if it is for the most part already sensed 3) and recalled in the 
imagination (§598), 4) when it is something already often foreseen (§563) and 
if it 5) becomes feebler by intervals, unless always enjoying the light of 
novelty (§549), 6) not so very long after being actually experienced (§598), 7) 
having feeble previous and associated heterogeneous perceptions, hence [if the 
foresight follows] feeble or nonexistent or not at all clear sensations and 
mental images, 8) but on the contrary if  the foresight is followed and 
accompanied by stronger mental images just like sensations, whose partial 
perceptions are shared with the [acts of] foresight (§596, 597).
§603 Foresight is impeded, if  1) a future sensation should impede [an instance of] 
foresight §543, 2) a powerful present sensation [should occur] partly with an 
[instance of] foresight, 3) if  mental images, following §569, 4) [cause 
instances of] foresight to be primarily impeded especially if  5) interrupted by 
weaker perceptions which are themselves continually obscured (§550), 6)
[with] procrastination o f the foresight (§598), 7) having stronger previous and 
associated heterogeneous mental images and sensations, 8 but on the other 
hand, it becomes more feeble, when [the act of] foresight shares common 
perceptions (§602, 221).
§604 Since in all sensations (§544) and imagination there is something o f the
obscure (§570) and foresight is less clear than the same thing [as a] sensation 
or [as an] imagined mental image (§597, 598), so [instances of] foresight even 
though distinct are very mixed together with confusion and obscurity. All my 
foresight is sensory(§522), realised by the faculty of lower cognition (§520), 
whose thoughts and propositions guide soothsaying (§350), [which] is a part 
of aesthetics (§533).
§605 If foresight should [happen to] agree with sensation, [such] instances of
foresight are truthful, or PRE-SENSATIONS. They are not o f the same, nor 
do they offer equally clear perceptions as sensations do. If a pre-sensation 
were [actually] to be sensed, [it would be] a FULFILLED FORESIGHT, n 
unfulfilled foresight is FALSE, a fountain o f practical errors (§578).
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Section IX: Judgment.
§606 I perceive the perfection and imperfection of things, i.e. I JUDGE51. Therefore 
I have the faculty of judgment52 (§216). The least judgment would be a unique 
minimally strong perception of a unique minimally perfect or imperfect object, 
maximally feeble among previous heterogeneous perceptions and loosely 
associated representations. Therefore, the more numerous, the more perfect or 
imperfect, the more strongly associated with previous heterogeneous 
perceptions, the more strongly the faculty of judgment is represented and the 
more significant it is (§219). The practice o f making judgments is: 
DISCERNMENT; that of foresight is called PRACTICE, that of others is 
called THEORY, and in so far as perceptions are still obscure, [judgment] 
does however reveal many perfections and imperfections; it is 
PENETRATING.
§607 The law of the faculty of judgment is: by perceiving the variety of things or 
their congruence or their disharmony, we can perceive either their perfection 
or their imperfection (§94, 121). As these may be achieved either distinctly or 
indistinctly, the faculty o f judgment, and hence also discernment, is either 
sensory or intellectual (§402, 521). Sensory discernment is TASTE in 
theWIDER SENSE (taste, palate, nose). CRITICISM BROADLY SPEAKING 
is the art o f discriminating. Hence the art o f developing [good] taste or sensory 
discernment and of expounding one’s judgment is AESTHETIC CRITICISM 
(§533). He who enjoys intellectual judgment is a CRITIC in the WIDER 
SENSE, whence CRITICISM in the GENERAL SENSE is the science o f the 
rules o f perfection or imperfection in judging distinctly.
§608 Taste in the broad sense o f SENSUALITY, i.e. that which is sensed, is the
JUDGMENT OF THE SENSES, and to that sense organ is assigned the means 
by which a judgment is to be sensed. From this are given the judgments of the 
eyes, the ears etc. Just as all these faculties o f judgment are actuated by the 
power o f the mind in representing the universe (§513), so everything in this 
world is in part perfect and in part imperfect (§250, 354). False judgments are 
ECLIPSED JUDGMENTS. Faculties o f judgment prone to eclipsed judgments 
are called HASTY JUDGMENTS. Such is CORRUPT TASTE. The practice 
o f caution against eclipsed JUDGMENT is one’s MATURITY. Such taste is 
UNCOMMON REFINEMENT (purer, more erudite); only a minority, 
however, can detect congruence or disharmony in making discriminations both 
perspicacious and DELICATE. Eclipsed judgments of sense are fallacious 
o n e s(§545)
§609 The higher the innate quality o f the following are, the more easily can they be 
developed through practice (§577, 606): memory (§579), ease of reminiscence 
(§582), creativity (§589), and the skill o f foresight (§595).
51 diiudico, the meaning o f  which, however, is given in the Collings Latin Gem Dictionary as “decide,
discriminate”; the Latin for “to judge” is given as iudicare..
52 diuicandi, perhaps more accurately translated as “discriminating”, see note 43, above.
312
Section X: Foreboding
§610 He who has a foresight contemporaneously with a perception, has a
FORBODING of something, therefore he has the faculty of foreboding or of 
fORBODING in the BROAD SENSE. Perceptions activated through such 
forebodings are PREDICTING BROADLY SPEAKING, either sensory or 
intellectual (§402, 521). PREDICTIONS STRICTLY SPEAKING and 
FOREBODING are more exclusively53 sensory. Sensory forebodings are 
instances o f aesthetic soothsaying (§604).
§611 I he law ol loreboding is this: If in a series o f successive perceptions, a present 
perception is represented [with qualities] partially in common with earlier 
perceptions, this shared partial representation forms the content o f the former 
and latter perceptions (§572). Therefore, granted that one has memory and 
imagination: so will one have foreboding and foresight (§579).
§612 Sensitive foreboding is the EXPECTATION of SIMILAR CAUSES, o f which 
this is the rule: either I sense or I imagine or I foresee A, which has much in 
common with the other foresight B; hence B represents the same future as A. 
He whose mind has a foreboding [engendered by] previous associated ideas, 
when earlier he had no foreboding, now ANTICIPATES, hence he has the 
faculty o f anticipation (§216), which it owes to foreboding as it does to 
reminiscence and memory (§582, 610).
§613 The faculty o f anticipation is foreknowledge whose rule is the following: The 
mind foreknows what is foreseen by the mediation of associated perceived 
ideas.
§614 A minimal instance o f foreboding would be, when a unique, minimal, very
strong, very frequently and recently foreseen [object] with maximal feebleness 
is at least perceived, between previous and associated heterogeneous and 
loosely connected perceptions (§610, 161).
§615 The more numerous, the greater, the rarer, the more weakly seen previously, 
the longer the time which has elapsed, completed with other very powerful 
perceptions (§564), the more powerfully it is enmeshed with previous and 
associated heterogeneous [perceptions], the stronger the perceived 
foreknowledge, the greater this is (§219), and the less work is required by [the 
faculty of] anticipation.
§616 A notable skill o f foreknowledge is the FACULTY OF DIVINING, whether 
natural or innate or acquired or inspired (§577). The last is the GIFT OF 
PROPHECY. Foreknowledge from the gift o f divining is DIVINATION; this 
from the gift o f prophecy is SOOTHSAYING54 (prophesying).
§617 Errors flowing from soothsaying are VAIN FOREKNOWLEDGE, false 
foresights with illusory truthfulness, the faculty of perceiving congruences 
confusedly (§578, 605). If anything is foreknown to me, the expectations are
53 tantum , “to such an extent”; Schweizer translates this as “im engeren Sinne”, in a narrower sense.
54 VATICINIUM , related to vates, “prophet” and vaticinio , “prophesying”.
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caused by similarities (§612), anticipations (§613), activated through the force 
of mind [by which] I have made my representation of the universe (§595,
§618 II an instance o f foresight with some other preceding sensation or mental
image or some other piece o f foresight taken to be of the same consequence, 
which it is not, there arises an instance of deceptive foresight (§605) through 
empty foreknowledge (§617, 576).
Section XI: The Faculty of Sign Use.
§619 I perceive [as] one the sign and the signified; therefore I have the faculty o f 
representing the sign and the signified [as] conjoined, which could be called 
the FACULTY OF SIGN USE (§216). Flowever, there is in this world a nexus 
o f signification (§358); the perceptions o f this faculty of sign use are activated 
by the power o f the mind to represent the universe (§513). The nexus of 
signification may be known either distinctly, or indistinctly, hence the faculty 
o f sign use will be either sensory (§512) or intellectual (§402).
§620 If the sign and the signed are perceived [as] conjoined and I perceive the sign
as more significant than the signified, the COGNITION could be called 
SYMBOLIC; if the signed is represented as more significant than the sign, the 
COGNITION will be REVEALING55 (looked at). In both forms o f the 
semiotic capacity, this is the law: among interconnected perceptions, the one 
form becomes the medium for knowing the existence of the other (§347).
§621 Suppose that, through a trick o f the faculty o f the correspondences o f things, I
take for a sign, that which is not [a sign], and for the signified [also,] that 
which is not (§576). There thus arises a false symbolic and revealed cognition. 
Suppose in the same way I take for a prognostication that which is not such, 
there will be bom false seeming foresights, forebodings and anticipations, 
multiply corroborated (§605, 515).
§622 The faculty o f sign use will be least, when a single, minimal sign is very
loosely associated with a single minimal signified, maximally feeble and 
amongst previous and associated heterogeneous perceptions. Therefore, the 
more numerous [the qualities], the stronger the signified, the more numerous 
and more significant the signified [objects] are, the more strongly enmeshed 
among previous and heterogeneous perceptions, the more strongly it conjoins 
the capacity to use signs, [and hence] the more significant56 it is (§219). The 
science o f sensorily knowing concerned with such propositions is the 
AESTHETICS o f SIGN USE, as much heuristics as hermeneutics (§349). The 
sign use o f oratory is PHILOLOGY (grammar, broadly speaking), which, 
when teaching what many individual languages have in common, is
55INTUITIVA, which Schweizer translates as anschauend, which might be translated as “visualised” or 
“contemplated”. Intuitiva derives from intueor, past participle intuitus: “look at, watch, 
contemplate, consider, admire”. Mirbach {Op. Cit.) (2007) translates cognitio intuitus as ein 
anschauendes Erkennntnis: “an examined cognition” (p. 1128).
56 Once more I follow Schweizer in translating m aior as significant (bedeutend).
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GENERAL57 philology. The general rules for teaching philology are I) 
observ ing the vocabulary used in all orations, a part of which 1) is 
ORTHOGRAPHY BROADLY SPEAKING, 2) modulation, is 
EI YMOLOGY (analogy), 3) cohesion or construction is SYNTAX, 4) 
quantity , PROSODY. The [means of] binding together o f these disciplines is 
GRAMMAR (strictly speaking). 5) [The studyl of meanings, is LEXIS 
(lexicography), 6) o f writing, is LETTERING5 . II) The special [rules for 
teaching philology] are e.g. ELOQUENCE or perfection in sensory speech, 
namely, 1) as generally considered, ORATORY60, 2) and, more specially 
[considered], [would be] either the loose [form] of RHETORIC, or [the] 
restricted [form] of POETRY. These disciplines, with their individual 
daughters, as far as they demonstrate the many rules common to particular 
languages, are UNIVERSAL.
§623 As the external sensations o f the sleeping person are not clear (§556), sleep
furthermore will be of feebler mental images more suitable to sensorily seeing 
into the future than the waking state (§598, 539). The network o f rules for 
extracting, from dreams, visions o f the future and foreknowledge, is the ART 
of INTERPRETING DREAMS61
57 UNIVERSALIS, translated by Schweizer as der allgeeinen Philologie, a formula which 1 have
followed.
58 i.e. length o f  syllables for scansion
59 GRAPHICE, which Schweizer translates as die Graphik.
60 ORATORIA, which Schweizer translates as Redenkunst, “the art o f  [public] speaking”.
61 ONIROCRITICA. I have relied on context and Schweizer, who translates this as die Kunst der
Traumdeutung.
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Plate 1 Artworks that tease the viewer.
a) Marcel Duchamp The Bride Strippd Bare by her Bachelors Even (The Green Box) (1934) 
Felt covered cardboard box containing one colour plate and ninety-four paper elements.
( http://www.tate.org.uk/servlet/ViewWork? 
cgroupid=999999961 &workid=66623&searchid=9637 )
b) Marcel Duchamp Bicycle Wheel (1913)
This is a replica o f  the first ‘readymade’
(http://www.tc.umn.edu/~rozaiOO 1/1017/images/duchamp2.jpg)
c) Signed: “from Marcel Duchamp” In Advance o f  the Broken Arm (1915)
This is a replica o f the first American ‘readymade’
( http://www.marcelduchamp.net/images/ln Advance_of_the_Broken_Arm.jpg)
d) Julian Opie H (1987)
This looks like a wall heater, and plays on the gallery-goer’s ‘ontological’ problem of 
addressing their ‘aesthetic attitudes’ only to artworks, to avoid the embarrassment o f  
being seen bestowing the same level o f  loving attention to fixtures and fittings. Too 
cautious a visitor would overlook this sculpture completely.
( http://www.tate.org.uk/servlet/ViewWork? 
ceroupid=999999961 &workid=20363&searchid=9613 )
a) b) c)
Plate 2 A 200-year dialogue o f objects
a) Donatello David { 1430-32) National Museum, Florence.
(H. W. Janson (1962) A History o f  Art, London, Thames and Hudson, fig. 481, p. 312)
b) Michelangelo D a vid (1501 -4) Academy, Florence.
(Same source as a), fig. 534, p. 357)
c) Bernini David ( 1623) Marble, Borghese Gallery, Rome.
(Same source as a) and b), fig. 609, p. 408)
Plate 3 Baby aged 3 weeks enraptured by the visual array of her “ baby gym ”.
Concentrating on the 'L ’ (left) A i f j E V
c t  «  'creates activity in the right
D hemisphere (A) while attending I  m )  .  *  £D to the 'Os' causes activity in £  j r  9 £  TD the Ifft (B). These scans demon­
D strate how the two sides o f  the c * .
D brain deal with different aspects ™  V W  XDDDDD o f  a single stimulus.
a)
b)
Plate 4 The ‘feeling’ of ‘Right Brain’ activity
a) From Rita Carter Mapping the Mind, p. 39.
b) From Betty Edwards, p. 22.
Japanese woodcuts by Torii Kiyonobu (active 1723-1750).
In order to help students become more aware o f the quality o f “right brain” thinking, Betty 
Edwards writes:
“Line expresses two different kinds o f dances in the two Japanese prints.
Try to visualise each dance. Can you hear the music in your imagination?”
cj%c>.n)ih.
Plate 5 Chardin The Draughtsman (ca. 1734)
Oil on wood
Kimbell Art Museum, Forth Worth, Texas
(From (2000) Chardin catalogue, Royal Academy, London, pi. 37, p. 198)
Plate 6 Leonardo da Vinci, Drapery Study, Windsor, Royal Library.
According to Cecil Gould, this is a study for the angel in the London version 
o f  the Virgin o f  the Rocks, from the 1490’s.
(From Cecil Gould (1975) Leonardo: the Artist and the Non-Artist, London, 
Weidenfield and Nicholson, Plate V.)
Plate 7 C opying P icasso’s draw ing o f  Stravinsky
a) Pablo Picasso Portrait o f  Igor Stravinsky, illustration 4-9 in Betty Edwards.
Shown upside-down in the text book, to discourage verbal (left brain) thinking and 
encourage visual (right brain) thinking.
b) Examples o f  student drawings:
Left,
Top
&
Bottom: Pre-course drawings by 
adult students A and B, 
showing schematic forms o f  
verbal/conceptually driven 
“childish” drawing.
Top
Right: Copy o f  Picasso’s Stravinsky,
copied “the right way up”, 
showing clear evidence o f  
continuing verbal-conceptual 
(left-brain) thinking.
Bottom
Right: Copy o f  Picasso’s Stravinsky,
copied “upside -dow n”, 
showing evidence o f  
decreased verbal-conceptual 
and increased visual thinking.
Student B
a)
b)
Plate 8 Seeing ‘negative spaces’
a) Illustration to assist students to reify “negative spaces” (from Betty Edwards (1979) Drawing on 
the Right Side o f  the Brain (1993 UK paperback edition) London, Harper Collins, (Fig. 7-19,
p. 108, each space marked by an “x”, added by me).
b) Fra Angelico, The Annunciation, ca. 1440-50, Fresco, San Marco, Florence.
This picture is characterised by the beauty and harmony o f its negative spaces, particularly 
in the architecture. Note the expressive placement o f  the haloes within the main arches, 
giving the angel dynamic movement, and calmness to the Virgin Mary.
(from H. W. Janson, (1962) A History ofArt: a survey o f  the visual arts from the dawn o f  history 
to the present day, London, Thames and Hudson., Fig. 497, p. 326)
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b)
Plate 9 Eye fixations o f artist and novice
a) Graph of eye fixations during a 1-minute portrait drawing 
Black: Artist Humphrey Ocean (mean time per fixation, I second)
Red: Similar data for novice artists (mean time per fixation, 0.5 seconds)
From the “Eye Movements in Portrait Drawing” project at Camberwell College o f Art. 
(Fig. 11 o f  the web report posted in 2001 at: 
http://www.arts.ac.uk/research/drawing_cognition/portrait.htm)
b) Portrait o f  Nick, Humphrey Ocean, pencil on paper, 79.5 x 59.5cm. 1998.
(Fig. 12 from the same web report as above.)
Plate 10 Jasper Johns The Critic Sees, (1964) sculpmetal over plastic with glass.
Lent by the artist, Philadelphia Museum of Art.
(http://www.nga.gov/feature/artnation/johns/interpretation_2a.htm)
C)
Plate 11 Priority of Form demonstrated in work of 'extreme colourists’. 
Joseph Albers 1888-1976
a) Study fo r  Homage to the Square, 1963. Painting.
b) White Line Square IV, 1966. Painting.
Mark Rothko 1903-70
c) Red on Maroon, 1959. Painting.
(Images from the Tate website)
b)
Plate 12
a) Earthrise (1968)
Photograph taken by an unidentified astronaut on Apollo 8.
(from the NASA website)
b) Polar Bear in Northern Alaska
Photograph on Daily Mail website from a story by Barry Wigmore 
on 9th September 2007, “Most polar bears ‘will be wiped out by the 
end o f the century’.”
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/pages/live/articles/news/news.html?
a)
b)
Plate 13 The Aesthetic as Evolutionary Driver
a) Peppered Moths
Pictures o f the two famous varieties o f peppered moths, whose change from a 
predominantly light population to predominantly dark, and back, was documented 
in the industrial revolution, and since. (en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peppered_moth)
b) The Heike (Samurai) Crab
The Heike crab is considered sacred and never eaten. Japanese crab fishermen 
throw them back into the sea, as they resemble the faces o f samurai warriors who 
threw themselves into the sea in 1185, in a mass suicide, after defeat in a naval battle. 
(From the website: http://forums.egullet.org/index.php? 
s=69f5e47192f6233e77c9ece34a8e5e45&showtopic=28569)
r
Plate 14. Two Bowerbird bowers
a) The Orange-Crested Striped Gardener Bowerbird
(Plate II from Ernst Gombrich (1979; 1984 edn.) The Sense o f  Order, London, Phaidon)
b) The display ground o f  the Stagemaker
(Plate 25 from A. J. Marshall (1954)MARSHALL, A.J. (1954) Bower-birds: their displays 
and breeding cycles, Oxford, Clarendon Press.)
a)
c)
Plate 15 Sensitivity of Paramaecium  to its environment
a) Avoidance o f obstacle.
(From Ralph Buchsbaum Animals Without Backbones, p. 38)
b) Movement to preferred temperature range, but “trial and error” exploration.
(From same source as a) above, p. 39)
c) The beating o f the cilia in the oral groove draws a plume o f water, allowing Paramaecium 
to “sample” conditions ahead and either to take avoiding action or to follow the trail,
e.g to a food source. (From same source as a) and b) above, p. 40)
a v o h m n o  r e a c t i o n .  I ,  p a r a m e c i u m  
encounters an obstacle. 2, the animal 
backs. 3, shifts its position. 4, again 
meets resistance. 5. 6, backs a n d  turns. 
7, finds a free p a t h .  (Based on Jennings.)
b)
L, 2 o C -------------------26°---------------------- 36« C J
BEHAVIOUR IN RELATION TO TEMPERATURE. When 
the tem perature is uniform  throughout the tank, 
the param ecia are uniform ly distributed. I f  one 
end o f  the tank is cooled to  12°C. and  the other 
end Is heated to  36°C., the param ecia avoid the 
extremes o f  tem perature and accum ulate in the 
region o f optim um  (m ost favourable) tempera 
ture. (After M endelssohn.)
carbon particles
PARA M ECIU M  ‘ SA M PL E S’ TH E W A T E R  A HEAD , RS CAJ1
be seen by placing in the path of the animal a drop 
of Indian ink containing visible particles. (After 
Jennings.)
b)
Plate 16 Key evolutionary moments: sex and vision
a) Paramaecium “conjugation”
These unicellular organisms supplement simple cell division with an early form o f sexual 
reproduction, with a direct exchange o f the some of the DNA in their chromosomal 
“microneuclei”. It is assumed that sexual reproduction “accelerated” the process o f evolution, 
by rapidly increasing variability. This image comes from the Clinton Community 
College website by Googling ‘paramecium’ and ‘images’.
b) The Trilobite, which evolved the first eyes known to science. The bar is 5mm long.
(http://upload.wikimedia.Org/wikipedia/commons/e/ea/PhacopidDevonian.jpg )
> ________________________
Plate 17: Warning signs and mimicry
a) Wasps and many other stinging or otherwise poisonous animals have evolved yellow and 
black patterning, which renders them conspicuous. This is probably because potential 
predators learned to leave them alone, so they had less need for camouflage, eventually 
benefiting from the immunity conferred by their livery. Image from www.preston.gov.uk
b) The harmless hoverfly has achieved immunity in the wake o f the wasp’s reputation, as 
potential predators did not want to risk eating them, for fear o f being stung.
http://images.google.eom/imgres7imgurHhttp://piccies.flybywire.org.uk/
General/20040612/20040617/Hoverfly.jpg&imgrefurl=http://piccies.flyby wire.org.uk/General/ 
index20040612.
html&h=640& w=480&sz=40&hl=en&start= 1 &um= 1 &usg= s W9L W U10o4 AKKaOrsAcnFh V
9Z20=&tbnid=TNNo5Qe5fUFfzM:&tbnh=137&tbnw=103&prev=/images%3Fq%3Dhoverfly% 
26um%3D 1 %26hl%3Den%26rls%3DGGGL,GGGL:2006-31 ,GGG L:en%26sa%3 DN
c) An orchid mantis waiting in an orchid for its prey to arrive.
(from David Attenborough (2005) Life in the Undergrowth, London, BBC, p. 175)
Plate 18 Selective aesthetic pressures on our apple tree
a) May.
The selective pressure o f pollinators’ perceptual abilities and appetites shaped
the evolution o f apple blossom.
b) September; two Gestalt factors are at work here:
1) “pop-out” colour, for frugivores with colour vision, and
2) grouping according to colour and shape. The perceptual systems o f the 
fruit consumers provided a selective pressure on fruit-bearing plants, 
which disperse their seeds in this way, to develop these characteristics, 
in addition to a sugary pulp and fragrant smell.
Plate 19 Sexual ornaments leading to extreme dimorphism
a) Humming-birds Spathura uttderwoodi
Comparison of male (right) and female (left). From Descent o f  Man, 
2nd Edition, p. 388.
b) Beetles Chiasognathus grantii
Comparison of mouthparts, male (above) and female (below). From 
Descent o f  Man, 2nd Edition p. 301.
Plate 20 Dolphins at Durban surfing competition
(The Guardian, Travel Section, Saturday 29th April 2006, p. 16)
b)
Plate 21 Examples of RamachandraiTs “ Laws” at work
a) The “ Peak Shift Principle”, identified by Ramachandran with the Sanskrit term, “rasa”.
Plate 4 from “Art and the Brain”, a special feature in Journal o f  Consciousness Studies (1999) 
Vol. 6; no. 6-7) The caption reads:
"A Celestial Nymph— the rasa o f  feminine perfection. (Mathura, 800 A.D.). Notice the 
clever use o f  abdominal creases and dimples produced by subcutaneous fa t—a feminine 
secondary sexual characteristic. (Replica in Ramachandran Collection.) ”
b) The “ Isolation Principle” (Plate 12 from the same source as a), above)
Horses drawn by Nadia, an autistic savant, aged 3 years and 5 months. Two forms o f isolation 
are at work: 1) the “island intelligence” o f the autistic child
2) restriction o f the image to line.
A  •
b)
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Plate 22 G om brich: “ break spotter” and “extrapolator”; Gestalt vs Information Theory.
a) Records o f  eye fixations (G. T. Buswell, 1935); From Gombrich Sense o f  Order (1984 Edn.)
fig. 132, p. 122. The “break spotter” examines the boundary; the “extrapolator” ignores the 
un-broken length o f  the column, which has been shortened to save paper in a book o f  
architectural diagrams.
b) “D evil’s Tuning Fork” from Gombrich Sense o f  Order {1984 Edn.) fig. 133, p. 124.
i. “Break spotter” fooled by “extrapolator” generalising from either end without checking 
continuous area.
ii. Making a break, and reducing the distance apart, removes most o f  the illusion
iii. Bringing both ends together gives the “extrapolator” no role; the “break detector” works.
c) Comparison o f  the explanatory power o f  Gestalt vs Information Theory
From Gombrich Sense o f  Order (1984 Edn.) fig. 130, a and b, p. 121.
i. The principle o f  simplicity in Gestalt Theory successfully explains a certain level o f  simplicity 
achieved by visually grouping the circles and triangles. However, the design is still restless, 
and Gombrich says that the best explanation for this comes from information theory. All the 
different “breaks” leave the “break detector” unable to resolve the arrangement into an 
orderly pattern.
ii. Grouping the same ten circles and ten triangles produces a simple arrangement which carries 
much less information, and settles quickly into a restful, but more boring, Gestalt.
Plate 23.‘Top-down’ information affecting vision.
a) The Rhine at Rheinfelden (1992) P. Bilon
This view o f the Rhine from Haus Salmegg, the Rheinfelden municipal museum and 
gallery, was painted by a visiting Russian Artist. The painting was hanging in the 
municipal visitors’ flat. I thought the handling o f the water was ‘crude’ before 
I had seen the current at high-water level for myself the next morning.
b) View from the balcony o f Haus Salmegg, with the river at a high level, on 3rd 
September, 2005. In the painting the water level looks about a meter higher, as the 
vertical pier is completely submerged.
a)
Plate 24 Perceiving unity: from challenge and pleasure to frustration or boredom
a) Crazy paving
(from Ernst Gombrich (1979; 1984 edn.) The Sense o f  Order, London, Phaidon, Fig. 6, p. 8.)
b) Regular paving (source, as a) above)
c) Gestalt “Aha!” moment o f  resolving apparent chaos.
(from V.S. Ramachandran and William Hirstein (1999) “The Science o f  Art” in the Journal o f  
Consciousness Studies (Vol. 6, No. 6-7) pp. 15-51, p. 21)
Plate 25 German cheesecake and other homemade gateaux for a wedding in Wales.
The parents o f  the German groom contributed both still and sparkling wine from 
their region, Rheinland-Pfalz, and homemade cakes from traditional German 
recipes. These conveyed messages o f goodwill, cultural diplomacy and tangible 
tokens o f  the donors’ personal worth.
